Focal points seem to be important in helping players coordinate their strategies in coordination problems. Game theory lacks, however, a formal theory of focal points. This paper proposes a theory of focal points that is based on individual rationality considerations. The two principles upon which the theory rest are the Principle of Insufficient Reason (IR) and a Principle of Individual Team Member Rationality. The way IR is modelled combines the classic notion of description symmetry and a new notion of pay-off (...) symmetry, which yields different predictions in a variety of games. The theory can explain why people do better than pure randomization in matching games. (shrink)

This paper defends strict invariantism against some philosophical and empirical data that have been taken to compromise it. The defence involves a combination of a priori philosophical arguments and empirically informed theorizing. The positive account of the data is an epistemic focal bias account that draws on cognitive psychology. It involves the assumption that, owing to limitations of the involved cognitive resources, intuitive judgments about knowledge ascriptions are generated by processing only a limited part of the available information—the part that (...) is in focus. According to the epistemic focal bias account, the intuitive judgments about knowledge ascriptions that constitute contrast effects amount to false positives, whereas the intuitive judgments that constitute salient alternatives effects amount to false negatives. I conclude by considering how the basic epistemic focal bias account may be developed further by reference to relevant alternatives theory in epistemology, pragmatics in the philosophy of language, and dual process theory in cognitive psychology. (shrink)

Agrarianism, according to Paul B. Thompson, is an environmental philosophy focused on agriculture and the nurturing of food, fuel, and fiber. Agrarianism hopes to re-establish our fundamental connection to the land, helping us approach a tenable understanding of sustainability. Thompson enlists Albert Borgmann’s notion of “focal practices” to discuss farming and the culture of the table. With this comes a critique of “the device paradigm,” the modern technological way of life that alienates us from quotidian beauty, lifecycles and seasonality, and (...) vital place-based insights embedded in focal practices and obscures how techno-industrial capitalism limits our opportunities for rich, intimate experiences with our biotic communities. In this paper, the author will outline the contours of Thompson’s agrarian philosophy in light of Borgmann’s focal practices, noting the enduring wisdom in this position. But the author will evoke Sylvia Wynter’s critique of the hegemonic techno-industrial order of things to conjure alternative conceptions of decolonial agrarian futures (that will not foreground bucolic settler-colonial farms). (shrink)

The Charkha, or the spinning wheel, a symbol of self-sufficiency and freedom, implicitly promoted the idea of togetherness, as it makes people sit and spin yarn together while they share joy and agony. This paper highlights the charkha as an epicenter, where it assimilates all the attributes and values of the focal thing (pre-technological life), a concept developed by Albert Borgmann in contrast to the device paradigm (modern technology). The paper has three objectives: first, to understand how the charkha may (...) be developed as a model artifact in the context of Gandhi’s philosophy; second, to highlight the conceptual proximity between Borgmann’s and Gandhi’s ideas of harmonious relation between humans and technology through skill and engagement; and lastly, reading Gandhi through Borgmann, the paper explores the charkha as a focal thing that provides people with a meaningful way of living where it tends to unify means and ends, labor and leisure. (shrink)

In times of digitalization and globalization, social expectations change at an increasing pace. In order to provide orientation in times of frequent change, this article argues to reinforce the meaning of moral principles, norms, or values as focal points, which build the basis of mutually aligned behavioral expectations. Accordingly, the paper explains the abstract meaning of focal points – having reciprocal expectations as foundation for social cooperation – as well as the particular relevance of the focal point ‘do no harm’.

Literary narratology has rightly devoted much attention to analysing the source(s) of verbal information about the story world, usually discussed under the label “narration”, and to any agent(s) that present(s) non-verbalized perspectives on it, usually discussed under the label “focalization”. Assessing the identity of narrators and focalizers is crucial for understanding what is going on in the story world. Which narrative agent is in charge? Is the narration and/or focalization layered? If the latter, is there any “colouring” by the higher-level (...) narrative agent of anything said, thought, or experienced by the lower-level agent? Is the information provided trustworthy? Nuanced? Prejudiced? Narration and focalization have supra-medial as well as medium-specific dimensions. Over the past years, the issue of how these concepts function in the medium of comics, which combines visuals and language, has begun to be systematically addressed. This paper aims to show how the visual mode can, on its own or combined with the written-language mode, signal the sources of narration, focalization, and joint narration-and-focalization, as well as distinguish between different levels at which these take place. (shrink)

RESUMO Um problema de longa data na erudição aristotélica diz respeito à questão de como reconciliar a dupla descrição de Aristóteles da metafísica como ontologia (a ciência universal do ser enquanto ser) e teologia (a ciência da substância imutável e separada). Uma tentativa importante de responder a esta questão (iniciada primeiro por G. Patzig) consiste em dizer que a substância imutável e separada é focalmente anterior (ou o significado focal da) substância e, portanto, de ser em geral (uma vez que (...) a substância é focalmente anterior a ser no geral). Este artigo visa refutar esse tipo de abordagem para o problema da unidade da metafísica de Aristóteles, argumentando que (i) as relações de significado focal implicam a prioridade lógica (definição) dos itens anteriores sobre os itens dependentes situados em tais relações; (ii) a substância imutável e separada não é logicamente anterior aos outros tipos de substâncias distinguidas por Aristóteles; e, portanto, (iii) a substância imutável e separada não é focalmente anterior à (o significado focal de) substância. (shrink)

The sites of tightest adhesion that form between cells and substrate surfaces in tissue culture are termed focal contacts. The external faces of focal contacts include specific receptors, belonging to the integrin family of proteins, for fibronectin and vitronectin, two common components of extracellular matrices. On the internal (cytoplasmic) side of focal contacts, several proteins, including talin and vinculin, mediate interactions with the actin filament bundles of the cytoskeleton. The changes that occur in focal contacts as a result of viral (...) transformation are discussed. (shrink)

Aristotle is believed to have introduced the focal meaning of friendship in Eudemian Ethics VII.2 and then to have formulated it more generally in Metaphysics Γ.2. Bonitz’s unjustifiable emendation of the text underscores these interpretations. This paper therefore reads the MSS and supposes that the EE passage introduces a wider focal meaning based on the theory presented in the Categories, one that does not imply referential relationships between the primary and secondary terms. This wider focal meaning can help explain disputed (...) terms in practical philosophy, such as “friendship” and “like-mindedness,” without invoking the Form of the Good. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:134 Feminist Studies 41, no. 1. © 2015 by Gabeba Baderoon Focal Length Gabeba Baderoon I take out the black and white photos I brought with me from Cape Town and haven’t looked at for years and stand them next to one another on the dining room table. In one, my mother in her white coat at the hospital looks up from her notes, distracted, in the grainy matte (...) finish you could ask for in the eighties instead of gloss. Here she is, younger, standing by the window, holding the telephone with its spiraling black cord to her ear, the curtain slanting to the side as she turns away from the camera. I take down from the wall the framed collection of Rafi’s baby photos I’d found wrapped in tissue paper among the tablecloths in the sideboard we inherited from his parents and line us up with each other. There he is, his face fitting into his mother’s shoulder; his brother holding him with hands under the armpits the way he was told; posing by a white door in a hooded woolen coat, his head reaching just above the handle. When I unwrapped them, the tissue paper had only one set of creases, untouched since she packed them for their long journey. In the soft focus of faded paper, I am standing with my back to a VW Beetle I know is pale green, my hands tucked behind me against the bumper, the license plate showing the number from the time before we moved from Uitenhage to Cape Town. In this one, I am on my mother’s lap, leaning against her like gravity. In the photo the focus shifts between my face and my mother’s. She is looking at me, like my father who is taking the picture. My face is clear and hers slightly blurred, as though his eyes are moving between us, as though the camera cannot capture the eye’s oscillation between two people one loves at the same time. One photo had been folded into three, bent once and then again to fit into a pocket, close enough to the skin to warm the paper, and then smoothed out again to fit into a frame. In it, I am turning sideways toward the camera—someone must have called my name—and a line creases just Gabeba Baderoon 135 beneath my eyes. Folded, hidden, forgotten, memory doesn’t come to me straight. The pleat of the curtain as she leans against it, his face in the crook of her shoulder as though he would never leave, me turning toward my name, the paper keeping its original crease. Poetry for Beginners In the evening poetry class for beginners in the community hall during the introductions a girl looking down behind her hair and a thick brown coat she doesn’t take off breathes in deep and risking something says fast my boyfriend’s in prison and I’m here to find out how to write to him through the bars and someone laughs and she pulls herself back into her coat and from inside looks past us and the next week doesn’t come back and I think of her for years and what poetry is I think of her long pause at the beginning her silence before and her silence after and I think this is my origin where poetry is risk, is betrayal and the memory of the first question how not to be alone 136 Gabeba Baderoon ID Photos In the small caravan parked permanently next to the Traffic Department with the handwritten sign ID Photos Taken Here its wheels rusted into place the young old photographer with dreadlocks and a tired poet’s face is shaking his head from side to side muttering some version of no just before me a woman in a long black skirt and black veil unties the loop of fabric knotted behind her head and her face briefly emerges the young old photographer sees everything hundreds of unclaimed photos line the inside of his caravan the making of identity interrupted and turned into small sad signs of something else we don’t look at... (shrink)

Focal adhesion kinase (FAK) is a nonreceptor protein‐tyrosine kinase implicated in controlling cellular responses to the engagement of cell‐surface integrins, including cell spreading and migration, survival and proliferation. Aberrant FAK signaling may contribute to the process of cell transformation by certain oncoproteins, including v‐Src. Progress toward elucidating the events leading to FAK activation following integrin‐mediated cell adhesion, as well as events downstream of FAK, has come through the identification of FAK phosphorylation sites and interacting proteins. A signaling partnership is formed (...) between FAK and Src‐family kinases, leading to tyrosine phosphorylation of FAK and associated ‘docking’ proteins Cas and paxillin. Subsequent recruitment of proteins containing Src homology 2 domains, including Grb2 and c‐Crk, to the complex is likely to trigger adhesion‐induced cellular responses, including changes to the actin cytoskeleton and activation of the Ras‐MAP kinase pathway. (shrink)

We study game-theoretic models of human evolution to analyze fundamentals of human nature. Rival-claimants games represent common situations in which animals can avoid conflict over valuable resources by mutually recognizing asymmetric claiming rights. Unlike social-dilemma games, rival-claimants games have multiple equilibria which create a rational role for communication, and so they may be good models for the role of language in human evolution. Many social animals avoid conflict by dominance rankings, but intelligence and language allow mutual recognition of more complex (...) norms for determining political rank or economic ownership. Sophisticated forms of economic ownership could become more advantageous when bipedalism allowed adaptation of hands for manufacturing useful objects. Cultural norms for claiming rights could develop and persist across generations in communities where the young have an innate interest in learning from their elders about when one can appropriately claim desirable objects. Then competition across communities would favor cultures where claiming rights are earned by prosocial behavior, such as contributions to public goods. With the development of larger societies in which many local communities share a common culture, individuals would prefer to interact with strangers who identifiably share this culture, because shared cultural principles reduce risks of conflict in rival-claimants games. (shrink)

Functional imaging studies of neurologically intact adults have demonstrated that the right posterior cerebellum is activated during verb generation, semantic processing, sentence processing, and verbal fluency. Studies of patients with cerebellar damage converge to show that the cerebellum supports sentence processing and verbal fluency. However, to date there are no patient studies that investigated the specific importance of the right posterior cerebellum in language processing, because: case studies presented patients with lesions affecting the anterior cerebellum, and group studies combined patients (...) with lesions to different cerebellar regions, without specifically reporting the effects of right posterior cerebellar damage. Here we investigated whether damage to the right posterior cerebellum is critical for sentence processing and verbal fluency in four patients with focal stroke damage to different parts of the right posterior cerebellum. We examined detailed lesion location by going beyond common anatomical definitions of cerebellar anatomy, and employed a recently proposed functional parcellation of the cerebellum. All four patients experienced language difficulties that persisted for at least a month after stroke but three performed in the normal range within a year. In contrast, one patient with more damage to lobule IX than the other patients had profound long-lasting impairments in the comprehension and repetition of sentences, and the production of spoken sentences during picture description. Spoken and written word comprehension and visual recognition memory were also impaired, however, verbal fluency was within the normal range, together with object naming, visual perception and verbal short-term memory. This is the first study to show that focal damage to the right posterior cerebellum leads to language difficulties after stroke; and that processing impairments persisted in the case with most damage to lobule IX. We discuss these results in relation to current theories of cerebellar contribution to language processing. Overall, our study highlights the need for longitudinal studies of language function in patients with focal damage to different cerebellar regions, with functional imaging to understand the mechanisms that support recovery. (shrink)

The degree to which physiology and culture have affected the formation of primitive color categories continues to be a matter of discussion. In this paper the degree of agreement between the ranges of individual color term foci for the four hue-based color categories yellow, green, blue, and red and individual choices of Munsell samples representing for the observers Hering's four unique hues is investigated. The color term focus range data are extracted from the survey results of the 110 unwritten languages (...) of the World Color Survey, also in terms of the Munsell color order system. Agreement of approximately 90% between the two has been found, indicating the likelihood of a strong color vision system related physiological component in the formation of these four primitive hue categories. (shrink)

In this response to Michael Blome-Tillmann's comments on On Folk Epistemology, I defend the book's epistemic focal bias account of the salient alternatives effect that Blome-Tillmann takes to motivate epistemic contextualism. First, I defend the epistemic focal bias account against Blome-Tillmann's criticism that it is insufficiently general insofar as it fails to account for a range of cases. Second, I defend the epistemic focal bias account from Blome-Tillmann's charge that it overgeneralizes insofar as it can ‘explain away the context-sensitivity of (...) gradable adjectives.’ Along the way, I discuss the metaphilosophical principles that guide the epistemic focal bias account. (shrink)

The subject of this article was suggested by the question of whether the present tense formuĕnitin Catull. 64.85 should be considered anomalous. My analysis will result in a positive answer, and I shall conclude by proposing a way to eliminate this anomaly. However, a study of Catullus' use of the historical present may also be of some relevance for the interpretation of poem 64 as a whole.

The distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness is a subject of intensive debate. According to one view, visual experience overflows the capacity of the attentional and working memory system: We see more than we can report. According to the opposed view, this perceived richness is an illusion—we are aware only of information that we can subsequently report. This debate remains unresolved because of the inevitable reliance on report, which is limited in capacity. To bypass this limitation, this study utilized (...) color diversity—a unique summary statistic—which is sensitive to detailed visual information. Participants were shown a Sperling-like array of colored letters, one row of which was precued. After reporting a letter from the cued row, participants estimated the color diversity of the noncued rows. Results showed that people could estimate the color diversity of the noncued array without a cost to letter report, which suggests that color diversity is registered automatically, outside focal attention, and without consuming additional working memory resources. (shrink)

Can we consciously see more items at once than can be held in visual working memory? This question has elud- ed resolution because the ultimate evidence is subjects’ reports in which phenomenal consciousness is filtered through working memory. However, a new technique makes use of the fact that unattended ‘ensemble prop- erties’ can be detected ‘for free’ without decreasing working memory capacity.

BackgroundConventionally, transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) aims to focalize the current reaching the target region-of-interest (ROI). The focality can be quantified by the dose-target-determination-index (DTDI). Despite having a uniform tDCS setup, some individuals receive focal stimulation (high DTDI) while others show reduced focality (“non-focal”). The volume of cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), gray matter (GM), and white matter (WM) underlying each ROI govern the tDCS current distribution inside the brain, thereby regulating focality.AimTo determine the regional volume parameters that differentiate the focal and (...) non-focal groups.MethodsT1-weighted images of the brain from 300 age-sex matched adults were divided into three equal groups- (a) Young (20 ≤ × < 40 years), (b) Middle (40 ≤ × < 60 years), and (c) Older (60 ≤ × < 80 years). For each group, inter and intra-hemispheric montages with electrodes at (1) F3 and right supraorbital region (F3-RSO), and (2) CP5 and Cz (CP5-Cz) were simulated, targeting the left- Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex (DLPFC) and -Inferior Parietal Lobule (IPL), respectively. Both montages were simulated for two current doses (1 and 2 mA). For each individual head simulated for a tDCS configuration (montage and dose), the current density at each region-of-interest (ROI) and their DTDI were calculated. The individuals were categorized into two groups- (1) Focal (DTDI ≥ 0.75), and (2) Non-focal (DTDI < 0.75). The regional volume of CSF, GM, and WM of all the ROIs was determined. For each tDCS configuration and ROI, three 3-way analysis of variance was performed considering- (i) GM, (ii) WM, and (iii) CSF as the dependent variable (DV). The age group, sex, and focality group were the between-subject factors. For a given ROI, if any of the 3 DV’s showed a significant main effect or interaction involving the focality group, then that ROI was classified as a “focal ROI.”ResultsRegional CSF was the principal determinant of focality. For interhemispheric F3-RSO montage, interaction effect (p < 0.05) of age and focality was observed at Left Caudate Nucleus, with the focal group exhibiting higher CSF volume. The CSF volume of focal ROI correlated positively (r ∼ 0.16, p < 0.05) with the current density at the target ROI (DLPFC). For intrahemispheric CP5-Cz montage, a significant (p < 0.05) main effect was observed at the left pre- and post-central gyrus, with the focal group showing lower CSF volume. The CSF volume correlated negatively (r ∼ –0.16, p < 0.05) with current density at left IPL. The results were consistent for both current doses.ConclusionThe CSF channels the flow of tDCS current between electrodes with focal ROIs acting like reservoirs of current. The position of focal ROI in the channel determines the stimulation intensity at the target ROI. For focal stimulation in interhemispheric F3-RSO, the proximity of focal ROI reserves the current density at the target ROI (DLPFC). In contrast, for intrahemispheric montage (CP5-Cz), the far-end location of focal ROI reduces the current density at the target (IPL). (shrink)

Everyday ethics refers to those issues which have a sometimes unrecognized moral dimension and that arise regularly within healthcare and research. These issues are often contrasted to dramatic ethics issues (i.e. issues that have seemingly higher stakes such as those arising in acute care situations or with invasive or life-threatening interventions). Claims have been made that scholarly bioethics tends to focus on dramatic ethics to the detriment of everyday ethics discussions. However, empirical evidence showing this has been lacking. Our own (...) research investigating bioethics discussions in the Parkinson’s disease literature suggested this trend. Consequently, we decided to characterize the context and content of the Parkinson’s disease bioethics literature to empirically test the hypothesis that everyday ethics is under discussed. We conducted a broad literature search using the keywords “Parkinson’s disease” AND (“ethics” OR “bioethics”) and classified results inductively based on the context in which the bioethics discussion occurred. In line with our hypothesis and initial observations, we found that there is indeed a greater focus on dramatic ethics where topics such as deep brain stimulation and neuronal cell transplantations, dominated bioethics discussions. Given the potential utility of everyday ethics in improving healthcare and research, this mismatch in focus ought to be addressed. There is a clear need for further understanding and discussion of everyday ethical issues in scholarly bioethics. (shrink)

Following Shelly Kagan’s useful terminology, foundational consequentialists are those who hold that the ranking of outcomes is at the foundation of all moral assessment. That is, they hold that moral assessments of right and wrong, virtuous and vicious, morally good and morally bad, etc. are all ultimately a function of how outcomes rank. But foundational consequentialists disagree on what is to be directly evaluated in terms of the ranking of outcomes, which is to say that they disagree on what the (...) primary evaluative focal point is. Act-consequentialists take acts to be the primary evaluative focal point. They evaluate acts in terms of how their outcomes rank (the higher ranked the outcome, the morally better the act), but evaluate everything else in terms of the morally best acts. Thus, the morally best rules are those that would, if internalized, most reliably lead us to perform the morally best acts. Rule-consequentialists, by contrast, take rules to be the primary evaluative focal point. They evaluate rules according to how their outcomes rank and then assess everything else in terms of the morally best rules. Thus, the morally best acts are those that conform to the morally best rules. In this paper, I argue that foundational consequentialists should not take the primary evaluative focal point (or points) to be acts, rules, virtues, or even everything. In so doing, I argue against act-consequentialism, rule-consequentialism, and global consequentialism. But my project is not entirely negative, for I argue that the primary evaluative focal point should be a complex of acts and attitudes. In the end, then, I claim that foundational consequentialists should accept a new kind of consequentialism, which I call attitude-consequentialism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Narcissism A Focal Point for Examining the Interrelatedness of Psychology and PhilosophyLydia Amir, PhD (bio)In a groundbreaking article, Aleksandar Fatic challenges the view that mental health is to be dissociated from morality or ethics. His argument targets cluster B personality disorders, such as Borderline and Narcissistic Personality Disorders, but focuses mainly on narcissistic disorders, whether diagnosed or not. Although these persons are not exempt of moral and legal responsibility, (...) they are diagnosed by and relegated to the mental health system, which is often ineffective in treating them. Fatic suggests that addressing their faulty morality is the best policy. In my commentary of his article, I further probe the viability and desirability of doing so. I point to narcissism as a focal point for examining the necessary impact of psychology and philosophy insofar as psychologists may be considered experts in emotions and philosophers in normative ethics. I question the interest in any ethics that does not also supply the means of its implementation and suggest that narcissists may have a morality of their own, ethical egoism.As psychiatrist Bennett Simon notes, Socrates did not inquire into the mental health field; his presence is missed as the questions, “what is mental illness?” and “what are psychiatry and psychiatrists?” are not addressed. It follows that it is up to us, as Simon attempts to do in the first chapter of Mind and Madness in Ancient Greece: The Classical Roots of Modern Psychiatry (1978), to define the psychiatrist’s proper area of professional competence (p. 28). That which makes matters even more confusing, he notes, is that psychiatrists are only one group of professionals who deal with the “mentally ill” and that they are “far from unanimous” about which problems “pertain to their particular sphere” (Simon, 1978, p. 29). He thus lists a variety of problems which “a glance at both popular and professional literature…reveals that at one time or another, psychiatrists have claimed [End Page 169] (sometimes by public demand) for their proper sphere” (Simon, 1978, p. 29). Among them is the issue that Fatic’s break grounding article tackles: “Psychiatrists at times consider it their proper task to deal with people who are excessively selfish and self-centered (narcissistic personality disorder)” (Simon, 1978, p. 29).Thus, Simon sees as a matter of controversy whether narcissism is a psychiatric issue, and defines the disorder in moral terms (“selfish,” “self-centered”). Fatic broadens the argument: he questions the validity of the psychological approach not only to narcissism as a personality disorder, but also to narcissistic traits, and the effectivity of this approach given that this is an area in which therapists usually do not have much success even if the patients look for help, which is rare. Fatic suggests that these personalities, either those with narcissistic traits or those with full-fledged narcissistic personality disorder, should be better understood (and maybe also addressed, although this point is not explicitly made) when viewed through moral lenses. In doing so, Fatic not only questions the validity of one form of personality disorder––still a controversial category––but re-kindles the view that correlates aspects of mental health with virtue, a view that was valid up until the nineteenth century and that made of philosophers (and priests) doctors of the soul.1That which made of philosophers’ teachings an important part of one’s life before the advent of scientific psychology has been often associated with this view, that the virtuous are also the healthy. Without going as far as to suggest that philosophers should teach virtue to narcissists, which could be a further argument in favor of the new field of philosophical practice and a broadening of its legitimate concerns, Fatic notes that moral categories are better suited to approach those who are plagued by narcissism.One way to explain the historical role that psychology played in relation to the traditional one upheld by morality is that psychology stepped in to explain the origins of failures in morality. If the narcissist is to be judged according to moral categories (a judgment that he necessarily fails in so far as right emotions as relevant to morality), what might be the consequences?Ascribing... (shrink)

We give the precise correspondence between polarized linear logic and polarized classical logic. The properties of focalization and reversion of linear proofs are at the heart of our analysis: we show that the tq-protocol of normalization for the classical systems and perfectly fits normalization of polarized proof-nets. Some more semantical considerations allow us to recover LC as a refinement of multiplicative.