La ciencia abierta constituye una transformación radical en la manera de llevar a cabo la investigación científica. Se trata de un nuevo modelo de hacer ciencia que se basa en el trabajo colaborativo entre personas de la academia y también en la apertura y la transparencia de todas las fases de la investigación. La ciencia abierta tiene sus antecedentes en el uso de las Tecnologías de la Información y la Comunicación por quienes investigan y en la consolidación del acceso abierto (...) a las publicaciones. Por otro lado, en su desarrollo también ha contado con tres elementos facilitadores: su conexión con los valores clásicos de la ciencia, la acción de responsables políticos con capacidad resolutiva en sus organizaciones, y el apoyo institucional, en especial de la Comisión Europea y de diversas agencias de financiación de la investigación. En el artículo se analizan diversas definiciones de ciencia abierta para destacar sus características fundamentales: apertura, transparencia y reutilización de contenidos. Se considera la ciencia abierta como un término «paraguas» que agrupa diversas piezas o elementos como el acceso abierto, los datos abiertos, la revisión abierta, el uso de preprints, la ciencia ciudadana y los nuevos modelos de evaluación. A pesar de que existe discrepancia sobre cuáles son esas piezas elementales, el artículo se centra en los seis elementos mencionados, repasa la situación actual de cada uno de ellos, y pone especial énfasis en su grado de desarrollo y en lo que aportan a la ciencia abierta. Se constata una notable diversidad en el desarrollo de cada una de las piezas y también la ausencia de una acción coordinada, lo que podría suponer una ralentización de las prácticas de ciencia abierta. A pesar de los destacados avances en acceso abierto, de la notable compartición de datos de investigación y de un respetable uso de preprints, se ha avanzado muy poco en el establecimiento de nuevas métricas y de nuevos modelos de evaluación, aun cuando estos son un elemento clave para incentivar la expansión de la ciencia abierta en todas las disciplinas. (shrink)

En una carta publicada hace seis meses, pocas semanas después de que la Agencia Española de Evaluación se adhiriera a la declaración dora, hacíamos un llamamiento a las autoridades científicas españolas para que abandonaran las políticas de evaluación de la investigación basadas en un uso excesivo e indiscriminado de los indicadores bibliométricos —especialmente el Journal Impact Factor —, para valorar el desempeño individual de los académicos. En concreto se les animaba a «que suscriban y cumplan con la dora y sigan (...) las recomendaciones en el uso de indicadores bibliométricos señalados en el Manifiesto Leiden». Una mesa redonda organizada en el mes de julio con participación de distintos agentes del sistema español de i+d+i coincidía en la necesidad de afrontar ese cambio de forma urgente. (shrink)

Different inferences in probabilistic logics of conditionals 'preserve' the probabilities of their premisses to different degrees. Some preserve certainty, some high probability, some positive probability, and some minimum probability. In the first case conclusions must have probability I when premisses have probability 1, though they might have probability 0 when their premisses have any lower probability. In the second case, roughly speaking, if premisses are highly probable though not certain then conclusions must also be highly probable. In the third case (...) conclusions must have positive probability when premisses do, and in the last case conclusions must be at least as probable as their least probable premisses. Precise definitions and well known examples are given for each of these properties, characteristic principles are shown to be valid and complete for deriving conclusions of each of these kinds, and simple trivalent truthtable 'tests' are described for determining which properties are possessed by any given inference. Brief comments are made on the application of these results to certain modal inferences such as "Jones may own a car, and if he does he will have a driver's license. Therefore, he may have a driver's license.". (shrink)

Reflective Knowledge draws together ground-breaking work in epistemology by Ernest Sosa. He argues for a reflective virtue epistemology based on virtuous circularity, shows how this idea may be found explicitly or just below the surface in such illustrious predecessors as Descartes and Moore, and defends the view against its rivals.

Since the seventeenth century, Western society has had a turbulent relationship with Reason. Descartes set out to reorganize all his opinions in the light of Reason, allowing, as Pascal bitterly reproached him, nothing else. In the course of the centuries which followed, the relationship with Reason became the object of a vigorous, often passionate debate. David Hume declared Reason to be impotent; Immanuel Kant observed that men suffered from "misology" as the result of their disappointed expectations of Reason; G. W. (...) F. Hegel declared that the main insight of philosophy consisted of the realization that reason masterminded and guided all history. The debate has not remained restricted to philosophy. Max Weber, the most influential modern sociologist, was obsessed with the distinctive role of Reason in Western society, and the part it played in engendering industrialism. Social anthropologists have been preoccupied both with the universality and the diversity of conceptual thought. Emile Durkheim taught them to ask why all men were rational, whilst Max Weber taught sociologists to ask why some men were more rational than others. This book brings together the philosophical, historical and sociological discussions of rationality and strives to make clear the underlying issues and the continuity of the debate under the various idioms. (shrink)

It would be ever so nice if there were a viable analytic/synthetic distinction. Though nobody knows for sure, there would seem to be several major philosophical projects that having one would advance. For example: analytic sentences2 are supposed to have their truth values solely in virtue of the meanings (together with the syntactic arrangement) of their constituents; i.e., their truth values are supposed to supervene on their linguistic properties alone.3 So they are true in every possible world where they mean (...) what they mean here.4 So they are necessarily true. So if there were a viable analytic/synthetic distinction (‘a/s distinction’ often hereafter), we would understand the necessity of at least some necessary truths. If, in particular, it were to turn out that the logical and/or the mathematical truths are analytic, we would understand why they are necessary. It would be ever so nice to understand why the logical and/or mathematical truths are necessary (cf. Gibson 1998; Quine 1998). (shrink)

Preface.--The ethical system of Richard Cumberland.--The relation of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson to utilitarianism.--Gay's ethical system.--Hume's ethical system.--Conclusion.

Review of John Greco's The Transmission of Knowledge This paper responds to the Lackey objection to virtue epistemology. Its response is one that can be used to defend Greco's virtue epistemology as well as the author's own virtue epistemology.

That inferences of the form "If M then S and possibly M, therefore possibly S" are invalid in possible worlds modal logics can be viewed as another fallacy of material implication. However, this paper argues that properly analyzing this and related inferences requires treating the possibility involved as a practical modality. Specifically, ordinary language propositions of the form "It is possible that M" must be understood to mean that there is a non-negligible probability of M being the case. But this (...) entails reexamining the very idea of logical validity. (shrink)

Mossner's Life of David Hume remains the standard biography of this great thinker and writer. First published in 1954, and updated in 1980, it is now reissued in paperback in response to increased interest in Hume. E. C. Mossner was Emeritus Professor of English at the University of Texas at Austin. 'Mossner's work is a quite remarkable scholarly achievement; it will be an indispensable tool for Hume scholars and a treasure-trove of information for all students of the intellectual and literary (...) history of the eighteenth century' Richard H. Popkin in the Philological Quarterly. (shrink)

It is with the Greeks that I shall be mainly concerned. I know much less about those sons of Aeneas, the Romans, whose mother was Venus (so legend and Lucretius tell us), but with whom, for all that, I have never fallen so much in love as I have with the Greeks. In speaking of elections among the Greeks I shall be concerned with their ideas about principles, mainly as those ideas are recorded by Plato and Aristotle, rather than with (...) the methods which actually they used: in other words, I shall attempt an analysis of the general political thinking that lay behind their behaviour, rather than a description of the working of their particular electoral systems. But I must first of all lay a foundation—a foundation of distinctions and definitions—before I attempt that analysis. (shrink)