In the essay “What is Enlightenment?” , Foucault espouses a novel and emancipatory“philosophical ethos” which challenges individuals to undertake an ongoing, aesthetic project oftotal self-transformation . By advocating a view of the self---and moreaccurately the relationship one has to oneself --as a free creation on the part of thesubject, Foucault seems to be espousing a pluralistic ethical position. However, I argue that whilethis interpretation is not entirely false, it is not altogether accurate either. Quite simply, it is toobroad in (...) scope. Instead, I argue that Foucault’s philosophical ethos is best described as a DeepEthical Pluralist position. Furthermore, I demonstrate that the two most common objectionsto Foucault’s new ethos for the contemporary subject in the secondary literature, namely theregressive and dandyist objections miss their mark precisely because they are successful onlyagainst ethical pluralism but not DEP. (shrink)

A global information ethics that seeks to avoid imperialistic homogenization must conjoin shared norms while simultaneously preserving the irreducible differences between cultures and peoples. I argue that a global information ethics may fulfill these requirements by taking up an ethical pluralism – specifically Aristotle’s pros hen [“towards one”] or “focal” equivocals. These ethical pluralisms figure centrally in both classical and contemporary Western ethics: they further offer important connections with the major Eastern ethical tradition of Confucian thought. (...) Both traditions understand ethical judgment to lead to and thus require ethical pluralism – i.e., an acceptance of more than one judgment regarding the interpretation and application of a shared ethical norm. Both traditions invoke notions of resonance and harmony to articulate pluralistic structures of connection alongside irreducible differences. Specific examples within Western computer and information ethics demonstrate these pluralisms in fact working in praxis. After reviewing further resonances and radical differences between Western and Eastern views, I then argue that emerging conceptions of privacy and data privacy protection laws in China, Hong Kong, Japan, and Thailand in fact constitute a robust, pros hen pluralism with Western conceptions. In both theory and in praxis, then, this pluralism thus fulfills the requirement for a global information ethics that holds shared norms alongside the irreducible differences between cultures and peoples. (shrink)

In the essay “What is Enlightenment?”, Foucault espouses a novel and emancipatory“philosophical ethos” which challenges individuals to undertake an ongoing, aesthetic project oftotal self-transformation. By advocating a view of the self---and moreaccurately the relationship one has to oneself --as a free creation on the part of thesubject, Foucault seems to be espousing a pluralistic ethical position. However, I argue that whilethis interpretation is not entirely false, it is not altogether accurate either. Quite simply, it is toobroad in scope. Instead, (...) I argue that Foucault’s philosophical ethos is best described as a DeepEthical Pluralist position. Furthermore, I demonstrate that the two most common objectionsto Foucault’s new ethos for the contemporary subject in the secondary literature, namely theregressive and dandyist objections miss their mark precisely because they are successful onlyagainst ethical pluralism but not DEP. (shrink)

Ethical pluralists hold that moral values and systems are irreducibly diverse and incommensurable according to a common scale. One criticism of the view is that accepting such incommensurability renders them unable to criticize values, practices, institutions, and so forth that are genuinely bad. This paper considers two ways that pluralists have appealed to human nature to answer this criticism. One way appeals to nature to ground a positive conception of human flourishing, whereas the other appeals to nature as a (...) source of constraints. I argue that both views fail to meet the criticism in a satisfactory way and then advance a view that improves upon the existing options. Specifically, I argue that human nature is the standard by which it is possible to assess humaneness, which is a kind of beauty that represents the elevation or refinement of human nature. Accordingly, pluralists can deploy judgments of humaneness to criticize practices, institutions, and so forth that are not worth tolerating without violating the spirit of pluralism. (shrink)

This chapter considers the question of ordinary judgment in ethics, followed by certain criticisms and forms of skepticism with regard to attempts at theorization in moral philosophy. It then presents the principal ethical theories. These are used to support more general forms of pluralism in practical reasoning. The chapter outlines an analytical approach to the fullest possible form of ethical pluralism, in relation to ethical evaluation in a context of justification. This pluralism applies to (...) participatory technology assessment (PTA), responsible research and innovation (RRI) and, beyond that, to any ethical evaluation. From these essential bases, forming part of ethical judgments and evaluations, the chapter considers the rapprochement between ethical theories and ethical argument in the conclusion. Meta‐ethics is involved in developing other areas of interest, and may enter into relation with other areas of science, such as psychology, epistemology, metaphysics or linguistics. (shrink)

Meta-ethical pluralism gives us additional insight into how moral communities become cohesive and why this can be problematic (even dangerous) – and in this way provides support for the worries raised by the target article. At the same time, it offers several reasons to be concerned about the proposed initiative, the most important of which is that it could seriously backfire.

In this article the challenge of a pluralist ethics presented by Arnold Gehlen in his book Moral und Hypermoral [Morality and Hypermorality] is examined by attempting to find out what might still be worth preserving after Jürgen Habermas’s critical objections to the text in his “Arnold Gehlen: Imitation Substantiality” (1970). To this end the basic assumptions of Gehlen’s pluralist ethics are briefly presented (1), before going on to summarizing Habermas’s central, and largely convincing, objections to this ethics (2), in order, (...) finally, to reintroduce Gehlen’s pluralism as a critique of Habermas’s monist discourse ethics (3). The core idea is to defend the pluralistic intuition of Gehlen against his own theoretical consequences and against the monism of discourse ethics. (shrink)

In this brief comment on Chandran Kukathas’s “Ethical Pluralism from a Classical Liberal Perspective,” I present the other side of the liberal dialogue on diversity. It sets out the responses of deliberative liberals to the difficulties of pluralism where these responses are different from those presented by Kukathas’s liberals. One of the best examples of this other strand of classical liberalism today is John Rawls’s “political liberalism,” a view of liberalism founded on the ideal of the exchange (...) of public reasons among ethically plural citizens. Of course, both types of liberals share a great deal and most are members of both schools under some descriptions. However, important differences remain and their continuous contestation within liberalism make this a living and evolving tradition. The aim of this comment is thus to supplement Kukathas’s excellent account by bringing in these other liberal voices where they dissent from the views of the minimal liberals on pluralism. (shrink)

This chapter considers the difficulties inherent in judgment, and focuses on differences of an ethical variety, shot through with the normative reality of the ethical pluralism of values, from relativisms to monisms, and some of their characteristics conditionality, incompatibility, and incommensurability. It also considers the type of commitments made in relation to these values and different types of conflict. The chapter explains five types of burdens of judgment listed by John Rawls. Rawls' solution for avoiding the general (...) fact of State oppression has collateral effects on moral philosophy and on ethics. Unlike pluralism, relativism questions, in a variety of ways, the possibility of discussion, of justification and of a critique of values. There are at least three distinct types of relativism: radical relativism, conventionalist relativism, and perspectivist relativism. The most notable fact is reasonable pluralism, described as “the diversity of religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines found in modern democratic societies”. (shrink)

I give the label “ethical pluralism” to the meta-ethical view that competing moral views are valid. I assume that validity is conferred on a moral view by its satisfying the relevant meta-ethical criteria in a maximally satisfactory way. If the relevant meta-ethical criteria are based on something roughly like the wide reflective equilibrium model, then ethical pluralism is likely to be correct. Traditional moral views do not grant exemptions from their own binding rules (...) or principles to agents – should any exist – who adhere to a competing valid moral view. Given the usual conception of accepting a moral view, an ethical pluralist cannot honestly accept a traditional moral view. Consequently, I argue, an ethical pluralist is committed to the view that all traditional moral views are invalid. Given the likelihood of ethical pluralism, this conclusion is alarming. I set forth a weak conception of accepting a moral view that is designed to allow an ethical pluralist honestly to accept a traditional moral view. In particular, my conception is designed to explain how someone can (a) be guided by the view that she accepts; (b) accept her own moral view while rationally not accepting competing views that she thinks are equally valid; and (c) not be prepared to prescribe morally to those who are following other valid views. Central to my formulation are what I call a stance of modest respectful disapproval toward other people’s wrong behavior, together with acceptance of decisive moral reasons for oneself that are generated by the valid moral view that one accepts. (shrink)

It might seem as if the Weltbild emanating from Aeschylus's plays in general—and the Oresteia in particular, as that shall be my main focus in what follows—exhibits an almost dreamlike incoherence. Building on the works of James J. Helm, I argue that, contrary to this reading, it is fruitful and plausible to read the trilogy as expounding a coherent moral outlook.

In the article “An Argument for Standardized Ethical Directives for Secular Healthcare Services,” Abram L. Brummett and Jamie C. Watson argue that, parallel to the directives of the Roman Catholic Church, secular healthcare ethics consultants (HECs) need substantive standardized ethical guidelines (what they call SEGs) that would constitute a best practice across all HECs in the U.S. Brummett and Watson believe that the absence of such directives constitutes an important deficit in clinical ethics consultation (CEC) that needs to (...) be rectified in order for consultation to achieve the professionalism and universality necessary for legitimacy. This is a bold argument worthy of consideration, perhaps most because it challenges the field to engage in a self-assessment about its current and future directions against the backdrop of both the concerning data on national CEC and the current intense values polarization in the U.S. As part of assessment, I will argue in this essay that such a consensus document is not only impossible in our current national climate, but undesirable given the way that it would impose lib- Values Imposition and Ethical Pluralism: An Argument Against Standardized Ethical Directives for Healthcare Ethics Consultants Autumn Fiester eral clinical ethics values on an extremely values-pluralistic populace and exacerbate the deep divisions that many of us fear could be our national undoing. (shrink)

The interdisciplinary aspect of collective deliberation, involved in participatory technology assessment (PTA) and responsible research and innovation (RRI), raises issues in relation to the cohabitation of disciplines. In ethics, the choice of which path to take is rarely clear or simple. Without falling into relativism, descriptions of the same actions may vary. Faced with the hard and apparently inevitable reality of misunderstandings, loyalties, interests and requirements, which are mutually incompatible, ethics offers one way of delimiting a conflict in order to (...) maintain relationships. This chapter considers the difficulties involved in judgment, the fact of pluralism, the ethical pluralism of values, ethical theories and their place in practical reasoning between monism and relativism, and finally the potential and the limitations of deliberative democracy. Reaching an ethical judgment on a question, or simply reaching judgment on a question, is a difficult task for any individual. (shrink)

Institutions associated with the idea of opposition play a crucial role in democracy: “[i]f it is to work, it requires an extraordinarily sophisticated human attitude—that of loyal [and tolerated] opposition.”.

In an episode in the Bhagavadgita Arjuna refuses to fight that would involve killing his teachers, elders, relatives and friends. Krishna argues that he should fight because it is the special duty of a soldier to fight in a just war, one should do one’s duty regardless of the consequences, one should act for the common good, one should build an unwavering character taking victory and defeat, pleasure and pain, friend and foe in the same way, etc. Some of these (...) reasons may be taken to promote deontology, others utilitarianism, yet others virtue ethics that are often viewed contemporarily as incompatible ethical theories. We argue that these three theories are not necessarily incompatible and may be linked to three sides of human nature: deontology to cognitivity, utilitarianism to dynamism and virtue ethics to affectivity. We also argue that Krishna may be taken to promote ethical pluralism just as he may be taken to promote religious pluralism by recommending the path of knowledge, the path of action and the path of devotion from an inclusive perspective. (shrink)

In today’s pluralistic society, clinical ethics consultation cannot count on a pre-given set of rules and principles to be applied to a specific situation, because such an approach would deny the existence of different and divergent backgrounds by imposing a dogmatic and transcultural morality. Clinical ethics support (CES) needs to overcome this lack of foundations and conjugate the respect for the difference at stake with the necessity to find shared and workable solutions for ethical issues encountered in clinical practice. (...) We argue that a pragmatist approach to CES, based on the philosophical theories of William James, John Dewey, and Charles Sanders Peirce, can help to achieve the goal of reaching practical solutions for moral problems in the context of today’s clinical environment, characterized by ethical pluralism. In this article, we outline a pragmatist theoretical framework for CES. Furthermore, we will show that moral case deliberation, making use of the dilemma method, can be regarded an example of a pragmatist approach to CES. (shrink)

For Frank Knight, the fact that we are free to engage in economic pursuits brings out what is both best and worst in human nature. The same competitive economy that liberates individuals to choose their own desired ends also provides them with socially undesirable wants and fosters habits potentially at odds with the demands of liberal democracy. Given Knight’s desire both to defend human liberty and his concession that liberty is likely to be abused, his version of liberalism must of (...) necessity be anticonsequentialist. Paradoxically, Knight’s philosophical pluralism?his insistence that there are any number of incommensurable perspectives on the good or just society?underlies both his criticism of the ?ethical? possibilities of the competitive order and his defense of human liberty against the dangers of social planning. (shrink)

Recent work by Piers Stephens has established axiological pluralism as the common element between various strands of theorizing in environmental ethics. However, a tension still exists in contemporary theories between the need for practical convergence among the values through rational argumentation and the experience of the motivational power of the value orientations in living human experience. The pragmatist phenomenological foundation for a pluralist environmental ethics developed in the philosophy of William James is consistent with the contemporary theories, while potentially (...) solving some of their tensions. In particular, the proposed approach of James adds a deeper layer of experiential values, which are not always considered in the public discursive practices and which often mobilize non‐scientific and not explicitly rational motivations and beliefs (including the environmental as well as the psychological, social, and cultural). In doing so, the phenomenological pragmatism of William James opens up an avenue for integrating experiential values into a broadened pluralist environmental ethics. (shrink)

Recent scholarship (Goodwin & Darley, 2008) on the meta-ethical debate between objectivism and relativism has found people to be mixed: they are objectivists about some issues, but relativists about others. The studies discussed here sought to explore this further. Study 1 explored whether giving people the ability to identify moral issues for themselves would reveal them to be more globally objectivist. Study 2 explored people's meta-ethical commitments more deeply, asking them to provide verbal explanations for their judgments. This (...) revealed that while people think they are relativists, this may not always be the case. The explanations people gave were sometimes rated by outside (blind) coders as being objective, even when given a relativist response. Nonetheless, people remained meta-ethical pluralists. Why this might be is discussed. (shrink)

Moral epistemology is central to ethical theory and, after a period of some neglect, is currently receiving much attention. Discussion of the subject suffered no small setback from the influence of positivistic noncognitivism. Nor was moral epistemology a main object of the narrowly metaethical focus that dominated much of ethical discussion between the Second World War and the early 1970s; the concern during that period was mainly semantical and metaphysical. Even now, many writers in ethics who tend to (...) take for granted that there is much scientific knowledge are skeptical about the possibility of any moral knowledge; and some of them accept the view, especially common in university communities, that moral judgments represent at best cultural assumptions having no claim to truth. (shrink)

People living in a pluralistic age are aware of diversity among themselves and consider it both natural and enriching for humankind. However, there are many disagreements that create ethical questions on the nature of human good, religion and public morality, and more. Joseph Runzo, with the help of a diverse group of contributors, skillfully deals with these ethical issues.

This chapter talks about ethical deliberations that may be individual, potentially based on thought experiences or overhanging and discusses a real confrontation of evaluations and the deliberations of other individuals. This is one of the new elements introduced by participatory technology assessment (PTA), particularly in Europe. Stakeholder participation has been promoted by European agencies as a pillar of responsible research and innovation (RRI), confirming the need to consider the risks of exposure to the deliberations of others. The chapter describes (...) the resources offered by certain political philosophers who considered proposing the best possible systems for managing pluralism. It discusses the criteria of one of the most promising political theories: deliberative democracy. The qualification of this theory will prove useful in managing the cohabitation of individual and collective evaluation. The chapter considers a number of possible improvements to this theory, notably with regard to one of its major components: ethical arguments. (shrink)

The war on terrorism, say America's leaders, is a war of Good versus Evil. But in the minds of the perpetrators, the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington were presumably justified as ethically good acts against American evil. Is such polarization leading to a violent "clash of civilizations" or can differences between ethical systems be reconciled through rational dialogue? This book provides an extraordinary resource for thinking clearly about the diverse ways in which humans see good and (...) evil. In nine essays and responses, leading thinkers ask how ethical pluralism can be understood by classical liberalism, liberal-egalitarianism, critical theory, feminism, natural law, Confucianism, Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. Each essay addresses five questions: Is the ideal society ethically uniform or diverse? Should the state protect, ban, or otherwise intervene in ethically based differences? How should disagreements on the rights and duties of citizens be dealt with? Should the state regulate life-and-death decisions such as euthanasia? To what extent should conflicting views on sexual relationships be accommodated? This book shows that contentious questions can be discussed with both incisiveness and civility. The editors provide the introduction and Donald Moon, the conclusion. The contributors are Brian Barry, Joseph Boyle, Simone Chambers, Joseph Chan, Christine Di Stefano, Dale F. Eickelman, Menachem Fisch, William Galston, John Haldane, Chandran Kukathas, David Little, Muhammad Khalid Masud, Carole Pateman, William F. Scheuerman, Adam B. Seligman, James W. Skillen, James Tully, and Lee H. Yearley. (shrink)

I trace the development of an emerging global Information and Computing Ethics , arguing that ethical pluralism – as found in both Western and Asian traditions – is crucial to such an ICE. In particular, ethical pluralism – as affiliated with notions of judgment , reson-ance, and harmony – holds together shared ethical norms alongside the irreducible differences that define individual and cultural identities. I demonstrate how such pluralism is already at work in both (...) contemporary theory and praxis, including in development projects in diverse cul-tures. I conclude with a number of resonances between this global pluralism and African thought and tradi-tions that thus suggest that such a pluralism may also succeed in the African context, as diverse African cultures and countries seek to benefit from ICTs while maintaining their cultural identities. (shrink)

Doing ethics in a pluralistic world -- Ethical issues for religion in Canada.

This book offers a radical reformulation of the pluralist position in 'English School' theory, providing an account of world politics that is normatively progressive and rooted in the significance of multiple community membership to human lives.

ETHICS: A PLURALISTIC APPROACH TO MORAL THEORY, FIFTH EDITION provides a comprehensive yet clear introduction to the main traditions in ethical thought, including virtue ethics, utilitarianism, and deontology. Additionally, the book presents a conceptual framework of ethical pluralism to help students understand the relationship among various theories. Lawrence Hinman, one of today's most respected and accomplished educators in ethics and philosophy education, presents a text that gives students plentiful opportunities to explore ethical theory and their own (...) responses to them, using fascinating features such as the Ethical Inventory sections that appear at the beginning and the end of the text. End-of-chapter discussion questions, and the use of current issues and movies help students retain what they've learned and truly comprehend the subject matter. Important Notice: Media content referenced within the product description or the product text may not be available in the ebook version. (shrink)

Today, bioethics experts have an increasing role in public life. However, the question arises: what does bioethics expertise really mean? Can there be such a thing in our globalised world characterised by ethical pluralism? I will argue that bioethics as a discipline represents the transformation of ethics expertise from a hard to a soft form of it. Bioethics was born as a reaction to the growing awareness of ethical pluralism, and it denied the hard form of (...) normative–prescriptive ethics expertise, particularly in its medical ethics form. In contrast, the traditional medical ethics model, and pre-modern societies in general, believed in hard normative ethics expertise. From this followed the characteristic paternalism of traditional medical practice: if physicians were experts in moral matters as well, if they knew what the right course of action to choose was, then they had a right to benevolently force this course of action on their patients. The remnants of this doctrine, although rarely stated explicitly, still can often be seen in clinical practice. The whole bioethics movement can be seen as a radical denial of the doctrine of physician's hard expertise in moral matters. Bioethics, however, represents a type of soft ethics expertise. Hence follows the seeming paradox of bioethics expertise: bioethics is both a denial of ethics expertise as well as a type of ethics expertise. (shrink)

This chapter presents a new version of the theory of deliberative democracy, focusing on its specificity as a future genre, and based on arguments used to defend plausibility. Moral philosophy of ethical theories is applied in this context as a form of casuistics, involving probabilities, and not limited to case studies within the framework of applied ethics. The chapter then considers relationships between the sciences, scientific practices and ethics; the interweaving of facts and values; the quarrels that exist between (...) coexisting disciplines; the competing approaches of epistemic pluralism, in both inter‐ and intra‐disciplinary forms; and argumentative coexistence in interdisciplinary contexts. It outlines the possible solution pathways, notably that of dialogical co‐argumentation. The chapter explores the question of pluralism of ethical theories with a focus on relevant elements that may modify an evaluation. In France, the precautionary principle has been enshrined in the Constitution since 2005, within the framework of the Environment Charter. (shrink)

This paper argues that from an ethical point of view tolerance, which is simply one of a number of possible responses to ethical pluralism, is not an acceptable ideal. It fails to acknowledge and appreciate the good in other forms of life and thereby does not adequately respect the people who live these lives. Toleration limits the range of goods we might appreciate in our own lives and in the lives of those we care most about, and (...) it tends to lead to a number of deformations or personal failures of character. In place of tolerance, we should embrace ethical promiscuity—a view that not only acknowledges ethical pluralism but also offers good reasons to celebrate this state of affairs. (shrink)

Teaching ethics is always challenging, and it is especially challenging in a pluralistic society. One reason is that the participants in an ethical dispute frequently have different fundamental interests and perspectives, and they may not be fully aware of the extent to which they have, or share, or fail to share certain interests. It is a difficult task simply to sort out the various interests, both conscious and subconscious, that participants in a dispute bring to a table. And, partly (...) because that is such a difficult task, we tend to forget that there are other causes of ethical disagreement, and that one particularly troublesome cause is the different level of commitment people may have to using words to settle ethical disputes in the first place. (shrink)