Muss man eine Situation verstanden haben, um in ihr moralisch handeln zu können? Dieser Frage widmet sich der Autor mit Bezug auf Maschinen, die mit Künstlicher Intelligenz betrieben werden, jedoch die Probleme, die sie lösen, nicht verstehen: Reinforcement-Learning-Agenten. Aktuell werden viele Konzepte im Kontext der Künstlichen Intelligenz genutzt, hinter denen eine lange Entwicklungsgeschichte steht. Diese Konzepte werden zunächst historisch und systematisch aufgearbeitet bzw. eingeordnet. Der Fokus liegt allerdings auf den rezenten Ansätzen zur Umsetzung Künstlicher Intelligenz, insbesondere auf dem subsymbolischen Machine-Learning-Ansatz. (...) Dabei ist die Frage zentral, ob eine Maschine tatsächlich von Normen geleitet werden kann, wenn sie zur Gänze auf Elimination von Bedeutung setzt, um funktionieren zu können. Der Autor Antonio Bikić ist Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter an der Fakultät für Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft der LMU München und forscht zu der Philosophie der Künstlichen Intelligenz. (shrink)

As sophisticated artificial intelligence software becomes more ubiquitously and more intimately integrated within domains of traditionally human endeavor, many are raising questions over how responsibility (be it moral, legal, or causal) can be understood for an AI’s actions or influence on an outcome. So called “responsibility gaps” occur whenever there exists an apparent chasm in the ordinary attribution of moral blame or responsibility when an AI automates physical or cognitive labor otherwise performed by human beings and commits an error. Healthcare (...) administration is an industry ripe for responsibility gaps produced by these kinds of AI. The moral stakes of healthcare are often life and death, and the demand for reducing clinical uncertainty while standardizing care incentivizes the development and integration of AI diagnosticians and prognosticators. In this paper, we argue that (1) responsibility gaps are generated by “black box” healthcare AI, (2) the presence of responsibility gaps (if unaddressed) creates serious moral problems, (3) a suitable solution is for relevant stakeholders to voluntarily responsibilize the gaps, taking on some moral responsibility for things they are not, strictly speaking, blameworthy for, and (4) should this solution be taken, black box healthcare AI will be permissible in the provision of healthcare. (shrink)

In comparing classical and non-classical solutions to the semantic paradoxes arguments relying on strength have been influential. In this paper I argue that non-classical solutions should preserve the proof-theoretic strength of classical solutions. Leitgeb’s logic of HYPE is then presented as an interesting possibility to strengthen FDE with a suitable conditional. It is shown that HYPE allows for a non-classical Kripkean theory of truth, called KFL, that is strong enough for the relevant purposes and has additional attractive properties.

Integrated Information Theory is one of the leading models of consciousness. It aims to describe both the quality and quantity of the conscious experience of a physical system, such as the brain, in a particular state. In this contribution, we propound the mathematical structure of the theory, separating the essentials from auxiliary formal tools. We provide a definition of a generalized IIT which has IIT 3.0 of Tononi et al., as well as the Quantum IIT introduced by Zanardi et al. (...) as special cases. This provides an axiomatic definition of the theory which may serve as the starting point for future formal investigations and as an introduction suitable for researchers with a formal background. (shrink)

RésuméQuels sont les objets de la perception? Deux réponses célèbres à cette question soutiennent que ce sont soit les images des objets extramentaux, c'est-à-dire la façon dont ils nous apparaissent, soit les objets eux-mêmes. Dans cet article, je présente une analyse de cette question par Abū l-Barakāt al-Baġdādī, un savant post-avicennien dont l'impact sur l'histoire de la philosophie islamique a été largement négligé. Abū l-Barakāt s'est opposé au dualisme épistémologique traditionnel aristotélicien-avicennien, qui établit une distinction entre la perception sensorielle des (...) particuliers matériels et la conception des universaux immatériels, notamment en ce qui concerne le percevant et/ou la structure de la perception. Selon la théorie d'Abū l-Barakāt, tous les actes épistémiques ont la structure unifiée d'une relation directe entre un même percevant et les objets eux-mêmes – matériels et immatériels. Sa thèse principale consiste à dire qu'avoir des organes corporels n'est pas nécessaire pour la perception sensorielle. Dans la dernière section de cet article, je montre que la critique d'Abū l-Barakāt de la tradition aristotélicienne-avicennienne fut considérée comme une innovation révolutionnaire en épistémologie. Cela peut avoir déterminé les théories épistémologiques de deux des philosophes arabes postavicenniens les plus importants : Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī et Šihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī. (shrink)

Structuralism about mathematical objects and structuralist accounts of physical computation both face indeterminacy objections. For the former, the problem arises for cases such as the complex roots i and \, for which a automorphism can be defined, thus establishing the structural identity of these importantly distinct mathematical objects. In the case of the latter, the problem arises for logical duals such as AND and OR, which have invertible structural profiles :369–400, 2001). This makes their physical implementations indeterminate, in the sense (...) that their structural profiles alone cannot establish whether a given physical component is an AND-gate or an OR-gate. Doherty has recently shown both problems to be analogous, and has argued that computational structuralism is threatened with the absurd conclusion that computational digits might be indiscernible, such that, if structural properties are all that we have to go on, the binary digit 0 must be treated as identical to the binary digit 1. However, we think that a solution to the indiscernibility problem for mathematical structuralists, drawing on the work of David Hilbert, can be adapted for the analogous problem in the computational case, thereby rescuing the structuralist approach to physical computation. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose a unified account of conditionals inspired by Frank Ramsey. Most contemporary philosophers agree that Ramsey’s account applies to indicative conditionals only. We observe against this orthodoxy that his account covers subjunctive conditionals as well—including counterfactuals. In light of this observation, we argue that Ramsey’s account of conditionals resembles Robert Stalnaker’s possible worlds semantics supplemented by a model of belief. The resemblance suggests to reinterpret the notion of conditional degree of belief in order to overcome a (...) tension in Ramsey’s account. The result of the reinterpretation is a tenable account of conditionals that covers indicative and subjunctive as well as qualitative and probabilistic conditionals. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Humans and other animals possess the remarkable ability to effectively navigate a shared perceptual environment by discerning which objects and spaces are perceived by others and which remain private to themselves. Traditionally, this capacity has been encapsulated under the umbrella of joint attention or joint action. In this comprehensive review, we advocate for a broader and more mechanistic understanding of this phenomenon, termed co-perception. Co-perception encompasses the sensitivity to the perceptual engagement of others and the capability to differentiate between objects (...) perceived privately and those perceived commonly with others. It represents a distinct concept from mere simultaneous individual perception. Moreover, discerning between private and common objects doesn't necessitate intricate mind-reading abilities or mutual coordination. The act of perceiving objects as either private or common provides a comprehensive account for social scenarios where individuals simply share the same context or may even engage in competition. This conceptual framework encourages a re-examination of classical paradigms that demonstrate social influences on perception. Furthermore, it suggests that the impacts of shared experiences extend beyond affective responses, also influencing perceptual processes. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Attention Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science Philosophy > Psychological Capacities. (shrink)

It is widely believed that immigrants, after some time, acquire a claim to naturalize and become citizens of their new state. What explains this claim? Although existing answers (may) succeed in justifying some of immigrants' rights claims, they cannot justify the claim that immigrants are owed the opportunity to naturalize because these theories lack a sufficiently rich account of the purpose of citizenship. To fill this gap, I offer a novel egalitarian account of citizenship. Citizenship, on this account, partially protects (...) immigrants against social hierarchy by realizing social equality in a publicly accessible manner. This explains claims to naturalize. (shrink)

What role do human relationships play within the moral domain? There appears to be a lot of agreement that relationships play an important role in and for morality, but certainly not any foundational one. Yet, there has been a recent interest in seeking to explain the foundation of morality in relational terms. According to these relational proposals, the very foundation of impartial morality, and in particular the domain of “what we owe to each other” can be found in the same (...) normative structures that are characteristic of interpersonal relationships and the partial reasons they give rise to. This suggestion has been met with serious criticism, according to which any seeming appeal to a so-called moral relationship does no work in grounding morality and the obligations that we owe to each other. The present paper intends to challenge this conclusion by arguing that the objections rendered are not decisive, as a result of which we can begin to make sense of the idea that we do share a reason-giving relationship with each other in the moral sphere. The moral relationship, the paper argues, is one we simply share with each other in virtue of our shared vulnerability to attitudinal injury as rational agents. (shrink)

It is astonishing that we humans are able to have, act on and express moral beliefs. This dissertation aims to provide a better philosophical understanding of why and how this is possible especially when we assume metaethical expressivism. Metaethical expressivism is the combination of expressivism and noncognitivism. Expressivism is the view that the meaning of a sentence is explained by the mental state it is conventionally used to express. Noncognitivism is the view that the mental state expressed by a moral (...) sentence is a noncognitive, desire-like state. The central question of this dissertation is this: "How can metaethical expressivists explain that we are able to express moral beliefs?" The shortest answer this dissertation will give is the following: "by becoming `dispositional expressivists´." Dispositional expressivists hold that moral beliefs are dispositions to be in certain mental states that resemble desires. More precisely, a central thesis of this study is that to hold a moral belief is to be disposed to be in a desire-like, noncognitive state where this state has some specific structure. This dissertation arrives at and justifies this thesis by making a number of steps. It starts with preparing the ground by developing a general theory of what it is for a sentence to express a mental state. Roughly, this theory states that for a sentence to express a mental state is for that sentence to be conventionally used to perform a speech act which counts as sincere only if the user or speaker is in that mental state. This theory of expressing satisfies all the constraints that must be satisfied for it to be compatible with the purposes of metaethical expressivism. The next step is to provide a solution to the most notorious semantic problem confronting metaethical expressivism, the problem of explaining how sentences containing moral words can have compositional meaning and stand in logical relations also known as the Frege-Geach or embedding problem. Building on the research of Mark Schroeder, a new expressivist semantics, called `Attitude Semantics´, will be developed for a first-order language. The motivating idea underlying attitude semantics is that expressivists can avoid the problematic feature of so-called `biforcation´ if they treat the structures of the mental states expressed by moral sentences as well as that expressed by non-moral sentences as being isomorphic. In order to give those structures a philosophically interesting interpretation, it will be suggested that we treat sentences as expressing dispositional states. As a toy example we will treat the sentence `murder is wrong´ as expressing the disposition to be for blaming for murder. After dealing with the Frege-Geach problem, I turn to the metaethical expressivists' project of quasi-realism. Two major goals of this project are to explain how moral sentence can be truth-apt and how the states expressed by them can be regarded as moral beliefs. In order to establish those goals I critically examine a number of theories of truth-aptness by providing counterexamples to them. I then present my own theory which says that a sentence is truth-apt iff and because there is a conventional way to use it to express a belief. What is new about this theory is that it treats expressing a belief as being explanatorily more basic than being truth-apt. Belief, according to this theory, explains truth-aptness, not vice versa. This has the important consequence that it shows that what I call the `orthodox strategy´ of quasi-realists is mistaken and needs to be inverted: expressivists must `earn the right´ to moral belief before they can establish that moral sentences are truth-apt, and not the other way round. The second part of this dissertation is then concerned with the question of what it is to hold a moral belief and how they can figure in rational reasoning. In short: it is concerned with earning the right to moral belief. After discussing the major problems confronting a noncognitivist theory of belief, most importantly what I call the `tightrope problem´, I argue for a dispositional form of noncognitivism about moral belief that combines elements from Eric Schwitzgebel's dispositionalism about belief and Sebastian Köhler's `conceptual role expressivism´. This dispositional noncognitivism perfectly matches and justifies the dispositionalist interpretation of the expressivist semantics developed before. In order to fully earn the right to moral belief, however, metaethical expressivists must also deal with several epistemological objections concerning the rationality of moral belief. The first objection I deal with comes from Derek Baker and is directed against Mark Schroeder's specific development of expressivism. I deal with this objection because my own theory bears close resemblance to Schroeder's theory and so it might be worried that it confronts the same issues. Fortunately, we will see that Baker's objection rest on a number of mistaken assumptions and so neither applies to Schroeder's expressivism nor to the version which I defend in this study. The other epistemological objection to metaethical expressivism I deal with is Cian Dorr's famous wishful-thinking objection. In contrast to previous replies to this objection I attack it by directly questioning the central assumption on which it rests, namely that reasoners can never be justified in basing a factual belief on a desire-like state. I argue that this is false, and that under certain conditions reasoning from desire-like mental states to factual beliefs is justified. My argument shows that even if holding a moral belief is being in a desire-like noncognitive state, basing factual belief on a moral belief can give one an epistemic reason for the factual belief. Hence, even if moral thoughts are wishes, moral thinking is not wishful thinking. I take my arguments to earn the dispositional expressivist the right to moral belief. By the previously defended theory of truth-aptness in terms of belief, this allows the dispositional expressivists to conclude that moral sentences are also truth-apt. This finishes the quasi-realist project of this dissertation. In the last part of this dissertation I switch gears and present two unnoted problems for metaethical expressivists having to do with explaining moral motivation. Both arguments are surprisingly simple. The first one is this: if motivation requires a belief as well as a desire (Humeanism), and moral judgments motivate by themselves (internalism), then moral judgments cannot be desires only. If this argument is sound, it shows that the famous `motivation argument´ not only entails the falsity of cognitivism, but also the falsity of noncognitivism. The second argument is the following: moral judgments when combined with suitable external desires motivate to act (externalism), but if motivation requires belief as well as desire (Humeanism), then moral judgments cannot be desires only. I discuss several ways in which noncognitivists might want to deal with those problems, but leave it as an open question whether those solutions will ultimately be viable. Overall, this dissertation makes serious contributions to the research program of metaethical expressivism. It makes proposals for how to solve a number of notorious problems, such as the Frege-Geach problem in semantics and the wishful-thinking problem in epistemology. Besides this, however, it also raises two new problems for metaethical expressivism in the philosophy of action. For those reasons this dissertation will be of interest for anyone who wants to defend or criticize expressivism in metaethics, and more generally, anyone who wants to better understand our astonishing ability to express moral beliefs. (shrink)

Die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Theologie und Philosophie ist so alt wie das Christentum. Im Mittelalter wurde der Streit weitgehend zugunsten der Theologie entschieden. Die Philosophie, verstanden als Metaphysik, wurde ancilla theologiae, Magd der Theologie. Im Zeitalter der Aufklärung drehte sich jedoch der Spieß um, die Theologie wurde nun zur Magd der Philosophie. Später, unter dem wachsenden Einfluss der empirischen Wissenschaften und der Technik, verlor die Philosophie ihren metaphysischen Charakter und wurde weitgehend eine Theorie der Wissenschaften, die schließlich in einer Selbstkritik des (...) empirisch-wissenschaftlichen Denkens überhaupt gipfelte. Diese letzte Entwicklung wird in dem folgenden Artikel skizziert. Es wird gezeigt, wie gegenwärtig Theologen, die diese Entwicklung nicht erkannt haben und von einem heute überholten Wissenschaftsbegriff ausgehen, immer noch versuchen, ihn mit dem theologischen Denken zu versöhnen. So werden sie mehr und mehr gezwungen, das, was sie für einen »dogmatischen Ballast« halten, über Bord zu werfen mit der Folge, dass sie das Wesen der christlichen Offenbarung weitgehend verfremden.The struggle between theology and philosophy is as old as Christianity. In the middle age this struggle ended in favour of theology. Philosophy, understood as metaphysics, was called ancilla theologiae. However, in the age of enlightenment the tables were turned: Now, theology became the ancilla of philosophy. Later, under the growing influence of the empirical sciences and technology, philosophy lost its metaphysical character and widely became a theory of sciences which culminated in self-criticism of scientific thinking. Now, this last development will be sketched in the following article. It will be shown how at present theologians who ignore this development and proceed from an antiquated concept of science still try to reconcile it with theological thinking. Thereby, they are more and more compelled to throw off what is deemed to be »dogmatic ballast« with the consequence that they alienate the essence of christian revelation. (shrink)

Bd. 1. Wissenschaftliche Erklärung und Begründung.

Zusammenfassung Fuer unseren Begriff der Gegenstaende der Biologie ist es charakteristisch, dass diese Gegenstaende eine Geschichte haben. Das unterscheidet sie von den Grundgegenstaenden der Physik, die wir so definieren, dass sie als Elemente in geschichtliche Ablaeufe zwar eingehen, ohne dabei indes selbst historischen Wandlungen unterworfen zu sein. Deswegen ist es im Rahmen biologischer Forschungen ueblich, Erklaerungen einmal fuer Veraenderungen und einmal fuer Entstehungen eines Lebewesens (einer Art) anzustreben.

First of all some problems of a scientifical dialogue between the different systems in the East and the West are being presented. In such a dialogue symmetry and reflexivity as principles of orientation have an important function. These principles are close to reality in the field of the philosophy of science and history of science in the DDR. By the controversy between the philosophy of science and the history of science in the DDR and by the way of discussing the (...) Kuhnian theory within the Marxist-Leninist-philosophy of science, together with an apologetical demarcation a real westernoriented willingness of dialogue in the DDR can be remarked. Even far-reaching positions can be found so that an intensification of the dialogue is possible. (shrink)

English summary: This anthology deals with the work of Augustinus Wucherer-Huldenfelds, one of Austria's most prominent philosophers of the late 20th and early 21st century.

Die »Enzyklopädie Philosophie- und Wissenschaftstheorie«, das größte allgemeine Nachschlagewerk zur Philosophie im deutschsprachigen Raum, wurde 1980 begonnen und 1996 mit dem vierten Band abgeschlossen. Sie erschien 2005 bis 2018 in einer komplett aktualisierten und erweiterten 8-bändigen Neuauflage, die hiermit nun in einer kartonierten Sonderausgabe vorliegt. Die »Enzyklopädie« umfasst in Sach- und Personenartikeln nicht nur den klassischen Bestand des philosophischen Wissens, sondern auch die neuere Entwicklung der Philosophie, insbesondere in den Bereichen Logik, Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie sowie Sprachphilosophie. Zugleich finden (...) Grundlagenreflexionen in den Wissenschaften und deren Geschichte ausführliche Berücksichtigung. Die umfassenden Bibliographien und Werkverzeichnisse wurden für die 2. Auflage in allen Artikeln auf den neuesten Stand gebracht. Der Herausgeber Jürgen Mittelstraß, Professor em. für Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie an der Universität Konstanz, ist einer der international renommiertesten deutschen Philosophen. 1989 erhielt er den Leibniz-Preis der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) und seitdem zahlreiche weitere Wissenschaftspreise sowie Ehrendoktorwürden. Er ist Direktor des Konstanzer Wissenschaftsforums, war Präsident der Academia Europaea (2002-2008) und Vorsitzender des Österreichischen Wissenschaftsrates (2005-2015). Band 1: A-B | Band 2: C-F | Band 3: G-Inn | Band 4: Ins-Loc | Band 5: Log-N | Band 6: O-Ra | Band 7: Re-Te | Band 8: Th-Z. (shrink)

Changing Perspectives – From the Experimental to the Technological Turn in History and Philosophy of Science. In the 1960s the philosophy of science was transformed through the encounter with the history of science, resulting in a collaborative venture by the name of “History and Philosophy of Science” (HPS). Philosophy of science adopted ever more regularly the format of the case study to reconstruct certain episodes from the history of science, and historians were mostly interested in the production of scientific knowledge. (...) The so‐called “experimental turn” of the 1980s owed to this interaction between philosophy and history. Its guiding question remained quite traditional, however, namely “How do the sciences achieve an agreement between representation and reality?” Only the answers to this question broke with tradition by focusing not on theory but on the role of instruments and experiments. – Roughly 30 years after the experimental turn, another transformative encounter appears to be taking place. HPS is being transformed in the encounter with philosophy of technology. From the point of view of philosophy of technology, the question does not arise whether and how the agreement of mind and world, representation and reality can be achieved. When things are constructed, built or made, human thinking and physical materiality are inseparably intertwined. Instead of seeking to describe a mind‐independent reality, technoscientific researchers are working to acquire and demonstrate capabilities of experimental or predictive control. When science is regarded as a kind of technology, a program of study opens up for epistemology and so do avenues for the historiography of science. History of science might now show how the problems and procedures of the sciences arise from and impinge back upon a world that is itself a product of science and technology. It thereby abandons its traditional HPS niche existence and joins forces with environmental history, history of technology, social, labor, and consumer history. (shrink)

Die »Enzyklopädie Philosophie- und Wissenschaftstheorie«, das größte allgemeine Nachschlagewerk zur Philosophie im deutschsprachigen Raum, wurde 1980 begonnen und 1996 mit dem vierten Band abgeschlossen. Sie erschien 2005 bis 2018 in einer komplett aktualisierten und erweiterten 8-bändigen Neuauflage, die hiermit nun in einer kartonierten Sonderausgabe vorliegt. Die »Enzyklopädie« umfasst in Sach- und Personenartikeln nicht nur den klassischen Bestand des philosophischen Wissens, sondern auch die neuere Entwicklung der Philosophie, insbesondere in den Bereichen Logik, Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie sowie Sprachphilosophie. Zugleich finden (...) Grundlagenreflexionen in den Wissenschaften und deren Geschichte ausführliche Berücksichtigung. Die umfassenden Bibliographien und Werkverzeichnisse wurden für die 2. Auflage in allen Artikeln auf den neuesten Stand gebracht. Der Herausgeber Jürgen Mittelstraß, Professor em. für Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie an der Universität Konstanz, ist einer der international renommiertesten deutschen Philosophen. 1989 erhielt er den Leibniz-Preis der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) und seitdem zahlreiche weitere Wissenschaftspreise sowie Ehrendoktorwürden. Er ist Direktor des Konstanzer Wissenschaftsforums, war Präsident der Academia Europaea (2002-2008) und Vorsitzender des Österreichischen Wissenschaftsrates (2005-2015). Band 1: A-B | Band 2: C-F | Band 3: G-Inn | Band 4: Ins-Loc | Band 5: Log-N | Band 6: O-Ra | Band 7: Re-Te | Band 8: Th-Z. (shrink)

Der Band gibt wichtige Impulse für die methodologische Reflexion der historischen Kulturwissenschaften. Er geht auf eine Tagung zurück, deren Thema "Dichtung und Wahrheit. Zum Verhältnis von Narration und Erklärung in den Kultur-, Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften" war. Die Autoren greifen zum ersten Mal im kulturwissenschaftlichen Kontext Anregungen vor allem aus der Analytischen Philosophie auf und diskutieren ihren Wert für historisches und kulturwissenschaftliches Arbeiten. Im Fokus der Untersuchungen steht eine Begriffstrias, die für die Sozial-, Geistes- und Kulturwissenschaften gleichermaßen seit dem 19. Jahrhundert (...) eine große Herausforderung darstellt: Erklären, Verstehen und Erzählen. (shrink)

Das vorliegende Buch präsentiert mit der Untersuchung der komplexen historischen und systematischen Voraussetzungen und Konsequenzen des zweiten Anfangs der aristotelischen Philosophie die mittelalterlichen Grundlagen der europäischen Wissenskultur. In der ersten umfassenden Monographie zu Dominicus Gundissalinus (ca. 1110-1190) stellt Alexander Fidora einen herausragenden Vertreter der intellektuellen Revolution des 12. Jahrhunderts mit seinem Beitrag zum zweiten Anfang der aristotelischen Philosophie vor. Der Philosoph und Übersetzer Gundissalinus kann als einer jener frühen Rezipienten der aristotelischen Wissens- und Wissenschaftstheorie gelten, durch deren Rezeption und (...) Interpretation der Stagirite die Physiognomie der abendländischen Wissenskultur nachhaltig bis in die Gegenwart hinein prägen sollte. Dabei verbindet der spanische Gelehrte, der im Spannungsfeld der drei großen abrahamitischen Religionen und ihrer kulturellen Überlieferungen in Toledo wirkte, in origineller Weise Motive des lateinisch-christlichen Denkens mit Elementen der arabisch-jüdischen falsafa und des durch sie der lateinischen Welt erstmals vollständig zugänglichen Corpus aristotelicum zu einem eigenständigen wissens- und wissenschaftstheoretischen Gesamtentwurf, der auch für die zeitgenössischen Diskussionen, etwa zum Status der Metaphysik, nichts an Bedeutung verloren hat. (shrink)