This article suggests a ‘best alternative' justification of induction (in the sense of Reichenbach) which is based on meta-induction . The meta-inductivist applies the principle of induction to all competing prediction methods which are accessible to her. It is demonstrated, and illustrated by computer simulations, that there exist meta-inductivistic prediction strategies whose success is approximately optimal among all accessible prediction methods in arbitrary possible worlds, and which dominate the success of every noninductive prediction strategy. The proposed justification of meta-induction is (...) mathematically analytical. It implies, however, an a posteriori justification of object-induction based on the experiences in our world. *Received November 2005; revised March 2008. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Duesseldorf, Universitaetsstrasse 1, Geb. 23.21, Duesseldorf, Germany D-40225; e-mail: gerhard[email protected]. (shrink)

A new approach to Hume's problem of induction that justifies the optimality of induction at the level of meta-induction. Hume's problem of justifying induction has been among epistemology's greatest challenges for centuries. In this book, Gerhard Schurz proposes a new approach to Hume's problem. Acknowledging the force of Hume's arguments against the possibility of a noncircular justification of the reliability of induction, Schurz demonstrates instead the possibility of a noncircular justification of the optimality of induction, or, more precisely, of (...) meta-induction (the application of induction to competing prediction models). Drawing on discoveries in computational learning theory, Schurz demonstrates that a regret-based learning strategy, attractivity-weighted meta-induction, is predictively optimal in all possible worlds among all prediction methods accessible to the epistemic agent. Moreover, the a priori justification of meta-induction generates a noncircular a posteriori justification of object induction. Taken together, these two results provide a noncircular solution to Hume's problem. Schurz discusses the philosophical debate on the problem of induction, addressing all major attempts at a solution to Hume's problem and describing their shortcomings; presents a series of theorems, accompanied by a description of computer simulations illustrating the content of these theorems (with proofs presented in a mathematical appendix); and defends, refines, and applies core insights regarding the optimality of meta-induction, explaining applications in neighboring disciplines including forecasting sciences, cognitive science, social epistemology, and generalized evolution theory. Finally, Schurz generalizes the method of optimality-based justification to a new strategy of justification in epistemology, arguing that optimality justifications can avoid the problems of justificatory circularity and regress. (shrink)

One of the most discussed issues in psychology—presently and in the past—is how to define and measure the extent to which human cognition is rational. The rationality of human cognition is often evaluated in terms of normative standards based on a priori intuitions. Yet this approach has been challenged by two recent developments in psychology that we review in this article: ecological rationality and descriptivism. Going beyond these contributions, we consider it a good moment for psychologists and philosophers to join (...) forces and work toward a new foundation for the definition of rational cognition. We take a first step in this direction by proposing that the rationality of both cognitive and normative systems can be measured in terms of their cognitive success. Cognitive success can be defined and gauged in terms of two factors: ecological validity (the system's validity in conditions in which it is applicable) and the system's applicability (the scope of conditions under which it can be applied). As we show, prominent systems of reasoning—deductive reasoning, Bayesian reasoning, uncertain conditionals, and prediction and choice—perform rather differently on these two factors. Furthermore, we demonstrate that conceptualizing rationality according to its cognitive success offers a new perspective on the time-honored relationship between the descriptive (“is”) and the normative (“ought”) in psychology and philosophy. (shrink)

This paper supplements an earlier one (Wassermann 1978b). Its views aim to reinforce those of Lewontin and other prominent evolutionists, but differ significantly from the opinions of some philosophers of science, notably Popper (1957) and Olding (1978). A basic distinction is made between 'laws' and 'theories of mechanisms'. The 'Theory of Evolution' is not characterized by laws, but is viewed here as a hypertheory which explains classifiable evolutionary phenomena in terms of subordinate classifiable theories of 'evolution-specific mechanisms' (ESMs), each of (...) which could apply to a host of species. Adaptations could result from ESMs that are rooted in molecular complementarities. The status of optimization theories that aim to predict best adapted states of organisms or populations is also discussed. (shrink)

The constraint against harming people in order to save yourself and others seems stronger than the constraint against harming people as a consequence of saving yourself and others. The reduced constraint against acting in one type of case is often justified with reference to the intentions of the agent or to the fact that she does not use the people she harms as a means. In this article I offer a victim-centered account. I argue that the circumstances in which the (...) people to be harmed find themselves are significant in distinguishing morally between two instances of harming. (shrink)

This paper elaborates on the following correspondence theorem (which has been defended and formally proved elsewhere): if theory T has been empirically successful in a domain of applications A, but was superseded later on by a different theory T* which was likewise successful in A, then under natural conditions T contains theoretical expressions which were responsible for T’s success and correspond (in A) to certain theoretical expressions of T*. I illustrate this theorem at hand of the phlogiston versus oxygen theories (...) of combustion, and the classical versus relativistic theories of mass. The ontological consequences of the theorem are worked out in terms of the indirect reference and partial truth. The final section explains how the correspondence theorem may justify a weak version of scientific realism without presupposing the no-miracles argument. (shrink)

Do members of democratic societies have a moral right that others not actively prevent them from engaging in wrongdoing? Many political theorists think that they do. “It is a feature of democratic government,” Michael Walzer writes, “that the people have a right to act wrongly—in much the same way that they have a right to act stupidly”. Of course, advocates of a democratic right to do wrong may believe that the scope of this right is limited. A majority in a (...) democratic society, for example, may not have a moral right against being prevented from enslaving or arbitrarily disenfranchising a minority, or if it were to launch a wrongful aggressive war against another society. But many join Walzer in asserting that it would be wrong in principle to intervene to prevent some wrongs that democratic societies would inflict. This thesis, which we call the democratic right to do wrong thesis (DRTDWT), can be formulated as follows: DRTDWT – For democratic societies A and agents B, there is a class of wrongful policies and institutions X, such that if A chooses to implement members of this class pursuant to democratic procedures, B has a duty not to actively intervene to prevent the implementation of X. Our goal in this essay is to show that the DRTDWT should be rejected. (shrink)

In the first part of my paper I discuss eight arguments in favour of the theory-dependence of observation: realistic content, guidance function of theories, perception as cognitive construction, expectation-dependence of perception, theory-dependence of scientific data, continuity between observational and theoretical concepts, language-dependence, and meaning holism. I argue that although these arguments make correct points, they do not exclude the existence of observations that are weakly theory-neutral in the sense that they don’t depend on acquired background knowledge. In the second part (...) I suggest an experimental method, the method of ostensive learning experiments, by which the degree of theory- and language-independence of a concept can be tested. (shrink)

White (2015) proposes an a priori justification of the reliability of inductive prediction methods based on his thesis of induction-friendliness. It asserts that there are by far more induction-friendly event sequences than induction-unfriendly event sequences. In this paper I contrast White's thesis with the famous no free lunch (NFL) theorem. I explain two versions of this theorem, the strong NFL theorem applying to binary and the weak NFL theorem applying to real-valued predictions. I show that both versions refute the thesis (...) of induction-friendliness. In the conclusion I argue that an a priori justification of the reliability of induction based on a uniform probability distribution over possible event sequences is impossible. In the outlook I consider two alternative approaches: (i) justification externalism and (ii) optimality justifications. (shrink)

This chapter offers a close reading of a passage from the literary and philosophical work Minima Moralia that enacts Theodor W. Adorno's radical concept of nonpropositional truth content in philosophical aesthetics after Auschwitz. Readers of Adorno's texts, especially those devoted to philosophical aesthetics, can hardly fail to be struck by their chiastic structure. The aesthetic theory that Adorno develops constitutes not only a theory of the aesthetic but also a theory that is itself aesthetic, hence a theory of literature that (...) exhibits qualities associated with literary texts, and a theory of music that harbors within itself traces of musical composition. The rhetorically self-conscious tropes of his posthumous Aesthetic Theory, the stylized literary studies of his Notes to Literature, his musically inflected meditations on musicological questions from Ludwig van Beethoven to Arnold Schönberg, and so many of his other texts perform this provocative inversion in a variety of registers and conceptual modulations. (shrink)

One persistent puzzle in the life sciences is the asymmetric lipid composition of the cellular plasma membrane: while the exoplasmic leaflet is enriched in lipids carrying predominantly saturated fatty acids, the cytoplasmic leaflet hosts preferentially lipids with (poly‐)unsaturated fatty acids. Given the high energy requirements necessary for cells to maintain this asymmetry, the question naturally arises regarding its inherent benefits. In this paper, we propose asymmetry to represent a potential solution for harmonizing two conflicting requirements for the plasma membrane: first, (...) the need to build a barrier for the uncontrolled influx or efflux of substances; and second, the need to form a fluid and dynamic two‐dimensional substrate for signaling processes. We hence view here the plasma membrane as a composite material, where the exoplasmic leaflet is mainly responsible for the functional integrity of the barrier and the cytoplasmic leaflet for fluidity. We reinforce the validity of the proposed mechanism by presenting quantitative data from the literature, along with multiple examples that bolster our model. (shrink)

Although I agree with Elqayam & Evans' (E&E's) criticisms of is-ought and ought-is fallacies, I criticize their rejection of normativism on two grounds: (1) Contrary to E&E's assumption, not every normative system of reasoning consists of formal rules. (2) E&E assume that norms of reasoning are grounded on intuition or authority, whereas in contemporary epistemology they have to be justified, primarily by their truth-conduciveness.

Suppose two people are about to drown. We are in a position to save only one, so the other will have to die. One of the two has just culpably killed an innocent person, but has no intention of killing anybody else and there is no reason to expect that he will. Everything else being equal, should we give them an equal chance of being saved by flipping a coin? In this paper I argue that we should not. I argue (...) that the implications of a person's moral culpability for (recent or prospective) harm to a particular victim should transfer to other conflict situations in which the wrongdoer might find him or herself. This requires establishing the extent to which a person's contributing to harming another person — and his moral culpability for that harm — impinges on our decision making in situations where it is possible only to assist either the wrongdoer or some other person that is not his victim. (shrink)

In sec. 1.1 I emphasize the meliorative purpose of epistemology, and I characterize Goldman's epistemology as reliabilistic, cognitive, social, and meliorative. In sec. 1.2 I point out that Goldman's weak notion of knowledge is in conflict with our ordinary usage of 'knowledge'. In sec. 2 I argue for an externalist-internalist hybrid conception of justification which adds reliability-indicators to externalist knowledge. Reliability-indicators produce a veritistic surplus value for the social spread of knowledge. In sec. 3 I analyze some particular meliorative rules (...) which have been proposed by Goldman. I prove that obedience to the rule of maximally specific evidence increases expected veritistic value (sec. 3.1), and I argue that rule-circular arguments are epistemically worthless (sec. 3.2). In the final sec. 3.3 I report a non-circular justification of meta-induction which has been developed elsewhere. (shrink)

Two major works in recent evolutionary biology have in different ways touched upon the issue of cultural replicators in language, namely Dawkins’ Selfish Gene and Maynard Smith and Szathmáry’s Major Transitions in Evolution. In the latter, the emergence of language is referred to as the last major transition in evolution, a claim we argue to be derived from a crucial property of language, called Duality of Patterning. Prima facie, this property makes natural language look like a structural equivalent to DNA, (...) and its peer in terms of expressive power. We will argue that, if one takes seriously Maynard Smith and Szathmáry’s outlook and examines what has been proposed as linguistic replicators, amongst others phonemes and words, the analogy meme-gene becomes problematic. A key issue is the fact that genes and memes are assumed to carry and transmit information, while what has been described as the best candidate for replicatorhood in language, i.e. the phoneme, does by definition not carry meaning. We will argue that semiotic systems with Duality of Pattering force us to reconsider either the analogy between replicators in the biological and the cultural domain, or what it is to be a replicator in linguistics. (shrink)

Two conditions guiding permissible use of force in self-defence are proportionality and success. According to the proportionality condition the means used to prevent an attack can be permissible only if they are proportional to the interest at stake.1 According to the success condition, otherwise impermissible acts can be justified under the right to self-defence only if they are likely to succeed in preventing the perceived threat.2 These requirements should not always be interpreted narrowly. Sometimes people are permitted to kill culpable (...) aggressors in order to avoid a non-lethal harm. Sometimes people are permitted to take up arms to defend themselves against culpable aggressors they have little or no hope of .. (shrink)

... und was ist hässlich? Gibt es objektive Kriterien für Schönheit? Und welche Rolle spielt dabei die eigene Wahrnehmung? Diesen Fragen geht die Ästhetik nach.

The reception of the rational sciences, scientific practice, discourse and methodology into Arabic Islamic society proceeded in several stages of exchange with the transmitters of Iranian, Christian-Aramaic and Byzantine-Greek learning. Translation and the acquisition of knowledge from the Hellenistic heritage went hand in hand with a continuous refinement of the methods of linguistic transposition and the creation of a standardized technical language in Arabic: terminology, rhetoric, and the genres of instruction. Demonstration more geometrico, first introduced by the paradigmatic sciences-mathematics, astronomy, (...) mechanics-and adopted by philosophers embracing the cosmology of Neoplatonism, was complemented and superseded by the methods of syllogistic demonstration. Faced with the establishment of philosophy as a demonstrative science, which claimed absolute and universal knowledge, even the hermeneuti. (shrink)

Scientific knowledge should not only be true, it should be as objective as possible. It should refer to a reality independent of any subject. What can we use as a criterion of objectivity? Intersubjectivity (i.e., intersubjective understandability and intersubjective testability) is necessary, but not sufficient. Other criteria are: independence of reference system, independence of method, non-conventionality. Is there some common trait? Yes, there is: invariance under some specified transformations. Thus, we say: A proposition is objective only if its truth is (...) invariant against a change in the conditions under which it was formulated. We give illustrations from geometry, perception, neurobiology, relativity theory, and quantum theory. Such an objectivist position has many advantages. (shrink)

Lassen sich Aspekte der metaphysisch-theologischen Sprachspekulation des frühen Benjamin in eine kritische Ästhetik der ›Sprache der Dinge‹ einfügen? Ist sie, im designtheoretischen Kontext, mit dem Offenbacher Ansatz der ›Produktsprache‹ kompatibel? Dort geht es nicht darum, zu verstehen, was Produkte erzählen, sondern was Menschen einander mitteilen, wenn sie Produkte als dinghafte Zeichen verwenden, welche die Wortzeichen substituieren oder ergänzen. Daher bleibt die objektive Dimension des Ausdrucks unterbelichtet. Benjamins Spekulation über die nicht benennende, nicht bezeichnende Ding-Sprache verweist hingegen auf ein Konzept des (...) Ding-Ausdrucks. Dafür muss allerdings der Begriff des ›unmittelbaren Ausdrucks‹ aus seinem frühen Sprachkonzept aufgegeben werden. Wir können nicht für einen Ausdruck der Dinge als solcher empfänglich werden, aber für den Ausdruck eines gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisses, das sich in Dingen vergegenständlicht. Also: für einen Ausdruck des Verhältnisses von Menschen, die Dinge produzieren, tauschen und gebrauchen. (shrink)

D’un colloque à un autre, puis à un autre... En mai 1994, les Archives Henri-Poincaré, qui n’avaient alors que deux ans d’existence, organisaient à Nancy un important colloque dédié à l’œuvre scientifique et philosophique du savant [Greffe, Heinzmann et al. 1996]. En janvier 2012, à l’occasion du centenaire du décès d’Henri Poincaré, le laboratoire inaugurait à Nancy une année marquée par d’innombrables manifestations scientifiques et grand public avec un colloque « Vers une biographie d’Henr...

This monograph offers new insights into the connection between self-consciousness and emotion. It focuses on what fundamental “feelings of being” tell us about ourselves. The results enrich the philosophy of human affectivity and help shed new light on some pressing, current problems. The author seeks to understand self-consciousness as an affective phenomenon, namely as self-feeling. He identifies it as a pre-reflective, pre-propositional, bodily feeling that shapes our space of possibilities. It is the affective disclosure of individual existence. His account overcomes (...) the difficulties of infinite regress and vicious circularity that reflective accounts of self-consciousness struggle with. At the same time, it helps build a bridge between the basic level of self-consciousness and the higher level of more substantial thoughts about oneself. The title explores fundamental affectivity, Matthew Ratcliffe’s theory of existential feelings, features of self-feeling, and appropriateness and inappropriateness in self-interpretation. It also considers the contributions of the Heidelberg School of self-consciousness to current debates. The title provides students and researchers with a unique look into such vital philosophical questions as: What is self-consciousness? How do we know ourselves? It will also appeal to a wider audience interested in self-consciousness and/or human affectivity since it does not presuppose knowledge of the jargon. (shrink)

In this paper it is shown that, in spite of their intuitive starting points, Kuipers' accounts lead to counterintuitive consequences. The counterintuitive results of Kuipers' account of H-D confirmation stem from the fact that Kuipers explicates a concept of partial (as opposed to full) confirmation. It is shown that Schurz-Weingartner's relevant-element approach as well as Gemes' content-part approach provide an account of full confirmation that does not lead to these counterintuitive results. One of the unwelcome results of Kuipers' account of (...) nomic truthlikeness is the consequence that a theory Y, in order to be more truthlike than a theory X (where Y and X are incompatible), must imply the entire nomic truth. It is shown how the relevant-element approach to truthlikeness avoids this result. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 63 Heft: 3 Seiten: 563-568.

Among the many discussions Kierkegaard had with his Copenhagen contemporaries, his dispute with the Icelandic theologian Magnús Eiríksson over Kierkegaard’s theory of faith is particularly noteworthy. In the various drafts that Kierkegaard developed in response to Eiríksson’s critique, one finds insightful remarks not only on „the absurd“ and „the paradox“ as foundational concepts of Kierkegaard’s theory of faith, but also on the different perspectives of the various pseudonyms in this respect within the intricate tapestry of his writings. Notably, these drafts (...) were omitted from the authoritative Danish edition of Kierkegaard’s works, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter (SKS), and have remained largely untranslated into other languages. In this workshop report, Kierkegaard’s drafts are made accessible and presented in their entirety for the first time in German translation. (shrink)

English summary: Johann Gottfried Herder played a central role in the emergence of aesthetics and art history in the eighteenth century. His was not only an avid reader and critic of important contemporaries, but also made essential contributions to the possibilities of art and art theory. This volume is illuminated by contemporary art discussion and the many facets of debate around Herder and the emergence of aesthetics and art history, from his early writings in the 1760s and 70s, to this (...) later works. French description: Johann Gottfried Herder spielt eine zentrale Rolle fur die Entstehung der Asthetik und der Kunstgeschichte, die beide zu den grundlegenden geistesgeschichtlichen Neuerungen des 18. Jahrhunderts gehoren. Er war nicht nur ein aufmerksamer Leser und Kritiker der wichtigsten Autoren, die sich mit dieser Materie befassten, wie etwa Winckelmann, Lessing oder Baumgarten, sondern hat selbst grundlegende und umfassende Beitrage geschrieben, die immer wieder aufs Neue die Moglichkeiten und Grenzen der Kunst, der Kunstwahrnehmung und der Kunsttheorie ausloten. Der hier vorgelegte Band leuchtet vor dem Hintergrund der zeitgenossischen Kunstdiskussionen die vielen Facetten der Auseinandersetzung Herders mit der entstehenden Asthetik und Kunstgeschichte aus, beginnend mit seinen Schriften, Kritische Walder' und, Plastik' aus den 1760er und 1770er Jahren bis hin zu seinen spateren Werken. (shrink)

According to a plausible picture of information, to acquire information is to rule out possibilities. What is the nature of these possibilities? The most natural answer---that they are possible states of the world---seems to be refuted by the existence of informative truths that are necessary, and so don't rule out any real possibilities. This seems to show that informational contents cannot be identified with the real possibilities they eliminate. Real possibilities, it seems, are too coarse-grained to do the work of (...) informational contents. ;In the first part of the dissertation, I look at two defenses of the coarse-grained conception of content. First, Stalnaker has claimed that the informativeness of necessary truths can be explained within a two-dimensional semantic framework, in which necessary truths have contingent metalinguistic contents. In Chapter 1, I argue that this metalinguistic approach misconstrues the content of mathematical truths. Second, Stalnaker has claimed that we have independent reason to adopt a coarse-grained conception of content since naturalistic views of content such as indicator views allow only for coarse-grained contents. In Chapter 2, I argue that both indicator and teleological views allow for more fine-grained contents and that, given certain assumptions, they even require them. Together, these arguments show that the best attempt to explain the informativeness of necessary truths in terms of coarse-grained entities fails, and that naturalism gives us no reason for thinking that some other attempt will succeed. Instead of explaining informativeness in terms of the elimination of real possibilities, I claim, we should explain it in terms of the elimination of more fine-grained epistemic possibilities. ;In the second part of the dissertation, I describe the characteristic features of epistemic possibilities. Chapter 3 clarifies the relevant sense of epistemic possibility by distinguishing it from related senses that have gone under the same name. I argue that P is epistemically possible for a thinker at a time just in case an operative belief that P is compatible with his operative beliefs at this time, where beliefs are called compatible, not if their contents are compatible, but if the beliefs themselves are compatible in the sense that it is possible to have them at the same time. Since epistemic possibility in this sense is a matter of what it is possible to believe, I call it epistemic possibility in the believability sense. ;In Chapter 4, I turn to the question of what sort of thing epistemic possibilities are. I argue that epistemic possibilities can be defined in terms of, but not identified with, a certain kind of fine-grained content. (shrink)

Aus dem Inhalt: G.OBERHAMMER: Einleitendes zur Religionshermeneutik; J.REIKERSTORFER: Transzendentale Religionshermeneutik als theologische Religionstheorie; L.LEERTOUWER: Zur Definition des Objektes in der Religionshermeneutik; H.SCHWABL: Religioser Paradigmenwechsel im klassischen Altertum; E.WALDSCHUTZ: Zur Auslegung der "Mystik" Meister Eckharts in der neuzeitlichen Philosophie als Rueckfrage an die Moglichkeit dieser Auslegungen; W.HALBFASS: Tradition und Reflexion: Zur Gegenwart des Veda in der indischen Philosophie; J.C.HEESTERMAN: "I am who I am" - Truth and Identity in Vedic Ritual, T.Vetter: Zur religiosen Hermeneutik buddhistischer Texte; G.OBERHAMMER: "Begegnung" als Kategorie der (...) Hermeneutik altindischer Heilssysteme; G.H.SCHOKKER: Die Menschwerdung Gottes in der Bhakti-Poesie. (shrink)