Es ist, als ob man vergebens aus nächster Nähe zu betrachten suchte, was in weitester Ferne liegt – und dennoch nur scheinbar ein Jenseitiges ist. Etwas unreglementiert erfahren: ist das überhaupt möglich? Die in diesem Band versammelten Beiträge widmen sich der Bestimmung eines Begriffs, der in der kritischen Theorie Adornos einen zentralen, wenngleich nie ausdrücklich benannten Platz einnimmt. In der zahlreich vorhandenen Literatur zu Adorno wird unreglementierte Erfahrung, wenn überhaupt, als ein nur subjektives Phänomen oder gar als ein dem wissenschaftlichen (...) Objektivismus entgegengesetzter Ausdruck individuellen Leids aufgefaßt. Wie hier gezeigt werden soll, geht es allerdings bei der unreglementierten Erfahrung ums Ganze, um nichts weniger als die Möglichkeit von Emanzipation schlechthin. Devi Dumbadze, Christoph Hesse: Einleitung Gerhard Scheit: Erfahrung und jüngstes Gericht. Eine Anmerkung zum verborgenen Freiheitsbegriff der Kritischen Theorie Dirk Braunstein: Die Erfahrung der Gesellschaft. Grundsätzliches zur philosophischen Erkenntnis Simon Duckheim: Alles ganz anders. Adornos Utopie der Erkenntnis am Beispiel Prousts Devi Dumbadze: »Religion, IST«. Ideologie und unreglementierte Erfahrung Isabelle Klasen: »Erfahrung wider das Ich«. Überlegungen zu einem Schönen nach Adorno Irene Lehmann: Die möglichen Unendlichkeiten des Unverständlichen und die Formen der Kritik. Luigi Nono und das engagierte Kunstwerk Christoph Hesse: Virtuelle Erfahrung Fabian Kettner: Eine nutzlose Erfahrung. Der Tod als Instanz unreglementierter Erfahrung. (shrink)

Der erste Band der Gesammelten Schriften von Hermann Schweppenhäuser enthält Studien und Abhandlungen über Sprache, Literatur und Kunst, die zuerst im Zeitraum zwischen 1957 und 2007 publiziert wurden. Dazu gehören Schweppenhäusers Frankfurter Dissertation über Heideggers Theorie der Sprache; ein berühmter, lange nicht mehr erhältlicher Lexikonartikel zur Sprachphilosophie; kürzere Abhandlungen zum Sprachbegriff bei Benjamin, Adorno und Horkheimer; Aufsätze zu ästhetischen Themen sowie Essays über Johann Gottfried Seume, Friedrich Maximilian Klinger, Hermann Hesse, Stefan George und Botho Strauß. Außerdem wird hier erstmals (...) eine Arbeit über Sprachsoziologie veröffentlicht, die ursprünglich für die Soziologischen Exkurse des Instituts für Sozialforschung in Frankfurt geschrieben worden war, dann aber nicht in den 1956 erschienenen Band aufgenommen wurde. (shrink)

This study examines how institutional logics interplay in a cross-sector social partnership that manages refugee integration in a rural district in Germany. In an inductive 15-month case study that drew on interviews and observations, we observe the dynamic materialization of institutional logics in day-to-day practices and an increasing contradiction and even rivalry between community- and market-based institutional logics over time. As a result, we delineate a model explaining the interplay of institutional logics along two dimensions: the dominance of one salient (...) logic and whether conflicts arise among logics. Our analysis also addresses the unifying properties of community as an institutional logic, especially in the context of urgency conditions. In addition, we show the influence of exogenous events and their media coverage on the interplay and conflicts of institutional logics. By unfolding the complexity of refugee integration—one of the global grand challenges of the present—we deepen the current understanding of the specific challenges addressed by cross-sector social partnerships. (shrink)

The basic theory of scientific understanding presented in Sections 1–2 exploits three main ideas.First, that to understand a phenomenonP (for a given agent) is to be able to fitP into the cognitive background corpusC (of the agent).Second, that to fitP intoC is to connectP with parts ofC (via arguments in a very broad sense) such that the unification ofC increases.Third, that the cognitive changes involved in unification can be treated as sequences of shifts of phenomena inC. How the theory fits (...) typical examples of understanding and how it excludes spurious unifications is explained in detail. Section 3 gives a formal description of the structure of cognitive corpuses which contain descriptive as well as inferential components. The theory of unification is then refined in the light of so called puzzling phenomena, to enable important distinctions, such as that between consonant and dissonant understanding. In Section 4, the refined theory is applied to several examples, among them a case study of the development of the atomic model. The final part contains a classification of kinds of understanding and a discussion of the relation between understanding and explanation. (shrink)

This paper supplements an earlier one (Wassermann 1978b). Its views aim to reinforce those of Lewontin and other prominent evolutionists, but differ significantly from the opinions of some philosophers of science, notably Popper (1957) and Olding (1978). A basic distinction is made between 'laws' and 'theories of mechanisms'. The 'Theory of Evolution' is not characterized by laws, but is viewed here as a hypertheory which explains classifiable evolutionary phenomena in terms of subordinate classifiable theories of 'evolution-specific mechanisms' (ESMs), each of (...) which could apply to a host of species. Adaptations could result from ESMs that are rooted in molecular complementarities. The status of optimization theories that aim to predict best adapted states of organisms or populations is also discussed. (shrink)

Many of the things we do, we do together with other people. Think of carpooling and playing tennis. In the past two or three decades it has become increasingly popular to analyze such collective actions in terms of collective intentions. This volume brings together ten new philosophical essays that address issues such as how individuals succeed in maintaining coordination throughout the performance of a collective action, whether groups can actually believe propositions or whether they merely accept them, and what kind (...) of evidence, if any, disciplines such as cognitive science and semantics provide in support of irreducibly collective states.The theories of the Big Four of collective intentionality -- Michael Bratman, Raimo Tuomela, John Searle, and Margaret Gilbert -- and the Big Five of Social Ontology -- which in addition to the Big Four includes Philip Pettit -- play a central role in almost all of these essays. Drawing on insights from a wide range of disciplines including dynamical systems theory, economics, and psychology, the contributors develop existing theories, criticize them, or provide alternatives to them.Several essays challenge the idea that there is a straightforward dichotomy between individual and collective level rationality, and explore the interplay between these levels in order to shed new light on the alleged discontinuities between them. These contributions make abundantly clear that it is no longer an option simply to juxtapose analyses of individual and collective level phenomena and maintain that there is a discrepancy. Some go as far as arguing that on closer inspection the alleged discontinuities dissolve. (shrink)

In his paper “William Whewell on the Consilience of Inductions” Professor Laudan has suggested that Whewell’s use of “consilience of inductions” is not the same as mine in my paper of that title. Suppose we have a theory T which entails three empirical laws L1, L2, L3. L1 is supposed already confirmed by direct evidence of its instances, but we have as yet no direct evidence for L2 or for L3. Then Laudan distinguishes two problems: Whewell’s problem: T is suggested (...) to explain L1 and is supported by L1; how much is our confidence in T increased if it also predicts L2, and L2 is subsequently directly confirmed? My problem: T is suggested to explain L1 and is supported by L1; T also entails L3; how much is our confidence that L3 will turn out a correct prediction increased by the fact that T entails it? (shrink)

The volume contains the written versions of all papers given at the workshop, divided into five chapters and followed by Alvin Goldman's replies in the sixth.

In this paper first order theories for nonmonotone inductive definitions are introduced, and a proof-theoretic analysis for such theories based on combined operator forms a la Richter with recursively inaccessible and Mahlo closure ordinals is given.

Originally presented as the author's thesis (doctoral)--Universitèat Tèubingen, 1993.

Publications of Austrian philosophers of science.

In epistemology and in philosophy of language there is fierce debate about the role of context in knowledge, understanding, and meaning. Many contemporary epistemologists take seriously the thesis that epistemic vocabulary is context-sensitive. This thesis is of course a semantic claim, so it has brought epistemologists into contact with work on context in semantics by philosophers of language. This volume brings together the debates, in a set of twelve specially written essays representing the latest work by leading figures in the (...) two fields. All future work on contextualism will start here. Contributors: Kent Bach, Herman Cappelen, Andy Egan, Michael Glanzberg, John Hawthorne, Ernest Lepore, Peter Ludlow, Peter Pagin, Georg Peter, Paul M. Pietroski, Gerhard Preyer, Jonathan Schaffer, Jason Stanley, Brian Weatherson, Timothy Williamson. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to clarify the notion of shared emotion. After contextualizing this notion within the broader research landscape on collective affective intentionality, I suggest that we reserve the term shared emotion to an affective experience that is phenomenologically and functionally ours: we experience it together as our emotion, and it is also constitutively not mine and yours, but ours. I focus on the three approaches that have dominated the philosophical discussion on shared emotions: cognitivist accounts, concern-based (...) accounts, and phenomenological fusion accounts. After identifying strengths and weaknesses of these approaches and summarizing the elements that a multifaceted theory of shared emotions requires, I turn to the work of the early phenomenologist Edith Stein to further advance an approach to shared emotions that combines the main strengths of Helm and Salmela’s concern-based accounts and Schmid’s phenomenological fusion account. According to this proposal, the sharedness of a shared emotion cannot be located in one element, but rather consists in a complex of interrelated features. (shrink)

In this paper a new conception of foundation-oriented epistemology is developed. The major challenge for foundation-oriented justifications consists in the problem of stopping the justificational regress without taking recourse to dogmatic assumptions or circular reasoning. Two alternative accounts that attempt to circumvent this problem, coherentism and externalism, are critically discussed and rejected as unsatisfactory. It is argued that optimality arguments are a new type of foundation-oriented justification that can stop the justificational regress. This is demonstrated on the basis of a (...) novel result in the area of induction: the optimality of meta-induction. In the final section the method of optimality justification is generalized to deductive and abductive inferences. (shrink)

This article suggests a revision of the theory of causal nets. In section 1 we introduce an axiomatization of TCN based on a realistic understanding. It is shown that the causal Markov condition entails three independent principles. In section 2 we analyze indeterministic decay as the major counterexample to one of these principles: screening off by common causes. We call SCC-violating common causes interactive causes. In section 3 we develop a revised version of TCN, called TCN*, which accounts for interactive (...) causes. It is shown that there are interactive causal models that admit of no faithful noninteractive reconstruction. (shrink)