"Der Beitrag verhandelt den Begriff des Muts und beginnt diese Verhandlung ausgehend von der Frage, wie eine Kategorie, die die Geschichte der Philosophie zu durchziehen scheint, gegenwärtig an Relevanz und Einfluss verlieren kann. Er identifiziert den Grund dafür in der aristotelischen Bestimmung des Muts als männlich-militärischer Tugend und setzt dieser Bestimmung in der Folge eine Neubestimmung entgegen, die zu denken versucht, was weiblicher Mut sein kann. The paper discusses the concept of courage, starting from the question of how it is (...) possible that a category, which seems to permeate the history of philosophy, currently loses its relevance and influence. It identifies the rea- son for this in the Aristotelian definition of courage as a male and military virtue, and subsequently confronts it with a new definition, trying to imagine what female courage could be like. ". (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Der Islam Jahrgang: 93 Heft: 2 Seiten: 585-588.

This paper is concerned with the reconstruction of a core argument that can be extracted from Street’s ‘Darwinian Dilemma’ and that is intended to ‘debunk’ moral realism by appeal to evolution. The argument, which is best taken to have the form of an undermining defeater argument, fails, I argue. A simple, first formulation is rejected as a non sequitur, due to not distinguishing between the evolutionary process that influences moral attitudes and the cognitive system generating moral attitudes. Reformulations that respect (...) the distinction and that could make the argument valid, however, bring in an implausible premise about an implication from evolutionary influence to unreliability. Crucially, perception provides a counterexample, and the fitness contribution of reliably accurate representation has to be taken into account. Then the moral realist can explain why and how evolution indirectly cares for the truth of moral attitudes. The one and only condition that has to be satisfied in order for this explanation to work is the sufficient epistemic accessibility of moral facts. As long as the moral facts are sufficiently reliably representable, one can see how evolution could favor getting it right about the moral facts. Interestingly, apart from this epistemic constraint no further constraint and, in particular, no objectivity constraint on what the moral facts have to be like can be derived. Thus, the only problem for the moral realist is to make good on epistemic access to moral facts—an old problem, not a new one. (shrink)

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Of Water and the Spirit: Ritual, Magic, and Initiation in the Life of an African Shaman. Malidoma Patrick Someé. New York: G.P Putnam's Sons, 1994. 311pp. $22.95 (cloth).

This paper argues that the deconstructionist reading of Heidegger does not take fully into account the subtleties of his account of temporality. These subtleties include the mutually effacing character of being and temporality which allows for the event of disclosure to happen. The paper concludes that Heidegger's version of temporality can be upheld without conflating it with a view of time defined merely as flux.

Considerable fragmentation, and awareness of it, have characterized the field of psychology since its inception. It is suggested that over the years, efforts to reduce uncertainty and overcome fragmentation in psychology have clustered around two broad, opposite strategies which might be termed "scientism" and "constructionism." The first wishes to rely on secure methods and controlled experimentation, the second on a postmodern acceptance of radical heterogeneity and "no truth through method." Some of the shortcomings of these strategies are discussed. A hermeneutic (...) approach centering on dialogue and the idea of social inquiry as a kind of ethical practice is outlined which, it is argued, might have success in incorporating some of the virtues and avoiding the pitfalls of other responses to the problem of fragmentation. (shrink)