A critique of the hypothesis of extended cognition.

That about sums up what is wrong with Clark's view.

Socializing Epistemology: An Introduction through Two Sample Issues Frederick F. Schmitt Social epistemology is the conceptual and normative study of the ...

In his introduction Professor Edwards remarks that he does not believe that the work will be condemned "as either dull or timid", whatever else may be said about it. And, in the main, he is right in this belief. It is hardly feasible of course to maintain a uniform policy of scintillating provocativeness when one is summarizing the ideas of some rather obscure thinkers or dealing with some highly technical matter. But on controversial issues articles are often lively and make (...) no pretense of Olympian detachment. Some articles, even though useful, may be a bit flat. But the work as a whole certainly does not give this impression. (shrink)

Writing under the pseudonym "Jotabeche," José Joaquín Vallejo wrote forty-one short articles on Chilean life and society in the early republic. Known for their caustic wit, his writings were an instant success when they were first published in Chilean magazines and newspapers. This volume presents these vivid essays for the first time in English. Vallejo made famous the style of writing termed "costumbrista"—sketches and vignettes of society and local customs. He focused on the Norte Chico, or the mining zone of (...) Copiapó where he was born and where he lived most of his later life. His essays include vivid studies of mineworkers; the advancement of modernity in the steamships at Caldera; the religious, intensely cultural province of Copiapó; and the general atmosphere of liberalism beginning to pervade the country of Chile during that time. Considered the founder of his country's "genuinely national literature," he is the first creative writer of stature to emerge in Chile after the country's wars of independence. A provincial northerner, his writings give a sense of what these parts of Chile looked and felt like during the years of the early Chilean republic, and are consequently of ultimate value. (shrink)

This paper considers the debate over how we attribute beliefs, desires, and other mental states to our fellows. Do we employ a theory of mind? Or do we use simulational brain mechanisms, but employ no theory? One point of dispute between these theories focuses upon our ability to have empathic knowledge of the mind of another. I consider whether an argument posed by Ravenscroft settles the debate in favor of Simulation Theory. I suggest that the consideration of empathy does not (...) settle the dispute. Then I look at recent results from false memory research and other research employing neural imaging. I suggest that new discoveries there may help shape the future of the empirical dimension of the debate. (shrink)

Theological stateist theories, the most well-known of which is Divine Command Theory (DCT), ground our moral obligations directly in some state of God. The prior obligations objection poses a challenge to theological stateism. Is there a moral obligation to obey God’s commands? If no, it is hard to see how God’s commands can generate any moral obligations for us. If yes, then what grounds this prior obligation? To avoid circularity, the moral obligation must be grounded independent of God’s commands; and (...) therefore DCT fails to ground all moral obligations in God’s commands. I argue that DCT proponents should embrace “metaethical DCT.” On this view, there is no moral obligation to obey God. God creates our moral obligations out of normative nothingness. I argue that this helps DCT proponents to escape the prior obligations objection. Other theological stateist theories can modify their theory similarly to meet this objection. (shrink)

Frederick G. Whelan relates Hume's political theory to the other parts of his philosophy, including his epistemology, his account of human nature, and his ethics, emphasizing the unity of the whole. Originally published in 1985. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal (...) of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

A collection of essays by Frederick J.E. Woodbridge that show the changes and developments in an essentially constant philosophy, and presents a unified view of the author's constructive ideas and metaphysical position.

This book describes how scientists bring their own interests and passions to their work, illustrates the dynamics between researchers and the research community ...

In recent years, Duncan Pritchard has developed a position in religious epistemology called quasi‐fideism that he claims traces back to John Henry Newman's treatment of the rationality of religious belief. In this paper, we give three reasons to think that Pritchard's reading of Newman as a quasi‐fideist is mistaken. First, Newman's parity argument does not claim that religious and non‐religious beliefs are on a par because both are groundless; instead, for Newman, they are on a par because both often stem (...) from implicit rather than explicit reasoning. Second, pace Pritchard, Newman's distinction between simple and complex assent does not map onto the Wittgensteinian distinction between groundless hinge commitments and beliefs that flow from these hinges. For Newman, simple and complex assent differ in terms of the believer's level of awareness of their grounds. Third, and finally, Newman does not reject Locke's evidentialism in toto. Instead, he argues that certitude is not restricted to beliefs stemming from intuition and demonstration but often rightly includes probabilistically supported (or fallibly evidenced) beliefs. (shrink)

1. Do models formulated in programming languages use explicit rules where connectionist models do not? 2. Are rules as found in programming languages hard, precise, and exceptionless, where connectionist rules are not? 3. Do connectionist models use rules operating on distributed representations where models formulated in programming languages do not? 4. Do connectionist models fail to use structure sensitive rules of the sort found in "classical" computer architectures? In this chapter we argue that the answer to each of these questions (...) is negative. (shrink)

I defend the consistency of affirming the right to life while rejecting universal healthcare and liveable income programmes. I also defend the rationality of accepting inconsistency.

Gödel's theorem seems to me to prove that Mechanism is false, that is, that minds cannot be explained as machines. So also has it seemed to many other people: almost every mathematical logician I have put the matter to has confessed to similar thoughts, but has felt reluctant to commit himself definitely until he could see the whole argument set out, with all objections fully stated and properly met.1 This I attempt to do.

The four essays in this volume examine the most central issues that face liberal democratic regimes. They tackle the protection of individual liberty, the basic principles of ethics, the benefits and the costs of representative institutions, and the central importance of gender equality in society.

In an inspirational act of faith and hope, nearly one hundred contributors--social activists, thinkers, artists and spiritual leaders--reflect with poignant candor on our shared human condition and attempt to define a core set of human values in our rapidly changing socity. Contributors include: * The Dalai Lama * Wilma Mankiller * Oscar Arias * Jimmy Carter * Cornel West * Jack Miles * Mother Teresa * Nancy Willard * Elie Wiesel * James Earl Jones * Joan Chittister * Mary Evelyn (...) Tucker * Vaclav Havel * Archbishop Desmund Tutu What Does It Mean To Be Human? is a vital meditation on the endless possibilities of our humanity. (shrink)

I explain what haecceities are and the role they play in our thought and talk about specific individual things, whether those things are concrete or abstract. Everything that can be referred to by using a singular term has a haecceity. I distinguish between singular terms and general terms, on the one hand, and subject terms and predicate terms, on the other. I distinguish three types of sentence: singular predications; general predications; and singular quantifications. I show how singular predications can be (...) eliminated without loss of content, provided we have singular quantifications as well as general predications. This should not be confused with Quine’s “elimination of singular terms.” I say a few words about propositions. (shrink)