In this paper I explore Aristotle’s idea of epikeia, or equity, in relation to the contemporary abortion debate. Equity is the rule of justice that insists we gobeyond the letter of the law in those cases in which following it would be harmful. One consequence of this is that we do not need to create exceptionless laws,since laws can admit exceptions for the sake of a higher good. I argue that this arrangement appears to be a reasonable way to (...) move the abortion debate forward, since the common good would mandate the prohibition of most abortions, but applications of equity would protect access to abortion for those considered most in need. In the end, though, despite this reasonableness, its usefulness for reforming abortion law is limited due to the current hostility of the American legislature to natural law as a higher form of justice. (shrink)

Conscience – a catholic anthropological vision In the catholic tradition conscience always played an important role as visible in the ‘clausula Petri’ (Ac 5,30-33) or in Paul’s belief in its wisdom (Rm 2,14-16). Conscience can break rules (‘epikeia’), but should not stand up against the church as such. Luther’s historical deed left behind a distrust in conscience in the Catholic Church; it took 400 years to restore Paul’s vision of the conscience as the highest authority – if it is (...) formed and reaches the state of maturity. By his conscience, man is called to be as God created him; he is called by others to develop and to respect their dignity. He is also called by the world to form it according to its higher possibilities which cannot be realized but by man. Conscience is God’s voice in the person where his promises can be heard. Though conscience is free, it is the place where responsibility is formed according to what someone can and should do. This is why the conscience will keep its unavoidable and undeniable role – even in a postmodern context. (shrink)

Over the last half century, United States debates about abortion focused at first on the question whether the fetus is a person with rights and later on whether involuntary conception—for instance, as a consequence of sexual assault—might mitigate a woman’s responsibilities toward the fetus she carries. This article argues that, whatever one’s position on these two questions, a third, morally salient dimension of most US women’s experiences of unwanted pregnancy deserves more attention: both abortion and birth burden women with their (...) inevitable moral failure to fulfill their responsibilities to persons who frequently have de facto last‐resort and unavoidable claims on them. Using Lisa Tessman’s work on moral failure and Pope Francis’s interventions on abortion and mercy, I argue that this moral anguish is not a simple emotional remainder. Structural evil, not necessity, is the primary driver of forced pregnancy choices that injure women and their children both materially and morally. Consequently, whether they abort or carry to term, women with unwanted pregnancies need mercy or forgiveness. But they also need compassionate solidarity: prophetic, active efforts to transform the social structures that make material harm and moral failure, and consequent moral anguish and moral injury, inevitable for many pregnant women. (shrink)

I examine all the occasions on which Aquinas uses a particular example, which goes back to Plato's Republic, to shed light on the controversial subject of the immutability of natural law. Aquinas usually transcribes it as depositum gladius non debet restitui furioso, although some variations also occur. We shall first look at the context in which Plato situates this idea, then go on to examine the occasions on which Aquinas draws on it: in the Summa, when discussing the question as (...) to whether the natural law is the same for everyone; in his Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, when he explains in what sense natural law may change, and in what sense it remains the same; and finally, where he examines the virtues of gnome and epieikeia, also in the Summa. (shrink)