Transcententals such as 'being', 'one', 'good', and 'something' are part and parcel of the medieval heritage in Aristotelian philosophy. Since transcendentals must be predicated of every particular thing, they are essential both to argumentation and to metaphysics, specifically to the theory of Platonic Forms. Lorenzo Valla (1407-1457) hence concluded that 'thing' (res) is the only transcendental, distinct from metaphysical universality that applies to God exclusively. Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499) in drawing upon Platonism as entailed in the metaphysics of universals and in (...) theology argued that 'one' must be the transcendental that precedes 'being' – at least in God. Related to that was his epistemological claim (which became popular in Cartesianism) that cognition of external reality is controlled by internal ideas, which in Platonic terms originate in God's ideas. Therefore it seemed logical to Tommaso Campanella (1568-1639) to infer that the first three transcendentals (being, true, good) produce the tri-une God in such a way that these refer to all other properties of things (epistemologically and ontologically). Those approaches were known to Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) who endeavored to keep the semantic and the ontological meaning of transcendentals combined by interpreting Platonic Forms as principles of understanding and of creation. In doing so he developed teachings of Thomas Aquinas. – The Jesuit Suárez is known as a leading Aristotelian of the Second Scholasticism. In this chapter his metaphysics is portrayed as an appropriation and a critique of Renaissance Platonism. (shrink)

Vitoria and Suárez defend the categorical immunity of the innocent not to be intentionally killed. But they allow for inflicting collective punishment on the innocent and the noninnocent alike during and after a just war. So they allow for deliberately harming them. Inflicting harm on the innocent can often result in their death. Hence, holding both claims seems incoherent. First, the objections against using the term “innocent” are explained. Second, their views on just war are explored. And third, by appealing (...) to Aquinas' double-effect reasoning, it is shown how they try to avoid the above-mentioned incoherence. Still, their appeal might be insufficient to palliate the tension between the above-mentioned claims. If just wars are possible, the deliberate harming of the innocent is reasonably unavoidable for defeating and punishing those who wage them. Hence, defenders of just wars, whether from a religious or a secular perspective, must live with such a tension. (shrink)