Menéndez y Pelayo. -- Juan Maragall. -- Juan Luis Vives. -- San Juan de la Cruz. -- Ricardo León.

Para Eugenio d’Ors, la vida humana no se define por su relación con la muerte, sino como principio creador de formas que se afirma a sí mismo. En cambio, la muerte sí se define como lo radicalmente opuesto a la vida, un principio de negación y destrucción, de fatalidad y resistencia. De este modo se establece entre ambos principios una relación dialéctica, una tensión de antagonistas que hace que la vida sea una permanente lucha contra la muerte. Por (...) ello el planteamiento de d’Ors acerca de la muerte adquiere un fuerte sentido ético y beligerante, afirmando la necesidad de vivir en actitud alerta y combativa. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es dar noticia de la recepción del pragmatismo en la obra y el pensamiento de Eugenio d’Ors, reuniendo algunos resultados de nuestros trabajos preceden- tes2. Dedicamos una primera parte a describir el encuentro de Eugenio d’Ors con el pragmatismo. En segundo lugar describimos su conexión con William James a quien llegó a conocer en París. En tercer lugar, damos cuenta de en qué consiste la denominada “superación del pragmatismo” por parte de (...) Eugenio d’Ors y, por último, señalamos las afinidades más relevantes de su pensamiento con algunas de las intuiciones más originales del pragmatismo de Charles S. Peirce. (shrink)

Para intentar comprender la visión que Eugenio d'Ors tiene de España a principios de los años 30 del pasado siglo, es necesario entender su biografía. Cuando Eugenio d’Ors deja Barcelona en julio de 1921 solo le faltaban tres meses para cumplir los cuarenta años. A los cuarenta —escribió su hijo Álvaro— lo más normal es que los hombres no cambien ya su caudal de ideas. La originalidad de la época catalana sobre el resto de la producción de (...) d'Ors no significa, sin embargo, un menosprecio de los años posteriores. Fue en gran medida su producción no catalana y su constante actividad y participación en muchos otros proyectos españoles y europeos, lo que hizo que su “gloria catalana” no quedara diluida y que su figura tenga hoy un lugar destacado en las letras españolas. Por todo ello, la exposición está organizada en las tres secciones siguiente: 1) Su biografía catalana; 2) la primera etapa de su biografía castellana, y 3) Su visión de España en los años 30. (shrink)

Writer Eugenio d'Ors was born in Barcelona in 1881, but frequently alludes that his work owes a debt to pragmatism. He is one of the thinkers in Spain who consciously included connections with the American philosophical world. This chapter explores d'Ors thinking and explains a clear affinity between his thinking and the pragmatism of Charles S. Pierce.

The relations between the Scottish School of Common Sense and the Catalan philosophy of Martí d'Eixalà and Llorens i Barba are well known. But the links between that Catalan tradition and the thought of Eugenio d'Ors (1881-1954) have not been studied. The study of the texts from d'Ors and of the cultural context of his philosophical development gives strong support to the suggestion that the germinal role that Scottish philosophy had during the XIX century in the so-called School of (...) Barcelona was taken over in the first decades of the XX century by a special blend of pragmatism and vitalism coming from Paris. (shrink)

The main purpose of this paper is to explore the connections between Eugenio d’Ors and Pragmatism. Specific attention is devoted to showing the reception of Pragmatism in the philosophy of d’Ors, and to explaining a constant theme in his works: the characterisation of his thought as a post–pragmatic intellectualism.

At the beginning of the 20th century Machiavelli is an author celebrated by Ortega y Gasset: the philosopher of Madrid despises the nineteenth century, epilogue of an era, as much as he admires the Renaissance. Twenty years later - in España invertebrada - Ortega reads the pages of Il Principe as the brilliant commentary “from an Italian to the deeds of two Spaniards”, Fernando el Católico and César Borja. D ‘Ors’s position is very different. Although in 1920, in favor of (...) Machiavelli, he opposed “vulgar beliefs”, certainly ends up among the most radical critics. According to d ‘Ors, Machiavelli reaffirms in modernity the paganism of the Emperor Julian and anticipates - against Dante and his theory of the empire - the fate of a fragmented Europe, in which ideas and nations fight, without any reference to a universal authority. (shrink)

Eugenio d'Ors develops a non-reductionistic idea of science which contrasts with both the positivist idea of science, as well as with the pragmatist attempt to recover the links between science and life. In addition to the purely rational elements present in science d'Ors also finds certain creative elements, both in the origin of science and in its architecture, which allow him to construct an accurate image of science as a complex human activity. According to this image, science arises from (...) practical needs but goes beyond them. It not only establishes laws but also searches for causes, using rational methods in addition to intuition and “irony”. While science constructs its objects and is based on intersubjectivity, it nevertheless reaches a true understanding of reality. (shrink)

This article tries to show William James’s presence in the works of Eugenio d’Ors by offering key textual evidence. Both the agreement and disagreement between these two philosophers can help to understand the intellectual itinerary of the Spanish philosopher.

This essay offers a biographical presentation of the Spanish philosopher Eugenio d'Ors (1881-1954), paying special attention to his connection with Pragmatism. Against the mainstream philosophies of rationalism and idealism, d'Ors tried to develop a way of thinking in which it might be possible to live. This was his revolution of philosophy or, more precisely, his Keplerian reform of it.

In my paper I make a summary assessment of the connection between Eugeni Crexells and Eugeni d'Ors and that of both of them with pragmatism. I organize it in three sections: 1. First, the philosophical formation of Crexells and its relation with D'Ors; 2. Eugeni d'Ors and pragmatism, and 3. Joan Crexells and pragmatism.

In this paper I argue that the rationality of law and legal decision making would be enhanced by a systematic attempt to recognize and respond to the implications of empirical uncertainty for policy making and decision making. Admission of uncertainty about the accuracy of facts and the validity of assumptions relied on to make inferences of fact is commonly avoided in law because it raises the spectre of paralysis of the capacity to decide issues authoritatively. The roots of this short-sighted (...) view are found in primitive mechanical models of relationships in the empirical and social world – those of objective causality and determinism. Insofar as it is believed that if we had sufficient data a clear and unequivocal answer would be available to each question, admission of uncertainty is seen as a sign of insufficiency, incompetence, impotence, and is avoided whenever a decision that must be seen to be based on valid reasons, cannot be avoided. Avoidance of some decisions, duplicity in others, is the result. -/- Decision-making must be restructured to recognize the provisional and context-bound validity and relevance of the models we use to conceptualize and order our understanding of phenomena, and to utilize this awareness as an instrument in the production of legal policies and decisions that will be authoritative precisely because they are honestly accurate and socially responsible. The paper makes a start on such a re-structuring of the legal process by exploring the implications of the observation that if law is to be “just”: 1) legal policy must be based on accurate information and rationally related to social goals; and 2) decisions applying policy to individual fact situations must be based on assumptions that are both relevant and accurate. -/- Reasons for determinations of fact must be given, otherwise the presumption that the trier of fact is “reasonable” is an unconditional licence to use private modes of logic and theories of social and natural science. What is not disclosed cannot be challenged on grounds of invalidity or irrelevance. -/- Use of “objective validity” as a standard to evaluate conclusions made by the trier of fact in contentious cases would only serve to beg all important questions by concealing: 1) fundamental normative conflict, and 2) the limited nature and applicability of many validity claims. -/- Our use of the phrases “undue risk,” “public interest,” “reasonable,” and “necessary,” reflects the weight we choose to give conflicting social values and goals when we must make decisions in relative ignorance of all the consequences. “Objective criteria” are of limited utility in legal decision-making because their social meaning is derivative. Policy generation in the absence of any coherent conceptual-normative framework, use of vague terminology in legislation stating policy, and the absence of rational means to distinguish between individual cases to which decision-makers are required by law to apply policy, make it inevitable that many legal “decisions” made in the guise of determinations of objective fact, are charades, an arbitrary, capricious, intuitive, subjective (and thus private) use of public decision-making power. -/- Law must alter its aspirations and recognize that rational decision-making is a process that can occur only within parameters set by present knowledge and societal preference structures. Only by working with the constraints imposed by these parameters is it possible to achieve “just” decisions. Where no rational basis for differentiating cases exists, “individualized justice” must be avoided and public policy articulated in law applied uniformly to all cases in a class. The terms “reasonable” and “necessary,” used to describe policy and its consequences for specific cases, must be understood to represent provisional societal assessments, attempts to implement societal preference structures in the face of limited knowledge. Heightened awareness of the limited nature of our knowledge can only result in legal policies that have a more explicit normative basis. -/- The volume is is published with an introduction by Michael D. Bayles. It is available in hardback, paperback, and as an ebook. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell was never to forget the course he gave in Barcelona in the spring of 1920. In the bitter title-page of An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (1940), after the legal ruling which had suspended him from teaching at City College, New York, he expressly mentions his lectures in Barcelona, along with those he had given at the Universities of Uppsala and Copenhagen and at the Sorbonne. He also alludes briefly to them in his Autobiography (Russell 1990, II, 143), (...) but their circumstances and import have received no attention to date. The aim of this paper is to bring to light the available information on this subject in the Russell Archives (McMaster University, Canada) and the papers left by Joan Crexells (1896-1926) and Eugenio d'Ors (1881-1954), the two Catalan philosophers behind Russell's visit, and to put forward an assessment of Russell's influence on Spanish philosophy. (shrink)

Psychological characteristics of athletes play a key role in sport performance and may moderate and mediate the influence of technical, tactical, and physical abilities athletes show. Different authors have emphasized the special attention such psychological characteristics should receive considering the extent they can influence athletes’ behavior either in training or in competition. This paper is aimed at describing the psychological profiles of two cycling sports: triathlon and road cycling. One hundred and twenty-nine male and female professional and amateur cycling athletes (...) (35.74 years old average age ±12.79; 14.94 average number of years practicing cycling ±11.20) were assessed on different psychological characteristics. For that purpose, the Psychological Characteristics related to the Sport Performance (CPRD) Questionnaire and the Psychological Skills Inventory for Sports (PSIS) was used. Results showed significant differences among triathlon and road cyclists (Stress control = t 116 =-3.711, p = 0.000, d = 0.48 ; Influence of Performance Evaluation = t 115 =-3-115, p = 0.002, d = 0.49; Motivation = t 124 =-5.520, p = 0.000, d = 0.82; Mental Skills = t 119 =-4.985, p = 0.000, d = 1.02). There were no significant differences between men and women though there were differences among pros and amateur athletes. Triathlon professional, compared to amateurs, showed higher scores in all the psychological dimensions assessed (Stress control = t 85 = 3.005, p = 0.003, d = 1.07; Influence of Performance Evaluation = t 83 = 2.858, p = 0.005, 0.77; Motivation = t 91 = 2.721, p = 0.008, d = 0.26; Mental Skills = t 87 = 2.556, p = 0.012, d = 0.77). The results of this descriptive study contribute to establishing a model of optimal psychological profiling applied to the different cycling groups that can be used by sport psychologist, trainers, and coaches in order to promote peak performance of these athletes. (shrink)

In a paper presented at a symposium on structuralism at the Johns Hopkins University in 1968, the historian Charles Morazé analyzed the issue of invention largely with reference to mathematics and the theory of Henri Poincare.1 Poincare, along with the physiologist Hermann von Helmholtz, was the first to put forward a theory of scientific discovery as occurring in discrete phases. In 1926, Joseph Wallas generalized this theory to apply to all creativity, positing phrases which closely resemble those of Morazé. While (...) both Poincare and Wallas use a four-phrase model of invention, Morazé reduces his to three phrases: information, cogitation, and intellection. In information, the inventor becomes familiar with the sign systems and knowledge, the "collective contributions of society," relevant to his field of problems. Cogitation assembles these materials and concentrates them until "a certain moment" when "a light breaks through." This "sudden illumination...forces us to insist upon the neurological character" of the inventive moment. Finally, in intellection, the inventor rationally evaluates the utility of his invention and thus, in a sense, steps outside of himself and rejoins society. The distinction which organizes Morazé 's entire account, as well as most of the discussion that followed his presentation, is between the "collective" support and control of the inventor and his own individual, or "neurological," act of synthesis or creation. · 1. See Charles Morazé 's "Literary Invention," in The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man, ed. Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato, pp. 22-55. Loy D. Martin is an assistant professor of English at the University of Chicago. He has written The Language of Invention, a study of Robert Browning and the genesis of the dramatic monologue. "A Reply to Carl Pletsch and Richard Schiff" appeared in the Spring 1981 issue of Critical Inquiry. (shrink)

The article, titled «Mircea Eliade and Eugenio d’Ors (and the archetype)», is an analysis of the relationship between the Romanian intellectual Mircea Eliade (1907-1986) and the Spanish thinker Eugenio d’Ors (1881-1954). Divided in five parts, the first one, titled «The intellectual encounter: Eliade discovers d’Ors», is a revision of the process of the discovery of the works of d’Ors by Eliade in their French translations. In the second part titled «The personal encounter and the (...) project of the Romanian translation of a selection of works of d’Ors» is revised the Eliade-d’Ors relationship during the Portuguese years of Eliade using the Portuguese Journal and the correspondence of Eliade as primary source. The third part titled «D’Ors discovers Eliade» is a study of the reception by d’Ors of the two 1949 books of Eliade (and specially The Myth of the Eternal Return). The fourth part, devoted to revise the resemblances between Eliade and d’Ors, is titled «Eliade and d’Ors: affinities and convergences». The fifth part titled «The archetype’s question: an imaginary debt?» analyses the inclusion in the American preface of the 1959 edition of Cosmos and History (i.e. The Myth of the Eternal Return) of the following words: «I use the term “archetype,” just as Eugenio d’Ors does, as a synonym for “exemplary model” or “paradigm”». Due to the differences between the use by d’Ors of the notion of archetype and the Eliadian archetype (one of the core concepts in his hermeneutic) that words are analysed as an imaginary debt, a tactical parti pris liberating Eliade of the Jungian implications of the term archetype. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Acosta, José de (1539–1600) Alberdi, Juan Bautista (1810–84) Bello, Andrés (1781–1865) Bilbao, Francisco (1823–65) Bolkvar, Simón (1783–1830) Casas, Bartolomé de las (1484–1566) Caso, Antonio (1883–1946) Cruz, Sor Juana Inés de la (1651–95) da Costa, Newton Carneiro Affonso (b. 1929) Dussel, Enrique (b. 1934) Frondizi, Risieri (1910–83) Gaos, José (1900–69) González Prada, Manuel (1848–1918) Gracia, Jorge J. E. (b. 1942) Haya de la Torre, Victor Raúl (1895–1979) Hostos, Eugenio Marka de (1839–1903) Ingenieros, José (1877–1925) Korn, (...) Alejandro (1860–1936) Lastarria, José Victorino (1817–88) Lemos, Miguel (1854–1917) Mariátegui, José Carlos (1895–1930) Martk, José (1853–95) Méndez Sierra, Justo (1848–1912) Mora, José Maria Luis (1794–1850) Miró Quesada, Francisco (b. 1918) Rabossi, Eduardo (1930–2005) Ramos, Samuel (1897–1959) Rodó, José Enrique (1872–1917) Romero, Francisco (1891–1962) Sahagún, Fray Bernardino de (1499–1590) Salazar Bondy, Augusto (1925–74) Sarmiento, Domingo Faustino (1811–88) Ofelia Schutte (b. 1945) Sepslveda, Juan Ginés de (ca. 1494–1573) Torretti, Roberto (b. 1930) Vasconcelos, José (1882–1959) Vaz Ferreira, Carlos (1872–1958) Villoro, Luis (b. 1922) Vitoria, Francisco de (ca. 1483–1546) Zea Aguilar, Leopoldo (1912–2004) Acknowledgment Further Reading. (shrink)

This paper looks into the contents of the Tractatus suppositionum terminorum by Master Franquera, in the context of the teaching of logic in Salamanca in the fifteenth century. Franquera’s work is characterised by its explicit realist bias and its rejection of Ockhamist theses, i.e., by its recognition of the existence of a natura communis or a universale in re, which is evident in all discussions related to suppositio simplex and the theory of significatio. But, apart from this, Franquera’s discussion of (...) the theory of suppositio stands out as a strange mixture of different doctrines: some of them are derived from thirteenth-century analyses, others from fourteenth-century developments; realist goals are reached by means of instruments that, while not being nominalist, are definitely inspired by terminism. While upholding the theses of realist schools, Franquera adopts the definitions and rules of nominalist authors. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 53, Issue 2-4, pp 269 - 293 This article presents some results of the study of seventeen medieval treatises containing a logical analysis of the syncategorem ‘_an_’. On the one hand, a new classification is proposed of the literary genres of the _Logica Modernorum_, based on the four elements involved in the logical analysis of syncategorematic terms: the meaning of the syncategorem, logical rules, related sophisms, and proposed solutions. On the other, three texts are studied in detail, (...) showing the origins and development of the logical analysis of the syncategorem ‘_an_’ between the 12th and the 13th centuries. Finally, a comparative study is offered of different analyses of the sophism ‘_Tu scis an de mentiente sit falsum Sortem esse illum_’, a sophism that does not raise any problem as to the particle ‘_an_’, but introduces the issue of the truth conditions of the _dicta_. (shrink)