Even a decade after the end of the 1914–1918 war, economic theory assumed that the world was tranquil and orderly. By 1939 an economic slump without parallel, allied to the re-emergence of military ambition in Europe, had brought economic theorists face to face with reality. In this classic book, first published in 1967, Professor Shackle provides a study, in exact and professional language, of the precise nature, structure, presuppositions, language and inter-relations of the theories which were formulated in these fourteen (...) years - unparalleled in the whole history of economics except perhaps by the years of the Physiocrats and Adam Smith. These theories are not prototypes on the way to something better but are of essential and permanent importance. (shrink)

This paper emphasizes the crucial role of variation, at several different levels, for a detailed historical understanding of the development of the biomedical sciences. Going beyond valuable recent studies that focus on model organisms, experimental systems and instruments, we argue that all of these categories can be accommodated within our approach, which pays special attention to organismal and cultural variation. Our empirical examples are drawn in particular from recent historical studies of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century genetics and physiology. Based on (...) the quasi-paradoxical conclusion that biological and cultural variation both constrains and enables innovation in the biomedical sciences, we argue that more attention should be paid to variation as an analytical category in the historiography of the life sciences. (shrink)

The humanitarian thought did not encounter such challenges that we face today. Biotechnologies outline the perspectives of “posthuman” personology, while digitalization and robotization of almost all spheres of social practice bring to the fore the idea of homodicy – justifying the need for human existence. The article analyzes four blocks of challenges to humanitarian knowledge: (1) achievements in medicine, prosthetics, transplantology and genetic engineering, which outlined the separation of a sentient subject from traditional anthropomorphism (“posthuman” personology); (2) studies of the (...) brain neurophysiology, which advanced new arguments against free will; (3) costs of ill-considered propaganda of human rights; (4) digitization of almost all socio-cultural practices – from economics and military affairs to the formation and functioning of authority. Digitalization permeates all these “problematization fields,” setting their common conceptual and technological platform. In this regard, the question arises of the humanitarian expertise of modern technologies and the projects of education, communication and management, which implemented with their help. That expertise deals with not only the consequences, progress or even the possibility of implementing such projects, but also with their necessity. The focus and criteria of such expertise are important. Obviously, it cannot be directed only at the preservation of the biological species of homo sapiens and the conditions of its survival. Paradoxical choice arises in a situation where freedom and free will are questioned: which is more important – homo or sapiens? It is time for a clear distinction between the concepts of humanism and humanitarianism, including in the latter the posthuman personology. If humanitarianism is a personology of free spirit, then humanism seems to have a place next to economism and nationalism as forms of confined humanitarianism. This wide range of problems requires comprehension not only of their content but also of the methodology of the humanities and of the prospects of the humanities in modern society. (shrink)

From the materialist stance that I find compelling, the metaproblem of consciousness -- explaining why the problem of consciousness seems hard -- is hardly distinct from the 'easy' problem of explaining how the underlying physical/computational system works, and how it gives rise to perceptions of its own functioning. I discuss several confusions that might plausibly arise in that process, and propose that these confusions could create apparent gaps, ontological and epistemic, in materialist accounts of consciousness, thereby making the hard problem (...) hard. Inversely, resolving these confusions may help solve the hard problem. (shrink)

In 404 Sparta stood supreme, militarily and politically master of Greece, in concord with Persia. By 362, the year at which Xenophon terminated his history on the sad note of ‘even greater confusion and uncertainty’, she was eclipsed militarily, never to win a great battle again; and so far from being master even of the Peloponnese that she would spend the rest of time struggling to recover her own ancestral domain of Messenia, no longer a world power, merely a local (...) wrangler. The reasons for all this which are to seek are of absorbing interest and prime importance for the history of Greece, but it is hard to resist the temptation to connect the change with the policies of Agesilaus whose reign virtually coincided with the period in question. He was king for forty-one years and over thirty of them well before the battle of Leuctra and he had influence in the state unequalled as far as we can tell by any other king. (shrink)

A highly original reading of Immanuel Kant that demonstrates his interest in the social realm of human interaction.

Russell Berman has written a fascinating book about space and alterity in colonial discourse. The book has a Eurocentric focus: the time and world Berman discusses were Eurocentric. So, too, was the Enlightenment, and Berman explicates the encounter between European voyagers and non-European peoples in terms of the “dialectic of enlightenment.” As a device, this works well. It allows a unity of focus in an otherwise varied assortment of topics. As he writes, his book is “neither a history of German (...) colonialism nor an intellectual history of images of non-Europeans in German literature,” but a look at “some specific cases…. (shrink)

Every expansion of power, economic or any other, must find a justification, a principle of legitimacy. All concepts and formulas, expressions and slogans that serve this purpose evidence that all human activity, including politics and imperialism, is by its very nature intellectual and cultural. Carl Schmitt clearly demonstrates that American imperialism corresponds to the legitimating principles and justifying forms of “modern” imperialism. It is in this sense that we must understand his statement: “American imperialism is certainly an economic imperialism; but, (...) as such, it is no less intensively imperialistic.”. (shrink)