The topic of fake news has received increased attention from philosophers since the term became a favorite of politicians (Habgood-Coote 2016; Dentith 2016). Notably missing from the conversation, however, is a discussion of fake news and conspiracy theory media as a market. This paper will take as its starting point the account of noxious markets put forward by Debra Satz (2010), and will argue that there is a pro tanto moral reason to restrict the market for (...) fake news. Specifically, we begin with Satz’s argument that restricting a market may be required when i) that market inhibits citizens from being able to stand in an equal relationship with one another, and ii) this problem cannot be solved without such direct restrictions. Our own argument then proceeds in three parts: first, we argue that the market for fake news fits Satz’s description of a noxious market; second, we argue against explanations of the proliferation of fake news that are couched in terms of “epistemic vice”, and likewise argue against prescribing critical thinking education as a solution to the problem; finally, we conclude that, in the absence of other solutions to mitigate the noxious effects of the fake news market, we have a pro tanto moral reason to impose restrictions on this market. At the end of the paper, we consider one proposal to regulate the fake news market, which involves making social media outlets potentially liable in civil court for damages caused by the fake news hosted on their websites. (shrink)

Despite being a new term, ‘fake news’ has evolved rapidly. This paper argues that it should be reserved for cases of deliberate presentation of false or misleading claims as news, where these are misleading by design. The phrase ‘by design’ here refers to systemic features of the design of the sources and channels by which fake news propagates and, thereby, manipulates the audience’s cognitive processes. This prospective definition is then tested: first, by contrasting fake (...) news with other forms of public disinformation; second, by considering whether it helps pinpoint conditions for the proliferation of fake news. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the growing literature in social epistemology of diagnosing the epistemically problematic features of fake news. I identify two novel problems: the problem of relevant alternatives; and the problem of the degradation of the epistemic environment. The former arises among individual epistemic transactions. By making salient, and thereby relevant, alternatives to knowledge claims, fake news stories threaten knowledge. The problem of the degradation of the epistemic environment arises at the level of entire epistemic (...) communities. I introduce the notion of an epistemic environment, roughly the totality of resources and circumstances relevant to assessing the epistemically interesting statuses, such as knowledge. Fake news degrades our epistemic environment by undermining confidence in epistemic institutions and altering epistemic habits, thereby making the environment less conducive to achieving positive epistemic statuses. This is problematic even if the decrease in confidence and the altering of habits are rational. I end by considering solutions to these problems, stressing the importance of reproaching each other for proliferating fake news. I argue that we should reproach even faultless purveyors of fake news. This is because fake news typically arises in abnormal epistemic contexts, where there is widespread ignorance of, and noncompliance with, correct epistemic norms. (shrink)

This paper shows why defining „fake news“ is worthwhile and what a suitable definition of “fake news” might look like. We begin by introducing our definition of “fake news” (§2) and employ it to set fake news apart from related phenomena that are often conflated with it (§3). We then extract seven potential dimensions of the concept of fake news from the literature (§4) and compare the most representative definitions that (...) have been proposed so far along those dimensions (§5). In particular, we discuss the definitions by Rini, Gelfert, Dentith, Mukerji, and Zimmermann & Kohring, show up their merits and debits and put them in relation to ours. Although we take our definition as the starting point and argue for it on the side-lines, our primary aims are (i) to enable a systematic evaluation of prevalent definitions with respect to their extensional scope, practical utility, and conceptual transparency, (ii) to demonstrate that there is more widespread agreement than one would think on the outset, and (iii) to show (in §6) that defining “fake news” is not only far from futile, but of vital importance to confront the epistemic threats posed by fake news. (shrink)

I argue that there is a prima facie tension between solutions to the problem of fake news and solutions to the problem presented by various cognitive biases that dispose us to dismiss evidence against our prior beliefs (what might seem to be the driving force behind echo chambers). We can guard against fake news by strengthening belief. But we can exit echo chambers by becoming more sensitive to counterevidence, which seems to require weakening our beliefs. I (...) resolve the tension by arguing against an injunction to weaken belief in the required ways. In particular, there is no injunction to be open-minded in all circumstances toward various counterarguments, even those whose premises seem compelling and in which we can’t expose a flaw. On the contrary, there are circumstances in which you should, in the relevant sense, be closed-minded toward such counterarguments. (shrink)

Since the Brexit Referendum in the United Kingdom and the election of Donald Trump as US President in 2016, the term ‘fake news’ has become a significant source of concern. Recently, the European Commission and the British House of Commons have condemned the phenomenon as a threat to their institutions’ democratic processes and values. However, political disinformation is nothing new, and empirical studies suggest that fake news has not decided crucial elections, that most readers do not (...) believe the online fake news stories they read, and that political polarization in Western democracies like the US began to increase long before online fake news existed. The question then is: how exactly does fake news threaten democracies? This paper argues that online fake news threatens democratic processes because it undermines citizens’ epistemic trust in each other. This in turn threatens to undermine the perceived legitimacy and the moral justification of democratic institutions as a whole. While online fake news is a symptom of a much larger issue (how has the Internet affected democracies, and how can we use its positive power while checking its negative effects?), it deserves particular attention given the potential danger it presents for the viability and the legitimacy of the democratic process. (shrink)

Across two studies, one of which was pre-registered, we find that a simple questionnaire that measures intellectual virtue and vice predicts how many fake news articles and conspiracy theories participants accept. This effect holds even when controlling for multiple demographic predictors, including age, household income, sex, education, ethnicity, political affiliation, religion, and news consumption. These results indicate that self-report is an adequate way to measure intellectual virtue and vice, which suggests that they are not fully immune to (...) introspective awareness or “stealthy” in the sense that Cassam (2015) argues. This is an important methodological result and may pave the way for future research on intellectual virtue and vice. (shrink)

This paper focuses on extant approaches to counteract the consumption of fake news online. Proponents of structural approaches suggest that our proneness to consuming fake news could only be reduced by reshaping the architecture of online environments. Proponents of educational approaches suggest that fake news consumers should be empowered to improve their epistemic agency. In this paper, we address a question that is relevant to this debate: namely, whether fake news consumers commit (...) mistakes for which they can be criticized and that they could easily avoid by reforming their doxastic conduct. Proponents of structural approaches, like R. Rini and B. Millar, have defended in different ways a negative answer to this question. In this paper, we criticize their views and suggest that individual users could improve on their epistemic practice by widening their information diet. (shrink)

O artigo busca oferecer um quadro conceitual útil para pensar sobre fake news nas trocas testemunhais em ambientes informacionais complexos. Pretende-se mostrar que, em um ambiente social fortemente marcado por interações sociais difusas, no qual fake news afloram ou podem potencialmente aflorar, modificam-se as exigências epistêmicas para a obtenção de racionalidade e conhecimento, sejam elas concebidas de modo internista ou externista. Trata-se, também, de uma revisão integrativa da literatura, com a finalidade de sintetizar os resultados obtidos (...) sobre o tema em questão. Para atingir seus objetivos, o artigo explora o fenômeno e a noção de fake news e examina o impacto dos elementos advindos dos novos ambientes informacionais sobre a epistemologia do testemunho. Após apresentarmos um exame de lições gerais que o quadro conceitual delineado traz à tona, concluímos com notas sobre o impacto dessas lições para a epistemologia do testemunho, em particular. (shrink)

Many of U.S. President Donald Trump’s business interests—and those of his family and close associates—either conflict or could conflict with his position as the country’s top elected official. Despite concerns about the vitality of the journalism industry, these actual or potential conflicts have been reported in great detail across a number of journalism platforms. More concerning, however, are the partisan news organizations on both the right and left that deliberately sow social discord by exciting deeply polarized political tensions among (...) the U.S. populous. Often described as “fake” news, these organizations produce reports that seem designed to create outrage among audiences instead of enlightenment. This paper draws upon social epistemology and information ethics to offer a truth-based ethos for journalism to help overcome this pernicious form of exploitation. (shrink)

In a recent contribution to conceptual ethics, Joshua Habgood-Coote argues that philosophers should refrain from using the term “fake news,” which is commonly employed in public discussions focusing on the epistemic health of democracies. In this short discussion note, I take issue with this claim, discussing each of the three arguments advanced by Coote to support the conclusion that we should abandon this concept. First, I contend that although “fake news” is a contested concept, there is (...) significant agreement among contemporary philosophers about its key feature. Second, I argue against the claim that “fake news” is an unnecessary concept by underlying that it is not reducible to other terms we customarily use to describe the epistemic dysfunctions of democracies. Lastly, I suggest that using the term “fake news” need not serve propagandistic aims, and that philosophers can use this concept without engaging in epistemic policing, that is, commanding their interlocutors not to believe specific news stories or sources. (shrink)

Did you know that Hillary Clinton sold weapons to ISIS? Or that Mike Pence called Michelle Obama “the most vulgar First Lady we’ve ever had”? No, you didn’t know these things. You couldn’t know them, because these claims are false.1 But many American voters believed them.One of the most distinctive features of the 2016 campaign was the rise of “fake news,” factually false claims circulated on social media, usually via channels of partisan camaraderie. Media analysts and social scientists (...) are still debating what role fake news played in Trump’s victory.2 But whether or not it drove the outcome, fake news certainly affected the choices of some individual voters.Why were people willing to believe easily... (shrink)

If political fake news is a serious concern for democratic politics, no less worrisome is scientific news with patently distorted content. Prima facie, scientific misinformation partially escapes the definition of fake news provided by empirical and philosophical analysis, mainly patterned after political disinformation. Most notably, we aim to show that people are often unaware not only of disseminating, but also of producing false or misleading information. However, by leveraging the philosophical and psychological literature, we advance (...) some reasons for keeping scientific misinformation under the same umbrella, broadening the definition of fake news in order to account for it as well. In concluding, we shall advance some ideas on how to reform scientific communication, which may help to address the issue of scientific misinformation. (shrink)

Philosophers and social scientists largely agree that fake news is not just necessarily untruthful, but necessarily insincere: it’s produced either with the intention to deceive or an indifference toward its truth. Against this, I argue insincerity is neither a necessary nor obviously typical feature of fake news. The main argument proceeds in two stages. The first, methodological step develops classification criteria for identifying instances of fake news. By attending to expressed theoretical and practical interests, (...) I observe how our classification practices turn on worries about fake news’s unique political-epistemic risks. From this, I argue (i) theories of fake news should capture independent mechanisms that realise these risks and (ii) the manifestation of them suffices for classifying a news story as fake news. The second step applies the classification criteria to bad science journalism. I argue the systematic epistemic faults in bad science journalism manifest the same political-epistemic risks we see in fake news, which suffices to justify classifying it as fake news. But since such faults aren’t plausibly attributed to its propagators being insincere, insincerity doesn’t function independently as a mechanism for realising fake news’s political-epistemic risks. Thus, I conclude, we should exclude insincerity from our accounts of the phenomenon. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In Habgood-Coote : 1033–1065) I argued that we should abandon ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’, on the grounds that these terms do not have stable public meanings, are unnecessary, and function as vehicles for propaganda. Jessica Pepp, Eliot Michaelson, and Rachel Sterken and Étienne Brown : 144–154) have raised worries about my case for abandonment, recommending that we continue using ‘fake news’. In this paper, I respond to these worries. I distinguish more clearly between theoretical and (...) political reasons for abandoning a term, assemble more evidence that ‘fake news’ is a nonsense term, and respond to the worries raised by Pepp, Michaelson and Sterken, and Brown. I close by considering the prospects for anti-fascist and anti-authoritarian conceptual engineering. (shrink)

The purpose of a study is to critically assess common presupposition, that fake news is a) a threat for civilization as we know it; b) something that appeared only recently or at least that recent examples present a more serious threat for civilization as those from the past. It looks like the fast and global spread of fake news widens the gap between objective reality and that reality asserted by fake news. It is thus (...) accepted especially by so-called liberal media but also a wider intellectual community that we are living in the post-truth era. Such shift is mainly attributed to a strong anti-scientific movement of which one of more important consequence is agnotology that is then understood as one of the major causes for the inefficiency of democracy, post-democracy. (shrink)

Recently, the term «fake news» has become ubiquitous in political and public discourse and the media. Despite its omnipresence, however, it is anything but clear what fake news is. An adequate and comprehensive definition of fake news is called for. We take steps towards this goal by providing a systematic account of fake news that makes the phenomenon tangible, rehabilitates the use of the term, and helps us to set fake (...) class='Hi'>news apart from related phenomena. (You can email us for a penultimate draft of this paper.). (shrink)

Looking at the recent spate of claims about “fake news” which appear to be a new feature of political discourse, I argue that fake news presents an interesting problem in epistemology. Te phenomena of fake news trades upon tolerating a certain indiference towards truth, which is sometimes expressed insincerely by political actors. Tis indiference and insincerity, I argue, has been allowed to fourish due to the way in which we have set the terms of (...) the “public” epistemology that maintains what is considered “rational” public discourse. I argue one potential salve to the problem of fake news is to challenge this public epistemology by injecting a certain ethical consideration back into the discourse. (shrink)

This study examines the potential of fake news to produce effects on social media engagement as well as the moderating role of education and government approval. We report on a 2x2x2 online experiment conducted in Romania (N=813), in which we manipulated the level of facticity of a news story, its valence, and intention to deceive. Results show that ideologically driven news with a negative valence (rather than fabricated news or other genres, such as satire and (...) parody) have a greater virality potential. However, neither the level of education nor government approval moderate this effect. Additionally, both positive and negative ideologically driven news stories enhance the probability that people will sign a document to support the government (i. e., potential for political engagement on social media). These latter effects are moderated by government approval: Lower levels of government approval lead to less support for the government on social media, as a consequence of fake news exposure. (shrink)

Some kinds of “fake news” bits on Saturday Night Live (SNL) become more meaningful when linked back to the work of media theorist Neil Postman. Postman's best‐known book, Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business, argues that TV journalism will inevitably reflect the influences and biases of television itself. The result is an entertaining but incoherent stream of “disinformation” in a “peek‐a‐boo world” of unfocused and shallow discussion. Using Postman's arguments for structure and (...) support here, this chapter explores similar concerns reflected in the satirical news reporting of SNL. It shows that “Weekend Update” and other such pieces can ground key lessons that help us navigate our increasingly complex media environment, a point that Postman himself considers in his book's closing pages. As our media environment continues to change, it becomes helpful to see Postman's thesis as a valuable philosophical insight, and one that SNL's comedy can illustrate quite effectively. (shrink)

The world is swimming in misinformation. Conflicting messages bombard us every day with news on everything from politics and world events to investments and alternative health. The daily paper, nightly news, websites, and social media each compete for our attention and each often insist on a different version of the facts. Inevitably, we have questions: Who is telling the truth? How would we know? How did we get here? What can we do? Beyond Fake News answers (...) these and other queries. It offers a technological and market-based explanation for how our informational environment became so polluted. It shows how purveyors of news often have incentives to mislead us, and how consumers of information often have incentives to be misled. And it chronicles how, as technology improves and the regulatory burdens drop, our information-scape becomes ever more littered with misinformation. Beyond Fake News argues that even when we really want the truth, our minds are built in such a way so as to be incapable of grasping many facts, and blind spots mar our view of the world. But we can do better, both as individuals and as a society. As individuals, we can improve the accuracy of our understanding of the world by knowing who to trust and recognizing our limitations. And as a society, we can take important steps to reduce the quantity and effects of misinformation. (shrink)

Since 2016, there has been an explosion of academic work and journalism that fixes its subject matter using the terms ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’. In this paper, I argue that this terminology is not up to scratch, and that academics and journalists ought to completely stop using the terms ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’. I set out three arguments for abandonment. First, that ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’ do not have stable public meanings, entailing that they (...) are either nonsense, context-sensitive, or contested. Secondly, that these terms are unnecessary, because we already have a rich vocabulary for thinking about epistemic dysfunction. Thirdly, I observe that ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’ have propagandistic uses, meaning that using them legitimates anti-democratic propaganda, and runs the risk of smuggling bad ideology into conversations. (shrink)

The central thesis of this paper is that fake news and related phenomena serve as defeaters for knowledge transmission via journalistic channels. This explains how they pose a threat to democracy; and it points the way to determining how to address this threat. Democracy is both intrinsically and instrumentally good provided the electorate has knowledge (however partial and distributed) of the common good and the means of achieving it. Since journalism provides such knowledge, those who value democracy have (...) a reason to protect it. Hostile agents, however, can undermine both the effectiveness of democratic decision-making and faith in democracy itself, by deliberately promulgating fake news and hyper-partisan views; moreover, these effects can come about unintentionally on social media. I conclude that we may need to change, not just the way we process information online, but also the informational environment in which we operate. (shrink)

This paper reports on the results of a survey of faculty members at California State University, Northridge in Los Angeles, California regarding their understanding of and familiarity with the concept of fake news. With very few studies published on the attitudes of teaching faculty at universities, this study is a unique approach to the issues facing educators, knowledge creators, and information specialists. The paper examines the origins of the term “fake news”, the factors contributing to its (...) current prevalence, and proposes a new definition. It also reports upon the attitudes that teaching faculty hold, and how they define fake news within their specific disciplines. Though nearly all surveyed faculty felt fake news was an important topic that impacted them professionally, the researchers also find that faculty across all disciplines and ranks, ages, and gender, hold widely differing conceptions of fake news. This lack of consensus may have future implications for students in particular and higher education in general and are worth exploring further. (shrink)

The term "fake news" ascended rapidly to prominence in 2016 and has become a fixture in academic and public discussions, as well as in political mud-slinging. In the flurry of discussion, the term has been applied so broadly as to threaten to render it meaningless. In an effort to rescue our ability to discuss—and combat—the underlying phenomenon that triggered the present use of the term, some philosophers have tried to characterize it more precisely. A common theme in this (...) nascent philosophical discussion is that contemporary fake news is not a new kind of phenomenon, but just the latest iteration of a broader kind of phenomenon that has played out in different ways across the history of human information-dissemination technologies. While we agree with this, we argue that newer sorts of fake news reveal substantial flaws in earlier understandings of this notion. In particular, we argue that no deceptive intentions are necessary for fake news to arise; rather, fake news arises when stories which were not produced via standard journalistic practice are treated as though they had been. Importantly, this revisionary understanding of fake news allows us to accommodate and understand the way that fake news is plausibly generated and spread in a contemporary setting, as much by non-human actors as by ordinary human beings. (shrink)

Our current understanding of ‘fake news’ is not in good shape. On the one hand, this category seems to be urgently needed for an adequate understanding of the epistemology in the age of the internet. On the other hand, the term has an unstable ordinary meaning and the prevalent accounts which all relate fake news to epistemically bad attitudes of the producer lack theoretical unity, sufficient extensional adequacy, and epistemic fruitfulness. I will therefore suggest an alternative (...) account of fake news that is meant as an explication rather than a traditional conceptual analysis of the term and that understands fake news solely from the consumer’s perspective. I will argue that this new account has the required theoretical unity, that it is epistemically highly fruitful, and that it is still very close to the ordinary usage. I conclude with addressing some of the main objections to this view. (shrink)

Fake News Nation tells the story of how false information has flooded American public life for over 230 years. The authors show how lies, misrepresentations, and rumors have drawn America into wars, covered up assassinations, influenced national elections, and impacted contentious policy issues such as the effects of smoking and climate change.

An important way in which philosophy can contribute to public discourse is by clarifying concepts that are central to it. This paper is a philosophical contribution in that spirit. It offers an account of fake news—a notion that has entered public debate following the 2016 US presidential election. On the view I defend, fake news is Frankfurtian bullshit that is asserted in the form of a news publication. According to Frankfurt’s famous account, bullshit has two (...) characteristics. There is, firstly, an “indifference to how things really are” on the part of the bullshitter. This does not mean that what a bullshitter says is always false. It might well be true. What it does mean, however, is that, unlike a liar, who tries to convince us that a given statement he believes to be false is true, a bullshitter simply does not care whether what he says is true. The same, I believe, is true of the publisher of fake news. Secondly, the bullshitter misrepresents “in a certain way … what he is up to”. Likewise, the publisher of fake news seems to misrepresent what he is up to. It appears that he wants to hide his actual motives. At any rate, so I will argue. (shrink)

Pourquoi la pollution de l’information se répand elle si aisément dans le media sociaux? et pourquoi est-il si vain de recourir aux preuves et aux données pour la combattre? Ma réponse repose sur une nouvelle hypothèse au sujet de la fonction de certains de nos actes de communication dans les media sociaux. Elle vise à comprendre le phénomène des fake news, mais aussi la communication en général.

Fake news is a worrying phenomenon which is growing increasingly widespread, partly because of the ease with which it is disseminated online. Combating the spread of fake news requires a clear understanding of the nature of fake news. However, the use of the term in everyday language is heterogenous and has no fixed meaning. Despite increasing philosophical attention to the topic, there is no consensus on the correct definition of “fake news” within (...) philosophy either. This paper aims to bring clarity to the philosophical debate of fake news in two ways: Firstly, by providing an overview of existing philosophical definitions and secondly, by developing a new account of fake news. This paper will identify where there is agreement within the philosophical debate of definitions of “fake news” and isolate four key questions on which there is genuine disagreement. These concern the intentionality underlying fake news, its truth value, the question of whether fake news needs to reach a minimum audience, and the question of whether an account of fake news needs to be dynamic. By answering these four questions, I provide a novel account of defining “fake news”. This new definition hinges upon the fact that fake news has the function of being deliberately misleading about its own status as news. (shrink)

O advento da sociedade em rede promoveu mudanças significativas na experiência-com-o-mundo. Observa-se nos últimos anos a crescente toxidade no ambiente informacional, marcado tanto pela vivência tóxica da informação que circula legalmente nas redes sociais como por informações que intoxicam os indivíduos e grupos. O objetivo é discutir, em tempos de pós-verdade e da sociedade non-stop, o aspecto tóxico da informação, que ao tornar o ambiente informacional tóxico, adoece indivíduos e também as sociedades democráticas, ao esmaecer a empatia para com os (...) demais e de pôr em risco a própria ideia de democracia e de vida partilhada de modo democrático. A proposta é discutir a intoxicação pela informação não pelo excesso (infoxicação), mas pelo que nomeio informação tóxica, i.e., o aspecto tóxico da informação e de ambiente informacional tóxico tendo como referência os discursos de ódio. Para tanto serão consideradas a desconstrução de experiências de estados democráticos mediante o crescimento da circulação de discursos de ódio e de discursos de ódio fascistas; o crescimento da desinformação; o crescimento da circulação de notícias fraudulentas (Fake news) e de notícias falsas (por exemplo, as não endossadas pelos saberes científicos, como o terraplanismo, a ideia da supremacia branca); os robots e os algoritmos. (shrink)

The complex issue of fake news has been approached extensively by many disciplines in academia. Despite this variety of approaches, the concept of fake news still lacks a reasonable degree of definitional unicity. This paper critically analyzes a sample of definitions from the current literature. By diving into the set of definitions, it will exhibited a total of ten necessary conditions that scholars generally consider: imitation, falsity, deception, bullshit, purpose, morality, assessability, virality, channel, and appeal. Current (...) definitions of fake news have certain blindspots and leave too much leeway for interpretation. This leeway is utterly problematic because it creates a grey zone in which articles are left stranded halfway between fake news and factual news articles. However, it has the crucial advantage of opening up new epistemic paths of inquiry regarding fake news. As a conclusion, we will summarize the conditions one can accept or reject to define fake news. (shrink)

Purpose This study aims to understand how fake news can cause an impact on consumer behavioral intentions in today’s era when fake news is prevalent and common. Brands have not only faced reputational losses but also got a dip in their share prices and sales, which affected their financial standing. Hence, it is significant for brands to understand the impact of fake news on behavioral intentions and to strategize to manage the impact. Design/methodology/approach This (...) study uses several branding and marketing concepts such as brand experience, brand trust, brand credibility, consumer behavioral intentions along with variables suggested by Elaboration Likelihood Model and Heuristic Systematic Model such as personal relevance/involvement. For fake news, news truthfulness, news credibility and source credibility are used. Findings The results of this study shows that positive brand experience, brand trust, brand credibility help in creating positive behavioral intentions for brands. This study shows that brands focusing on providing positive brand experience have a stronger brand trust and credibility and are affected less by fake news than those brands which do not emphasize on these factors. Practical implications This paper can assist brand managers in understanding the impact fake news can have on behavioral intentions of consumers. The managers can strategize such that the fake news affects their brands the least. Originality/value The authors in this paper attempt to fill in the gap in literature, which is to study how the fake news impacts the brands considering the credibility, trust and experience they establish with their customers. The existing literature discusses the generation and dissemination of fake news on social media and its impact on political scenarios and personalities. Also, studies explain the impact of fake news on the financial position of brands, but marketing facets are not tested empirically. (shrink)

The advance of the internet and social media has had a drastic impact on our epistemic environment. This paper will focus on two different risks epistemic agents face online: being exposed to fake news and epistemic flooding. While the first risk is widely known and has been extensively discussed in the philosophical literature, the notion of ‘epistemic flooding’ is a novel concept introduced in this paper. Epistemic flooding occurs when epistemic agents find themselves in epistemic environments in which (...) they are routinely confronted with more information and evidence than they can diligently process. Epistemic flooding is one of the most significant risks epistemic agents run while using social media and one of the reasons why the first risk (being exposed to fake news) is especially pernicious. It is particularly harmful if one ascribes to the Spinozan model of belief acquisition in which belief comes easy. Mitigating the combined threat of fake news and epistemic flooding requires us to think normatively about our epistemic environments and how to better them. This paper turns to the normative framework of epistemic environmentalism in order to accomplish this. (shrink)

This book is the first sustained inquiry into the new epistemology of fake news. The chapters, authored by established and emerging names in the field, pursue three goals. First, to analyse the meaning and novelty of 'fake news' and related notions, such as 'conspiracy theory.' Second, to discuss the mechanics of fake news, exploring various practices that generate or promote fake news. Third, to investigate potential therapies for fake news.

This article makes the case that a deficit or absence of trust in media sources to report on news- worthy items facilitates acceptance of fake news. The article begins by identifying the sort of fake news that is of interest for the purposes of this article. Epistemic cove rage is then explained—in particular, how an individual’s expectations about their epistemic environment can lead them to accepting or rejecting claims. The article explains that when an individual (...) believes that main- stream media report on what is deemed newsworthy, it follows that an individual will have grounds to dismiss a newsworthy claim that has not been reported upon—such as a claim made by fake news. Trust—which has both a believed competence requirement and a believed good- will requirement—is then discussed as part of this explanation. The article concludes with a dis- cussion of the implications of the argument for regulating mainstream media. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print.

Talk of fake news is rife in contemporary politics, but what is fake news, and how, if anything, does it differ from news which is fake? I argue that in order to make sense of the phenomenon of fake news, it is necessary to first define it and then show what does and does not fall under the rubric of ‘fake news’. I then go on to argue that fake (...) news is not a new problem. Rather, if there is problem with fake news it is its centrality in contemporary public debate. (shrink)

The spread of fake news online has far reaching implications for the lives of people offline. There is increasing pressure for content sharing platforms to intervene and mitigate the spread of fake news, but intervention spawns accusations of biased censorship. The tension between fair moderation and censorship highlights two related problems that arise in flagging online content as fake or legitimate: firstly, what kind of content counts as a problem such that it should be flagged, (...) and secondly, is it practically and theoretically possible to gather and label instances of such content in an unbiased manner? In this paper, I argue that answering either question involves making value judgements that can generate user distrust toward fact checking efforts. (shrink)

Why do we share fake news? Despite a growing body of freely-available knowledge and information fake news has managed to spread more widely and deeply than before. This paper seeks to understand why this is the case. More specifically, using an experimental setting we aim to quantify the effect of veracity and perception on reaction likelihood. To examine the nature of this relationship, we set up an experiment that mimics the mechanics of Twitter, allowing us to (...) observe the user perception, their reaction in the face of shown claims and the factual veracity of those claims. We find that perceived veracity significantly predicts how likely a user is to react, with higher perceived veracity leading to higher reaction rates. Additionally, we confirm that fake news is inherently more likely to be shared than other types of news. Lastly, we identify an activist-type behavior, meaning that belief in fake news is associated with significantly disproportionate spreading. (shrink)

Addressing fake news requires a multidisciplinary effort The rise of fake news highlights the erosion of long-standing institutional bulwarks against misinformation in the internet age. Concern over the problem is global. However, much remains unknown regarding the vulnerabilities of individuals, institutions, and society to manipulations by malicious actors. A new system of safeguards is needed. Below, we discuss extant social and computer science research regarding belief in fake news and the mechanisms by which it (...) spreads. Fake news has a long history, but we focus on unanswered scientific questions raised by the proliferation of its most recent, politically oriented incarnation. Beyond selected references in the text, suggested further reading can be found in the supplementary materials. (shrink)

Questo articolo prende in esame il fenomeno della proliferazione di fake news da un punto di vista filosofico—anzi, per meglio dire, prettamente epistemologico—con particolare attenzione a tre questioni fondamentali: cosa sono le fake news e come debbano essere definite; quali meccanismi ne favoriscono la proliferazione sui social media; chi debba essere ritenuto responsabile e degno di biasimo nel processo sotteso alla generazione, pubblicazione e diffusione di fake news. A partire dall'analisi dei principali lavori nella (...) letteratura filosofica sul tema, ci proponiamo di: offrire una definizione di fake news che eviti le obiezioni sollevate contro altre definizioni discusse dalla letteratura (§1); mettere in luce le principali cause della propagazione di fake news, con particolare riferimento ai bias cognitivi e alle strutture comunitarie in cui si organizzano gli utenti dei social media (§2); infine, presentare una analisi originale della responsabilità epistemica dei consumatori di fake news (§3). (shrink)

Deliberative democracy is increasingly criticised as out of touch with the realities of partisan politics. This paper considers the rise of fake and hyperpartisan news as one source of this scepticism. While popular accounts often blame such content on citizens’ political biases and motivated reasoning, I survey the empirical evidence and argue that it does not support strong claims about the inability of citizens to live up to deliberative ideals. Instead, much of this research is shown to support (...) the deliberative capacities of citizens and points to their potential in helping to reduce the spread of false and misleading content. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to reflect on the communication model of fake news, starting from the assumption that fake news items are not mere falsehoods (e.g., trivial lies) nor something completely new.Drawing inspiration from the work of Umberto Eco, I will investigate the idea that today’s viral fake news can be aligned with the hermetic paradigm he outlined. Then I will consider another communicative model: that of gossip. Thanks to these two models, (...) I will support the thesis that fake news are not something to eliminate or to correct according to the criterion of evidence or truth, but rather something to live with, corresponding to a potentiality of discourse, that is to detect and to analyze. (shrink)

É recente a evocação do termo de “fake news” em comunicações científicas da comunidade acadêmica brasileira inscrita na grande área de Ciências Sociais Aplicadas. Este artigo objetiva identificar a presença do conceito “fake news” em artigos científicos no domínio da grande área das Ciências Sociais Aplicadas por meio de levantamento na Base de Dados em Ciência da Informação. Metodologicamente, a pesquisa é exploratória com abordagem quantitativa e qualitativa, em que a perspectiva cientométrica foi utilizada para representação (...) dos resultados. Apresenta discussões que reforçam o entendimento do papel da comunicação científica para a consolidação de conceitos que visam refletir demandas presentes na sociedade. Considera positivo o aspecto exploratório das discussões para estudos que podem oferecer contribuições no campo dos estudos métricos, da Biblioteconomia e da Ciência da Informação, no intuito de entender a práxis de elaboração conceitual presente em uma comunidade científica circunscrita. (shrink)

Heute gibt es kaum jemanden mehr, der nicht mit Fake News und Verschwörungstheorien in Berührung gekommen wäre. Mit dem globalen Aufstieg des modernen Populismus und besonders seit Donald Trumps US-Präsidentschaft konnten sie von obskuren Internetfo-ren und dem Rand der Gesellschaft weiter als je zuvor in die öffentliche Debatte vordringen. Mit der zunehmenden Nutzung sozialer Medien und Messenger-Apps wie Telegram oder WhatsApp findet scheinbares Wissen ungehindert Verbreitung und direkten Zugang zu den Smartphones und Köpfen der Menschen. Vor diesem Hintergrund (...) ist es nicht verwunderlich, dass Verschwörungstheorien und Fake News auch Einzug ins Klassenzimmer halten. Dabei stehen Lehrer*innen vor vielen offenen Fragen. Wie sind diese Behauptungen im Einzelnen zu bewerten? Was zeichnet Fake News und Verschwörungstheorien aus und was genau macht sie problematisch? Wie, selbst wenn sie klarerweise falsch und unbegründet sind, sollte damit im Klassenzimmer umgegangen werden? Sollte man sie offen diskutieren? Oder sollte man die Diskussion darüber unterbinden? Hier werden grundlegende und komplexe Fragen der freien Meinungsbildung und -äußerung berührt, zu denen Grundgesetz, Beamten- und Schulrecht nur begrenzt Auskunft geben. In diesem Beitrag wollen uns zuerst ein klares Bild davon machen, was Fake News und Verschwörungstheorien eigentlich sind, warum manche Menschen sie für wahr halten und was daran problematisch ist. Vor diesem Hintergrund soll anschließend die Frage diskutiert werden, wie aus demokratie- und bildungstheoretischer Sicht mit Fake News und Verschwörungstheorien im Unterricht umgegangen werden sollte. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Ahead of Print.

Dieser Beitrag greift das Phänomen Fake News auf und plädiert für einen analytischen Zugang zur Thematik. Zunächst grenzt er den Begriff der Fake News von anderen Phänomenen ab. Er zeigt auf, dass der Begriff nicht nur keinen analytischen Mehrwert bietet, sondern dass er die eigentlichen Probleme verschleiert und als Propagandabegriff u.a. Verwendung findet, um Zensur zu rechtfertigen und die Gegenseite zu delegitimieren. Trotzdem sollte die Politische Bildung nicht vollkommen auf den Begriff verzichten. Versteht man Fake (...) News als einen fließenden Signifikant in hegemonischen Projekten, erlaubt dies den Zugriff auf die politische Dimension von Desinformation. Fake News als politischer Kampfbegriff lässt sich darüber hinaus als einen Angriff auf die Autorität der Leitmedien interpretieren. Der Autor geht im Anschluss sowohl auf die inhaltliche als auch auf die formelle Dimension dieses Angriffs ein. Darauf basierend erarbeitet er einen Vorschlag, wie Fake News auf analytischer Basis in der Politischen Bildung behandelt werden könnten. (shrink)