Economists and biologists have proposed a distinction between two mechanisms – “strong” and “weak” reciprocity – that may explain the evolution of human sociality. Weak reciprocity theorists emphasize the benefits of long-term cooperation and the use of low-cost strategies to deter free-riders. Strong reciprocity theorists, in contrast, claim that cooperation in social dilemma games can be sustained by costly punishment mechanisms, even in one-shot and finitely repeated games. To support this claim, they have generated a large body of evidence concerning (...) the willingness of experimental subjects to punish uncooperative free-riders at a cost to themselves. In this article, I distinguish between a “narrow” and a “wide” reading of the experimental evidence. Under the narrow reading, punishment experiments are just useful devices to measure psychological propensities in controlled laboratory conditions. Under the wide reading, they replicate a mechanism that supports cooperation also in “real-world” situations outside the laboratory. I argue that the wide interpretation must be tested using a combination of laboratory data and evidence about cooperation “in the wild.” In spite of some often-repeated claims, there is no evidence that cooperation in the small egalitarian societies studied by anthropologists is enforced by means of costly punishment. Moreover, studies by economic and social historians show that social dilemmas in the wild are typically solved by institutions that coordinate punishment, reduce its cost, and extend the horizon of cooperation. The lack of field evidence for costly punishment suggests important constraints about what forms of cooperation can or cannot be sustained by means of decentralised policing. (shrink)

Thaler and Sunstein justify nudge policies from welfaristic premises: nudges are acceptable because they benefit the individuals who are nudged. A tacit assumption behind this strategy is that we can identify the true preferences of decision-makers. We argue that this assumption is often unwarranted, and that as a consequence nudge policies must be justified in a different way. A possible strategy is to abandon welfarism and endorse genuine paternalism. Another one is to argue that the biases of decision that choice (...) architects attempt to eliminate create externalities. For example, in the case of intertemporal discounting, the costs of preference reversals are not always paid by the discounters, because they are transferred onto other individuals. But if this is the case, then nudges are best justified from a political rather than welfaristic standpoint. (shrink)

The answer in a nutshell is: Yes, five years ago, but nobody has noticed. Nobody noticed because the majority of social scientists subscribe to one of the following views: (1) the ‘anomalous’ behaviour observed in standard prisoner’s dilemma or ultimatum game experiments has refuted standard game theory a long time ago; (2) game theory is flexible enough to accommodate any observed choices by ‘refining’ players’ preferences; or (3) it is just a piece of pure mathematics (a tautology). None of these (...) views is correct. This paper defends the view that GT as commonly understood is not a tautology, that it suffers from important (albeit very recently discovered) empirical anomalies, and that it is not flexible enough to accommodate all the anomalies in its theoretical framework. It also discusses the experiments that finally refuted game theory, and concludes trying to explain why it took so long for experimental game theorists to design experiments that could adequately test the theory. (shrink)

The folk conception of money as an object is not a promising starting point to develop general, explanatory metaphysical accounts of the social world. A theory of institutions as rules in equilibrium is more consistent with scientific theories of money, is able to shed light on the folk view, and side-steps some unnecessary puzzles.

Typical presentism asserts that whatever exists is present. Moderate presentism more modestly claims that all events are present and thus acknowledges past and future times understood in a substantivalist sense, and past objects understood, following Williamson, as “ex-concrete.” It is argued that moderate presentism retains the most valuable features of typical presentism, while having considerable advantages in dealing with its most prominent difficulties.

Hindriks’ paper raises two issues: one is formal and concerns the notion of ‘cost’ in rational choice accounts of norms; the other is substantial and concerns the role of expectations in the modification of payoffs. In this commentary I express some doubts and worries especially about the latter: What’s so special with shared expectations? Why do they induce compliance with norms, if transgression is not associated with sanctions?

I discuss paradoxes of implication in the setting of a proof-conditional theory of meaning for logical constants. I argue that a proper logic of implication should be not only relevant, but also constructive and nonmonotonic. This leads me to select as a plausible candidate LL, a fragment of linear logic that differs from R in that it rejects both contraction and distribution.

In a famous and controversial paper, B. H. Slater has argued against the possibility of paraconsistent logics. Our reply is centred on the distinction between two aspects of the meaning of a logical constant *c* in a given logic: its operational meaning, given by the operational rules for *c* in a cut-free sequent calculus for the logic at issue, and its global meaning, specified by the sequents containing *c* which can be proved in the same calculus. Subsequently, we use the (...) same strategy to counter Quine's meaning variance argument against deviant logics. In a nutshell, we claim that genuine rivalry between (similar) logics *L* and *L'* is possible whenever each constant in *L* has the same operational meaning as its counterpart in *L'* although differences in global meaning arise in at least one case. (shrink)

This is the first book to trace the doctrine of the guise of the good throughout the history of Western philosophy. It offers a chronological narrative exploring how the doctrine was formulated, the arguments for and against it, and the broader role it played in the thought of different philosophers. -/- In recent years there has been a rich debate about whether value judgment or value perception must form an essential part of mental states such as emotions and desires, and (...) whether intentional actions must always be done for reasons that seem good to the agent. This has sparked new theoretical interest in the classical doctrine of the guise of the good: whenever we desire (to do) something, we see it under the guise of the good; that is, we conceive of what we desire as good, desirable, or justified by reasons, in some way or another. This book offers a systematic historical treatment of the guise of the good. The chapters span from Ancient and Medieval philosophy (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas), through the early modern period (Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Hume, Kant) and up to Elizabeth Anscombe's rediscovery in the 20th century after a period of relative neglect. Together they demonstrate how history can offer potential new models of the guise of the good—or new arguments against it—as well as to give a sense of how the guise of the good can bear on other philosophical issues. -/- The Guise of the Good: A Philosophical History is an excellent resource for scholars and students working on the history of ethics, philosophy of action, and practical reason. -/- 1. Introduction 2. Socrates and Plato 3. Aristotle and the Stoics 4. The Canon in Christian Philosophy 5. The Canon Doubted and Reaffirmed (1300-1600) 6. Descartes and Spinoza: Revision and Rejection 7. Empiricism: The Guise of the Good between Desire and Pleasure 8. The Guise of the Good in Hume and Kant 9. After Kant, Before Anscombe 10. Epilogue. A Fresh Start. (shrink)

The Risk of Freedom presents an in-depth analysis of the philosophy of Jan Patočka, one of the most influential Central European thinkers of the twentieth century, examining both the phenomenological and ethical-political aspects of his work. In particular, Francesco Tava takes an original approach to the problem of freedom, which represents a recurring theme in Patočka’s work, both in his early and later writings.Freedom is conceived of as a difficult and dangerous experience. In his deep analysis of this particular (...) problem, Tava identifies the authentic ethical content of Patočka’s work and clarifies its connections with phenomenology, history of philosophy, politics and dissidence. The Risk of Freedom retraces Patočka’s philosophical journey and elucidates its more problematic and less evident traits, such as his original ethical conception, his political ideals and his direct commitment as a dissident. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss and try to remove some major stumbling blocks for a Moorean buck-passing account of reasons in terms of value (MBP): There is a pro tanto reason to favour X if and only if X is intrinsically good, or X is instrumentally good, or favouring X is intrinsically good, or favouring X is instrumentally good. I suggest that MBP can embrace and explain the buck-passing intuition behind the far more popular buck-passing account of value, and has (...) the means to avoid the wrong kind of reasons problem. Further, I counter the common suspicion that a Moorean account cannot make sense of deontological views such as Ross’s, and that it generally leaves no room for agent-relative reasons. In order to do this, I appeal to the idea that a Moorean account does not dictate the substantive view that values have to be maximized. In some cases, expressing them might be a better response. Finally I lay out and reply to a potentially devastating argument to the effect that a Moorean account makes oughts and reasons non-normative. I also criticize Scanlon’s attempt to favour his own buck-passing account via consideration of the open question argument. MBP thus emerges as a live option in the buck-passing debate. (shrink)

In this paper, we support a continuistic reading of Joseph Margolis' philosophy, defending the claim that in the 1970s, Margolis tackled the issues suggested by the analytic philosophy of art from an original theoretical perspective and through conceptual tools exceeding the analytical framework. Later that perspective turned out to be a radically pragmatist one, in which explicitly tolerant realistic claims and non-reductive naturalism converged with radical historicism and contextualism. We will endorse this thesis by focusing on two important concepts appearing (...) in Margolis' aesthetics essays from the late 1950s to the 1970s: the type-token pair and the notion of cultural emergence. On the one hand, we will emphasise Margolis' indebtedness to Peirce's first formulation of the type-token distinction, involving a strong interdependence between the two elements of the pair, as well as an anti-essentialistic, historicised, and contextualised notion of type. On the other hand, we will delve into Margolis' exploration of the concept of emergence and cultural emergence, involving a genuinely pluralistic view of ontology, as well as a non-reductive, continuistic form of naturalism. Finally, we will connect the criticism of the so-called closure of the physical world with Margolis' anti-autonomistic stance in defining artworks. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of how emojis are integrated into the text that they occur with. I use the typology of gestural iconic enrichments proposed by Schlenker (2018a, 2018b) to investigate the hypothesis that emojis denoting objects (e.g., ????) and activities (e.g., ????) project (i.e., interact with logical operators) when co-occurring with text in a similar way as gestures do with speech. In particular, I claim that [i.] emojis generate co-suppositions, i.e., assertion-dependent presuppositions, when immediately following text (e.g., the (...) sentence “John didn’t train today ????” gives rise to the inference that “if John had trained today, weightlifting would have been involved”); [ii.] emojis generate supplements (in the sense of Potts, 2005), just like appositive relative clauses, when they are separated from the accompanying text by a pause (e.g., the sentence “John trained today...????” gives rise to the inference that “John trained today, which involved weightlifting”); [iii.] when used as replacements for words (e.g., “Yesterday, John didn’t ???? ”), emojis have an at-issue semantics and can trigger standard presuppositions. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a reconstruction of the onto-cosmological perspective of Plato’s Timaeus and suggest an interpretation of it in the light of some contemporary approaches to ontology and logic, i.e. “ontological sequentialism” and “fuzzy logic”, attempting to use the categories and language of present-day ontology and logic to examine from a different point of view some aspects of the Timaeus onto-cosmology and of its logical scaffolding.

ABSTRACT The current analytical debate on time is full of attempts to adjudicate from a purely theoretical standpoint among competing temporal ontologies. Little attention has instead been devoted to the existential attitudes -- emotional or ethical -- that may lurk behind, or ensue from, the endorsement of one of them. Some interesting opinions have however been voiced regarding the two most prominent views in the arena, namely eternalism and presentism; it has been said that the former is nourished by a (...) fear of death, or more generally by a desire of preservation for whatever we find precious and valuable, and that the latter is fuelled by a propensity to reap whatever fruits the present brings, as enshrined in the carpe diem motto. This paper explores such a territory by focusing on the reality of past sentience, whether joyful or painful, and on the open future. The first part contrasts the reality of past sentience that comes with eternalism with the denial of this reality that follows from presentism, and argues that from an emotional, or perhaps even moral, standpoint the latter is preferable to the former. The second part clarifies why the eternalist must renounce the open future, whereas presentism is consistent with it, and considers how its rejection or acceptance, as the case may be, could be emotionally, or even morally, significant for our conception of ourselves as free agents. The conclusion offers a tentative proposal regarding which temporal ontology is superior from an existential perspective and some ruminations on the impact that all this may have on the theoretical side of the issue. (shrink)

I present a formal framework historically faithful to Leibniz's analysis of relational sentences, which: (i) engrafts thematic roles and the non-truth-functional connective insofar as (quatenus) into the monadic fragment of first-order logic; (ii) suggests a plausible ontological picture of thematic roles and relational facts; (iii) supports argument deletion and related inferential patterns that are not taken into account by standard first-order logic.

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is gaining momentum in the business world, but several issues continue to challenge managers in charge of sustainability. Supply chain management is one area in which CSR-related activities could potentially drive the process of sustainability within firms. This case presents the way that illycaffè, an Italian coffee producer, has approached CSR. Since 1991, the company has focused on developing a new relationship with Brazilian coffee producers based on networking translated into knowledge transfer—Brazilian producers became responsible for (...) their operations all along the supply line—and innovation translated into quality—one supplier talks about how illycaffè persuaded him he was capable of producing a Ferrari among coffees instead of a Fiat. These two factors not only drive the supplier relationship, but also serve as the drivers of illycaffè’s sustainability strategy. Lessons for managers relate to benefits for the business, for society and for stakeholders, and questions arise about how to replicate illycaffè’s success and create value through values. (shrink)

In recent times, particularly in the last few years, we have observed the rise of numerous Artificial Intelligence and Natural Language Processing semantic technologies. These advancements have subtly yet profoundly transformed our understanding of knowledge and truth, and the mechanisms for expressing, preserving, and disseminating them. This article aims to explore the dual challenge of assessing the effects of Large Language Models and associated semantic technologies on text dissemination and production, especially across the Internet. It specifically examines the implications for (...) trust in online knowledge repositories, the creation of indirect or deliberate forms of ignorance, and the general perception of AI as a critical component of autonomous systems from the users’ viewpoint. The discussion will also consider potential strategies to mitigate the epistemic risks posed by the employment of AI semantic tools, in both suitable and unsuitable scenarios. The suggested approach contributes to the debate on AI intelligence measurement, proposing the evaluation of an AI system’s expected intelligence (as perceived by users) as a means to address the challenges associated with the “knowledge” generated by these systems. My claim is that measuring the expected intelligence in AI systems places humans at the forefront of the issue without necessitating a precise definition of intelligence for AI systems. This approach preserves therefore the essential attribute of these systems: intelligence. (shrink)

Scholarship in rhetorical political analysis and parliamentary studies devoted little attention to study how politicians employ intellectuals’ authority and theories in their discourses. We offer methodological directions to navigate this territory, combining quantitative and qualitative analyses to investigate the employment of Machiavelli’s figure in the Italian Parliament. We show that Machiavelli is regarded as a contested authority and that appeals to his arguments can perform different rhetorical functions, which are countered with different rhetorical tactics. In particular, we show that the (...) right appropriates the realist Machiavelli, especially in foreign policy, both as a national symbol and as a legitimate source of insights on political affairs, while the left and the centre resist these claims with alternative rhetorical tactics. Finally, we provide an original dataset and a new theoretical framework for future explorations of intellectuals and other authoritative figures’ rhetorical influence on politics. (shrink)

Scalability, efficiency, and security had been a persistent problem over the years in data mining, several techniques had been proposed and implemented but none had been able to solve the problem of scalability, efficiency and security from cloud computing. In this research, we solve the problem scalability, efficiency and security in data mining over cloud computing by using a restful web services and combination of different technologies and tools, our model was trained by using different machine learning algorithm, and finally (...) using different validation and cross-validation methods to compare and validate our results. We build, train, test and deploy our model by restful API services which can be called through an endpoint, and with very high accuracy and huge success. (shrink)

We report the latest structural information on PREP1 tumor suppressor, the specific “oncogene” and “tumor suppressive” signatures of MEIS1 and PREP1, the molecular rules regulating PREP1 and MEIS1 binding to DNA, and how these can change depending on the interaction with PBX1, cell‐type, neoplastic transformation, and intracellular concentration. As both PREP1 and MEIS1 interact with PBX1 they functionally compete with each other. PREP1, PBX1, and MEIS1 TALE‐class homeodomain transcription factors act in an interdependent and integrated way in experimental tumorigenesis. We (...) also pool together the plethora of data available in human cancer databanks and connect them with the available molecular information. The emerging picture suggests that a similarly basic approach might be used to better dissect and define other oncogenes and suppressors and better understand human cancer. (shrink)

Husserl develops his reflection on ethics mainly in his lecture courses. These lectures can be divided into two parts, according to a principle that is both chronological and pertaining to content, and following thus the respective editions in the Gesammelte Werke.1 The common aspect of the two different phases of Husserl’s research can be detected in the critical confrontation with Kant’s practical philosophy, starting with the question concerning the formality.

Dans cet article je propose un examen de la lecture traditionnelle du fr. B3 de Parménide (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι), qui suppose une « identité » forte entre penser et être, pour lui préférer l’hypothèse d’une « correspondance » de ce qui est pensable et de ce qui est. Ces considérations me conduisent a défendre une traduction du fr. B3, qui me paraît la moins anachronique: « c’est en effet une seule et même chose que l’on (...) pense et qui est ». Je m’interroge ensuite sur le sens du verbe νοεῖν et des termes apparentés dans le Poème de Parménide (particulièrement dans le fr. B4). Je présente trois options d’interprétation du νοεῖν : 1. comme connaissance purement intellectuelle de l’être vrai (c’est à dire de l’intelligible) ; 2. comme connaissance discursive ou « véritative » qui concerne donc la vérité ou la fausseté d’une proposition ; 3. comme capacité de « réaliser une situation », de « reconnaître » quelque chose ou quelqu’un, en supposant un sens d’« être » qui vise la simple constatation de l’être des choses et du monde sensible. (shrink)

We formally investigate immediate and mediate grounding operators from an inferential perspective. We discuss the differences in behaviour displayed by several grounding operators and consider a general distinction between grounding and logical operators. Without fixing a particular notion of grounding or grounding relation, we present inferential rules that define, once a base grounding calculus has been fixed, three grounding operators: an operator for immediate grounding, one for mediate grounding – corresponding to the transitive closure of the immediate grounding one – (...) and a grounding tree operator, which enables us to internalise chains of immediate grounding claims without losing any information about them. We then present an in-depth proof-theoretical study of the introduced rules by focussing, in particular, on the question whether grounding operators can be considered as logical operators and whether balanced rules for grounding operators can be defined. (shrink)

This paper outlines a version of instantaneous presentism, according to which the present is a point-like instant, and defends it from two prominent objections. The first one has to do with the difficulty of accounting, from the point of view of instantaneous presentism, for the existence of events that take time, dynamic events, which cannot be confined to a single instant. The second objection is of a Zenonian nature and arises once time is viewed as a continuum that can be (...) subdivided ad infinitum. In response to the first problem, it is argued that the presentist can appeal to past and future instants as long as it is not assumed that there are events that occur at them. Once they are granted, one can then appeal to "past-oriented" and "future-oriented" properties such as *was P at t* (or *will be P at t*), where t is a past or future instant, in order to view dynamic events as occurring at the present instant. In response to the second problem, one must accept the idea that, as a new instant becomes present, there is no preceding instant which is immediately past. There can only be infinitely many past instants with increasingly lower degrees of pastness. (shrink)

This paper critically examines Richard Kraut’s attack on the notion of absolute value, and lays out some of the conceptual work required to defend such a notion. The view under attack claims that absolute goodness is a property that provides a reason to value what has it. Kraut’s overall challenge is that absolute goodness cannot play this role. Kraut’s own view is that goodness-for, instead, plays the reason-providing role. My targets are Kraut’s double-counting objection, and his ethical objection against absolute (...) value. After explaining the double-counting objection, and discussing the idea of non-additive reasons, I examine and reject Kraut’s reasons for holding that nonadditivity can rescue relative value but not absolute value. I proceed then to explore a different reply to the double-counting objection by introducing a distinction between normative reasons for action and reasons that explain why a certain consideration is a reason for action. Such a distinction (hinted at by Kraut) would either help both Kraut and the friend of absolute value, or neither of them. I defend the distinction from the objection that it would make absolute value just a ‘shadow’. Finally, I reply to Kraut’s ethical objection that being motivated by absolute value is depersonalizing, on two grounds: 1) if thinking in terms of absolute value depersonalizes relationships, then we have absolute-value-given reasons not to think in those terms; 2) the distinction between normative and explanatory reasons explains why even a motivation centred on absolute value need not be depersonalizing. (shrink)

Questo articolo discute un aspetto specifico della teoria causale di Plotino, ossia la critica che egli rivolge alla funzione della causa finale nella sua spiegazione della struttura e della generazione della realtà a partire dal principio primo situato al suo culmine. A tale fine, sono esaminati i capitoli 1-3 e 25 del trattato VI 7 delle Enneadi, in cui la questione della causa finale è posta con chiarezza, innanzitutto nel quadro di una lettura e di un’interpretazione del racconto cosmologico del (...) Timeo di Platone e del ruolo che assume il demiurgo in questo racconto, quindi nel quadro di una critica della concezione aristotelica del primo motore immobile come fine ultimo di tutte le cose. (shrink)