The present PhD thesis is concerned with the question whether good reasoning requires that the subject has some cognitive grip on the relation between premises and conclusion. One consideration in favor of such a requirement goes as follows: In order for my belief-formation to be an instance of reasoning, and not merely a causally related sequence of beliefs, the process must be guided by my endorsement of a rule of reasoning. Therefore I must have justified beliefs about the relation between (...) my premises and my conclusion. -/- The rationality of a belief often depends on whether it is rightly connected to other beliefs, or more generally to other mental states —the states capable of providing a reason to holding the belief in question. For instance, some rational beliefs are connected to other beliefs by being inferred from them. It is often accepted that the connection implies that the subject in some sense ‘takes the mental states in question to be reason-providing’. But views on how exactly this is to be understood differ widely. They range from interpretations according to which ‘taking a mental state to be reason-providing’ imposes a mere causal sustaining relation between belief and reason-providing state to interpretations according to which one ‘takes a mental state to be reason-providing’ only if one believes that the state is reason-providing. The most common worry about the latter view is that it faces a vicious regress. In this thesis a different but in some respects similar interpretation of ‘taking something as reason-providing’ is given. It is argued to consist of a disposition to react in certain ways to information that challenges the reason-providing capacity of the allegedly reason-providing state. For instance, that one has inferred A from B partly consists in being disposed to suspend judgment about A if one obtains a reason to believe that B does not render A probable. The account is defended against regress-objections and the suspicion of explanatory circularity. (shrink)

Offers a glimpse into the world of science and technology between 1950 and 1990 as seen through the eyes of a mathematician, and debunks various myths of scientific philosophy. Portrays some of the great scientific personalities of the period, including Stanislav Ulam, who patented the hydrogen bomb, and Jack Schwartz, one of the founders of computer science. Also discusses phenomenology of mathematics, and philosophy and computer science. Includes book reviews. For students and academics. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, (...) OR. (shrink)

We present an axiomatic approach for a class of finite, extensive form games of perfect information that makes use of notions like “rationality at a node” and “knowledge at a node.” We distinguish between the game theorist's and the players' own “theory of the game.” The latter is a theory that is sufficient for each player to infer a certain sequence of moves, whereas the former is intended as a justification of such a sequence of moves. While in general the (...) game theorist's theory of the game is not and need not be axiomatized, the players' theory must be an axiomatic one, since we model players as analogous to automatic theorem provers that play the game by inferring (or computing) a sequence of moves. We provide the players with an axiomatic theory sufficient to infer a solution for the game (in our case, the backwards induction equilibrium), and prove its consistency. We then inquire what happens when the theory of the game is augmented with information that a move outside the inferred solution has occurred. We show that a theory that is sufficient for the players to infer a solution and still remains consistent in the face of deviations must be modular. By this we mean that players have distributed knowledge of it. Finally, we show that whenever the theory of the game is group-knowledge (or common knowledge) among the players (i.e., it is the same at each node), a deviation from the solution gives rise to inconsistencies and therefore forces a revision of the theory at later nodes. On the contrary, whenever a theory of the game is modular, a deviation from equilibrium play does not induce a revision of the theory. (shrink)

Gian Aldo Antonelli and Cristina Bicchieri. Backwards Forwards Induction.

In this paper we apply the idea of Revision Rules, originally developed within the framework of the theory of truth and later extended to a general mode of definition, to the analysis of the arithmetical hierarchy. This is also intended as an example of how ideas and tools from philosophical logic can provide a different perspective on mathematically more “respectable” entities. Revision Rules were first introduced by A. Gupta and N. Belnap as tools in the theory of truth, and they (...) have been further developed to provide the foundations for a general theory of (possibly circular) definitions. Revision Rules are non-monotonic inductive operators that are iterated into the transfinite beginning with some given “bootstrapper” or “initial guess.” Since their iteration need not give rise to an increasing sequence, Revision Rules require a particular kind of operation of “passage to the limit,” which is a variation on the idea of the inferior limit of a sequence. We then define a sequence of sets of strictly increasing arithmetical complexity, and provide a representation of these sets by means of an operator G(x, φ) whose “revision” is carried out over ω2 beginning with any total function satisfying certain relatively simple conditions. Even this relatively simple constraint is later lifted, in a theorem whose proof is due to Anil Gupta. (shrink)

Some of the foundations of Heyes’ radical reasoning seem to be based on a fractional selection of available evidence. Using an ethological perspective, we argue against Heyes’ rapid dismissal of innate cognitive instincts. Heyes’ use of fMRI studies of literacy to claim that culture assembles pieces of mental technology seems an example of incorrect reverse inferences and overlap theories pervasive in cognitive neuroscience.

The notion of form-of-life refers to a living dimension that has overthrown the structures of power in which humans are supposedly destined to live, disclosing the possibility of a new understanding of political and legal life. By placing the 'form-of-life' in the context of contemporary philosophy, this book re-imagines anew some of the basic categories of human socialities - such as work, rights, obligation, property, and use. It explores the ways in which Agamben's philosophy might be helpful in developing political (...) and legal strategies that leave behind a situation dominated by pervasive sovereign violence. At a moment of history in which the fundamental promises of Western modernity are undergoing a decisive crisis, to look beyond the basic categories of human social institutions becomes an urgency. Through a close engagement with Agamben's concept of form-of-life, this book seeks to challenge the current crisis of juridical, political and economic reality"-- Back cover. (shrink)

Essays on art, spectacle, and subjectivity in late capitalist society.

Il libro curato da Francesca De Vecchi, Eidetica del diritto e ontologia sociale. Il realismo di Adolf Reinach, si indirizza in primo luogo agli studiosi di filosofia del diritto, di ontologia sociale, ai fenomenologi e agli esperti del pensiero di Adolf Reinach (1883-1917), noto fenomenologo tedesco. Esso però ha il suo maggiore fascino, a mio parere, nella pretesa teoretica di discutere la posizione realista sottesa al lavoro di Reinach. A esserci in gioco, chiarisce la curatrice, è la scop...

Gian Aldo Antonelli and Cristina Bicchieri. Forward Induction.

Husserl’s Third Logical Investigation, ostensibly dealing with the phenomenology of whole and parts, is actually meant to introduce the notion of Fundierung. This term is frequently used in the phenomenological literature, although little has been written about Fundierung itself since Husserl introduced it. Husserl himself, although he used it extensively, never again felt the need to reopen the discussion.

In the Aeneid, Virgil sets out to achieve a new sublime style, paradoxically steeped in the common parlance. He aims for the spontaneity of everyday language to win readers’ involvement, while elaborating a discourse both expressively taut and stylistically marked, that avoids a register too colloquial or prosaic. Above all, he tirelessly deploys an array of subtle strategies – below the threshold of perception – that defamiliarize language in order to elevate its style. The present paper furnishes a selection of (...) case studies. (shrink)

Describing and defining what 'Japan style' is, this book explores specific achievements in Japanese art and architecture, offering an analysis of the Japanese culture, its vision of the world and of humankind.

Excerpt from Benedetto Croce: Philosopher of Art and Literary Critic In Italian of course there are several aids to the study of Croce, including a full bibliography, completely indexed; see Appendix 2. But there are still a number of unsettled points concerning the development of Croce's thought and the chronology of his doctrines. The current view of this chronology as it refers to aesthetic theory is cited above, but each date may be pushed backwards. The theory of art as expression (...) is already outlined in a book of 1893. The lyrical intuition, announced in the Heidelberg lecture of 1908, was already formulated in the first draft of the Logic The first formulation of ex pression as an a priori synthesis is dated, even by some Italian scholars, in 1912, but it is to be found in the Logic of 1908. The cosmic intuition is dated 1918, but it is already found in a book which goes back to 1915. My book gives some attention to chronology, but does not attempt to solve all the relative problems. A complete study of Croce's intellectual develop ment still remains to be done. However, the ultimate aim of this work is not biographical or purely historical but critical. The goal has been to see whether there is a practical theory of literary criticism in Croce. Are the problems of criticism solved more clearly and satisfactorily when viewed from Croce's standpoint? Is the question I have asked myself throughout. Accordingly, I have endeavored to see things as much as possible from his point of View and to present his doctrines in the most favorable light. However, dissent will appear on three main points of doctrine: Croce's handling of the image in his theory of practical criticism (chapters III and VIII), his third or universalistic aesthetics (chapter XI) and his later criticism of contemporary writing (chapter XIV). In other words, Croce in this book has been criticized only from within, when his conclusions appeared to be inconsistent with his premises. Of course these premises themselves are sub jcet to discussion. But this discussion is profitable only when it arises out of complete knowledge of what Croce had to say. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

In this paper we show that the Gupta-Belnap systems S# and S* are П12. Since Kremer has independently established that they are П12-hard, this completely settles the problem of their complexity. The above-mentioned upper bound is established through a reduction to countable revision sequences that is inspired by, and makes use of a construction of McGee.