In juxtaposition with the myth and tragedy of Ovid’s Medea, this paper investigates the possibility within the Kantian conception of agency of understanding moral evil as acting against one’s better judgment. It defends the thesis that in Kant self-deception, i. e. the intentional untruthfulness to oneself, provides the fundamental structure for choosing against the moral law. I argue that, as Kant’s thought progresses, self-deception slowly proceeds to become the paradigmatic case of moral evil. This is discussed with regard to two (...) important topics in his later moral philosophy: the doctrine of radical evil and the crucial role of the duty of truthfulness in ethics. The inquiry into Kant’s theory of conscience unfolds both against this theoretical background and in light of its historical roots in the polemic against casuistry and probabilism. This contribution closes with a brief look at the tools Kant implements to counter this tendency to self-deception in moral judgment and particularly at the role casuistry plays within his conception of moral education. (shrink)

In this paper, in line with the general framework of value-sensitive design, we aim to operationalize the general concept of “Meaningful Human Control” in order to pave the way for its translation into more specific design requirements. In particular, we focus on the operationalization of the first of the two conditions investigated: the so-called ‘tracking’ condition. Our investigation is led in relation to one specific subcase of automated system: dual-mode driving systems. First, we connect and compare meaningful human control with (...) a concept of control very popular in engineering and traffic psychology, and we explain to what extent tracking resembles and differs from it. This will help clarifying the extent to which the idea of meaningful human control is connected to, but also goes beyond, current notions of control in engineering and psychology. Second, we take the systematic analysis of practical reasoning as traditionally presented in the philosophy of human action and we adapt it to offer a general framework where different types of reasons and agents are identified according to their relation to an automated system’s behaviour. This framework is meant to help explaining what reasons and what agents play a role in controlling a given system, thereby enabling policy makers to produce usable guidelines and engineers to design systems that properly respond to selected human reasons. In the final part, we discuss a practical example of how our framework could be employed in designing automated driving systems. (shrink)

Contemporary brain reading technologies promise to provide the possibility to decode and interpret mental states and processes. Brain reading could have numerous societally relevant implications. In particular, the private character of mind might be affected, generating ethical and legal concerns. This paper aims at equipping ethicists and policy makers with conceptual tools to support an evaluation of the potential applicability and the implications of current and near future brain reading technology. We start with clarifying the concepts of mind reading and (...) brain reading, and the different kinds of mental states that could in principle be read. Subsequently, we devise an evaluative framework that is composed of five criteria-accuracy, reliability, informativity, concealability and enforceability-aimed at enabling a clearer estimation of the degree to which brain reading might be realistically deployed in contexts where mental privacy could be at stake. While accuracy and reliability capture how well a certain method can access mental content, informativity indicates the relevance the obtainable data have for practical purposes. Concealability and enforceability are particularly important for the evaluation of concerns about potential violations of mental privacy and civil rights. The former concerns the degree with which a brain reading method can be concealed from an individual’s perception or awareness. The latter regards the extent to which a method can be used against somebody’s will. With the help of these criteria, stakeholders can orient themselves in the rapidly developing field of brain reading. (shrink)

We propose that sleep is linked to synaptic homeostasis. Specifically, we propose that: (1) Wakefulness is associated with synaptic potentiation in cortical circuits; (2) synaptic potentiation is tied to the homeostatic regulation of slow wave activity; (3) slow wave activity is associated with synaptic downscaling; and (4) synaptic downscaling is tied to several beneficial effects of sleep, including performance enhancement.

The capabilities approach is the theory according to which, in order to assess people's quality of life and reflect on the basic political entitlements, we should consider what people are capable of doing and being. Focusing mostly on Nussbaum's account, a number of scholars analysed the metaethical structure underlying the approach, showing her Aristotelian and Kantian sources. This article explores another aspect of Nussbaum's theory which has so far been somewhat overlooked: the role of emotions in the justification and motivational (...) support of the approach. After showing the importance Nussbaum places on compassion (and other benevolent emotions) to warrant her moral theory, I argue that – assuming her own cognitive account of compassion – her argument begs the question. I will then contend that Nussbaum's case does not have the inner tools to overcome such a circularity, trying to suggest, in conclusion, a possible way out which is consistent with it. (shrink)

Placebos are commonly defined as ineffective treatments. They are treatments that lack a known mechanism linking their properties to the properties of the condition on which treatment aims to intervene. Given this, the fact that placebos can have substantial therapeutic effects looks puzzling. The puzzle, we argue, arises from the relationship placebos present between culturally meaningful entities, our intentional relationship to the environment and bodily effects. How can a mere attitude toward a treatment result in appropriate bodily changes? We argue (...) that an ‘enactive’ conception of cognition accommodates and renders intelligible the phenomenon of placebo effects. Enactivism depicts an organism’s adaptive bodily processes, its intentional directedness, and the meaningful properties of its environment as co-emergent aspects of a single dynamic system. In doing so it provides an account of the interrelations between mind, body and world that demystifies placebo effects. (shrink)

A constructivisation of the cut-elimination proof for sequent calculi for classical, intuitionistic and minimal infinitary logics with geometric rules—given in earlier work by the second author—is presented. This is achieved through a procedure where the non-constructive transfinite induction on the commutative sum of ordinals is replaced by two instances of Brouwer’s Bar Induction. The proof of admissibility of the structural rules is made ordinal-free by introducing a new well-founded relation based on a notion of embeddability of derivations. Additionally, conservativity for (...) classical over intuitionistic/minimal logic for the seven (finitary) Glivenko sequent classes is here shown to hold also for the corresponding infinitary classes. (shrink)

Two problems about rights have received so far little attention. One is the problem of identifying a general value in the practice of rights. The second is to see when, if at all, rights violations wrong the right-holder, in a morally significant sense. In the present essay, I address the first question by investigating the second. I first show that if we commit to the two ideas, common in the contemporary philosophy of rights, that claim-rights always correlate with directed duties (...) and that rights aspire to protect interests of the right-holder, we make it hard to explain why rights violations, in general, wrong right-holders. In the final section, I present what I see as a promising solution to the puzzle. I describe a particular social environment (the society of equals) where interacting with others through rights is indeed valuable because respecting rights communicates that one takes seriously others’ equal moral status. In such a society and only in such a society, I conclude, moral agents are required to treat all rights violations as wrongs perpetrated against the right-holder. (shrink)

The target article misrepresents the foundations of integrated information theory and ignores many essential publications. It, thus, falls to this lead commentary to outline the axioms and postulates of IIT and correct major misconceptions. The commentary also explains why IIT starts from phenomenology and why it predicts that only select physical substrates can support consciousness. Finally, it highlights that IIT's account of experience – a cause–effect structure quantified by integrated information – has nothing to do with “information transfer.”.

In this paper, I assess critically the recent debate on corrective duties across moral and legal philosophy. Two prominent positions have emerged: the Kantian rights-based view (holding that what triggers corrections is a failure to respect others' right to freedom) and the so-called continuity view (correcting means attempting to do what one was supposed to do before). Neither position, I try to show, offers a satisfactory explanation of the ground (why correct?) and content (how to correct?) of corrective duties. In (...) the final section, I suggest that it is probably better to restrict the label “corrective duties” to duties generated by interpersonal wronging. (shrink)

This book shows how the Church Fathers, especially the Cappadocians in the 4th century, rethought Greek metaphysics, in particular relation, an extremely topical category. It offers a perspective to those who study philosophy, particularly in Late-Antiquity, and to those who study patristics and systematic theology.

The distinction between receptive field and conceptual field is appealing and heuristically useful. Conceptually, it is more satisfactory to distinguish between information from the environment and from the brain. We emphasize here a selectionist view that considers information transmission within the brain as modulated by a stimulus, rather than information transmission from a stimulus as modulated by the context.

The aim of the paper is to confront some challenges raised by intergenerational justice from the perspective of Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. After having sketched her account, the essay deals with some objections to it from an environmental perspective, arguing that, contrary to some critics, it can be a valuable basis for reflecting on our duties towards future generations. More precisely, I focus on how the CA provides promising insights to address two central problems of intergenerational ethics: 1) the so-called (...) ‘circumstances of justice;’ 2) the problem of the asymmetry between present and future generations. In both cases, I argue that the philosophical anthropology underlying the CA is better suited than the contractualist one to include future generations into the realm of justice and ground our motivation to care for them. After underlining the potential of the CA, in the concluding remarks I will underline a potential flaw of this theory, i.e. the lack of guidance when it comes to the trade-offs between our rights and well-being and those of the unborn. (shrink)

The extended mind thesis states that the mind is not brain-bound but extends into the physical world. The philosophical debate around the thesis has mostly focused on extension towards epistemic artefacts, treating the phenomenon as a special capacity of the human organism to recruit external physical resources to solve individual tasks. This paper argues that if the mind extends to artefacts in the pursuit of individual tasks, it extends to other humans in the pursuit of collective tasks. Mind extension to (...) other humans corresponds essentially to the ‘we-mode’ of cognition, the unique power of human minds to be jointly directed at goals, intentions, states of affairs, or values (which, importantly, differs from having a ‘group mind’). Because the capacity for collective intentionality holds evolutionary and developmental primacy over human-epistemic artefacts relations, the extended mind should not be seen as a special phenomenon, but as a central aspect of the human condition. The original extended mind thesis carried important implications for how the cognitive sciences should proceed. In a version of the thesis that accommodates collective intentionality, these implications would go far deeper than originally assumed. (shrink)

According to the beneficiary pays principle (BPP), following an injustice that has produced damages, agents that have received benefits from it may incur a duty to redress the victim even if they are not at fault for it. In this paper, I do not offer either a full-blown defense or a refutation of the principle. Instead, I take issue with the common view, accepted by both sympathetic and critical authors, according to which the BPP is a matter of corrective justice. (...) In the end, I am going to argue that the sole way of defending the BPP is as a principle of distributive justice. Far from a merely semantic dispute, the issue of whether the BPP is corrective or distributive is going to lead to significant normative implications regarding the sense in which we can meaningfully say that beneficiaries owe it to victims to redress the unfairness existing between them. (shrink)

I aspire to answer two questions regarding the concept of a corrective duty. The first concerns what it means to wrong others, thus triggering a demand for corrections (the ground question). The second relates to the proper content of corrective duties. I first illustrate how three prominent accounts of corrective duties—the Aristotelian model of correlativity, the Kantian idea that wronging corresponds to the violation of others’ right to freedom, and the more recent continuity view—have failed to answer the two questions (...) satisfactorily. I then introduce my proposal, which holds that we wrong others when we fail to treat their status as moral agents as a source of stringent constraints on our action. I call it the moral neglect account. Once we have identified a common aim of corrective duties (counterbalancing moral neglect), we can fill their content in the various contexts in which wronging has occurred. I conclude by observing that it is not the primary role of corrective justice to assign responsibilities for damage reparations; in fact, requests for compensation make more sense if framed in distributive rather than corrective terms. (shrink)

Glivenko’s theorem says that classical provability of a propositional formula entails intuitionistic provability of the double negation of that formula. This stood right at the beginning of the success story of negative translations, indeed mainly designed for converting classically derivable formulae into intuitionistically derivable ones. We now generalise this approach: simultaneously from double negation to an arbitrary nucleus; from provability in a calculus to an inductively generated abstract consequence relation; and from propositional logic to any set of objects whatsoever. In (...) particular, we give sharp criteria for the generalisation of classical logic to be a conservative extension of the one of intuitionistic logic with double negation. (shrink)

We propose a new integrative framework of external time monitoring in prospective memory (PM) tasks and its relation with performance. Starting from existing empirical regularities and our theoretical analysis, the framework predicts that external monitoring in PM tasks comprises a first stage of loose monitoring to keep track of the passage of time, and a subsequent stage of finer-grained monitoring, based on interval reduction, to meet the PM deadline. Following our framework, we predicted and observed in three different datasets (N (...) = 375): (1) a marked increase in external monitoring frequency in the final part of the period of the PM task, well captured by a proportional rate exponential growth function; (2) a positive association between individual compliance with this monitoring pattern and PM performance; (3) a positive relation between monitoring frequency in the time window immediately preceding the PM deadline and PM performance at the individual level; and (4) good individual compliance with an interval reduction pattern in external monitoring, especially in the time window closer to the PM deadline. These results support the proposed integrative framework, which has the potential to foster future research on external monitoring in PM and in other fields of cognitive science. (shrink)

The brains of higher mammals are extraordinary integrative devices. Signals from large numbers of functionally specialized groups of neurons distributed over many brain regions are integrated to generate a coherent, multimodal scene. Signals from the environment are integrated with ongoing, patterned neural activity that provides them with a meaningful context. We review recent advances in neurophysiology and neuroimaging that are beginning to reveal the neural mechanisms of integration. In addition, we discuss concepts and measures derived from information theory that lend (...) a theoretical basis to the notion of complexity as integration of information and suggest new experimental tests of these concepts. (shrink)

The property of fundamental mechanical theories which allows to treat compound objects as particles under suitable conditions is considered. It is argued that such a property, called compoundation invariance, is a nonreleasable property of any mechanical theory not declaring to which elementary constituents it applies. Compoundation invariance is discussed in the framework of Bohmian mechanics. It is found that standard Bohmian mechanics satisfies the requirement of compoundation invariance, with some reservation in the case of compound objects with spin. On the (...) contrary that requirement is violated when additional terms are added to the standard velocity. (shrink)

Modern color science finds its birth in the middle of the nineteenth century. Among the chief architects of the new color theory, the name of the polymath Hermann von Helmholtz stands out. A keen experimenter and profound expert of the latest developments of the fields of physiological optics, psychophysics, and geometry, he exploited his transdisciplinary knowledge to define the first non-Euclidean line element in color space, i.e., a three-dimensional mathematical model used to describe color differences in terms of color distances. (...) Considered as the first step toward a metrically significant model of color space, his work inaugurated researches on higher color metrics, which describes how distance in the color space translates into perceptual difference. This paper focuses on the development of Helmholtz’s mathematical derivation of the line element. Starting from the first experimental evidence which opened the door to his reflections about the geometry of color space, it will be highlighted the pivotal role played by the studies conducted by his assistants in Berlin, which provided precious material for the elaboration of the final model proposed by Helmholtz in three papers published between 1891 and 1892. Although fallen into oblivion for about three decades, Helmholtz’s masterful work was rediscovered by Schrödinger and, since the 1920s, it has provided the basis for all subsequent studies on the geometry of color spaces up to the present time. (shrink)

A number of authors in recent liberal political theory have advanced an ‘argument from integrity’ in favour of legal accommodations. This holds that people are entitled to forms of legal accommodations every time they can plausibly claim that complying with a certain norm compromises their ability to act in accordance with some fundamental personal values. I advance two points against this argument. Valuing integrity unconditionally is implausible because a life devoid of integrity is one that does not prevent anyone from (...) developing crucial liberal virtues. If integrity is valued conditionally, on the other hand, its normative role becomes redundant. In fact, I argue, the key liberal values of fairness and toleration can give a more plausible guidance with regard to the problem of how to treat (and sometimes accommodate) moral commitments that are incompatible with public norms. I conclude that the notion of personal integrity is, by itself, unnecessary and possibly detrimental in a theory of justice. (shrink)

This in-depth study of the apophatic dimension crafted by Gregory of Nissa is the translation on the epistemological level of a new ontology, developed in debates with Arianism, and intended to expand classical metaphysics on the meaning of relationship. In Neoplatonic philosophy silence protects the absolute nature of the First Principle leaving expressive mediation to degrees of intermediate ontologies. Through trinitarian revelation God is manifested as a communion of love within which the external Logos is identified with the divine essence (...) itself, in a unity founded upon relationship and will. Beginning from this new trinitarian ontology, Gregory sees in contemplation and in adoration, made up of silence and word, the human response to a free creative act of divine love and thus cognitive instruments, paths of access to the personal relationship of union with the Beloved. (shrink)

In 1788, the Tuscan intellectual Giovanni Maria Lampredi (1731–1793) published in Florence his most famous treatise, Del commercio dei popoli neutrali in tempo di guerra, conceived as a reply to his well-known opponent, Ferdinando Galiani. Since then, many scholars have claimed that Lampredi’s reflection upon neutral trade remains one of the most objective academic contributions on the subject. Furthermore, these interpretations have generally analysed Lampredi’s Del commercio without taking into account the context of the work or the author’s real political (...) intents and intellectual goals. Therefore, the aim of this article is to provide a new interpretation of Lampredi’s ideas on trade and neutrality, demonstrating that, far from being impartial, his theories allow us to appreciate the intellectual dimension of the strategies formulated by European and Mediterranean small powers, such as Tuscany, to buttress their neutral policies and independence. In addition, Del commercio proposed an original conception of neutrality which urged Italian small states to pursue a more autonomous and profitable foreign and commercial policy, taking advantage of their sovereignty and neutral condition. Lampredi’s thought, then, requires us to reconsider the relationship between small powers and neutrality in eighteenth-century Europe. (shrink)

A Nobel Prize-winning scientist and a leading brain researcher show how the brain creates conscious experience.