In the most comprehensive examination to date of Heidegger’s Nazism, Emmanuel Faye draws on previously unavailable materials to paint a damning picture of Nazism’s influence on the philosopher’s thought and politics. In this provocative book, Faye uses excerpts from unpublished seminars to show that Heidegger’s philosophical writings are fatally compromised by an adherence to National Socialist ideas. In other documents, Faye finds expressions of racism and exterminatory anti-Semitism. Faye disputes the view of Heidegger as a naïve, temporarily disoriented academician (...) and instead shows him to have been a self-appointed “spiritual guide” for Nazism whose intentionality was clear. Contrary to what some have written, Heidegger’s Nazism became even more radical after 1935, as Faye demonstrates. He revisits Heidegger’s masterwork, _Being and Time_, and concludes that in it Heidegger does not present a philosophy of individual existence but rather a doctrine of radical self-sacrifice, where individualization is allowed only for the purpose of heroism in warfare. Faye’s book was highly controversial when originally published in France in 2005. Now available in Michael B. Smith’s fluid English translation, it is bound to awaken controversy in the English-speaking world. (shrink)

L’argument de base de cet article est que le débat consensuel n’a pas été une notion très significative jusqu’à présent parce que le consensus n’a pas été étudié de manière approfondie en tant que concept et que la délibération n’a pas été étudiée précisément en termes de sa propension à parvenir à un accord commun. En particulier, la délibération et les problèmes qui en découlent n’ont pas été classées en plusieurs niveaux afin d’exposer les différents défis qui se posent lorsque (...) l’on tente de parvenir à un accord et les types d’approches délibératives impliquées dans chaque catégorie. La présente recherche propose une telle catégorisation dans le but de clarifier davantage le débat. (shrink)

In The Experience of Injustice, the French philosopher Emmanuel Renault opens an important new chapter in critical theory. He brings together political theory, critical social science, and a keen sense of the power of popular movements to offer a forceful vision of social justice. Questioning normative political philosophy’s conception of justice, Renault gives an account of injustice as the denial of recognition, placing the experience of social suffering at the heart of contemporary critical theory. Inspired by Axel Honneth, Renault (...) argues that a radicalized version of Honneth’s ethics of recognition can provide a systematic alternative to the liberal-democratic projects of such thinkers as Rawls and Habermas. Renault reformulates Honneth’s theory as a framework founded on experiences of injustice. He develops a complex, psychoanalytically rich account of suffering, disaffiliation, and identity loss to explain these experiences as denials of recognition, linking everyday injustice to a robust defense of the politicization of identity in social struggles. Engaging contemporary French and German critical theory alongside interdisciplinary tools from sociology, psychoanalysis, socialist political theory, social-movement theory, and philosophy, Renault articulates the importance of a theory of recognition for the resurgence of social critique. (shrink)

In 20th century thinking, few concepts have provoked as many misunderstandings as Merleau-Ponty’s notion of ‘Flesh’. Such misunderstandings (of which the article sketches the outline of an archaeology) rest on the initial assumption that the Flesh has to be derived from the body. The article suggests that the dominant readings of the Flesh can be organized along what could respectively be called the scenario of propriety and the scenario of expansion, beyond which a third way comes into view which does (...) not think Flesh as plenitude, but as an interstitial fabric. In this sense, the genesis of the last ontology of the Flesh is neither to be found in Husserl or in a simple anti-Sartrianism, but in a fecund and still underestimated reading of Saussure’s notion of the diacritics. The ontological turn of the last writings can thus only be understood on the grounds of the expressive turn from the intermediate period. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore Hegel’s concept of freedom as self-liberation. I consider the struggle between the soul and the body within Hegel’s Anthropology as an example of how conflict can act as a condition for asserting one’s freedom through self-improvement or Bildung. In this regard, there are reminiscent aspects of the famous ‘Lordship and Bondage’ dialectic within Hegel’s treatment of the body-soul relation. If the initial dominion of nature over the soul can be described as madness for Hegel, habit (...) constitutes the mean through which spirit acquires its freedom. (shrink)

BackgroundThe COVID-19 pandemic has magnified pre-existing challenges in healthcare in Africa. Long-standing health inequities, embedded in the continent over centuries, have been laid bare and have raised complex ethical dilemmas. While there are very few clinical ethics committees (CECs) in Africa, the demand for such services exists and has increased during the COVID-19 pandemic. The views of African healthcare professionals or bioethicists on the role of CECs in Africa have not been explored or documented previously. In this study, we aim (...) to explore such perspectives, as well as the challenges preventing the establishment of CECs in Africa.MethodsTwenty healthcare professionals and bioethicists from Africa participated in this qualitative study that utilized in-depth semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions. Themes were identified through thematic analysis of interviews and open-ended responses.ResultsKenya and South Africa are the only countries on the continent with formal established CECs. The following themes emerged from this qualitative study: (1) Lack of formal CECs and resolution of ethical dilemmas; (2) Role of CECs during COVID-19; (3) Ethical dilemmas presented to CECs pre-COVID-19; (4) Lack of awareness of CECs; (5) Lack of qualified bioethicists or clinical ethicists; (6) Limited resources to establish CECs; (7) Creating interest in CECs and networking.ConclusionsThis study illustrates the importance of clinical ethics education among African HCPs and bioethicists, more so now when COVID-19 has posed a host of clinical and ethical challenges to public and private healthcare systems. The challenges and barriers identified will inform the establishment of CECs or clinical ethics consultation services (CESs) in the region. The study results have triggered an idea for the creation of a network of African CECs. (shrink)

Der Körper hat Konjunktur. Als ausgestellter, verfüg- und verführbarer begegnet er uns täglichim Übermaß. Es war nur eine Frage der Zeit, bis im Spiel der sich in den Wissenschafteneinander ablösenden turns auch ein corporeal (oder body) turn ausgerufen würde. Dabeibleibt im genannten turn der Gegenstand der Untersuchung nicht selten reduziert auf das, wasman im deutschen Sprachgebrauch »Körper« nennt: ein physisches Substrat, das wie ein Dingunter Dingen beschreibbar ist. Gegen diese Verkürzung stellt der Begri des »Leibes«,spätestens seit Edmund Husserl, eine präzise (...) theoretische Intervention in die wissenschaftlicheund philosophische Diskussion um Körper und Körperlichkeit dar: Dem objektiv beobachtbaren Körper, den wir haben, wird der lebendige Leib, der wir sind, gegenübergestellt. Diesem »Leib«, seiner Geschichte, seinen Varianten und seinem Versprechen gehen dieAutoren der vorliegenden Beiträge nach. Inhaltsübersicht Emmanuel Alloa/Thomas Bedorf/Christian Grüny/Tobias Nikolaus Klass: Einleitung I. Der Leibbegriff in der Phänomenologie Emmanuel Alloa / Natalie Depraz: Edmund Husserl – „Ein merkwürdig unvollkommenkonstituiertes Ding“ – Stefan Kristensen: Maurice Merleau-Ponty I – Körperschema undleibliche Subjektivität – Emmanuel Alloa: Maurice Merleau-Ponty II – Fleisch und Dierenz – David Espinet: Martin Heidegger – Der leibliche Sinn von Sein – Thomas Bedorf: EmmanuelLevinas – Der Leib des Anderen – Karel Novotný: Körper, Leib, Aektivität in Jan Pato č kasPhänomenologie der natürlichen Welt – Julia Scheidegger: Michel Henry – TranszendentaleLeiblichkeit – Jörg Sternagel: Bernhard Waldenfels – Responsivität des Leibes – Kerstin Andermann: Hermann Schmitz – Leiblichkeit als kommunikatives Selbst- und Weltverhältnis II. Zur Geschichte des Leibbegris Emmanuel Alloa: Archaische Leiblichkeit. Die griechische Antike und die Entdeckung desKörpers – Theresia Heimerl: Der Leib Christi und der Körper des Christen: Körper und Leib alszentrale Problemzonen des Christentums – Marc Rölli: Philosophische Anthropologie im 19. Jahrhundert – Zwischen Leib und Körper – Tobias Nikolaus Klass: Friedrich Nietzsche – Denkenam „Leitfaden des Leibes“ – Andreas Cremonini: Sigmund Freud – Der gelebte vs. derphantasmatische Leib – Uta Noppeney: Kurt Goldstein und Frederik Buytendijk – Der Leib-Begri in der organismischen Biologie – Volker Schürmann: Max Scheler und Helmuth Plessner– Leiblichkeit in der Philosophischen Anthropologie – Marion Lauschke: Ernst Cassirer und AbyWarburg – Kulturanthropologie III. Grenzen und Kritik des Leibbegris Christian Grüny: Theodor W. Adorno – Soma und Sensorium – Ulrich Johannes Schneider: Michel Foucault – Der Körper und die Körper – Burkhard Liebsch: Paul Ricoeur – Das leiblicheSelbst begegnet dem Widerstand des Anderen – Mirjam Schaub: Gilles Deleuze – Was weiß ein„Körper ohne Organe“ vom Leib? – Kathrin Busch: Jean-Luc Nancy – Exposition und Berührung– Shaun Gallagher: Embodiment: Leiblichkeit in den Kognitionswissenschaften – Marie-Luise Angerer: Gender und Performance – Ist leibliche Identität ein Konstrukt? – Thomas Bedorf/Selin Gerlek: Praxistheorien – Leibkörperliche Praktiken im Vollzug. (shrink)

Malgré l’extrapolation parfois violente qu’opère Hegel, son traitement des découvertes physiologiques de Bichat montre à quel point il demeure soucieux de penser la compatibilité entre sciences empiriques et sciences spéculatives ou philosophiques. Loin de déduire un concept de la nature a priori indépendamment de toute considération pour les travaux de son temps, Hegel est au contraire un lecteur attentif des sciences en plein essor. Son système doit ainsi se comprendre à l’aune d’un dialogue constant avec les sciences dans lequel la (...) philosophie se nourrit des nouvelles découvertes scienti. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis essay tracks Heidegger’s thought from 1919 forwards to the decisive years of his political engagement, on behalf of the Nazi movement. Part 1 tracks how the question concerning Being devolves into the implicitly identitarian question of who “we” are. Part 2 addresses the “existential” of Befindlichkeit which Heidegger in Sein und Zeit positions as prior to understanding, and examines his esoteric mode of writing as the means to cultivate a prerational Stimmung. Part 3 examines Heidegger’s response to his 1929–1930 (...) questions of “What mood must we awaken?... Who are we, then?” in the decisive years of the Gleichchaltung, showing how Heidegger’s thinking elevates to ontological primacy a discriminatory and identitarian decision concerning who “we” are as the German volk. Part 4 examines in this light the Heideggerian “end of philosophy” in what the Black Notebooks talks of in terms of a “metapolitics ‘of’ the historical people”. (shrink)

Epiphenomenalism has had a long historical tradition. It is the view that mental properties are causally inert with respect to the physical world. In this paper, I argue that this tradition faces enormous challenges and needs better arguments to defend its position, and to demonstrate this, I interrogate the strands including computationalism, the idea of the illusion of conscious will, and causal exclusionism.

Certain questions have recurred throughout the history of philosophy. They are the big questions-about happiness and the good life, the limits of knowledge, the ultimate structure of reality, the nature of consciousness, the relation between causality and free will, the pervasiveness of suffering, and the conditions for a just and flourishing society-that thinkers in different cultures across the ages have formulated in their own terms in an attempt to make sense of their lives and the world around them. The essays (...) in this book turn to the major figures and texts of the Buddhist tradition in order to expand and enrich our thinking on these enduring questions. Examining them from a comparative and cross-cultural perspective demonstrates the value of alternative ways of addressing philosophical problems, showing how different approaches can produce new and unexpected kinds of questions and answers. Engaging with the Buddhist tradition, this book shows, helps return philosophy to its practical as well as theoretical aim: not only understanding the world but also knowing how to live in it. Featuring striking and generative comparisons of Buddhist and Western thought, Philosophy's Big Questions challenges our thinking in fundamental ways and offers readers new conceptual tools, methods, and insights for the pursuit of a good and happy life. (shrink)

Si les analyses merleau-pontiennes sont aujourd’hui fréquemment utilisées dans les études postcoloniales, notamment les analyses du corps, on n’a toujours pas prêté suffisamment attention à l’importance qu’eut pour sa pensée la confrontation avec la réalité du colonialisme, au fil de divers voyages vers la moitié des années 1950. Dans l’article, il s’agit en particulier de faire émerger le rôle exemplaire qu’au pu avoir la confrontation avec la réalité de Madagascar, en 1957, et ses effets en retour sur un certain nombre (...) de catégories philosophiques et politiques. Outre la reconstruction historique des circonstances de ce voyage, l’article se focalise sur trois notions centrales dont cette « épreuve de l’étranger » aura permis de faire apparaître la nature dialectique : les notions d’altérité, d’universalité, et d’autodétermination. L’altérité n’est plus une relation frontale, mais résulte d’une expérience de « décentrement » ; l’universalité doit être problématisée, en direction d’un « universel latéral » tandis que l’idée même de l’autodétermination soulève des questionnements autant politiques qu’ontologiques : dans la lutte pour une indépendance immédiate des colonies, Merleau-Ponty soupçonne le spectre d’une pensée libérale qui masque les liens de dépendance qui persistent sous d’autres formes. If Merleau-Pontian analyses – notably the analyses of the body – are, today, frequently used in post-colonial studies, sufficient attention was not always paid to the importance that the confrontation with the reality of colonialism had for his thought in the course of various travels during the mid-1950’s. This article is concerned, in particular, with shedding light on the exemplary role that the confrontation with the reality of Madagascar in 1957 could have had, and its effects in return on quite a number of philosophical and political categories. More than a historical reconstruction of the circumstances of that journey, the article focuses on three central notions whose dialectical nature is made apparent by this “experience of the foreign”: the notions of alterity, universality, and self-determination. Alterity is no longer a frontal relation, but results from an experience of “decentering,” universality must be problematized in the direction of a “lateral universality,” and the very idea of self-determination raises questions as much political as ontological. In the struggle for an immediate independence for the colonies, Merleau-Ponty senses the specter of a liberal thought that conceals the relations of dependence that persist in other forms. Se oggi le riflessioni merleau-pontiane, in particolare sul corpo, sono utilizzate di frequente negli studi postcoloniali, non si è mai prestata sufficiente attenzione all’importanza che ebbe, per il pensiero di Merleau-Ponty, il confronto con la realtà del colonialismo nel corso dei diversi viaggi effettuati dal filosofo verso la metà degli anni ’50. In quest’articolo ci proponiamo di far emergere il ruolo esemplare che poté avere il confronto con la realtà del Madagascar nel 1957 e le sue ripercussioni su un certo numero di categorie filosofiche e politiche. Oltre che sulla ricostruzione storica delle circostanze di questo viaggio, l’articolo si concentra su tre nozioni di cui questa esperienza avrebbe permesso di far apparire la natura dialettica: le nozioni di alterità, di universalità e di autodeterminazione. L’alterità non è più una relazione frontale, bensì risulta da un’esperienza di “decentramento”; l’universalità deve essere problematizzata nella direzione di un “universale laterale”, mentre l’idea stessa di autodeterminazione solleva un interrogarsi tanto politico che ontologico: nella lotta per un’indipendenza immediata delle colonie, Merleau-Ponty intravvede infatti lo spettro di un pensiero liberale volto a mascherare i legami di dipendenza per farli così persistere sotto altre forme. (shrink)

Building on prior research related to impact of information communication technology and operational risk management in the context of medium and small enterprises, the focus of this study was to investigate the relationship between ICT operational risk management and performances of MSEs. To achieve the focus, the research investigated evaluating models for understanding the value of ICT ORM in MSEs. Multiple regression, Repeated-Measures Analysis of Variance and Repeated-Measures Multivariate Analysis of Variance were performed. The findings of the distribution revealed that (...) only one variable made a significant percentage contribution to the level of ICT operation in MSEs, the Payback method. It may thus be inferred that the Payback method is the prominent variable, explaining the variation in level of evaluation models affecting ICT adoption within MSEs. Conclusively, in answering the two questions degree of variability explained and predictors, the results revealed that the variable contributed approximately 88.4% of the variations in evaluation models affecting ICT adoption within MSEs. The analysis of variance also revealed that the regression coefficients were real and did not occur by chance. (shrink)

The article aims at investigating in depth the idea of revelation expressed in the works of Clement of Alexandria. In particular, it focuses on the biblical-philosophical foundations; namely, how Clement, starting from an openness to the Greek cultural world, incorporates Greek philosophy into Christian revelation, albeit with some variations, thus making it part and parcel of his way of under-standing the relationship between Holy Scripture and Tradition.

This article defends the thesis that the reflection which Ricœur conducts on the notion of testimony is not one research topic among others, but forms one of the keys to understanding the Ricœurian project as such. The notion of testimony enables one to get beyond the polarity of description and ascription, in order to return to the question of the real. Through an examination of the quadruple grammar of testimony that Ricœur proposes and its context in the dialogue with historiography (...) and theology, the article advances the thesis that with testimony, we broach the limit point of hermeneutics, a “non-interpretable” at the heart of interpretation. This “non-interpretable” acquires a quasi-transcendental status, because it allows interpretation to broach the thing it is dealing with and not another interpretation. Lastly, it will be important to show how Ricœur’s thought on testimony also reflects an ethics: this ethics prohibits treating the testimony as a mere source, referring to a positivity, but as a trace, within an experience, which as such is unrepeatable. (shrink)

During World War II, both the US and Canadian governments issued a series of propaganda posters aimed at reducing spending and redirecting private households’ financial expenditures into the general war effort. Many of those posters, developed by some of the cleverest advertisers of the time, drew on Puritanism’s most deeply rooted principle: self-restraint. One propaganda poster succinctly exemplifies the underlying logic: as an elegant couple looks up at a gigantic elephant for sale, the caption sternly reminds them to be thrifty: (...) “If you don’t need it … don’t buy it!”.If you don’t need it, don’t buy it. Propaganda Poster WWII. Ottawa... (shrink)

Kwame Nkrumah invokes the doctrine of emergentism in the hope of reconciling theism - a tenacious part of the African worldview - with materialism. However, in this article I seek to show that this reconciliation is not only ultimately unsuccessful, but is actually impossible. Towards this end, I identify weaknesses in what I call the six argumentative pillars of Nkrumah’s theory of emergentism (which he calls “philosophical materialism”), namely, his arguments regarding the origin of the cosmic material, the primary reality (...) of matter, idealism, categorial convertibility, dialectic change, and the self-motion of matter. The article should provide not only alternative perspectives to Nkrumah’s metaphysics, but also highlight some broader metaphysical implications for both strong and weak emergentism. (shrink)

This paper dwells on the debate on the question of what is/are responsible for African underdevelopment and, by extension, what will influence African development. The debate currently dwells on how much of development is human and how much is environmental, extraneous and beyond human control. Joseph Agbakoba thinks that development involves both nature and human agency, acknowledges the effect of nature, equally sees philosophy as a critique of worldview and ideology, and African philosophy as saddled with the critique of the (...) African worldview and ideology, which he sees as malfunctioning in the context of the modern African civic society imported from Europe and needs certain adjustments. In other words, he sees development in Africa as not beyond human control. J. Obi Oguejiofor attempts to refute Agbakoba’s claim that worldview has anything to do with the African predicament, and concludes that the African predicament is as a result of geography, biogeography and history, but his advancement of these factors as being solely responsible for the African predicament completely ignores the human agency in development and lands him in determinism raising the question of the very relevance of African philosophy to African development. Conceptual analysis informs the dominant method of the paper. (shrink)

Strong emergentists face a quadruple dilemma: accept the physical closure principle and deny strong emergentism, deny the closure principle and court either substance or property dualism, accept substance dualism and kill emergentism by accepting vitalism or accept property dualism and get locked into the fallacy of reconciling upward emergence with downward causation without the help of any external agency. Strong emergentists would most likely choose, and I seek to show that it contains contradictions that kill emergentism nonetheless. This is because (...) emergentists would ultimately have to admit the role of external agency or environmental input regarding upward/downward interaction. But once this happens, there seems no need to discuss emergence, since we are no longer entirely sure that properties alleged as emergent actually emerged from the base properties from which we would say they emerged. (shrink)

This paper was originally presented at a colloquium on Michel Henry’s book Incarnation at the Institut Catholique Paris. Michel Henry’s response to the present study can be found in “À Emmanuel Falque,” in Ph énoménologie et christianisme chez Michel Henry, ed. Ph. Capelle : 168-182. This response was reprinted recently in Michel Henry, La Ph énoménologie de la vie, vol. 5.

When translating phantasia as ‘imagination’, one commits a dangerous anachronism: interpreting the Greek concept from the vantage point of a modern, post-Kantian framework which sees imagination as a faculty mediating between sensibility and reasoning. A close reading of the Aristotelian sources shows why phantasia cannot be identifi ed as a distinct faculty, but rather designates a transversal power common to all psychic acts. The article argues that a more adequate translation of phantasia would be ‘visualization’.

Cet article pose la question de savoir dans quelle mesure les émotions ont été un élément de construction du genre par les théologiens médiévaux. Il montre dans un premier temps que la sensibilité, bien que régulièrement associée au féminin, n’a pas constitué un élément important de distinction des sexes avant le xiiie siècle. Le motif de la sensibilité féminine a même pu être utilisé au service d’une lecture égalitaire de certains passages bibliques en plaçant le féminin dans l’humain. Dans un (...) second temps, nous étudions une émotion particulière, la verecundia, souvent associée au voile et, par-là, aux femmes. C’est l’occasion de montrer comment une “émotion” régulièrement appliquée aux hommes, a pu être construite comme spécifiquement féminine en ce qu’elle exprime la réserve et la soumission attendue de la femme qui accepte la médiation masculine que signifie le voile, tout en lui ouvrant un chemin vers le salut et même vers la gloire. La verecundia apparaît ainsi pour les femmes comme un chemin vers la gloire à travers la honte qui se définit en vertu. (shrink)

Based largely on the so-called problem of “asymmetry in concept application”, philosopher Murat Aydede has argued for a non-perceptual view of pain. Aydede is of course not denying basic neurobiological facts about neurons, action potentials, and the like, but he nonetheless makes a strong philosophical case for pain not being the perception of something extramental. In the present paper, after having stated some of the presuppositions I hold as a physician and pain researcher, and after having shortly described Aydede’s critique (...) of perceptual theories of pain, I make a constructive proposal centred around the concept of pain as the perception of some-one, not some-thing. In doing so, I propose that there often is a problematic duality at work when we think about pain, namely the mental/extramental duality. This pre-reflective mindset creates difficulties when reflecting over pain. Instead, I propose the body/world duality as being more helpful. Two neologisms, cosmoception and egoception, are presented as an alternative to the twin concepts of exteroception and interoception. It is argued that the new concepts have the advantage of not pushing our thought into a mental/extra-mental dichotomy. Hence, when in pain, I get epistemic access to the body that is I, to how I fare in this world. From that perspective, pain is not the perception of something, but of someone–namely, the self. In the final part of the paper, this proposal is discussed in dialogue with a paper from phenomenological thinker Jennifer Bullington. (shrink)

This contribution studies the German translations for reality: Realität, Sachheit, Wirklichkeit, first in their own ambiguity, then at the end of the hegelian Objective Logic in The Science of Logi...

The “private” dimension of social life is problematic, posing conceptual, political, and ecological challenges. Some of these problems arise from the very nature of private property as it is enshrined in social life, which demands special privileges be granted to “private” matters on the grounds that these are private, because the predominant representation of the involved rights is that they reflect claims of the holders, rather than legitimate claims of society as a whole in allocating responsibilities, benefits, and duties. The (...) claim to the rationality of allocations of property rights, this article argues, must be questioned in light of the kind of commonality that is revealed in a striking manner by environmental issues (although it is not restricted to environmental matters). This questioning makes sense in relation to an analysis of social interactions, beyond the problematic opposition between the private sphere and public life. (shrink)

Kant’s emphasis on the immorality of lying even to a murderer at the door who is asking about a victim hidden inside has drawn criticism ever since. The example originally given by Constant has been read as the thread of morality by totalitarian ruthlessness. In order to defend the importance of Kant’s moral philosophy, many critics have tried to update his position by taking into account the threat of modern totalitarianism. Nonetheless, this article tries to argue that Kant is right, (...) especially since the rise of post-truth politics. Sincerity towards oneself and towards others remains the basis of democracy: we have to admit what seems to be the truth regardless of our feelings about it. (shrink)

Thomas d’Aquin n’a pas simplement écrit une somme « contre » les gentils ( contra Gentiles), mais aussi et surtout une somme « pour » les gentils ( pro Gentilibus ). La raison naturelle, unique recours pour les mahométans et les païens lorsqu’il n’y a pas d’Écriture en commun (contrairement aux juifs et aux hérétiques), n’est pas que le lieu vertical de l’accès à Dieu ; elle désigne aussi le topos horizontal d’une communauté d’humanité capable de nous rassembler. La « (...) raison » hier (Thomas d’Aquin) joue le rôle de la « finitude » aujourd’hui (Heidegger) – à savoir ce qui fait notre « en commun ». Telle est l’unique perspective d’une apologétique qui ne se tiendra plus dans une sorte de « transcendance de surplomb » (Merleau-Ponty), comme si l’absolu était immédiatement donné. On cessera alors d’opposer « métaphysique » et « théologie », dans un discours prétendument pur et faussement recherché. C’est à transformer la tradition plutôt qu’à la dépasser que nous convie la leçon du concile de Nicée (325). Le « c’est-à-dire » de la même substance du Père ( homoousios ) traduit bien le biblique en hellénique, plutôt qu’il ne tente de sortir de l’hellénique comme tel. Ainsi, le fameux « ce que tous nomment Dieu » ( et omnes dicunt Deum ) à la fin de chacune des cinq voies de Thomas d’Aquin indique moins l’idole d’un Dieu conceptuel à dépasser, que l’icône d’un Dieu rationnel qui, dans sa kénose, habite aussi notre propre nature pour la transformer. De la théo -logie où « seul Dieu parle bien de Dieu » (génitif subjectif), on passera donc à la théo- logie où « l’homme peut aussi, et en partie au moins, parler de Dieu » (génitif objectif). Un nouveau rapport de la métaphysique à la théologie s’instaure ici, capable d’initier une autre relation du croyant au monde. (shrink)

Cet article est une étude de l’importance de la référence au dialogue institutionnel pour la philosophie sociale critique aujourd’hui. Si le poids des institutions bride la liberté et la créativité dans le dialogue, c’est pour des raisons qu’il convient de chercher à cerner avec précision, en particulier pour comprendre le lien qui existe entre cette dimension institutionnelle et la formation de compromis. La prise en compte du dialogue institutionnel est cependant freinée par l’insistance morale sur la valeur unique du consensus. (...) Cela rend utile de revenir sur les raisons de la valorisation de formes raisonnées - et liées à des principes - de compromis ne se réduisant pas à des cas de modus vivendi imposé par un différentiel des forces. Ces réflexions peuvent conduire à dégager quelques perspectives sur les propriétés de la généralité des principes, de leurs difficultés typiques de mise en œuvre et de leur rôle dans la coordination autour d’interprétations et de significations. Ce travail fait, il devrait devenir possible de se saisir dans une perspective constructive de la question de la délimitation du périmètre des significations et des interprétations dans les échanges discursifs au sein d’un univers institutionnel. Il semble raisonnable d’y chercher la clé d’une éthique du compromis dans laquelle on ne se dissimule pas la distance qui nous sépare (en tant qu’êtres humaine) de ces interlocuteurs non humains que sont les institutions. (shrink)

Die Phänomenologie stellt eine der Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie dar und findet in zahlreichen Wissenschaften sowie in Praxis und Therapeutik starke Resonanz. Nach 120 Jahren Wirkungsgeschichte füllt die Bibliothek phänomenologischer Werke zahllose Bücherregale und selbst für Expert:innen ist die Forschungsliteratur mittlerweile unüberschaubar geworden. An allgemeinen Einführungen sowie spezialisierter Fachliteratur mangelt es dabei keineswegs, wohl aber an einem Handbuch, in dem sowohl der Vielfalt der historischen Entwicklungen als auch dem berechtigten Wunsch nach innerer systematischer Kohärenz Rechnung getragen wird. Das Handbuch Phänomenologie schließt (...) diese Lücke. Ausgewiesene Autor:innen bereiten in eigens für diesen Band verfassten Artikeln komplexe sachliche Zusammenhänge übersichtlich auf. Durch seinen Aufbau eignet sich das Handbuch sowohl für Anfänger:innen als auch für Fortgeschrittene. Anhand bündig präsentierter Grundbegriffe und Verfahren konturiert das Handbuch die Spezifik der phänomenologischen Methode, spart dabei jedoch nicht die Kontroversen und methodologischen Neuausrichtungen aus, die von ihrer Lebendigkeit und Vielstimmigkeit zeugen. Ein umfangreicher Schlussteil ist der Rezeption und Anwendung in einzelnen Wirkfeldern gewidmet. Als Hilfsmittel zur eigenständigen Erschließung der phänomenologischen Denkrichtung und zu ihrer Anwendung auf aktuelle Probleme zeichnet sich das Handbuch durch seine Leser:innenfreundlichkeit und einen stark forschungspraktischen Bezug aus. Ein Kompendium, das sich bald als ABC der Phänomenologie etablieren dürfte. (shrink)