This article deals with the metaphor of dogmatic slumber in Finkian phenomenology. The Husserlian thought experiment with two worlds for one subject functions here as a starting point which helps to thematize the somnambulistic certitude of the taken-for-granted. It leads to conclusion about the pedagogical task of the philosopher: to constantly wake up himself and the others.

The article examines Husserl’s conception of Buddhism, which was largely determined by the reading of the “Majjhima-nikaya” in Karl Eugen Neumann’s translation. It is a general and dotted image in which no distinctions were made regarding the eras, traditions and schools of Buddhist philosophy: an image that an interested European reader might form after reading the 152 sutras of the “Collection of Middle Instructions” of the Pali Canon. Nevertheless, it seems a productive task to interpret this image in order to (...) better explain Husserl’s conception of phenomenology about itself, regardless of the naivety of the image under discussion from the point of view of Buddhology. This article puts forward the following theses for discussion: Husserl understood Buddhist thought as a “conjugate detail (Gegenstück)” that complements the phenomenological science of transcendental subjectivity by contrast. Specifically, he interpreted Buddhism as a path to the transcendental position not from the critique of science, but from practice—as a suspension of the mythical picture of the world and the “practical general thesis” of the natural attitude. Although Buddhist thought according to Husserl, like phenomenology, is aimed at “revealing the transcendental position,” it nevertheless does not establish a science (in the radicalized Husserlian sense). In fact, Husserl uses this rough outline (characterizing Buddhism as “transcendentalism without science”) to emphasize the dynamics of his own phenomenological “working project of philosophy (Arbeitsphilosophie).” The “Collection of Middle Instructions” of the Pali Canon serves as an occasion for Husserl to thematize the specific combination of seriousness and playfulness that characterizes his phenomenology as “carefree care”; this helps Husserl to express the driving force of phenomenological labor (“work fervor” (Arbeitsfieber)). (shrink)

The article builds on Husserl’s “trivial” observations from the manuscript Reason — Science. Reason and Morality — Reason and Metaphysics on the topic of conscience, to then question the neglect of the topic of misguided conscience or self-deception in Heidegger’s model of conscience from §§ 54–60 of Being and Time. In Heidegger’s conception of conscience (as a silent call appealing to the authenticity of Dasein) we will not find a number of points important to the Husserlian understanding of conscience: neither (...) the unrevealed horizons of prior life, nor the relativity of intersubjective contexts, nor a misguided (and doubting) conscience, still less a search for (presumed) evidence. That said, the way Heidegger axiomatically sets up the original culpability of Dasein creates a number of dead ends or blind spots in this model. It is to these that Mark Richir addresses in his interpretation (or, more precisely, two alternative interpretations), speaking of the “original symbolic mishap” that befell Dasein, and then of the “symbolic tautology” in which it has become a prisoner. Richir’s critique is not aimed at “overcoming” Heidegger’s model of conscience, but at demonstrating a transcendental illusion — probably inevitable for one who is guided by “authenticity” and the “inner voice.” This is a kind of critical phenomenology of “authenticity”, which manages to avoid the closedness of phenomenology in itself by “grafting” in it poststructuralism. This is why both the first and the second interpretation by the Belgian phenomenologist focus on the problem of symbolic structures: “original symbolic mishap” in the first case and “symbolic tautology” in the second. (shrink)

We investigate the parallelism between aesthetic experience and the practice of phenomenology using Viktor Shklovsky’s theory of “estrangement”. In his letter to Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Husserl claims that aesthetic and phenomenological experiences are similar; in the perception of a work of art we change our attitude in order to concentrate on how the things appear to us instead of what they are. A work of art “forces us into” the aesthetic attitude in the same way as the phenomenological epoché drives (...) us into the phenomenological one. The change of attitudes is a condition of possibility of aesthetic and/or phenomenological experience. Estrangement is an artistic device that breaks the routinized forms of perception: one sees the thing as new and does not just “recognize” it automatically. Shklovsky insists that it is possible if one experiences or feels the form of the work of art—in an affective and even sensuous way. We claim that this is similar to the phenomenological seeing, or intuition, which, according to Husserl, should be devoid of all understanding. Phenomenological epoché can also be described as a philosophical technique that aims to arrest the “ready-made,” “taken for granted,” “pre-given” meanings in order to access a new meaning which is not yet stabilized, the “meaning-in-formation.” It is not enough to turn from what appears to how it appears; one has to oscillate between these conflicting attitudes, or rather to keep them both at the same time thus gaining a kind of a 3D-vision of meaning in its becoming. This double life in two different attitudes can be clarified in terms of Roman Jakobson’s theory of antinomic coexistence between the poetic and communicative functions of language. The notion of “double life in two attitudes” uncovers the role that ostranenie can play in the philosophical transformation of the subject based on variety and essential mobility of the affective components involved. Proposing a phenomenological interpretation of a passage from Samuel Beckett we show how the radicalization of ostranenie can lead even to “meta-estrangement”: to estrangement of the everyday “lack of estrangement.” We conclude with a remark on the productivity of this form of estrangement in the phenomenological context. (shrink)

The article analyzes some key motives of both classical German phenomenology and contemporary French phenomenology. The theme of sense-formation, a recurring thread throughout Husserl's entire body of work, serves as a discussion starting point.A special emphasis is put on one of Husserl's posthumously published texts from 1933, in which he distinguishes between the open process of sense-formation [Sinnbildung] and the closed sense-structures [Sinngebilde]. The “phenomenon” to which phenomenological philosophy refers here is not a “pre-given thing” yet, but rather the horizon (...) in which its sense is shaped. This fundamental intuition is crucially important for the project of “nonstandard” phenomenology, which Richir is developing in the context of Francophone philosophy. Drawing equally from Maurice Merleau-Ponty’ phenomenology of language, Richir refers to “the sense that creates itself.” In this way, he is continuing to develop one of the key intuitio... (shrink)

The implicit conception of conscience from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notes from 1929 is brought into comparison with the theory of conscience as a paradoxical identity of guilt and innocence by Philip Konrad Marheineke (which served as a pattern for Kierkegaardian concept of “despair”) and of conscience as a (grammatical and temporal) redoubling by Vladimir Jankélévitch. Wittgensteinian views on conscience and feeling of guilt tend to Marheineke-Kierkegaard’s model (the guilt hides in innocence and vice versa) and to Jankélévitch’s model (the wrongdoing from (...) the past makes us regret the innocence which preceded it in a far remote past). I explore these tautological models of conscience using the example of Wittgensteinian metaphor of “waterwheel”: of an engineering failure producing a constant sentiment of guilt. Austrian philosopher describes his “incapacity to think” as a source of background, freely floating guilt. “Uselessness” and “mediocrity” or as he puts it “groundlessness of your own existence” altogether with “incapacity to think”—those are the self-accusations of the thinker. This torturing state he at the same time considers to be the source of his own philosophical productivity. Would a conscience be possible which would be free of this tautological structure and of this endless “rumination” of the petty guilt? The article proposes a hypothesis how one could break the tautological circle of an idling scrupulous conscience. (shrink)