Nietzsche vs. Kant? Der siebzehnte Aphorismus aus dem ersten Teil von Menschliches, Allzumenschliches schliesst mit der korrosiven Bemerkung, das Ding an sich [sei] eines homerischen Gelachters werth. Aufgrund dieser Passage nun aber zu vermuten, Nietzsche habe diesen von Kant stammenden Terminus einfach so ad acta gelegt, ware jedoch ubereilt, denn die Auseinandersetzung mit der Unterscheidung zwischen Erscheinung und Ding an sich lasst sich als Konstante durch Nietzsches gesamtes Werk verfolgen. Mattia Riccardi widmet sich in seiner Studie den verschiedenen Positionen, (...) die Nietzsche im Zusammenhang mit dieser Problematik eingenommen hat: von der im Hintergrund der Geburt der Tragodie prasenten Artisten-Metaphysik bis zur radikalen Infragestellung des kantischen Denkmusters in den Jahren nach 1880. Riccardi beschrankt sich aber nicht auf eine historisch akkurate, direkte und indirekte Textquelle mit einbeziehender Rekonstruktion von Nietzsches kampferischer Lekturepraxis. Vielmehr stellen die wiederholt auftretenden Bezuge auf Kants Begrifflichkeit fur ihn ein geeignetes Instrument dar, um die Entfaltung von Nietzsches Denken in aller Scharfe sichtbar zu machen. Die Kritik an Kant wird auf diese Weise zum Ausgangspunkt einer differenzierten Interpretation von Nietzsches perspektivistischer Philosophie der Macht im Sinne einer relationalen Ontologie. Damit versteht sich das Buch auch als Beitrag zur - vor allem im englischsprachigen Raum sehr lebendigen - Debatte um das Verhaltnis Nietzsches zu Kant. (shrink)

This study deals with the conceptual pair of ‘Erscheinung/Ding an sich’ (appearance/thing-in-itself) in Kant's philosophy and tries to reinterpret it. Previous interpretations have neglected the metaphysical critical intention of the three themes in Kant's critical philosophy: epistemology, doctrine of ideas and practical philosophy. This book discusses the perspective of metaphysical criticism in the context of six ways of using the faculties of thought (understanding and reason or practical reason) and their relation to the conceptual pair. After that, the (...) author elucidates the general meanings of this conceptual pair in connection with Kant's chemical method. (shrink)

Este artículo tiene como objetivo aclarar desde una perspectiva fenomenológica el concepto de fenómeno en el capítulo de la Fenomenología del espíritu dedicado al entendimiento. En primer lugar, el texto muestra de qué modo el fenómeno se define como la totalidad de lo que aparece en el contexto del concepto de fuerza de la filosofía de la naturaleza. El artículo explicita a continuación cómo, a través de este concepto de fenómeno, el mundo suprasensible devine en objeto para el entendimiento y (...) nombrado, por ello, como el verdadero fenómeno. A partir de aquí, en tercer lugar, el texto muestra, a su vez, cómo a través del mundo suprasensible, el mundo de las leyes de la naturaleza se constituye en objeto para el entendimiento y cómo estas leyes no pueden dar cuenta efectivamente del surgimiento de lo que aparece, mostrando, por tanto, ya desde aquí, la necesidad de un concepto filosófico de fenómeno.The purpose of this article is to clarify from a phenomenological perspective the concept of appearance in the chapter of the Phenomenology of Mind dedicated to the concept of understanding. Firstly, the text shows how the concept of appearance is defined as the totality of seeming in the context of the concept of force within the philosophy of nature. Secondly, the article explains how the supersensible world, through this concept of appearance, turns into an object for understanding and now it is designated as the authentic appearance. Finally, the text shows how through the supersensible world, the world of the laws of nature is turned into an object for understanding and how these laws cannot effectively account for the emergence of what appears, thus, exhibiting since here the need for a philosophical concept of appearance. (shrink)

Ohne Unmittelbarkeit verliert sich das Selbst in Vermittlungen. Daher die Versuchung, auf Differenzen zu verzichten, zur Selbstaufgabe ins Unum. Wie aber, wenn wir Grenzen als als Trefflinien oder Flächen denken sollten? Das wird hier mit Fichte am Bild erwogen: Bild als Dienst im Erscheinungsgeschehen. Darin zeigt das Eins sich als Mit-Eins. Das bedrohliche Zwischen wird zum Ort wechselseitigen Daheim-seins.Without immediateness the self will be lost in mediations. Is it therefore forced to self-delivery into Unum? This paper suggests, to take borders (...) for meeting-lines or -faces. In this way - according to Fichte - pictures are serving within a process of appearance . So Unum could become togetherness, the threatening »between«: »circuminsessio«, mutually being at home. (shrink)

In Fichte research, there is no consensus on the interpretation of a topic of fundamental importance for Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre: the relationship of the absolute ‘in itself’ to its appearance. In addition to the difficulty of the matter in itself, the problems of understanding might also be related to the linguistic and terminological form of its presentation.My paper starts with the hypothesis, that an adequate understanding is actually decisively dependent on the dissolution of the ambiguity of the terminus “being”, which (...) also occupies a prominent position in Fichte’s prima philosophia. Taking a distinction from Rudolf Hermann Lotze, I consider in a type of thought experiment whether and how Fichte‘s concept of the absolute qua absolute being (“Sein”, as a counter-concept to appearance / image / existence of the absolute) can be explained or replaced by the term validity (“Geltung”). It is also necessary to consider to what extent the idea of validity is already contained in Fichte’s “Theory of Truth”. (shrink)

The theory of the appearance of the Absolute is the last theme of Fichte’s Science of Knowledge. Since he lectured the theory of appearance with that of truth in his Systemconcept of the Transcendentalphilosophy in 1804, he said that the Absolute exists, and that the Absolute appears. In the lecture in 1812, he explains the necessity of appearance, criticizing Spinoza’s Monismus. It is denied by the fact that a concept exists outside the only one substance, while the (...) latter is thought about. There is a Nonabsolute outside the Absolute. Fichte names it ›appearance‹, which is synonym with ›image‹ and ›scheme‹ of the Absolute. The appearance has a life to appear to itself. Because it is a concept and knowledge of the Absolute, it knows itself as such. Between two appearances is a difference, through which the manifold springs. The earlier question against Schelling’s philosophy of identity, how the finite can be deduced from the infinite or the Absolute, is solved here. Fichte calls the self-appearance of the appearance ›Seeing‹ and ›reflection‹. Also the ego as subject-object is born in it. The task of Science of Knowledge is to analyze it, through which the appearance appears to itself not only as appearing to itself, but also as appearing to itself as appearing to itself. Fichte calls this the formula of Science of Knowledge. In the appearance is a reflexibility, whose ground is the visibility of the Absolute, the absolute evidence or the light. Even the image-making act of ego is in fact that of the Absolute. The Absolute intuits itself. Ego, as a representant of it, should stand under the law of the Absolute and devote its freedom and will to this. Standing upon the will to obey the law Science of Knowledge can gain the total scope of knowledge and open the way to God and the morality.Die Lehre der Erscheinung des Absoluten ist der letzte Schritt der Entwicklung der Wissenschaftslehre bei Fichte. Nachdem er in seinem Systementwurf von 1804 die Erscheinungslehre neben die Wahrheitslehre gestellt hat, äußerte Fichte, »Das Absolute existiert« und »Das Absolute erscheint«. Im Vortrag von 1812 erklärt er die Notwendigkeit der Erscheinung des Absoluten in der Auseinandersetzung mit Spinozas Monismus. Dieser sei schon widerlegt, weil das Denken der Substanz als das Sein außerhalb derselben ist. Dies Nicht-Absolute heißt ›Erscheinung‹, welche als Bild oder Schema des Absoluten genommen wird. Die Erscheinung hat das Leben, sich selbst zu erscheinen. Da sie der Begriff oder das Wissen vom Absoluten ist, weiß sie zugleich sich selbst als solches. Zwischen zwei Erscheinungen ist eine Disjunktion, womit das Entspringen des Mannigfaltigen erklärt wird. Die früher gegen Schellings Identitätsphilosophie gerichtete Frage, wie aus dem Absoluten das Endliche abgeleitet werden könne, wird hier aufgelöst. Das Sicherscheinen der Erscheinung nennt Fichte ›Sehen‹ und ›Reflexion‹, und sieht die Aufgabe der Wissenschaftslehre in dessen Analyse. Dabei gehört diese selbst der Erscheinung an. In ihr erscheint die Erscheinung sich selbst als sich selbst erscheinend. Außerdem erscheint sie sich selbst als sich selbst erscheinend als sich selbst erscheinend, welches die Formel der Wissenschaftslehre ist. In ihr liegt die Reflexibilität, wodurch eben das Ich als Subjekt-Objekt entsteht. Dahinter aber ist die Sichtbarkeit des Absoluten, die absolute Evidenz oder das Licht. Die Bildungskraft des Ich ist in Wahrheit die des Absoluten. Das Absolute selbst schaut sich selbst an, und das Ich ist bloß sein Repräsentant. Es soll unter dem Gesetz des Absoluten stehen und seine Freiheit und den Willen diesem übertragen. Die Wissenschaftslehre macht den ganzen Umkreis des Wissens klar und öffnet den Weg zu Gott und zur Sittlichkeit, indem sie auf dem Willen als ihrem Standpunkt steht. (shrink)

This is a report of the international workshop «Transcendental Turn in Contemporary Philosophy 2: Kant’s Appearance, Its Ontological and Epistemic Status» (April 27—29, 2017, Moscow), the tasks of which was (1) to discuss the specificity of transcendental idealism, (2) to study the nature of one of Kant’s important concepts — that of appearance — within the framework of the essential conceptual triad of transcendentalism: thing in itself (Ding an sich) — appearance (Erscheinung) — representation (Vorstellung), (3) (...) to analyse the distinction between Kant’s concepts of appearance and phenomenon, and (4) to examine the concepts of appearance and phenomenon in relation to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. (shrink)

1735 veröffentlichte Johann Georg Zur Linden in Jena die "Ratio meditationis hermeneuticae imprimis sacrae methodo systematica proposita". Sein Werk ist das Resultat eines unerwarteten Bündnisses zwischen der wolffschen Aufklärung und dem Pietismus nach dem harten Zusammenstoß dieser beiden Richtungen, der seinen Höhepunkt in der Verbannung Wolffs aus Halle fand. In den folgenden Jahren trat eine neue kulturelle Figur in Erscheinung, der Aufklärer-Pietist oder umgekehrt, der die Hoch- und Spätaufklärung beherrschte und zu dessen ersten Repräsentanten Zur Linden zählt. Obgleich die (...) Ratio von den Vorschriften der logischen Hermeneutik ausgeht, beruht sie auf einer Aufwertung der Themen der antiken Rhetorik und konzipiert die Hermeneutik als eine auf die Mittel-Zweck-Rationalität gestützte Technik, der die Aufgabe zukommt, die besten Mittel für das Verstehen von Texten und Reden festzulegen. Die heilige Hermeneutik von Zur Linden zeichnet sich durch wenigstens vier innovative Aspekte aus: 1. Den Vorschlag einer allgemeinen Hermeneutik probabilistischer Art. 2. Eine eingehende Untersuchung der verschiedenen Sinnbegriffe und ihrer Wechselbeziehungen. 3. Die Kritik am Besserverstehen als Auslegungsziel. Die kritischen Punkte des Textes dürfen nicht zugunsten seiner Nichtwidersprüchlichkeit ausgemerzt werden, weil jede Verbesserung leicht in eine Manipulation des Sinns ausarten kann. 4. Die mögliche Nichtübereinstimmung zwischen dem, was der Autor sagen will, und dem, was er tatsächlich sagt. Für Zur Linden hat der Textsinn unzweifelhaft Vorrang und bildet den einzigen möglichen Zugang zum Autorsinn. Seine autorbezogene Texthermeneutik stellt sich noch heute als originelle, beachtenswerte Leistung dar. In 1735 Johann Georg Zur Linden published his "Ratio meditationis hermeneuticae imprimis sacrae methodo systematica proposita" in Jena. His work was the result of an unexpected alliance between the Wolffian Enlightenment and Pietism, after the fierce clash between these two trends which had culminated in Wolff’s banishment from Halle. In the years that followed a new cultural figure appeared, the Enlightener-Pietist, or vice versa, who was to dominate the high and late Enlightenment and of whom Zur Linden was one of the first examples. Although the Ratio takes as its starting-point the rules of logical hermeneutics, it is based in an evaluation of the themes of classical rhetoric, and conceives hermeneutics as a technique, grounded in means-end rationality, the task of which is to determine the best method for understanding texts and speech. Zur Linden’s sacred hermeneutic theory is distinguished by at least four innovative aspects: 1. The proposal of a general hermeneutics of a probabilistic type. 2. An intensive examination of the different concepts of sense and their interrelationships. 3. The critique of better understanding as the goal of exegesis. The critical points of the text should not be obliterated in favour of its consistency. 4. The possible lack of agreement between what the author intends to say and what he actually says. For Zur Linden the sense of the text takes undoubted precedence and constitutes the only possible access to the author’s sense. His author-related textual hermeneutics can still be seen today as an original and noteworthy achievement. (shrink)

In his final lectures and writings, Fichte continued to assert that his philosophy opened up a new word, one that he still associated with Kantian thought, although the horizon of his thinking had changed since 1801. The essay reveals this second horizon, on which Fichte worked until the end of his life. It asserts the reality of an absolute being and the ideality of the world representing the outer appearance or the existence of an absolute being, a world that (...) is nothing more than knowledge, seeing, an image of being and the images that form life. With this theory Fichte takes an original position in the history of Western philosophy. In seinen letzten Vorlesungen und Schriften behauptet Fichte weiterhin, dass seine Philosophie eine neue Welt eröffnet, die er immer noch mit dem kantischen Denken in Verbindung setzt, obwohl sich sein Denkhorizont seit 1801 verändert hatte. Im Aufsatz wird dieser zweite Horizont dargestellt und wie Fichte ihn bis zum Ende seines Lebens ausgearbeitete. In ihm wird die Realität eines absoluten Seins und die Idealität der Welt angenommen, die die äußere Erscheinung oder die Existenz des absoluten Seins darstellt und nichts anderes als Wissen, Sehen, Bild des Seins und bildendes Leben sei. Durch diese Lehre nimmt Fichte eine eigentümliche Stellung in der Geschichte der abendländischen Philosophie ein. (shrink)

Resumo: É comum a literatura secundária reduzir o ensaio kantiano Do Primeiro Princípio da Diferença das Regiões no Espaço a um ataque à concepção leibniziana de espaço relativo em defesa da concepção newtoniana de espaço absoluto. Até que ponto, porém, essa imagem não é obstáculo para compreender o Ensaio como um todo e o alcance de sua reflexão? A pergunta se impõe, porque não é claro o que o Ensaio pretende provar, uma vez que propõe quatro diferentes formulações de uma (...) prova que denomina evidente. Tampouco é claro, por isso mesmo, como pretende conduzir a demonstração segundo o método que denomina a posteriori. Para compreender o Ensaio, é necessário entender qual é o objetivo último da prova e o método de demonstração. Dessa investigação decorrem alguns pontos, de outro modo, insuspeitos: (1) Kant critica não apenas a concepção de espaço leibniziana, mas também princípios adotados pelos leibnizianos, em particular, o princípio de determinação completa como princípio de individuação para as coisas em geral; (2) o Ensaio propõe uma concepção inaudita de espaço absoluto como: conceito, radicado no corpo humano e primeiro fundamento das relações espaciais e de sua cognição; (3) assim entendido, o Ensaio kantiano mostra-se, do ponto de vista genético, estratégico para tornar compreensível a concepção, introduzida pela Estética Transcendental da Crítica da Razão Pura, de aparecimento (Erscheinung) como objeto indeterminado da intuição empírica. Palavras-chave: Kant; Leibniz; Baumgarten; Espaço; Princípio de determinação completa. Transcendental Aesthetic and the 1768 Essay: Space and Complete Determination Abstract: It is common for secondary literature to reduce Kant's 1768 essay On the First Ground of the Difference of Regions in Space to an attack on the Leibnizian conception of relative space in defense of the Newtonian conception of absolute space. To what extent, however, is this picture an obstacle to understanding the essay as a whole and the scope of its reflection? The question arises because it is not clear what the essay intends to prove, since it proposes four different formulations of a proof that it calls evident. Nor is it clear, therefore, how Kant’s essay intends to conduct the demonstration according to its a posteriori method. To understand Kant's argument, it is necessary to determine the ultimate objective of his proof and his method of demonstration. Some otherwise unsuspected points arise from this investigation: (1) Kant criticizes not only the conception of relative space but also the Leibnizian principle of thoroughgoing determination as a principle of individuation for things in general; (2) Kant proposes an unprecedented conception of absolute space as a fundamental concept, rooted in the human body, as the first ground of spatial relations and its cognition; (3) the Kant’s essay appears, from a genetic point of view, strategic to make comprehensible the conception introduced by the Transcendental Aesthetics of the Critique of Pure Reason, of appearance as an indeterminate object of empirical intuition. Keywords: Kant; Leibniz; Baumgarten; Space; Principle of thoroughgoing determination. Estética transcendental y el Ensayo de 1768: espacio y determinación completa Resumen: Es común en la literatura secundaria reducir el ensayo kantiano Del Primer Fundamento de la Diferencia de las Regiones del Espacio a un ataque a la concepción leibniziana de espacio relativo en defensa de la concepción newtoniana de espacio absoluto ¿Hasta qué punto, pero, esa imagen no es obstáculo para la comprensión del Ensayo en general y el alcance de su reflexión? La pregunta se impone, porque no es claro lo que el Ensayo pretende comprobar, una vez que propone cuatro diferentes formulaciones de una prueba que denomina evidente. Tampoco es nítido, por eso incluso, cómo pretende conducir la demostración, según el método que denomina a posteriori. Para comprender el Ensayo, es necesario entender cuál es el objetivo último de la prueba y el método de demostración. De esa investigación decurren algunos puntos, de otro modo, insospechados: (1) Kant critica no solamente la concepción de espacio leibniziana, sino también los principios adoptados por los leibnizianos, en particular el principio de determinación completa como: principio de individuación para las cosas en general; (2) el Ensayo propone una concepción inaudita de espacio absoluto como: concepto, radicado en el cuerpo humano y el primer fundamento de las relaciones espaciales y de su cognición; (3) de ese modo, el Ensayo kantiano se muestra, del punto de vista genético, estratégico para que se vuelva comprensible la concepción, introducida por la Estética Transcendental de la Crítica de la Razón Pura, de aparecimiento (Erscheinung) como objeto indeterminado de la intuición empírica. Palabras-clave: Kant; Leibniz; Baumgarten; Espacio; Principio de determinación completa. Data de registro: 30/07/2024 Data de aceite: 30/10/2024. (shrink)

At the present time, there are several interpretations and modes of Kant’s transcendental philosophy (TP). Which of these interpretations and modes of transcendentalism most adequately express the spirit of TP, i.e. can claim the title of the transcendental ones? For the explication of the ‘idea of transcendental philosophy’ [KrV, A1], here I distinguish two transcendental shifts: methodological and metaphysical ones, which in their totality predetermine the essence and set the specificity of Kant’s transcendental idealism. The methodological transcendental shift that Kant (...) postulates in his definitions of TP in the Critique of Pure Reason [KrV, A11; B25] represents a shift from studying of objects to the analysis and justification of our mode of cognition of objects. This shift sets a fairly wide range of a la Kantian a priori doctrines and predetermines the transcendental turn (Re–Transcendentalising) of modern philosophy. The metaphysical transcendental shift that can be correlated with “the altered method of our way of thinking [in metaphysics]” [KrV, BXVIII], is associated with the splitting of the “thing” into the actual object (or Kantian thing-in-itself) and object of experience (or Kantian appearance), and involves a transition from the study of thing-in-itself to the analysis of the appearance. More precisely, this shift finds its expression in the transcendental triad “object (thing-in-itself; Ding an sich) – appearance (Erscheinung) – representation (Vorstellung)”, which determines the ‘idea’ (essence) of transcendental idealism/metaphysics. (shrink)

Even today, a century after the publication of the “Origin of Species”, current zoological literature often reveals an insufficient grasp of the implications of the now generally accepted view that it is natural selection that confers direction on the evolutionary process.This is, in part, due to a reaction against oversimplified teleology and against Lamarckism. In rejecting Lamarck's thesis that the activities of an animal directly affect its hereditary characters it is frequently assumed that this implies that such activities are irrelevant (...) to the study of evolution. This is a non-sequitur, for activities may affect evolution not directly, through heredity, but indirectly, by influencing the direction of the selective forces impinging on the organism. Reasons are given for concluding that changes in habits and behaviour frequently precede structural change and, in fact, determine the direction of the latter.As an example of a concept which deserves a more evolutionary treatment than it commonly receives, the subject of neoteny is considered. It appears that failure to think in terms of the selective forces involved has frequently led to error. An analysis in functional terms is made of the theory that the chordates represent secondarily glorified sea-squirts and it is concluded that this idea is unlikely to be correct. The characteristics of man that are commonly considered to be neotenous are also discussed. It is concluded that a facile and unanalytical application of the label “neoteny” to many of the evolutionary changes involved has tended to obscure rather than to clarify their significance: the neotenous features of man are not those that have been of primary importance in human evolution, but are secondary to the acquisition of new characters which are not to be found in either the adult or the young stages of any other primate.Aujourd'hui, un siècle après l'apparition de l'Originedes Espèces, la conviction est presque générale que la sélection naturelle dirige le procès de l'évolution. Néanmoins, les publications zoologiques actuelles révèlent souvent une compréhension insuffisante de ce qui en résulte.Ceci doit en partie être considéré comme réaction contre une téléologie simpliste et contre le Lamarckisme. En rejetant la thèse de Lamarck, que les activités d'un animal ont une influence directe sur ses caractéristiques héréditaires, on admet fréquemment que de pareilles activités n'ont rien à voir avec l'étude le l'évolution. Cependant, une telle conclusion n'est pas justifiée, car les activités peuvent influer sur l'évolution non pas directement, par la voie de l'hérédité, mais indirectement en agissant sur la direction des forces sélectives que l'organisme rencontre. Des raisons ont été données qui mènent à conclure que des changements dans les habitudes et dans le comportement précèdent maintes fois le changement structural et même déterminent la direction de celui-ci.Comme exemple d'un concept qui mérite un traitement plus évolutionniste qu'il ne reçoive en général, la néoténie a été examinée. Il paraît que l'on a fait beaucoup d'erreurs en ne tenant pas compte des forces sélectives engagées. Une analyse au pointde-vue de la fonction a été appliquée à la théorie que les chordées ne sont que des ascidies néoténiques transfigurées par après, et il s'ensuit que cette idée n'est probablement pas correcte. Aussi les caractéristiques de l'homme généralement regardées comme neoténiques ont été discutées. Il en résulte que, en désignant légèrement et sans analyse plusieurs changements évolutionnaires comme néoténie, on a plutôt obsurci qu'éclairci leur signification. Ce ne sont pas les traits néoteniques de l'homme qui ont joué le rôle principal dans l'évolution humaine; au contraire, ils n'apparaissent qu'après l'acquisition de quelques nouvelles caractéristiques qui ne se trouvent ni dans l'adulte ni dans les phases plus jeunes des autres primates.Sogar heutzutage, ein Jahrhundert nach dem Erscheinen der „Origin of Species”, zeigt die jetzige zoologische Literatur oft eine unzulängliche Einsicht in die Folgerungen, zu denen die jetzt allgemein akzeptierte Annahme leitet, dass die natürliche Selektion die Richtung des Evolutionsprozesses bedingt.Dies ist teilweise zu sehen als eine Reaktion gegen eine einseitige Teleologie und gegen das Lamarckismus. Bei der Ablehnung der TheseLamarck's, dass die Aktivitäten eines Tieres einen direkten Einfluss ausüben auf seine erbliche Konstitution, nimmt man oft an, dass dies bedeutet, dass derartige Aktivitäten demnach nichts zur Sache tun bei dem Studium der Evolution. Zu einer derartigen Konklusion ist man jedoch nicht berechtigt, denn, obwohl die Aktivitäten die Evolution nicht direkt beeinflussen können mittels der Erblichkeit, so können sie dies jedoch indirekt, weil sie die Richtung der selektiven Kräfte, welche auf das Organismus einwirken, bestimmen. Es werden Argumente gegeben, welche die Konklusion rechtfertigten, dass Änderungen in Gewohnheit und Verhalten oft Strukturänderungen vorhergehen und tatsächlich die Richtung dieser letztgenannten bestimmen. Die Neotenie wirdt als ein Beispiel eines Begriff betrachtet, welcher eine mehr evolutionäre Behandlung verdient als bisher geschehen ist. Es ergibt sich dass man viele Irrtümer hat gemacht, indem man den betreffenden selektiven Kräften keine Rechnung getragen hat. Eine Analyse der Theorie, welche die Chordaten als neotenische Ascidien betrachtet, wird von einem funktionellen Gesichtspunkt aus durchgeführt. Daraus scheint der Schluss berechtigt, dass diese Theorie falsch ist. Auch werden die menschlichen Kennzeichen, welche gewöhnlich als neotenische betrachtet werden, besprochen. Die Konklusion lautet, dass, wenn man leichtfertig und ohne genügende Analyse den Zettel „Neotenie“ für mancherlei evolutive Änderungen anwendet, man die richtige Bedeutung dieser Erscheinung vielmehr verdunkelt als aufklärt: nicht die neotenische Kennzeichen des Menschen sind am wichtigsten in seiner Evolution; in Gegenteil sie erscheinen nur sekundär, nachdem die neuen Kennzeichen, welche sich weder in den Erwachsenen noch in den jüngeren Stadien von den anderen Primaten finden lassen, erschienen sind. (shrink)

Fichte as well as Jacobi posit that the Absolute cannot be grasped from the standpoint of knowledge. Therefore we must go beyond this point, in order to achieve the Absolute. Both agree that knowledge is negated in the face of the Absolute. What, however, Fichte understands by the negation of knowledge differs from Jacobi’s understanding. The negation of knowledge refers to, in Fichte’s case, the self-negation of knowledge. Whereas in Jacobi’s case it refers to the renunciation of knowledge. In this (...) essay the author attempts to bring out the salient characteristics of the negation of knowledge in Fichte on the basis of Jacobi to Fichte, Vocation of Man and Science of Knowledge 1801/02. Knowledge cannot grasp the Absolute. Knowledge knows, however, that it cannot grasp the Absolute (i.e. the Absolute, which it cannot grasp, exists). According to Fichte the Absolute appears in this way through knowledge. Knowledge is not merely negated in the face of the Absolute, but rather lets the Absolute, through its self-negation, appear. This knowledge is so in its self-negation in contact with the Absolute. In Fichte the Absolute is not something not-appearing. The misunderstanding, that the Absolute is something not-appearing, comes from objective cognition. The Absolute appears, as an appearance appears as an appearance (i.e. without confusing it with the Absolute). Sowohl Fichte als auch Jacobi meinen, dass das Absolute auf dem Standpunkt des Wissens nicht erfasst werden kann, und dass man daher über den Standpunkt des Wissens hinausgehen muss, um das Absolute zu erreichen. Die beiden sind in dem Punkt einig, dass das Wissen angesichts des Absoluten negiert wird. Was aber Fichte dabei unter der Negation des Wissens versteht, unterscheidet sich davon, was Jacobi darunter versteht. Die Negation des Wissens meint bei Fichte Selbstnegation des Wissens, während sie bei Jacobi Abschaffung desselben meint. Im vorliegenden Aufsatz versucht der Verfasser, das Charakteristische der Negation des Wissens bei Fichte anhand von Jacobi an Fichte, Bestimmung des Menschen und Wissenschaftslehre 1801/02 herauszuarbeiten. Das Wissen kann kein Absolutes erfassen. Das Wissen weiß aber, dass es kein Absolutes erfassen kann, d. h. dass es ein Absolutes gibt, das es nicht erfassen kann. Nach Fichte erscheint das Absolute auf diese Weise im Wissen. Das Wissen wird dabei angesichts des Absoluten nicht bloß negiert sondern lässt vielmehr durch seine Selbstnegation das Absolute erscheinen. So steht das Wissen durch seine Selbstnegation mit dem Absoluten in Berührung. Das Absolute ist bei Fichte nicht etwas Nicht-erscheinendes. Das Missverständnis, dass das Absolute ein Nicht-erscheinendes wäre, stammt daraus, es gegenständlich zu erfassen. Das Absolute erscheint, indem die Erscheinung als Erscheinung (d. h. ohne Verwechselung mit dem Absoluten) erscheint. (shrink)

The article is concentrated on three major concepts in the Hegelian System, namely: Begriff (notion), Schein (appearance), and Erscheinung (phenomenon). It reveals the interrelationship of this terms and unveils them by showing their triadic notion-elements – their abstracts, negations and concretes (sometimes called "thesis, antithesis and synthesis").

Die Wissenschaftslehre von 1812 - die letzte, die Fichte vollstandig vorgetragen hat - wird der Forschung erstmals in zuverlassiger Form vorgelegt. In ihr deduziert Fichte vom hochsten bestimmten 'Blick' aus, dem des sittlichen Wollens als einem der hoheren 'Schemata' der Erscheinung des Absoluten, die weiteren Momente des Wissens. Die Rechtslehre von 1812 wird ausschliesslich nach der Handschrift wiedergegeben. Drei nicht exakt zu datierende Texte zeigen Fichtes Reaktion auf die Zeitereignisse (u.a. Napoleons Kontributionsforderungen an den preussischen Staat). Ausserdem stellt der (...) Philosoph grundsatzliche Uberlegungen auch auf volkswirtschaftlichem Gebiet an (Bewertung landwirtschaftlicher Guter, Geldwerttheorie). The Wissenschaftslehre of 1812. This is the last complete version of Fichte's lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre, and it is here published for the first time in a reliable edition. This version begins with the most determinate "point of view," that of ethical willing, understood as one of the higher "schemata" of the absolute's appearance, from which Fichte deduces the additional moments of knowing. The texts of the 1812 Doctrine of Right [Rechtslehre] and the 1812 Doctrine of Ethics [Sittenlehre] published here are based entirely on the lecture manuscripts and incorporate nothing from previously published texts based upon other sources. -- Three additional texts, none of which can be precisely dated, illustrate Fichte's reaction to events of the day, such as Napoleon's demand for reparations from Prussia. Here the philosopher engages in fundamental reflections concerning the economic realm (the valuation of agricultural wealth, monetary theory). The introductory lecture of the Summer Semester of 1812 documents Fichte's efforts, at the start of the semester, to attract and to introduce as many interested students as possible to the study of philosophy. (shrink)

The article recapitulates the different phases of the western interpretation of Nāgārjuna and aims, proceeding from a foundation enriched by a critique of them, to obtain elements of a renewed transcendental-philosophical interpretation of the philosophy of emptiness, such as was initiated by Fyodor Ippolitovich Stcherbatsky in his approach inspired by Immanuel Kant. Based primarily on Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s transcendental logic and Wissenschaftslehre a systematic reconstruction of Nāgārjuna’s thought is undertaken. Taking up an insight of Bhavya/Bhāviveka, we suggest that the absolute (...) known by Nāgārjuna as pre-reflexive being-conscious is the concept-bound appearance of the absolute in the medium of prapanca and not the absolute itself dispensed from prapanca, which as the unthinkable beyond of all thinking can be immediately realized in actuality only by the self-annihilation of thinking. This will bring to light the cognitive yield of Nāgārjuna’s effort, which is of a transcendental nature avant la lettre, and which makes him a witness for the claim to universality of transcendental-philosophical knowledge, beyond Europe.Der Aufsatz rekapituliert die verschiedenen Phasen der westlichen Rezeptionsgeschichte Nāgārjunas und plädiert für eine erneute transzendentalphilosophische Interpretation der Philosophie der Leerheit, wie sie die von Immanuel Kant inspirierte Interpretation Fyodor Ippolitovich Stcherbatskys inauguriert hat. Ausgehend von Johann Gottlieb Fichtes transzendentaler Logik und Wissenschaftslehre wird eine systematische Rekonstruktion von Nāgārjunas Denken unternommen und das von Nāgārjuna affirmierte Absolute als präreflexives Bewusst-Sein interpretiert. Im Anschluss an Bhavya/Bhāviveka wird das präreflexive Bewusst-Sein Nāgārjunas als absolute Erscheinung des Absoluten vom Absoluten selbst unterschieden, das als undenkbares Jenseits allen Denkens nur durch die faktische Selbstvernichtung des Denkens unmittelbar realisiert werden kann. Anhand dieser exemplarischen Untersuchung wird die These vertreten, dass Nāgārjuna Erkenntnisse errungen hat und zwar – ante litteram – transzendentale, die ihn zu einem Zeugen des Universalitätsanspruches transzendentalphilosophischer Erkenntnis außerhalb Europas machen. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungAn der Gabenpraxis traditioneller Gesellschaften, die Marcel Mauss im Essai sur le don untersucht hat, ist die ästhetische Dimension von großer Bedeutung; zu sozial konstitutiven Gaben, die v.a. Akte wechselseitiger Anerkennung sind, eignen sich nämlich nur besondere Dinge und Leistungen. Diese werden im Rahmen festlicher Gelegenheiten getauscht. Die vorliegende Studie untersucht den Zusammenhang zwischen Gabe und Ästhetik an einem konkreten Fall der europäischen Vormoderne, an Benvenuto Cellinis Saliera für den französischen König François Ier. In der Renaissance verklammert der Begriff grazia (...) Hofkunst mit höfischem Habitus, Selbstdarstellung der Elite und Inszenierung der Macht. Das hier verhandelte kostbare Objekt und seine Geschichte realisieren grazia in ihrer doppelten Bedeutung als Erscheinung im Kunstwerk und soziopolitische Beziehung; beide verweisen auf die Gabenpraxis und deren symbolische Funktionen, und umgekehrt. Für die Analyse sind Materialität des Gegenstands und Textualität gleichermaßen wichtig.The aesthetic dimension is crucial in the practices of gift giving in traditional societies as studied by Marcel Mauss in his Essai sur le don. Aesthetics is highly relevant because not any object or service is suitable for the socially constitutive gift, which, above all, is a symbolic act of recognition. Rare and precious objects and services are exchanged at festive occasions. This paper examines the connection between gift and aesthetics in a concrete case of pre-modern Europe: in Benvenuto Cellini’s salt cellar for the French King François Ier. In Renaissance discourse, the concept of grazia links the work of an individual court artist to courtly behavior, elite self-representation and the celebration of political power. Grazia is actualized in the saliera and the history of its making; in its double sense, as appearance in the artwork and social relationship, it refers to gift giving practices and their symbolic functions, and vice versa. For my article, the material object and the related texts are equally important. (shrink)

Com a determinação de fenómeno empreendida por Heidegger em Sein und Zeit é abordada a problemática primeira, "fundamental", da filosofia; esse problema da fenomenalidade do fenómeno, contudo, já não é tematizado no contexto de quest0ões como "fundamentação da(s) ciência(s)", "certeza", "evidência apodíctica", tal como o fizeram algumas filosofias relevantes do passado, nomeadamente da Modernidade. O pensamento de Edmund Husserl e escolhido como exemplo paradigmatico dessa atitude que prescreve para o trabalho fundamentador da filosofia o metodo do "cepticismo metodico", uma vez (...) que, por via de regra, inscreve o tema da fenomenalidade do fenomeno no contexto da reduc. ao fenomenológica da epoche. O §7 de Sein und Zeit, determina o conceito de fenomeno como "aquilo-que-se-mostra-em-simesmo" e fa-lo estabelecendo as relações reciprocas entre fenomeno e outras formas deficientes de doagao — "aparencia" ("Schein") e "manifestacao" ("Erscheinung"); deste modo a questão da doação, isto é a questao da verdade (alétheia/desvelamento) retoma o seu lugar primeiro no quadro do pensamento fenomenológico relegando a questão metodológica da certeza para o lugar de problema derivado. /// Avec la détermination de phénoméne entreprise par Heidegger en Sein und Zeit, c'est la problématique première, "fondamentale", de la philosophic qui est envisagée; ce probléme de la phénoménalité du phénomène, cependant, n'est pas thématisé dans le contexte de questions comme celles de "fondement de(s) (la) science(s)", "certitude", "évidence apodictique", à la manière de certaines philosophies marquantes du passé, en particulier de la Modernite. La pensée de Edmund Husserl est choisie comme exemple paradigmatique de cette attitude que present pour le travail philosophique de fondation la methode du "scepticisme methodique" des lors que, en guise de regie, elle inscrit le theme de la phenoménalité du phenomene dans le contexte de la reduction phenomenologique, de 1' epoche. Le §7 de Sein und Zeit détermine le concept de phénomène comme "ce-qui-se-montre-en-soi-meme" et cela par le fait d'etablir les relations reciproques entre le phenomene et les autres formes deficientes de donation — "apparence" ("Schein") et "manifestation" ("Erscheinung") ; de la sorte, la question de la donation, c. á. d. la question de la vérité (alétheia-dévoilement) reprend sa place premiere dans le cadre de la pensée phénoménologique, relégant la question méthodologique de la certitude a la place de problème dérivé. /// With Heidegger's text to determine the phenomenality of the phenomenon in Sein und Zeit, one recognizes that it is philosophy's most fundamental problem that is being rethought, but not in terms of "foundations of the science(s), "certitude", "apodicti evidence" — as much of the philosophy in modern times has sought to do. Edmund Husserl's thought is paradigmatic of this atitude, attributing to philosophy the work of founding through "methodological scepticism" However Husserl approaches the matter of the phenomenality of the phenomenon within the context of phenomenological reduction. The 7th paragraph of Sein und Zeit determines the concept of phenomenon as that which "shows-itself-in-itself" and does so by establishing reciprocal relations between the phenomenon and other deficient torms of donation — "appearence" (Schein) and "manifestation" (Erscheinung)! In this way, the question of donation, i. e. the question of truth (ale theia/rev elation) takes up again its first place in the context of phenomenological thought, relegating the methodological question concerning certitude to a derived status. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hegel’s Idea of a “Phenomenology of Spirit” by Michael N. ForsterGünter ZöllerMichael N. Forster. Hegel’s Idea of a “Phenomenology of Spirit.” Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. Pp. xi + 661. Paper, $30.00.Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) has remained an enigmatic and controversial work. Typically it has been studied and appropriated selectively, by focusing on a few topics or sections of this immense opus. There are also several (...) commentaries on all or part of the work that immerse the reader in plenty of detail, but often with insufficient attention paid to the work’s overall design. Forster’s book is thematically focused but has sufficient scope to provide the reader with an overall orientation about the Phenomenology. Moreover, it is written in a clear, accessible language, with plenty of genuinely philosophical material to balance the more narrowly exegetical aspects of the study. Forster’s work stands in the tradition of a number of German and French studies that seek to unravel the “genesis and structure” (Hyppolite) of the Phenomenology as a key to understanding and assessing the import of Hegel’s singular work. Forster discusses those earlier readings, subjects them to a thorough critique, and develops original positions on a number of key issues in scholarship on the Phenomenology.The entire first half of the book (Parts One and Two) is concerned with the “official project of the Phenomenology,” which Forster reconstructs as three sets of philosophical tasks. First are the pedagogical tasks designed to introduce the reader to the superior viewpoint of Hegel’s system and its ability to overcome the ills specific to modern culture. In particular, Hegel is shown to further advance Herder’s and Schiller’s philosophical project of replacing the multiple, unreconciled dualisms of the modern intellectual and moral outlook with a unified, monistic account of natural and social reality. In a strong interpretive move, Forster attributes a naturalism of sorts to Hegel’s integrationist account of mind and body or self and world.Second are the epistemological tasks designed to justify the cognitive claims of Hegel’s [End Page 541] system (“science”) against those of all other philosophical and popular viewpoints. In particular, Forster shows Hegel’s indebtedness to the ancient (Pyrronic) skeptical strategy of equipollence, i.e., the method of setting into opposition equally strong arguments on both sides of any issue and thereby producing an equal balance of justification on all sides of the issue. Of all possible viewpoints only Hegel’s own, which is not subject to any external opposition, eludes the scope of the method of equipollence.The third, specifically metaphysical set of tasks of the Phenomenology centers around the work’s social and (on Forster’s reading) naturalist conceptions of God, meaning and truth, in which transcendent warrants are replaced by communal consensus. Forster concludes the first half of his study with a detailed consideration of the relation between the Phenomenology and Hegel’s system proper. He stresses that the work is only the “appearance” (Erscheinung) of the philosophical science itself and that it remains systematically independent of the latter.Part Three examines the role of history and historicism in the Phenomenology. Forster distinguishes between teleological or normative historicism and intellectual or descriptive historicism, and limits his investigation to the latter as the philosophically defensible of the two enterprises. He argues extensively for a one-to-one correlation between the various “shapes of consciousness” to be found in the core of the Phenomenology (from the chapter on Consciousness through the chapter on Reason) and specific periods in human history. This chronological history of consciousness is shown to be supplemented by two further accounts of the history of consciousness (in the chapter on Spirit and in the chapters on Religion and Absolute Knowledge, respectively), in which the first history’s focus on individual consciousness is enlarged to include supra-individual mind (“spirit”).In Part Four Forster explains the tripling of the history of consciousness with a shift in the plan of the Phenomenology, away from the more limited project of the original or “Ur-Phenomenology”—to lead individual consciousness to the viewpoint of (Hegelian) science—to the more ambitious goal... (shrink)

Prior to this work, Prauss has already become well known as a Kant commentator and also as one of the most distinguished systematic philosophers in Germany today. This book extends his work in both directions. First, although it appears to treat just one issue, freedom, it uses this issue to give Prauss's broadest interpretation of Kant to date, one which includes coverage of all three Critiques and many lesser known texts. Secondly, the work brings together and significantly refines many of (...) the main arguments of Prauss's earlier books. The emphasis on the theory/praxis relation that surfaced in Erkennen und Handeln in Heideggers "Sein und Zeit" is integrated here with the epistemology articulated in Einführung in die Erkenntnistheorie, and all this is built on to the analysis of Kant's theory of judgment explicated in Erscheinung bei Kant and the connections between aprioricity, subjectivity, and actuality developed in Kant und das Problem der Dinge an sich. This implicit dependence on so many earlier results might give some readers trouble, but on the whole the present book is probably one of Prauss's most accessible ones. It has a relatively leisurely style, it begins with a helpful introduction that surveys all the main points, and it repeats important themes at appropriate intervals. As for readers already familiar with Prauss, they will find not only the subtlety, carefulness, and precise documentation they have come to expect, but also some explicit modifications of earlier views. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Erscheinung bei Kant" verfügbar.

Abstract: How exactly should the relation between a veridical perception and a corresponding hallucination be understood? I argue that the epistemic notion of ‘indiscriminability’, understood as lacking evidence for the distinctness of things, is not suitable for defining this relation. Instead, we should say that a hallucination and a veridical perception involve the same phenomenal properties. This has further consequences for attempts to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of phenomenal properties in terms of indiscriminability, and for considerations (...) about the phenomenal sorites. (shrink)

Coherence theorists have universally defined justification as a relation only among (the contents of) belief states, in contradistinction to other theories, such as some versions of founda­tionalism, which define justification as a relation on belief states and appearance states.

This essay introduces this special issue on virtue ethics in relation to military AI. It describes the current situation of military AI ethics as following that of AI ethics in general, caught between consequentialism and deontology. Virtue ethics serves as an alternative that can address some of the weaknesses of these dominant forms of ethics. The essay describes how the articles in the issue exemplify the value of virtue-related approaches for these questions, before ending with thoughts for further research.

A sensible quality is a perceptible property, a property that physical objects (or events) perceptually appear to have. Thus smells, tastes, colors and shapes are sensible qualities. An egg, for example, may smell rotten, taste sour, and look cream and round.1,2 The sensible qualities are not a miscellanous jumble—they form complex structures. Crimson, magenta, and chartreuse are not merely three different shades of color: the first two are more similar than either is to the third. Familiar color spaces or color (...) solids capture, to a greater or lesser extent, these relations between the colors. The same goes for sensible qualities perceived in other modalities: middle C, high C, and D are not merely three different notes, and the taste of lemons, oranges, and sugar cubes are not merely three different tastes. How can this structure of appearance be explained? One idea is that sensible qualities are of two sorts: basic and derived. The basic sensible qualities are the building blocks from which the derived sensible qualities can be.. (shrink)

While the story of Stanislav Petrov – the Soviet Lieutenant Colonel who likely saved the world from nuclear holocaust in 1983 – is often trotted out to advocate for the view that human beings ought to be kept “in the loop” of automated weapons’ responses, I argue that the episode in fact belies this reading. By attending more closely to the features of this event – to Petrov’s professional background, to his familiarity with the warning system, and to his decisions (...) to defy his protocol – it becomes clear that Petrov was not seamlessly working “in his loop,” but reassessing it entirely. I claim that this exhibits a paradox intrinsic to all automated loops: namely, that their optimum function in fact rests on unforeseen human interventions that cannot be reliably codified ex ante, that is, that good judgment cannot simply be “programmed into” their protocols. This dependence, moreover, reveals automation’s ineluctable need for virtue ethics – not in the usual sense (whereby ethics deliberates about, say, possible damages and loss of life), but in the sense that ethical judgment, rightly understood, entails the reassessment of all of the conditions surrounding a decision, including whether a protocol should be followed at all. (shrink)

Visual Perception of Shape, Space and Appearance Liliana Albertazzi. the sort I have in mind. What I am speaking of is the mandatory correlations between attributes of visual space (those of, e.g., surfaces, shape, distance, direction) and  ...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Aristotle’s Phantasia in the Rhetoric:Lexis, Appearance, and the Epideictic Function of DiscourseNed O’GormanIntroductionThe well-known opening line of Aristotle's Rhetoric, where he defines rhetoric as a "counterpart" (antistrophos) to dialectic, has spurred many conversations on Aristotelian rhetoric and motivated the widespread interpretation of Aristotle's theory of civic discourse as heavily rationalistic. This study starts from a statement in the Rhetoric less discussed, yet still important, that suggests that a (...) visual aspect inheres in Aristotle's theory of rhetoric. Near the beginning of book 3, which deals with lexis (style, sometimes subsuming delivery1 ), Aristotle conjoins lexis and phantasia with the copula "is" (eimi): "The subject of expression [lexeôs], however, has some small necessary place in all teaching; for to speak in one way rather than another does make some difference in regard to clarity, though not a great difference; but all these things are forms of outward show [phantasia] and intended to affect the audience" (1404a).2 Whereas scholars exploring the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic have compared and contrasted the Rhetoric and the Topics, I explore rhetoric's relationship with phantasia by reading the Rhetoric alongside De Anima. De Anima is Aristotle's seminal account of the senses and their relationship to psychê (often translated "soul"). It addresses topics intimately connected to rhetoric: perception, cognition, deliberation, visualization, imagination, and the image. Phantasia is integral to each of these psychic processes and to Aristotle's understanding of the function of appearance in human experience. Hence, itis a lens suitable for exploring the relationship between Aristotle's conception of civic discourse and his notions of sight and appearances as they relate to perception, interpretation, deliberation, and judgment. I find in Aristotle's phantasia a tie between his art of rhetoric and his psychology and phenomenology (anachronistic though these terms are). Aristotle's psychological works, as Richard McKeon points out, are foundational to Aristotle's philosophy, and thus to his Rhetoric. [End Page 16] "Psychological inquiries occupy an extremely important position in the philosophy of Aristotle, for the conception of the psychê lays the foundation for the continuity of functions in nature" (1947, 142). De Anima, especially, articulates the psychological and phenomenological conceptions often tacitly at work in the Rhetoric.The importance of phantasia for the trajectory of ancient rhetorical and aesthetic theory is seen in the parallels between the visual arts, rhetoric, and poetics in Greek and Roman thought.3 As David Freedberg states (perhaps, slightly overstates), parallels between painting and poetry are "to be found everywhere in classical literature" (1989, 50). With respect to such visual-verbal parallels in Aristotle, D. Thomas Benediktson's reading of Aristotle's psychological, poetic, and rhetorical works concludes that phantasia ties together the visual and the literary. "[Aristotle's passages on phantasia] do help to see why Aristotle took for granted the similarity, almost the identity, of literature and the visual arts. Both types of art are imagistic; they present to the viewer either an image, as in visual art, or as in literature, a set of moving images that the soul then uses as raw data (phantasia) to enable thought to occur" (2000, 170). Phantasia developed a legacy in Hellenistic aesthetics, where it came to designate suprarealism in painting, moving art "beyond imitation" (Fowler 1989, 180–81). In later Greco-Roman works, phantasia was used to designate vivid imagery in written and oral discourse, imagery that could create sights and scenes in the minds of audience members. As Quintilian noted in his discussion of forensic rhetoric, in Latin phantasiai were termed visiones. Here, phantasiabecame a mode of displacing narrative in rhetorical discourse:There are certain experiences which the Greeks call phantasiai, and the Romans visions [visiones], whereby things absent are presented to our imagination with such extreme vividness that they seem actually to be before our very eyes.... From such impressions arises that enargeia which Cicero calls illumination [illustration] and actuality [evidential], which makes us seem not so much to narrate [dicere] as to exhibit [ostendere] the actual scene.(Institutio Oratoria 4.2.29, 32)Quintilian's invocations of phantasia and enargeia can be traced to Aristotle's discussion of rhetorical style in book... (shrink)

In the following essay I set out the core argument expounded by Nicholas Rescher in regard of the link between reality and appearance, illustrating this argument based on chapter 6 of his Reality and its Appearance. Rescher’s argument overlaps with critical realist concerns based on his approach to metaphysical realism. I make the point that the argument exhibits the virtue of concision, but, as a result, suffers from under-elaboration in important areas; most particularly, an explicit engagement with standard (...) philosophical problems of appearance, such as Gettier, and, more generally, the fundamental issue of how appearance may or may not change in response to changes in the human condition. (shrink)

I offer a reading of the two conceptions of the good found in Plato’s Protagoras: the popular conception—‘the many’s’ conception—and Socrates’ conception. I pay particular attention to the three kinds of goods Socrates introduces: (a) bodily pleasures like food, drink, and sex; (b) instrumental goods like wealth, health, or power; and (c) virtuous actions like courageously going to war. My reading revises existing views about these goods in two ways. First, I argue that the many are only ‘hedonists’ in a (...) very attenuated sense. They do not value goods of kind (b) simply as means to pleasures of kind (a); rather, they have fundamentally different attitudes to (a) and (b). Second, the hedonism that Socrates’ defends includes a distinction between kinds of pleasures: (a) bodily pleasures and (c) the pleasures of virtuous actions. This distinction between kinds of pleasures—some that do and some that do not exert the ‘power of appearance’—allows Socrates to address one of the central beliefs in the popular conception of akrasia, namely that it involves a special kind of unruly desire: non-rational appetites for pleasures like food, drink, or sex. Socrates replaces the motivational push of non-rational appetites with the epistemic pull of the appearance of immediate pleasures like food, drink, and sex. (shrink)

Monotheism: the word indicates a system of thought that proceeds from a recognition of the divinity of a single god to the exclusion of all other. This exclusivity distinguishes monotheism from henotheism or monolatry and explains why monotheism is a question of belief, unlike traditional eastern religions, among them the religion of the Old Testament. The paper shows that monotheism is in fact absent from the Hebrew Bible by examining in particular the Creation stories and the vocabulary of divine oneness. (...) It is in the Roman period, particularly in Philo of Alexandria’s work, that we find more properly monotheistic writing, influenced by exegesis based on cosmogonic myths, foremost among them the biblical story known as the Creation. Imperial power would have had to assume a truly universal character for the idea of a single god assuring that power to emerge from the multitude. (shrink)

In the early 1760s, the entry dedicated to the term “social” in Diderot's Encyclopédie claimed that it was “un mot nouvellement introduit dans la langue.” Strictly speaking, this description was inaccurate: “social” had already appeared (though very sporadically) in seventeenth-century French texts. But the essence of the Encyclopédie's argument was correct: “social” had been so marginal in French up until the mid-eighteenth century that its wide deployment in enlightened discourse from the 1740s onward could be treated as a new (...) class='Hi'>appearance. The article main argument is that “social's” new appearance in the mid-1740s was of considerable intellectual importance. To support this argument, the article is divided into three parts. The first outlines the general premises of the research into the word “social” and its significance. By placing this research within the ongoing investigation of the semantic field around “société” in enlightened philosophy, the article claims that such an investigation is much more than an etymological exercise. The special epistemological status of “social” in enlightened philosophy makes an understanding of the reasons for its rapid domination of French philosophical discourse a most rewarding project from the perspective of intellectual history. The second part of the article provides empirical evidence for the argument that “social” had been all but completely absent from French intellectual discourse before the mid-eighteenth century. It is of course harder to ascertain the absence of a word before a given point in time than to confirm its presence, but many different indications substantiate the essence of the Encyclopédie's claim. These indications also allow one to follow “social's” discursive rise after about 1745 and to speculate about the identity of the author(s) responsible for it. All evidence lead to two philosophes, the article claims: Diderot and Rousseau. Finally, the third part of the article presents an argument about the reasons for “social's” rapid naturalization in French enlightened thought and discusses what the philosophes tried so intensively to do, achieve, or express with “social.” Possible answers to this question lead to a reevaluation of mid-eighteenth century enlightened thought in general and contemporary philosophes in particular. Most importantly, such answers allow us to reflect on how we write and think about the intellectual achievements of the mid-eighteenth century, and in what way we, too, still inhabit the mental universe the philosophes helped to create. ☆ I would like to thank Keith Michael Baker for his encouragement and helpful criticism of a previous draft of this article. (shrink)

By all indications, the popularity of the Sense-Datum Theory is definitely on the wane. This once-proud theory, which was perhaps the most characteristic feature of British Philosophy during the first half of this century, has been attacked from so many different sides that even its foremost protagonists have either accepted the very watered-down version according to which it is just an alternative language for speaking about the facts of perception or else they hold their peace and let the youngsters play. (...) There are still some diehards who carry on as if nothing had happened, but they are an insignificant minority. (shrink)

This study investigated women’s lived experience of becoming less obsessed with their bodily appearance. Written narrative accounts were collected from seven women co-participants and a phenomenological analysis of these descriptive protocols was then performed in order to reveal the prereflective structure of the focal phenomenon, seven essential constituents of which emerged. A major goal of this research was to contribute to the undernourished area of phenomenological research regarding the experience of body image.

This study deals with the tensions between old and new Yogācāra, as seen in the Huayan sources, which, in turn, reflect discontinuity between Indian Yogācāra and its reception in China. Its particular focus is on the concept of karmic appearance , as developed in the Awakening of Faith and further elaborated on by many Huayanmasters. This concept illustrates the sudden arising of deluded thoughts and provides us with a paradigm for the approach to the problem of delusion, a problem (...) that is deeply rooted in Tathāgatagarbha Thought and addresses the origin of deluded thoughts against the backdrop of the pure mind. This Huayan solution resembles the concept of free will, as developed in mainstream Christian theology after Augustine attempted to solve the problem of evil, and the concept of playfulness found in Indian Vedānta theology to explain the creation of the illusory world. (shrink)

Modern science is based empirically on data, which are gained, mainly, by means of technical machinery and plants of high complexity. This type of laboratory research is at a distance to the old forms of investigating nature such that it is under suspicion to investigate artefacts rather than nature. - Against this it is argued in the following, that laboratory research has to be acknowledged as true heir of the form of science which Galileo had started. Knowledge of the powers (...) and mechanisms of nature can be gained only by means of pointed interventions into natural processes. The term ,,laboratory", however, designates less the place of experimentation, but, rather, the ,,thoughtstyle" practised by a research group, in which forms of handling experimental setups and (social) structures of cooperation in a team of specialists are integrated. - Scientific facts cannot be separated from the social and cultural conditions comprised in a thoughtstyle, they are dependent on thoughtstyles. Yet, this does not make them mere artefacts of instrumentation. Scientific practices in the laboratories define, rather, the conditions under which nature can present herself. German Die moderne Naturwissenschaft stützt sich auf empirische Daten, die weitgehend in hochkomplizierten technischen Apparaturen und Anlagen gewonnen werden. Von den Formen der alten Naturforschung ist diese Laborforschung so weit entfernt, daß sie den Vorwurf auf sich zog, sie untersuche Artefakte, aber nicht Natur. - Dagegen wird hier argumentiert, daß die Laborforschung als genuine Erbin der mit Galilei begonnenen Form der Naturwissenschaft anzuerkennen sei. Erkenntnis von den Wirkungsweisen der Natur ist nur durch gezieltes Eingreifen in Vorgänge der Natur zu gewinnen. Unter dem ,,Laboratorium haben wir allerdings weniger den Ort des Experimentierens zu verstehen, als vielmehr den in einer Arbeitsgruppe praktizierten ,,Denkstil, in dem die Formen des Forschungshandelns mit den (sozialen) Strukturen der arbeitsteiligen Kooperation verbunden sind. - Wissenschaftliche Tatsachen lassen sich zwar nicht von den Bindungen an einen Denkstil ablösen, sie erweisen sich als denkstilabhängig; das macht sie aber nicht zu Kunstprodukten. Die in einem Labor praktizierten Arbeitsweisen definieren vielmehr die Bedingungen, unter denen Natur sich zeigen kann. (shrink)

Bilder sind, anders als es eine hartnäckige ästhetische Tradition will, nicht bloß Raumkünste, sondern gehorchen einer ganz eigenen Zeitlichkeit. Was auf der Bildoberfläche liegt, ist bereits mit einem Blick zu erfassen, und doch entfaltet sich der ganze Detailreichtum der Bilderscheinung erst ganz allmählich. Diesem langsamen In-Erscheinung-Treten der Bilder steht die Plötzlichkeit gegenüber, mit der sie auftauchen und wieder verschwinden. Sie bannen einzelne Augenblicke, wirken dadurch oft schockhaft, traumatisch, überfordernd; selbst in filmischen Sequenzen tritt dieses Plötzliche auf, in Momenten der (...) Montage und des Blickwechsels. Erscheinung und Ereignis versammelt 10 Beiträge aus Philosophie und Kunstwissenschaft, die aus verschiedener Perspektive nach den eigentümlichen Rhythmen, Chronologien und Zeitläufen des Ikonischen fragen. (shrink)

Arbib derives the origin of language from the emergence of a complex imitation system; however, it is unlikely that this complication could occur without a prior complicating within the imitated systems. This means that Arbib's hypothesis is not correct, because the other systems determined the appearance of language. In my opinion, language emerged when the motivational system became able to support goal-directed processes with no innate basis.

(1981). Victorian quasi‐public schools: A question of appearance and reality or an application of the principle of the survival of the fittest? British Journal of Educational Studies: Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 54-68.