Many argue that our reasons to value choice do not depend on our having libertarian free will.The paper argues against this view. One reason to value choice is that it is constitutive of a life of self-determination. If choices are determined, however, they can be predicted and brought about by others; and if choices are randomly indeterministic, they can be mimicked. In either case, the importance of choice to self-determination is challenged. Thus, it is only as long as our (...) choices are free in a libertarian manner that the importance of choice as a means to self-determination makes full sense. (shrink)

The present analysis of the evolution of the concept of freedom in Ernst Tugendhat’s philosophy aims to highlight several interesting facts. First, Tugendhat attempts to describe the meaning of Kant’s statement “I could have acted otherwise” from a non-transcendental perspective. Second, he makes an effort to avoid the classical Kantian dilemma of the relation of free will and determinism by posing the question differently. Third, he situates the issue of the relation of freedom and causality in the (...) framework of the inner structure of freedom – examining it from the perspective of the human’s relation to him- or herself. Fourth, he attempts repeatedly to overcome the impossibility of considering freedom in the objective language of causality. The paper demonstrates why the issue of freedom remains a central problem of continental philosophy. (shrink)

At first glance it seems strange to compare the views of two philosophers from such different contexts as are Harry G. Frankfurt1 and Aurelius Augustinus. After all, Frankfurt makes virtually no use of Augustine, virtually no mention of his philosophical doctrines—whether on free will or anything else.2 And yet, the two have more to do with each other than initially meets the eye. For in their own ways both of them sketch a respective theory of freedom that is (...) similarly insightful; moreover, the theories of both lapse into paradox (paradox of which each author is aware but from which neither seeks to escape). Of course, Frankfurt's articulation of his theory is more systematic, more focused than is Augustine's. Indeed, Augustine seems to make most of his points as if en passant; even in De Libero Arbitrio he shows little interest in sustained treatment of the topic heralded in the title. So what links Frankfurt and Augustine is not their philosophical style but rather (1) their putative triumph over the philosophical elusiveness and the conceptual impenetrability of the notion of freedom-of-will and (2) the fact that in coming to cognate conclusions, they share similar strategies. Thus, they admit of plausible comparison. (shrink)

Locke was a libertarian: he believed in human freedom. To be sure, his conception of freedom was different from that of many philosophers who call themselves libertarians. Some such philosophers maintain that an agent is free only if her action is uncaused; whereas Locke thought that all actions have causes, including the free ones. Some libertarians hold that no action is free unless it proceeds from a volition that is itself free; whereas Locke argued that free volition, as (...) opposed to free action, is an impossibility. On the other hand, Locke agrees with the typical professed libertarian that free actions depend on volitions - or, as he often puts it, that an agent is free only with respect to the actions she wills, to those that are voluntary. And he also refuses to make voluntariness sufficient for freedom, whereby a free action is merely one that is willed. The free agent, Locke insists, must also be able or have been able to do something other than she does or did. Thus both Locke and the libertarian professor require indifference as well as spontaneity for freedom. But Locke’s freedom is not contra-causal; and he denies that it extends to volition. In this paper I want to focus on just this last component of Locke’s view of freedom: that freedom in willing, far from being required for free agency, is not even possible. I call this ‘the thesis of volitional determinism’. Locke presents an argument for this thesis in the Essay, but scholars have never paid much attention to it: I want to examine it. (shrink)

This article explores the idea of "Freedom of Will" from a philosophical viewpoint, comparing key theories like Fatalism, Determinism, Indeterminism, and Self-Determinism. It starts with the age-old question: are humans truly free to make their own choices, or is everything in life already decided? The article looks at this debate by examining how fate and freedom interact. Drawing from Western philosophy, it discusses ideas from famous thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, and Locke, showing how they contributed to (...) the understanding of free will. It also includes insights from Islamic philosophy, focusing on the Jabariya and Qadariya schools of thought, and how they view the balance between divine control and human freedom, supported by Quranic interpretations and scholarly analysis. The article goes further by looking at how free will plays out in real life-within families, societies, and political systems-where people’s freedom is often limited by external pressures. It also touches on the link between free will and morality, suggesting that true freedom should come with a sense of responsibility to do what is right. In conclusion, the article compares different views on free will, pointing out their strengths and weaknesses. It emphasizes the need for a balance between personal freedom and social responsibility, highlighting how understanding free will shapes our lives and communities. (shrink)

This article argues for a novel approach to the measurement of freedom of choice, on which the availability of an option is a matter of degree, rather than a bivalent matter of being either available or not. This approach is motivated by case studies involving weakness of will, where deficiencies in willpower seem to impair individual freedom by making certain alternatives much harder to pursue. This approach is perfectly general, however: its graded analysis of option availability can (...) be extended to cases where weakness of will is not involved and can be used to generalize numerous existing measures of freedom. (shrink)

Manipulation by another person often undermines freedom. To explain this, a distinction is drawn between two forms of manipulation: indoctrination is defined as causing another person to respond to reasons in a pattern that serves the manipulator’s ends; coercion as supplying another person with reasons that, given the pattern in which he responds to reasons, lead him to act in ways that serve the manipulator’s ends. It is argued that both forms of manipulation undermine freedom because manipulators track (...) the compliance of their victims, while neutral causal mechanisms do not. Manipulators see to it that their victims comply even in the face of forces that threaten to derail them from the manipulator’s desired course. It is suggested that this has an impact on freedom because part of what we desire in wanting to be free is the availability of forms of life very different from those we actually enjoy. (shrink)

_Freedom of the Will_ provides a novel interpretation of G. E. Moore’s famous conditional analysis of free will and discusses several questions about the meaning of free will and its significance for moral responsibility. Although Moore’ theory has a strong initial appeal, most metaphysicians believe that there are conclusive arguments against it. Huoranszki argues that the importance of conditional analysis must be reevaluated in light of some recent developments in the theory of dispositions. The original analysis can be (...) amended so that the revised conditional account is not only a good response to determinist worries about the possibility of free will, but it can also explain the sense in which free will is an important condition of moral responsibility. This study addresses three fundamental issues about free will as a metaphysical condition of responsibility. First, the book explains why agents are responsible for their actions or omissions only if they have the ability to do otherwise and shows that the relevant ability is best captured by the revised conditional analysis. Second, it aims to clarify the relation between agents’ free will and their rational capacities. It argues that free will as a condition of responsibility must be understood in terms of agents’ ability to do otherwise rather than in terms of their capacity to respond to reasons. Finally, the book explains in which sense responsibility requires self-determination and argues that it is compatible with agents’ limited capacity to control their own character, reasons, and motives. (shrink)

Dieser Aufsatz hält es für angeraten, einen bisher vernachlässigten Aspekt der Leibnizschen Gedanken bezüglich der Willensfreiheit, nämlich die Rolle der Rationalität, näher zu betrachten. Von den drei für die Freiheit notwendigen Bedingungen gehört nur die Rationalität all denjenigen Menschen, die frei sind, und ihnen ausschließlich an. Kontingenz und Spontaneität können die Handlungen unfreier Menschen kennzeichnen. Die Rolle der Rationalität erscheint in klarem licht, wenn man sie in die Reihe folgender zueinander in Beziehung stehender Konzepte stellt: Kraft, Wahrnehmung, Tätigsein, Vollkommenheit, Schönheit, (...) Weisheit, Liebe, Gerechtigkeit, Glück. Kritische Bemerkungen und im Sinne Leibnizens gegebene Antworten gegen Ende dieses Aufsatzes dienen nicht nur dem Zweck, Leibniz' Stellung zu beurteilen, sondern auch dem Zweck, seine Gedanken bezüglich dieses Themas näher zu erläutern. (shrink)

The idea of freedom of the will seems to conflict with the principle of causal efficacy implicit in many theories of mind. The conflict is normally resolved within a compatibilist view whereby the desires and beliefs of the agent, replete with a respectable if yet to be elucidated causal pedigree, are taken to be the basis of individual freedom. The present view is an alternative which erects mental content on a framework of rule following and then argues (...) that rule‐following is conceptually distinct from causally produced activity. The normative aspect of rule‐following defies reduction to descriptive or dispositional terms. According to this view we cannot get beyond the agent as a self‐determining rational individual in formulating a theory of mind and action. The theory is neo‐Kantian in that it identifies rules or conceptions of laws as central in human thought. It, follows Wittgenstein's treatment of rule‐following and generates a plausible (but non‐causal) account of mental explanation and weakness of the will. (shrink)

Edwards’s views on the nature of the human will demonstrate his unique ability to unite philosophical rigor and theological fervor. Edwards was a staunch defender of the Reformed doctrines of absolute divine sovereignty and meticulous providence, but he was also a proponent of the intellectual tools and methods of early modern philosophy (and of John Locke in particular). His ultimate statement of his doctrinal position, Freedom of the Will, is the masterful result of these dual commitments.

It might be the case that absence of constraint is the relevant sense of ' freedom' when we are discussing the freedom of the will, but it needs arguing for. ...

There are statements in the Qur'an that Satan has an influence on human will. In many verses, it is recalled that the devil and his followers are the greatest enemy of mankind, and they set up traps to mislead humans. The expressions that are related to these satans from humans and demons make people think that they are desperate against their traps and cause some questions about whether human beings have full freedom in their actions. As a matter (...) of fact, there are some interpretations in opposition to the freedom of will in the commentary sources regarding these verses. In some passages in the Qur'an it is emphasized that the traps set up by the devil are weak and can be overcome. This situation makes it necessary to evaluate the issue in terms of theology. As a matter of fact, the attempts of the devils to divert human freedom were handled along with the subjects of human freedom and responsibility in their actions in Kalam sources; and discussed in the light of human actions, the role of will in actions and freedom of will. In this study, how misguided actions of the devil and his followers affect the human will and whether this influence brings a limitation to the free will; will be discussed together with the relevant theological discussions. (shrink)

It is my view that one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will. Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call "first-order desires" or "desires of (...) the first order," which are simply desires to do or not to do one thing or another. No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires. (shrink)

이 연구에서 나는 칸트 철학에서 지성(Verstand)과 자유의 문제를 다룬다. 우선 나는 칸트에게서 지성의 자발성(die Spontaneität des Verstandes)은 몇몇 연구자들의 주장과 달리 상대적 자발성이 아니라 절대적 자발성이라고 주장한다. 그리고 나는, 기존의 연구들과 달리, 지성의 자발적 작용은 의지의 자유를 전제한다고 주장한다. 끝으로 나는 인식의 영역에서 지성의 자발성과 자유의지가 자유의 선험적 이념(die transzendentale Idee)에 의존한다고 주장한다. 칸트 철학에서 자발성은 이성적 존재자로서의 인간을 특징짓는 가장 중요한 개념이다. 인간의 행위가 자발적이라는 것은 인간의 행위의 근거가 인간 자신 안에 놓여 있다는 것을 의미한다. 이성적 존재자로서의 인간의 행위는 (...) 자기 규정적 활동이며 인간은 자발적 능력으로 인해 자신의 행위에 책임이 있는 일종의 자기원인(causa sui)이 된다. 나는 이 같은 자발성의 이론이 칸트의 인식 주체에게도 적용될 수 있다고 생각한다. (shrink)

This study will examine how Dāvūd al-Qarṣī, an 18th-century Ottoman scholar, resolved the paradox between human freewill and God being the creator of everything in his work Risālâh fi’l-ikhtiyārāt al-juzʾiyyah wa’l-irādāt al-qalbiyyah. In addition, in this study, the critical edition and translation of the risālah will also be provided. The treatise which is the subject of the present study is a link in the series of works written under the title of human acts in the Islamic thought tradition (...) regarding al-irādah al-juzʾiyyah, afʿāl al-ʿibād, khalq al-aʿmāl, qaḍā, and qadar. This risālah is one of the rare examples prepared with the method of “mamzūj annotation (sharḥ)”, which is a method in which “text” and “annotation” are intertwined. Qarṣī examines in detail a total of seven views, four of which are famous (mashhūr) and three of which are non-famous, about voluntary acts. Qarṣī interprets the approaches and views of the non-famous sects and includes them in the famous sects and allocates approximately 4/3 of the work to these sects. In the final stage of the work, the author states that the view of Māturīdīs is parallel with the predecessor’s (Salaf) view of “Neither jabr nor tafwīḍ; rather, it is merely a situation between these two approaches.” Qarṣī, who was inspired by Athīrī Maḥmad Afandī (d. 1092/1681), says that voluntary acts come about by the sum of “two powers (qudrat)”, “two wishes (mashīʾat)” and “one taqwīn”. Also, according to this, the first four of them are proximate causes, while the attribute taqwīn is the influencing factor. Qarṣī acts from the meanings of the term action (fiʿl) and the “theory of state (ḥāl)” in order to prove that human beings are true agents (fāʿil) on the one hand and to protect God’s attribute of creation on the other. In fact, the concept of “state (ḥāl)”, used in understanding divine attributes and some ontological issues, was applied to acts by the Māturīdī mutakallim Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa al-Thānī (d. 747/1346). Thus, a doctrine of action was developed, and this doctrine was accepted and used by the later period Māturīdī mutakallims. With reference to Ṣadr al-Sharīʿa, Qarṣī tries to justify the issue based on the meanings of the the term action and the modes of existence of these meanings. He says that action has two implications; one of them is the “infinitive meaning” (al-maʿnā al-maṣdarī) and the other is “the thing that comes with this infinitive meaning (al-ḥāṣıl bi-maṣdar)”. The infinitive meaning of the act constitutes the “non-thing aspect” of the action, and the meaning of the action that is created with the infinitive indicates “the thing aspect” thereof. Thus, because the aspect of the action that is not existentand therefore not a thing is not subject to creation, the agency and responsibility of human beings are grounded. Similarly, Qarṣī maintains that the mashīʾat, which means will, qaṣd and al-irādah al-juzʾiyyah, was not created because its existence in humans is in the form of succession and it is of a state-like (ḥāl) existenceOn this account. Qarṣī manages to preserve both human freewill and the absolute creativity of God due to the non-existent and non-thing aspect of the act on the one hand, and will (irādah), mashīʾat and qaṣd not being subjected to creation on the other. (shrink)

This thesis is an investigation into free will, and the role of alternative possibilities. I defend an incompatibilist notion of freedom, but argue that such freedom is not exercised in all cases of decision-making. I begin by considering the debate surrounding Harry Frankfurt’s famous argument that alternative possibilities are irrelevant to freedom. I argue that the main disagreement can be best understood by considering the dispute surrounding the 'Flicker-of-Freedom' objection, which contends that there are still (...) alternatives left open in Frankfurt's example. Compatibilists have argued that any such alternatives are outside the agent’s voluntary control and hence irrelevant. But the arguments for this conclusion commit the compatibilist to the more general claim that volitions are not within agents' voluntary control, and incompatibilism is generally motivated by a rejection this claim - so if we could support this claim, we would refute incompatibilism without appealing to Frankfurt’s argument. This disagreement about whether volitions are within agents' voluntary control has not received much attention in recent years, despite figuring implicitly in the debate. But in previous centuries, this figured explicitly as the main focus. I consider the historical debate, started by the famous dispute between Hobbes and Bramhall, and continuing throughout the eighteenth century. Although the libertarian position better captures our ordinary conception of freedom, compatibilists argue that it introduces freedom-undermining irrationality, and randomness of the sort that is either unhelpful or incoherent. Whilst for many cases of decision-making, these challenges are justified, they are not justified in cases involving a particular kind of reasons conflict. I argue that decisions are free in cases of this sort, but we cannot have incompatibilist freedom more generally. However, I also argue that these are the most important cases, given the nature of our concerns about freedom. By restricting the domain of incompatibilist freedom to just these cases, we can avoid introducing irrationality, or randomness of the sort that has made incompatibilism seem incoherent, whilst preserving the incompatibilist's intuition that an important sense of freedom rests on alternative possibilities. (shrink)

Schopenhauer's prize essay On the Freedom of Will is one of the classics of Western philosophy, dealing with the question of free will versus determinism. His treatment of the problem of free will is by no means obsolete, containing penetrating reflections relevant to contemporary discussion. The argument of the essay is clearly and rigorously presented, and reveals many basic features of Schopenhauer's thought. As such, it forms a useful introduction to Schopenhauer's philosophy in general. Equally, the (...) essay can be studied with profit independently of Schopenhauer's metaphysical views. This new edition of the sole English translation of this classic text contains and expanded bibliography, index and preface in which the translator comments on recent scholarship on Schopenhauer. The translator's introduction puts the essay into the context of Schopenhauer's general philosophy and suggests some possible criticisms of his position. (shrink)

This monograph deals with the controversy about determinism versus freedom of will. The book is addressed to scholars, especially in the areas of philosophy and psychology, and also to thinking and serious-minded laypersons who are interested in the implications of being human. The book attempts to help the reader understand and resolve the dilemma of determinism. The solution offered by this book has not been previously offered by any other book, even though the literature on this topic is (...) vast. The deterministic position is that all events are effects of previous events and causes of future events, in inexorable cause-effect sequences, which leave no room for intervention of anything outside of the stream of causal relationships, such as free will, thus rendering moral responsibility meaningless. Libertarians believe in freedom of will which is, for them, indispensable for moral responsibility. This controversy can be resolved only by making a clear distinction between two kinds of freedom. In common parlance, freedom means freedom from constraint or compulsion, which can be designated as contra-constraintual freedom. The second meaning of freedom is freedom from causation, which has been referred to as contra-causal freedom, and this is the meaning that is inherent in the concept of freedom of will. If we have contra-causal freedom, we can choose or decide to act irrespective of antecedent conditions including our own past. The distinction between contra-causal freedom and contra-constraintual freedom is the key to the resolution of the controversy between determinism and libertarianism. The absence of contra-causal freedom prevails at the theoretical, conceptual, objective, abstract, or as-is level, whereas contra-constraintual freedom functions at the practical, behavioral, subjective, concrete, or as-if level. All we need for moral responsibility is contra-constraintual freedom, and not contra-causal freedom. At the as-is level, there is neither freedom nor dignity, neither morality nor accountability, and neither purpose nor meaning for human existence. It is only at the as-if level that these terms make any sense at all. In theory there is no choice from alternative courses of action in light of the absence of contra-causal freedom; in practice there is, in direct proportion to contra-constraintual freedom. (shrink)

Stoic philosophers had to face the accusation of incoherence, self-contradiction and Paradoxes since ancient times. Plutarch in his Moralia writes against them; Cicero devotes a separate work on stoic paradoxes. Even in contemporary Literature there are still discussions on the possibility of such an incoherence and existence of paradoxes in the stoic theory. At first glance, stoic Cosmology gives the impression to both accept a kind of Determinism, and at the same time it undoubtedly argues for the moral agent’s (...) class='Hi'>freedom of the Will. In pre-stoic or even other contemporary to Stoicism Philosophical Traditions, the definitions that these two terms/concepts are given, fairly accuse as incoherent any Theory that does not set them as “contraries”. Under these types of accusations, the stoic Cosmology and Theory of the Freedom of the Will is often to be included. This phenomenal self-contradiction inside the Principles of Stoicism becomes even more obvious in Epictetus, a philosopher of the Late Stoa. He is interested in practical ethics, thus the phenomenal contradiction gets more lucid. This would have augmented the criticism of the Stoic philosophy for incoherence, if Epictetus had not made his main philosophical aim/target : the clarification of how an agent’s Will can be Free inside a Universe ruled by Fate/Destiny ; namely, a Universe merely Determined by Nature’s/God’s Will. Epictetus’ originality appears in the way he interrelates the concept of Freedom of the Will with the concept of Destiny and Determinism, in order to accomplish their simultaneous co-existence. This approach guards him against being easily accused for incoherence and self-contradiction. Through the unique way he understands and defines the Moral Agency, which is the agent’s internal state/condition/disposition, he steers towards an integrated, accomplished, strong and coherent line of argument. This sturdy declaration is able to support the weight of the Consent to a Free Will, and thus a certain kind Freedom of the moral agent. The excellence of this line of argument is that it can bear also the burden of the Consent to the phenomenally contrary concept of Determinism and Destiny. The elements used to the construction of this argument, which is stretched throughout the whole epictetean corpus can be summarised to a few key concepts, which are: the things which are in our power and the things which are not in our power, the concept of Freedom. These concepts work towards his philosophical targeting, because of the special definition he gives them. Axiomatically Epictetus states that in order for man to be free, it is necessary to be liberated from what the body forces him to do. Desires, passions and beliefs are considered as elements which are external to the moral agent. The moral agent “shrinks” into the Will. Thus man has the capability to free himself from anything external to his Will and therefore to harmonise his own Will to the Will of Nature/God; namely, to will what Nature/God wills and thus never conflict to the external facts. Consequently, Epictetus’ solution, is to include in the category of τά οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν anything that he defines as external to the prohairesis: the desires, beliefs, passions and in general anything the body entails, the external facts. Thus the prohairesis, remains unhindered and it is completely depended on man’s power ; as characteristically Epictetus writes, “not even Zeus himself can overpower” the prohairesis. -/- Dissertation for the MSc Ancient Philosophy (2008-2009) at The University of Edinburgh, supervised by Inna Kupreeva. (shrink)

In his book “Schiller as Philosopher”, Frederick Beiser laments that “contemporary Kant scholars have been intent on ignoring him. If they know anything at all about Schiller, it is only as the author of an epigram satirizing Kant”. Therefore, Beiser calls us “to consider Schiller as a philosopher, to reconstruct and appraise the arguments of his philosophical writings” (Beiser, 2005, p. vii). In this paper, I shall argue that it is Schiller's conception of freedom of the will as (...) “heautonomy” that stands behind his critique and modification of Kant's ethics. However, the systematic significance of Schiller's theory of freedom is not obvious. Its argumentative structure must first be reconstructed—as Beiser has demanded—because it is concealed by an esthetic discourse. A reconstruction of Schiller's theory of freedom shows that he contrasts his concept of heautonomy as individual self‐determination with the Kantian concept of an autonomy or autocracy of reason by the universal moral law. Schiller's own philosophical contribution to the debate on freedom after Kant must therefore not be understood as a mere esthetic balancing and softening of Kant's ethical rigorism. Rather, it shows serious transformations of Kant's approach, which justifies understanding it as a critical step beyond Kant's theory of the autonomy of reason. (shrink)

Rewiew of Hausmannn, M., & Noller, J... Free Will. Historical and Analytic Perspectives. Cham: Springer; Palgrave Macmillan.

In his book "Freedom of the Will: A Conditional Analysis", Ferenc Huoranszki tries to defend improved and amended version of the conditional analysis of free will. In my critical review, taking chapters 2 and 4 of his book as the most crucial for his theory, I try to show that incompatibilism is still more persuasive and that amended conditional analysis is not compatible with determinism. Despite my criticism, I consider this book as a significant contribution to the (...) free will debate. (shrink)

The so-called theory of karma is one of the distinguishing aspects of Hinduism and other non-Hindu south-Asian traditions. At the same time that the theory can be seen as closely connected with the freedom of will and action that we humans supposedly have, it has many times been said to be determinist and fatalist. The purpose of this paper is to analyze in some deepness the relations that are between the theory of karma on one side and determinism, (...) fatalism and free-will on the other side. In order to do that, I shall use what has been described as the best formal approach we have to indeterminism: branching time theory. More specifically, I shall introduce a branching time semantic framework in which, among other things, statements such as “state of affairs e is a karmic effect of agent a”, “a wills it to be the case that e” and “e is inevitable” could be properly represented. (shrink)

Doctor Farrer discusses the Libertarian-Determinist controversy in terms of mind and body, speech and conduct, nature and spirit, and responsibility and value. It should be of interest to philosophers from both schools of thought.

Excerpt from The Doctrine of the Freedom of the Will in Fichte's Philosophy This essay is a critical study of the doctrine of the freedom of the will, as found in Fichte's philosophy, and especially in his ethical treatises. In Part I. the attempt has been made to give a fair and just exposition of what Fichte really taught on the subject, and, in order that the exposition should be distorted as little as possible through misinterpretation, (...) exact quotations have been given wherever it seemed practicable to do so. Part II. is devoted to a critical examination of the validity of the doctrine as it is presented by Fichte. Fichte's own works are the basis of the essay, and the references are to Johann Gottlieb Fichte's Sammtliche Werke, herausgegeben von J. H. Fichte. The name of the treatise quoted from, or referred to, has been stated in each case, in order that the significance of the quotation may be the better understood. I am under special obligation to President J. G. Schurman for his encouragement, inspiration, and criticism given in the direction of the work; and to Professor J. E. Creighton, under whose efficient leadership my serious study of Fichte's philosophy was first undertaken. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.". (shrink)

Lucas plays off his understandings of the problem of freedom and Gödel's Theorem, concluding that, "... a human being cannot be represented by a logistic calculus and therefore cannot be described completely in terms of physical variables, all of whose values are completely determined by the conjunction of their values at some earlier time". Lucas approaches the problem of freedom from the perspective of a computer programmer. His argument is as follows. Men can construct a logistic calculus, L, (...) of which Gödel's theorem is a theorem. Gödel's theorem is known-by-men-to-be-true, which is a fact. Facts have ontological status. Any attempt to represent this fact by a definite description must result in an infinite regress of meta-L's, for a Gödel theorem can be constructed in any meta-L powerful enough to show that Gödel's theorem is a theorem of L. Accordingly, men can do something which cannot be represented within L; men are therefore undeterminable. Lucas's position amounts to a rethinking of Fichte's position, set in the metaphor of meta-mathematical logic. However, whereas Fichte concluded that a man can choose to posit that he is free, and thereby make himself free, Lucas concludes that all men are free since some men know that Gödel's theorem is true. One question suggested by Lucas's argument is ontological, and another is epistemological. First, what is the ontological status of facts? Secondly, what is the distinction between knowing-that-p and showing-that-p? Ultimately, Lucas's demonstration pivots on equating the-completeness-of-L with knowing-the-completeness-of-L. It remains to be shown that that which is capable of knowing-that-p is governed in the act of knowing-that-p by the conditions which determine p.--M. D. P. [[sic]]. (shrink)

The author, who pioneered this argument in 1961, here places it in the context of traditional discussions of the problem, and answers various criticisms that have been made.

This powerful study of freedom is the first volume of a new edition of Edwards' work under the general editorship of Perry Miller. The editors intend to publish the manuscript material as well as the printed works. This volume is handsome and well printed; Ramsey contributes a solid introduction outlining Edwards' argument and the relation of his thought to Locke, Berkeley, and Leibniz.--A. C. P.

The author, who pioneered this argument in 1961, here places it in the context of traditional discussions of the problem, and answers various criticisms that have been made.

The Buddha, unlike the Upaniṣadic or Brahmanical way, has avoided the concept of the self, and it seems to be left with limited conceptual possibilities for free will and moral responsibility. Now, the question is, if the self is crucial for free will, then how can free will be conceptualized in the Buddhist ‘no-self’ (anattā) doctrine. Nevertheless, the Buddha accepts a dynamic notion of cetanā (intention/volition), and it explicitly implies that he rejects the ultimate or absolute (...) class='Hi'>freedom of the will, but not the minimal power of free will. It seems that the Buddha’s view shifts from agent causation (independent ownership) to a causal sequence of impersonal processes (psychophysical factors). This paper claims to shed clarity on ‘whether free will is viable in the context of the anattāvāda in Buddhism.’ It mainly studies the secondary sources (even though it has also discussed the primary sources) and their interpretations of freedom of the will and how it further does argue for a compatibility approach of free will in Buddhist thought. (shrink)

Can absolute freedom of will be defended by arguing that apparent cases of diminished freedom when we act out of passion are cases of weakness of will? Rogers Albritton thought so. What is intriguing about Albritton's view is that he thought when we act from desire we are making choices, yet our desires are not functioning as reasons for those choices. So our desires must be influencing our choices in some other unspecified way that does not (...) diminish our freedom. I challenge the coherence of this position. My strategy is to examine the views of leading theorists of the will – Descartes, Aquinas and Reid – to argue that the only clear way in which passions can influence our choices so that we can accurately be described as weak-willed and yet nevertheless free is that our passions influence our choices by providing reasons for them. (shrink)

There is a long-standing interest in business ethics around the concept of free will, but study of its possible influence on consumer behavior is only in the nascent stage. This lack of research is particularly acute in certain consumption contexts, especially ones based on highly restricted access that appear to suggest abrogation of the will. In this paper, we offer a novel approach that involves reexamination of qualitative/ethnographic research that has chronicled consumption restrictions without consideration of potential implications (...) for free will. Using a new reanalysis method, we show that some of what is described as “vulnerability” using other theoretical paradigms is subsumed within this domain. Findings demonstrate that a complex relationship between free will and various consumption processes and outcomes exists that is acted out within and outside licit and illicit/formal and informal markets. These restrictions allow for a different vantage point to address free will and consumption, with implications for business ethicists and researchers interested in human quality treatment or human dignity-centered business frameworks. (shrink)

In his influential paper, “Freedom and Resentment,” P. F. Strawson argued that our ordinary practices of holding persons morally responsible and related reactive attitudes were wholly “internal” to the practices themselves and could be insulated from traditional philosophical and metaphysical concerns, including concerns about free will and determinism. This “insulation thesis” is a controversial feature of Strawson’s influential paper; and it has had numerous critics. The first purpose of this paper is to explain my own reasons for thinking (...) that our practices of holding responsible cannot be entirely insulated from incompatibilist concerns about freedom and determinism. The second purpose is to argue that these incompatibilist concerns are in fact legitimate concerns: There are sound reasons to believe that our ordinary practices of holding persons morally responsible do require at least sometimes in our lives that we must be capable of acting freely in a manner that is not determined. I defend this thesis by spelling out why I believe various compatibilist strategies attempting to show that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism fail to show this. In the course of this critique, a general theme will emerge: In order to do full justice to our ordinary practices of holding persons responsible and the freedoms thus involved, one must distinguish between different types of freedom, and in particular, between freedom of action and freedom of will. (shrink)