This article is an edited transcript of the roundtable entitled “What is Philo-Performance?” that took place in Paris on 28 June 2014, within the framework of the “Theatre, Performance, Philosophy International Conference: Crossings and Transfers in Anglo-American Thought”. The conference was organized by Julien Alliot, Flore Garcin-Marrou, Liza Kharoubi and Anna Street from the LAPS, a French research group on performance philosophy.

The Fonds Guattari contain a number of unpublished manuscripts catalogued under the title of ‘écrits littéraires’ which include a set of theatrical dialogues. Noting the scope of these titles, as well as their likely models, Guattari's theatrical practices are introduced with reference to the only play that was actually staged, Socrates, courtesy of Enzo Cormann at the Théâtre Ouvert, in Paris, in 1988.

In this paper, we argue that there are epistemic norms on evidence-gathering and consider consequences for how to understand epistemic normativity. Though the view that there are such norms seems intuitive, it has found surprisingly little defense. Rather, many philosophers have argued that norms on evidence-gathering can only be practical or moral. On a prominent evidentialist version of this position, epistemic norms only apply to responding to the evidence one already has. Here we challenge the orthodoxy. First, we argue that (...) there is no significant normative difference between responding to evidence you have and gathering more evidence. Second, we argue that our practices of epistemically criticizing agents for their poor evidence-gathering indicate the existence of epistemic norms on evidence-gathering. Finally, we show that our thesis has important implications for recent debates about the relationship between epistemic norms and inquiry. (shrink)

Background: In the last decades, there have been important developments in the scientific and technological areas of healthcare. On certain occasions this provokes conflict between the patients' rights and the values of healthcare professionals which brings about, within this clinical relationship, the problem of conscientious objection. Aims: To learn the opinions that the Nurses of the Madrid Autonomous Community have regarding conscientious objection. Research design: Cross-cutting descriptive study. Participants and research context: The nurses of 9 hospitals and 12 Health Centers (...) in the Madrid Autonomous Community. The study was done by means of an auto completed anonymous questionnaire. The variables studied were social-demographical and their opinions about conscientious objections. Ethical considerations: The study was approved by the Ethical Community of Clinical Research of the University Hospital Príncipe de Asturias. Participants were assured of maximum confidentiality and anonymity. Findings: A total of 421 nurses answered the questionnaire. In total, 55.6% of the nurses confirmed they were religious believers, and 64.3% declared having poor knowledge regarding conscientious objection. The matters that caused the greatest objections were voluntary abortions, genetic embryo selection, refusal of blood transfusions, and therapy refusal. Discussion: Different authors state that the most significant cases of conscientious objections for health professionals are those regarding carrying out or assisting in abortions, euthanasia, the practice of assisted reproduction and, finally, the prescription and dispensing of the morning-after pill. In our study, the most significant cases in which the nurses would declare conscientious objections would be the refusal to accept treatment, the selection of embryos after genetic diagnosis preimplantation, the patient’s refusal to receive blood transfusions due to religious reasons and pregnant women’s request for voluntary abortions within the first 14 weeks. Conclusion: Nurses’ religious beliefs influence their opinions regarding conscientious objection. The nurses who declare themselves as religious believers object in a higher percentage than those without religious beliefs. (shrink)

Epistemic agents interact with evidence in different ways. This can cause trouble for mutual understanding and for our ability to rationally engage with others. Indeed, it can compromise democratic practices of deliberation. This paper explains these differences by appeal to a new notion: epistemic styles. Epistemic styles are ways of interacting with evidence that express unified sets of epistemic values, preferences, goals, and interests. The paper introduces the notion of epistemic styles and develops a systematic account of their nature. It (...) then discusses the implications of epistemic styles for central questions in epistemology, in particular, for issues surrounding rational engagement and for the debate between virtue epistemologists and epistemic situationists. (shrink)

This article comprises an up-to-date critical review of the field known as Economic Methodology or Philosophy of Economics (EM/PE). Two edited volumes (Kincaid and Ross 2021; Heilmann and Reiss 2021), a special issue of the Journal of Economic Methodology (2021), and a recent bibliometric analysis of the field (Claveau et al. 2021) constitute the basis of the review. Drawing on these sources, we identify a number of problematic trends in current EM/PE research. We claim that these trends could be interpreted (...) as two kinds of biases, namely a micro-level bias and a mainstream bias. We discuss the respective details of these biases and their normative implications for the discipline. (shrink)

In a time of globalization, Political Philosophy for the Global Age provides a theoretical basis for the convergence of human values in terms of legitimate conceptions of time, language, and notions of self. Sánchez Flores reviews what she considers to be the most important positions in the current debate on political theory (liberalism, communitarianism, feminism, and postcolonialism) and also proposes her own original contribution. Sánchez Flores’s unique approach is a critique of a type of morality formulated solely on the basis (...) of the Judeo-Christian view of reality. It is a theoretical construct that becomes an invitation to explore other notions of human morality and an inquiry into the need to produce a political philosophy that universalizes an ethics of caring and responsibility as well as provides a locus where diverse human cultures can meet. (shrink)

Beliefs can be resistant to evidence. Nonetheless, the orthodox view in epistemology analyzes beliefs as evidence-responsive attitudes. I address this tension by deploying analytical tools on capacities and masking to show that the cognitive science of evidence-resistance supports rather than undermines the orthodox view. In doing so, I argue for the claim that belief requires the capacity for evidence-responsiveness. More precisely, if a subject believes that p, then they have the capacity to rationally respond to evidence bearing on p. Because (...) capacities for evidence-responsiveness are fallible and may be masked, beliefs can be held in the face of counter-evidence. Indeed, I will argue that our best science of belief supports the claim that evidence-resistant beliefs result from masks on evidence-responsiveness capacities. This account of belief not only allows for resistance to evidence, but provides us with a framework for describing and explaining actual cases of evidence-resistance. (shrink)

Cet article soutient que Ben. 1, 3-4, une célèbre polémique à l’encontre de l’étymologie chrysippéenne, ne devrait pas être lue comme un rejet « en bloc » d’une étymologie philosophique, mais seulement comme un ensemble de conditions restrictives imposées à celle-ci. Cette interprétation nous permet de considérer les nombreuses étymologies du corpus sénéquien, dont une douzaine sont ici réunies et commentées, comme des réflexions philosophiquement intéressantes sur le langage. L’article se concentre sur la manière dont Sénèque utilise l’étymologie comme une (...) stratégie de traduction (baptisée ancrage étymologique) ayant pour but de rendre acceptables pour le lecteur romain, les aspects les plus contre intuitifs et paradoxaux de la philosophie stoïcienne, domestiquant ainsi la doctrine du Portique. Cette stratégie est comparée à l’approche très semblable de Cicéron dans Tusc. 3, 7-11. (shrink)

Delusions are deeply evidence-resistant. Patients with delusions are unmoved by evidence that is in direct conflict with the delusion, often responding to such evidence by offering obvious, and strange, confabulations. As a consequence, the standard view is that delusions are not evidence-responsive. This claim has been used as a key argumentative wedge in debates on the nature of delusions. Some have taken delusions to be beliefs and argued that this implies that belief is not constitutively evidence-responsive. Others hold fixed the (...) evidenceresponsiveness of belief and take this to show that delusions cannot be beliefs. Against this common assumption, I appeal to a large range of empirical evidence to argue that delusions are evidence-responsive in the sense that subjects have the capacity to respond to evidence on their delusion in rationally permissible ways. The extreme evidence-resistance of delusions is a consequence of powerful masking factors on these capacities, such as strange perceptual experiences, motivational factors, and cognitive biases. This view makes room for holding both that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive and that delusions are beliefs, and it has important implications for the study and treatment of delusions. (shrink)

In this article, I examine the conceptual and methodological points of convergence and divergence of two intellectual currents frequently referred to as the decolonial and ontological turns in social and anthropological theory. Salient points considered are the ways both theoretical projects unsettle modernity’s dominant ontological and epistemological foundations by seriously engaging the conceptual potential of thinking with alterity (ethical dimension) and from exteriority (geopolitical dimension). I compare their subversive methodological contributions, examining, in particular, Enrique Dussel’s analectical hermeneutic approach and Eduardo (...) Viveiros de Castro’s ethnographic method of controlled equivocation. Lastly, I discuss how both theories and approaches complement each other’s efforts to destabilize Western modernity’s philosophical and anthropological foundations. (shrink)

In this article, I offer a methodological analysis of the empirical research on the causal effects of trade liberalisation, and assess whether such studies can be of any use for guiding policy prescriptions in real-world economies. The analysis focuses on the mainstream economic research that has been used to support arguments in favour of trade liberalisation during the last decades. Even though there are empirical results that could be taken as valid evidence for a causal connection between free trade and (...) economic gains, none of the existing evidence licences trustworthy inferences about the policy effectiveness of trade liberalisation reforms in real-world cases. There are three aspects of the empirical literature that make it highly problematic for making reliable policy inferences: (a) the criteria used to define the notion of ‘free trade’, (b) the background assumptions embedded in the econometric techniques used for estimating causal effects, and (c) the widespread desire among academic economists to attain scientific results in terms of universally valid generalisations. The analysis exposes a worrisome mismatch between, on the one hand, the research aims and outcomes of scientific economics and, on the other, the kind of evidence that would be useful for guiding actual policy deliberations. (shrink)

¿Es Kant un sexista? La discusión contemporánea sobre el sexismo kantiano recorre todas las áreas del corpus desde la epistemología, metafísica, estética, ética hasta la filosofía política. En la presente investigación me concentraré en la discusión ética y política, en particular en el estatus moral de la mujer. Argumentaré que inclusive en la lectura más caritativa de Kant el estatus moral de la mujer es inferior al del hombre. Para desarrollar el punto anterior tomaré como hilo conductor el concepto de (...) carácter. Este concepto presenta dos ventajas. Por un lado, condensa ciertas preocupaciones morales como la relación entre sensibilidad y razón. Por otro lado, y en relación con el punto anterior, el carácter moral se expresa diferente en el carácter femenino y en el carácter masculino. En el primero se expresa el sentimiento, mientras que en el segundo se expresa la racionalidad. Dada la primacia de la racionalidad sobre sentimiento, el carácter moral masculino tiene ciertas ventajas sobre el femenino. (shrink)

In this paper I draw on Einstein's distinction between “principle” and “constructive” theories to isolate two levels of physical theory that can be found in both classical and (special) relativistic physics. I then argue that when we focus on theoretical explanations in physics, i.e. explanations of physical laws, the two leading views on explanation, Salmon's “bottom-up” view and Kitcher's “top-down” view, accurately describe theoretical explanations for a given level of theory. I arrive at this conclusion through an analysis of explanations (...) of mass—energy equivalence in special relativity. (shrink)

The orthodox view in epistemology is that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive. I offer a novel argument for a version of this view, one that appeals to capacities to rationally respond to evidence. I do so by developing the Sellarsian idea that the concept of belief functions to mark the space of reasons in a non-intellectualist and naturalistic direction. The resulting view does justice to the role of belief in social interactions, joint deliberation, and rational persuasion, while including evidence-resistant beliefs and (...) animal beliefs as genuine beliefs. It has a range of further benefits: it helps us account for epistemic normativity, paves the way for better psychological models of belief revision, distinguishes beliefs from imaginings and mere acceptances, and helps us avoid noxious simplistic takes on human irrationality. (shrink)

En la presente investigación propongo el concepto de prudencia epistémica. La prudencia epistémica es la habilidad social para influir en los demás para fines socio-cognitivos. Como habilidad pragmática, la prudencia epistémica consiste no sólo en una descripción de los orígenes empíricos del error, sino en la habilidad social para evitar el error y otros males cognitivos frutos del egoísmo lógico y otros vicios epistémicos.

Resumen El propósito de este trabajo es profundizar en el concepto de actividad de imagen y defender su utilidad como categoría de estudio para comprender diferentes tipos de comportamiento que afectan a la imagen social de los hablantes en la interacción comunicativa: cortesía, descortesía y actividad de autoimagen. Teniendo como base estudios sociopragmáticos del español desde una perspectiva cultural y estudios teóricos en inglés de la última década, se tratará el concepto de actividad de imagen, el cual se caracteriza de (...) acuerdo con dos conceptos claves: el del efecto social que un comportamiento comunicativo tiene sobre las imágenes de los hablantes y el del continuo social, la conexión que se establece entre sus imágenes en la interacción. De esta forma, se propone tratar la actividad de imagen desde dos perspectivas relacionadas: la de la dirección seguida por el efecto social hacia los interactuantes y la de las características de este efecto, siendo su interrelación el factor que permite identificar y caracterizar el tipo de actividad de imagen. (shrink)

Delusions are standardly defined as attitudes that are not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence. But what evidence do people with delusion have for and against it? Do delusions really go against their total evidence? How are the answers affected by different conceptions of evidence? -/- This chapter focuses on how delusions relate to evidence. I consider what delusions-relevant evidence people with delusions have. I give some reasons to think that people typically have evidence for their delusions, and (...) that the evidence they have against them is often overstated. I draw on this discussion to consider whether delusions are evidentially supported and epistemically rational. Finally, I discuss implications for the nature of delusion, responsibility, and treatment and suggest directions for future research. Throughout, the discussion is sensitive to different conceptions of evidence and rationality in epistemology. -/- A central upshot is that what we should say about the epistemic standing of delusions depends substantively on our positions in epistemology, in particular, on the debate between internalists and externalists about evidence. If we want clarity on the epistemic standing of delusions, we need to incorporate more sophisticated tools from epistemology. (shrink)

A gorgeous combination of photographs, original art, and descriptive text that celebrates the wild and seldom-visited canyonlands of the Texas Plains. Exploring an environment largely unknown to even native Texans, both writer and artist take the reader on an intimate and compelling visit to an unforgetably beautiful corner of Texas.

En el proceso de configuración de "Occidente" como Cultura, hoy ya planetaria, han continuado permanentemente activas ciertas claves muy reconocibles en la larga historia de su pensamiento, rastreables desde el rigen mismo de éste y que nos han servido, a manera de huellas, para guiar nuestra comprensión de sus modos medulares de ser, pensar y de actuar. Poner, pues, en una íntima relación ese cierto destino suyo de tragedia respecto a la experiencia de lo sagrado -y su indisociable máscara de (...) nihilismo-, dilucidar en su seno el esencial papel del tiempo mítico y la experiencia de un existir para la muerte, mostrar las sendas visibles en la historia de una conciencia infausta colonizada por la sola pulsión de dominio hacia toda posible alteridad que sacie para siempre la ontológica sed de su insacable Logos, son algunas de las ideas que creemos básicas y que trataremos de exponer a lo largo de cuanto sigue. (shrink)