The split between analytic philosophy and Continental philosophy has mainly preoccupied scholars of philosophy so far, but in fact, it has broader pedagogical implications. This article argues that conventions of argumentative writing, as taught in colleges today, have their roots in analytic philosophy and its assumptions regarding ways of disseminating knowledge. Behind writing instructors’ emphasis on the ‘thesis and evidence’ structure lie analytic tendencies such as verifiability and intersubjectivity. By contrast, Continental philosophy emphasises the subjective human experience, which leads to (...) a more experimental form of writing. This split and the embeddedness of argumentation in analytic philosophy is indispensable in comprehending the rationale behind the conventions of academic writing taught in colleges today. (shrink)

Unintentional plagiarism abounds at universities. The literature offers several explanations for students’ difficulties with acquiring standards of good academic practice. In this paper, I propose an alternative account: unintentional plagiarism can only be understood in the context of implicit but irreconcilable forms of knowledge. While higher education institutions mainly operate within the framework of propositional epistemology, institutions of primary and secondary education tend to furnish students with encyclopedic epistemology. Accordingly, universities and institutions of pre-college education tend to propagate conflicting assumptions (...) regarding the nature of knowledge. Put simply, propositional epistemology is characterized by dialogue, agency and the exchange of ideas, which are ideally made explicit in academic writing. By contrast, encyclopedic epistemology tends to present knowledge monologically, leaving the scholarly conversation around it out. It is highly likely that the hardwired legacy of encyclopedic epistemology among students impedes the acquisition of the dialogism of academic inquiry at universities, resulting in cases of unintentional plagiarism. (shrink)

Frank Jackson’s famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. In recent years, a consensus has emerged that the credibility of this and other well-known anti-physicalist arguments can be undermined by allowing that we possess a special category of concepts of experiences, phenomenal concepts, which are conceptually independent from physical/functional concepts. It is held by a large number of philosophers that since the conceptual independence of phenomenal (...) concepts does not imply the metaphysical independence of phenomenal properties, physicalism is safe. This paper distinguishes between two versions of this novel physicalist strategy –Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) – depending on how it cashes out “conceptual independence,” and argues that neither helps the physicalist cause. A dilemma for PCS arises: cashing out “conceptual independence” in a way compatible with physicalism requires abandoning some manifest phenomenological intuitions, and cashing it out in a way compatible with those intuitions requires dropping physicalism. The upshot is that contra Brian Loar and others, one cannot “have it both ways.”. (shrink)

Education is the process of raising the people that your society needs. At the end of this process, whether the desired output is achieved or not is understood by measurement and evaluation processes. Measurement and evaluation activities, which are indicators of whether the training process is functioning right or not, have an important place in the system. At this point, the attitudes of the teachers who perform the assessment and evaluation towards measurement and evaluation are very important. Based on this (...) importance, the aim of this study is to determine the attitudes of RCE teachers towards assessment and evaluation within the framework of different variables. 341 RCE teachers participated in this quantitative study, which adopted a crosssectional and relationships screening model. In the study, "Attitude Scale for Assessment and Evaluation (ÖDTÖ/ASAE)" developed by Çalışkan and Yazıcı (2013) was used. The findings obtained as a result of the research show that there is a statistically significant difference in the attitudes of RCE teachers towards measurement and evaluation according to gender, status of receiving formation education, faculty graduated, tenure of duty, type of school served. On the other hand, whether or not they receive special training on assessment and evaluation does not significantly affect the attitudes of RCE teachers towards assessment and evaluation. (shrink)

Bu araştırmada, Suriyeli ergen bireylerde dini tutum, psikolojik dayanıklılık ve depresyon arasındaki ilişkiyi tespit etmek amaçlanmaktadır. Araştırmanın örneklemi, Elazığ’da ikamet eden 13–18 yaş aralığındaki 216 Suriyeli bireyden oluşmaktadır. Yaş ortalaması 15,31 olan katılımcıların 124’ü kadın, 92’si erkektir. Verilerin toplanmasında Kişisel Bilgi Formu, Beck Depresyon Envanteri II, Dini Tutum Ölçeği, Çocuk ve Genç Psikolojik Sağlamlık Ölçeği (ÇGPSÖ - 12) kullanılmıştır. Veriler SPSS (22,0) paket programı kullanılarak analiz edilmiştir. Araştırma sonucunda, Suriyeli ergenlerde depresyon ve dini tutum düzeyleri arasında negatif ve anlamlı bir (...) ilişki; depresyon ve psikolojik dayanıklılık düzeyleri arasında negatif ve anlamlı bir ilişki; psikolojik dayanıklılık ve dini tutum düzeyleri arasında pozitif ve anlamlı bir ilişki olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Ayrıca araştırma bulguları Suriyeli ergenlerde psikolojik dayanıklılık ve dini tutumun depresyon düzeyindeki toplam varyansın yaklaşık %20’sini açıkladığını göstermiştir. (shrink)

The central aim of this paper is to argue against Evans’ hybrid theory of reference. I will show that Evans’ theory makes false predictions in the case of some thought-experiments. The paper has two sections. After providing a short presentation of Evans’ theory in the first section, I will move on to criticize it in the second section.

The tumor microenvironment (TME) plays a pivotal role in the behavior and development of solid tumors as well as shaping the immune response against them. As the tumor cells proliferate, the space they occupy and their physical interactions with the surrounding tissue increases. The growing tumor tissue becomes a complex dynamic structure, containing connective tissue, vascular structures, and extracellular matrix (ECM) that facilitates stimulation, oxygenation, and nutrition, necessary for its fast growth. Mechanical cues such as stiffness, solid stress, interstitial fluid (...) pressure (IFP), matrix density, and microarchitecture influence cellular functions and ultimately tumor progression and metastasis. In this fight, our body is equipped with T cells as its spearhead against tumors. However, the altered biochemical and mechanical environment of the tumor niche affects T cell efficacy and leads to their exhaustion. Understanding the mechanobiological properties of the TME and their effects on T cells is key for developing novel adoptive tumor immunotherapies. (shrink)

Ross Cameron (2022) argues that metaphysical infinitists should reject the generally accepted idea that metaphysical determination relations back metaphysical explanations. Otherwise it won’t be possible for them to come up with successful explanations for the existence of dependent entities in non-wellfounded chains of dependence. I argue that his argument suffers from what he calls the finitist dogma, although indirectly so. However, there is a better way of motivating Cameron’s conclusion. Assuming Cameron’s principle of Essence, explanations for the existence of dependent (...) entities turn out to be circular if determination relations back explanations. This latter argument provides a stronger case as it puts the foundationalist under significant pressure, besides putting the infinitist under some pressure, to deny the idea that determination relations back explanations. (shrink)

McGinn claims, among other things, that we cannot understand the theory that explains how echolocationary experiences arise from the bat’s brain. One of McGinn’s arguments for this claim appeals to the fact that we cannot know in principle what it is like to have echolocationary experiences. According to Kirk, McGinn’s argument fails because it rests on an illegitimate assumption concerning what explanatory theories are supposed to accomplish. However, I will argue that Kirk’s objection misfires because he misapprehends McGinn’s argument. Further, (...) I will articulate and briefly assess some ways in which McGinn’s argument can be blocked. (shrink)

A new Turkish Penal Code came into effect on 1 June 2005. Article 280 concerns health care workers’ failure to report a crime. This article removes the responsibility from health care workers to maintain confidentiality, but also removes patients’ right to confidentiality. It provides for up to one year of imprisonment for a health care worker who, while on duty, finds an indication that a crime might have been committed by a patient and who does not inform the responsible authorities (...) about it. This forces the health care worker to divulge the patient’s confidential information. A patient who thinks he or she may be accused of a crime may therefore not seek medical help, which is the universal right of every person. The article is therefore contrary to medical ethics, oaths taken by physicians and nurses, and the understanding of patient confidentiality. (shrink)

How are we to account for the epistemic contribution of our perceptual experiences to the reasonableness of our perceptual beliefs? It is well known that a conception heavily influenced by Cartesian thinking has it that experiences do not enable the experiencing subject to have direct epistemic contact with the external world; rather, they are regarded as openness to a kind of private inner realm that is interposed between the subject and the world. It turns out that if one wants to (...) insist that perceptual experiences provide epistemic reasons for perceptual beliefs about the external world as we pre-reflectively take it to be, then one should find a way of avoiding Cartesianism. Here are the two main aims of this paper: firstly, identify the premise that is doing the heavy-lifting work in the Cartesian thinking; and, secondly, formulate an adequate way of denying that premise. The adequacy I claim for my formulation of a way of denying the premise will roughly amount to this: the way I offer is not as susceptible to Cartesian traps as other apparently available ways of denying the premise are. (shrink)

This study is an attempt toexamine the critiques of Mu‘tazilites in general and Rukn al-Dīn Abū Ṭāhir al- Ṭuraythīthī in particular, of “ta’yēen by naṣṣ”(appointment by text or direct proclamation) which has long been discussedwithin the intellectual history of Islam. The concept of ta’yēen by nass is a case which has been attemptedto be grounded on the basis of Qur’ān and Ḥadith. Although it is thought to bepeculiar to the Shiite circles, it has also been expressed in some Sunnischools as (...) well. Despite the fact that it is generally discussed in regard tothe imamate of the fourth Caliph ‘Ali,some also argued that ta‘yēen by ṇass was to be the case for the imamateof Abū Bakr. Concerning this theory, Mu‘tazilalevelled a great number of essential critiques at the Shiites’ understanding ofmatter. Since it has been discussed in direct relation to the textual evidencesfrom the Qur’ān, a re-examination of the subject in the Qur’anic context is required. In this regard, themethodological approach of Mu‘tazilitescholar al-Ṭuraythīthī is an important component to take into consideration.Ṭāhir al- Ṭuraythīthīcriticizes the sects for their understandings of the notion of ta‘yēen by naṣṣ, in his prominent book “Mutashābihal-Qur’ān” inwhich he tries to understand the subject at stake within the boundaries of languageand reason. Moreover, he evaluates the assertions of both Imāmiyya and Bakriyyaand criticizes both sides relying on the contextual basis of Qur’ānic verses. (shrink)

In this article, I make a distinction between two versions of non-epistemicism about seeing, and bring explicitly into view and argue against a particular version defended by Dretske. More specifically, I distinguish non-epistemic seeing as non-conceptual seeing, where concept possession is assumed to be cognitively demanding, from non-epistemic seeing as seeing without noticing, where noticing is assumed to be relatively cognitively undemanding. After showing that Dretske argues for the possibility of non-epistemic seeing in both senses of the term, I target (...) his thesis that a given subject sees all the objects that are visually differentiated in her visual field, where visual differentiation does not require that she notice those objects. I argue that the notion of a visual field deployed in the formulation of the thesis cannot be phenomenal and therefore that seeing without noticing amounts to mere visual confrontation. I further argue that since the epistemicist does not deny the existence of seeing without noticing in the sense of mere visual confrontation, there is a clear sense in which Dretske's non-epistemicism turns out to be trivial. (shrink)

In this paper, I respond to Millar’s recent criticism of naïve realism. Millar provides several arguments for the thesis that there are powerful phenomenological grounds for preferring the content view to naïve realism. I intend to show that Millar’s arguments are not convincing.

How are we to distinguish epistemic justification for believing a proposition from other sorts of justification one might have for believing it? According to what I call the received view about the differentia of epistemic justification, epistemic justification is intimately connected to “the cognitive goal of arriving at truth” in a specific way no other sorts of justification can possibly be. However, I will argue that the received view is mistaken by showing that there are cases in which pragmatic justification (...) for believing a proposition is related to the cognitive goal of arriving at truth in a way epistemic justification is supposed to be. The paper will close with a brief assessment of two possible rejoinders the received view might make to my objection.Epistemik gerekçelendirmeyi diğer tür gerekçelendirmelerden nasıl ayırmalıyız? Hâkim görüş diyebileceğimiz bir fikre göre, epistemik gerekçelendirme “doğruya varma” diyebileceğimiz bilişsel hedefe diğer tür gerekçelendirmelerin olamayacağı şekilde yakın bir biçimde irtibatlıdır. Bu yazıda, hâkim görüşün yanlış olduğunu iddia edeceğim. Bu iddiam, bazı olası durumlarda pragmatik gerekçelendirmenin de doğruya varma hedefiyle olan irtibatının epistemik gerekçelendirmenin o hedefle kurduğu iddia edilen irtibatın aynısı olduğunu gösteren bir düşünce deneyine dayanıyor. Yazı, hâkim görüşün sunduğum itiraza karşı geliştirebileceği iki yanıtın kısa bir değerlendirmesi ile sonlanıyor. (shrink)

Christopher Hill: Consciousness Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-6 DOI 10.1007/s10670-012-9373-8 Authors Erhan Demircioglu, Koc University, Rumeli Feneri Yolu, 34450 Sariyer, Istanbul, Turkey Journal Erkenntnis Online ISSN 1572-8420 Print ISSN 0165-0106.

In this note, I would like to focus on the two central distinctions Inan draws between varieties of ignorance. One is the distinction between “objectual” and “propositional” ignorance, and the other is the distinction between “truth-ignorance” and “fact-ignorance,” which is a distinction between two types of propositional ignorance. According to Inan, appreciating these distinctions allow us to see what is wrong with the “received view,” according to which ignorance (or awareness of it) is “always about truth,” and enables us to (...) “overcome our [philosophers’] propositional-bias.” I will argue for two theses. First, fact-ignorance appears to be a form of objectual ignorance; and, if this is so, there are no two distinctions but only one distinction that Inan in effect offers, which is between objectual and propositional ignorance. Second, what Inan calls “the received view” can raise some reasonable worries about objectual ignorance that are not taken into account by him. (shrink)

There are two claims that are central to McGinn’s mysterianism: (1) there is a naturalist and constructive solution of the mind-body problem, and (2) we human beings are incapable in principle of solving the mind-body problem. I believe (1) and (2) are compatible: the truth of one does not entail the falsity of the other. However, I will argue that the reasons McGinn presents for thinking that (2) is true are incompatible with the truth of (1), at least on a (...) fairly standard conception of the terms ‘naturalist’ and ‘constructive’, which McGinn himself seems to take for granted. (shrink)

In this paper, I respond to Kriegel’s criticism of McGinn’s mysterianism. Kriegel objects to a particular argument for the possibility of human cognitive closure and also gives a direct argument against mysterianism. I intend to show that neither the objection nor the argument is convincing.

Arap edebiyatı tarihinin dönemlerinden biri olarak Osmanlı dönemi Arap edebiyatı yaklaşık dört buçuk asırlık uzun bir dönemi kapsamaktadır. Modern dönemde Arap edebiyatı tarihi yazımına öncülük eden Carlo Alfonso Nallino (öl.1938), Hamilton Gibb (öl.1971), Régis Blachère (öl.1973) gibi müsteşrikler Osmanlı dönemi Arap edebiyatını yok saymış, dahası bir çöküş ve inkıta evresi olarak tanımlamışlardır. Bu makalede sözü edilen araştırmacıların dönemle ilgili iddialarının sağlamasını yapmak üzere Osmanlı’da Arap edebiyatı alanında var olan süreklilik, çeşitlilik ve gelişim durumu dönemin öncü iki edebiyatçısı ve eserlerinde ön (...) plana çıkan temalar üzerinden konu edilmiştir. Makale, literatür değerlendirmesinin de yapıldığı bir girişi, Osmanlı Dönemi Arap edebiyatı hakkında bir değerlendirmeyi, 17. yy. Osmanlı dönemi Arap edebi çevrelerinde meşhur olan edebiyatçılardan Yûsuf el-Bedî‘(öl. 1073/1662)’nin ve Şihâbuddîn el-Mûsevi Ebû Ma‘tûḳ (öl. 1087/1676)’un edebi şahsiyetlerini ve eserlerinde ön plana çıkan temaları, edebi süreklilik açısından incelemeyi içermektedir. Adı geçen iki edebi şahsiyetin seçilmesinin sebebi, edebiyatta hem geleneği korumuş olmaları hem de eserlerinin modern dönem edebiyatını etkilemiş olmasıdır. Genel olarak Osmanlı dönemi Arap edebiyatında ortaya konan edebî eserler hakkında, özel olarak makalenin konusunu teşkil eden edebiyatçılar hakkında henüz yeterli sayıda ilmî araştırmanın bulunmaması bir boşluk oluşturmaktadır. Makalemiz, önemini bu boşluğu bir nebze de olsa doldurma çabasından almaktadır. Makalemizde, bu dönemin edebî gelişim ve zenginlik açısından bir duraksamaya uğrayıp uğramadığı veya yok sayılacak denli edebî faaliyetlerden uzak olup olmadığı; edebiyat sahasında geleneğin sürekliliğinin sağlanıp sağlanmadığı ve edebî olgunluk ile gelişime ulaşılıp ulaşılmadığı sorularına cevap bulmak amaçlanmıştır. Dönemin iki usta edebiyatçısına ait edebî temaların süreklilik bakımından değerlendirilmesi suretiyle konuya objektif bir bakış açısı sunmak hedeflenmiştir. Makalede nitel araştırma yöntemlerinden betimleyici yöntem kullanılmış olup edebî metinlerden verilen örnekler sınırlı tutulmuştur. Osmanlı Döneminin, Arap edebiyatının sekteye uğradığı bir dönem olmayıp, kendisinden önceki edebî dönemlerin devamı olarak canlılığını sürdürdüğü ve modern döneme temel teşkil edecek çalışmaların yapıldığı verimli bir dönem olduğu sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Yûsuf el-Bedî‘î’nin ve Ebû Ma‘tûḳ'un edebî zevkleri, tenkit yetenekleri ve şair kimlikleri, onları yetiştiren kültürel çevreyi yansıtırken, canlı bir entelektüel ortamın varlığını da gösterir. Şiirlerinde klasik kasidenin temalarını dönemlerine uygun şekilde işleyerek, Arap edebiyatının zengin mirasının nesilden nesile aktarıldığını kanıtlarlar. Onların edebî kişilikleri, yaşadıkları yüzyılın entelektüel düzeyini ve dönemin edebiyatçı profilini nitelikli bir şekilde temsil etmektedir. (shrink)

The aim of this study is the examination of the effect of virtual reality based imagery (VRBI) training programs on the shot performance and imagery skills of athletes and, and to conduct a comparison with Visual Motor Behavior Rehearsal and Video Modeling (VMBR + VM). In the research, mixed research method and sequential explanatory design were used. In the quantitative dimension of the study the semi-experimental model was used, and in the qualitative dimension the case study design was adopted. The (...) research participants were selected from athletes who were involved in our target sports: curling (n= 14), bowling (n= 13), and archery (n= 7). All participants were randomly assigned to VMBR + VM (n= 11), VRBI (n= 12), and Control (n= 11) groups through the “Research Randomizer” program. The quantitative data of the study was: the weekly shot performance scores of the athletes and the data obtained from the “Movement Imagery Questionnaire-Revised.” The qualitative data was obtained from the data collected from the semi-structured interview guide, which was developed by researchers and field experts. According to the results obtained from the study, there were statistically significant differences between the groups in terms of shot performance and imagery skills. VRBI training athletes showed more improvement in the 4-week period than the athletes in the VMBR + VM group, in terms of both shot performance and imagery skills. In addition, the VRBI group adapted to the imagery training earlier than the VMBR + VM group. As a result, it was seen that they showed faster development in shot performances. From these findings, it can be said that VRBI program is more efficient in terms of shot performance and imagery skills than VMBR + VM, which is the most used imaging training model. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to cast doubt on the idea of undercutting defeat by showing that it is beset by some serious problems. I examine a number of attempts to specify the conditions for undercutting defeat and find them to be defective. Absent further attempts, and on the basis of the considerations offered, I conclude that an adequate notion of undercutting defeat is lacking.

In this paper, I aim to show that McGinn’s argument from analogy for the possibility of human cognitive closure survives the critique raised on separate occasions by Dennett and Kriegel. I will distinguish between linguistic and non-linguistic cognitive closure and argue that the analogy argument from animal non-linguistic cognitive closure goes untouched by the objection Dennett and Kriegel raises.

My main aim in this paper is to show that Kolodny’s intriguing argument against wide-scopism – ‘the Reasoning Argument’ – fails. A proper evaluation of the Reasoning Argument requires drawing two significant distinctions, one between thin and thick rational transitions and the other between bare-bones wide-scopism (and narrow-scopism) and embellished wide-scopism (and narrow-scopism). The Reasoning Argument is intended by Kolodny both as an argument against bare-bones wide-scopism and as an argument against embellished wide-scopism. I argue that despite its formidable virtue (...) of demonstrating the need for an account of thick subjective rationality, the Reasoning Argument works neither against bare-bones wide-scopism nor against embellished wide-scopism. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to do three things. First, I introduce the distinction between the Uniqueness Thesis (U) and what I call the Conditional Uniqueness Thesis (U*). Second, I argue that despite their official advertisements, some prominent uniquers effectively defend U* rather than U. Third, some influential considerations that have been raised by the opponents of U misfire if they are interpreted as against U*. The moral is that an appreciation of the distinction between U and U* helps to (...) clarify the contours of the uniqueness debate and to avoid a good deal of talking past each other. (shrink)