Although US and European research has documented improvement in earnings quality associated with corporate governance characteristics, the situation in Latin America is questionable, given the business environment in which firms operate, which is characterized by controlling family ownership and weak legal protection. The purpose of this study is to examine the relation between the internal mechanisms of Corporate Governance and Earnings Management measured by discretionary accrual. We use a sample of listed Latin American non-financial companies from the period 2006–2009. Our (...) results show how in the Latin American context the role of external directors is limited and that Boards which meet more frequently take a more active position in the monitoring of insiders, so showing a lower use of manipulative practices. In addition, we find a non-linear relation between insider ownership and discretionary accruals, also pointing to the fact that ownership concentration may be a manipulative practices constrictor mechanism only when the ownership of main shareholders is moderate. The findings have important policy implications since this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study to analyze the relation between the effectiveness of the government and the earnings management behavior. As policy implications, we document how when a country implements controls aimed at reducing corruption, strengthening the rule of law or improving the effectiveness of government, this leads to a reduction in firm earnings management. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to analyse the internal mechanisms of corporate governance (board of directors and ownership structure), which influence voluntary disclosure of intangibles. The results appear to corroborate the view that an increase in institutional investor shareholding has a negative effect on voluntary disclosure, supporting the hypothesis of entrenchment, whereas an excessive ownership by institutional investors may have adverse effects on strategic disclosure decisions. The results also indicate that an increase in the number of members of the (...) board to up to 15 has a beneficial effect on the disclosure of intangibles. However, as this number increases, the effect inverts and becomes adverse to improving the capacity for supervision and control in the decision-making process regarding the voluntary disclosure of intangibles. The findings endorse the recommendation of the most of the Corporate Governance Codes regarding an advisable maximum of 15 members on a board to ensure its effectiveness and internal cohesion. (shrink)

Does the board of directors influence cost of debt financing? This study of a sample of Spanish listed companies during the period 2004-2007 provides some evidence about the question. The results suggest that two board attributes - director ownership and board activity - appear to influence in the risk assessment of debtholders because of their ability to reduce agency cost and information asymmetry. We also find a non-linear relationship between board size and cost of debt, suggesting that from certain levels (...) the benefits of large boards may be outweighed by the cost of poorer communication and increased decision-making time. (shrink)

Based upon the quintuple helix model (QHM), this study explores whether the differences in firms' emission reduction effectiveness can be attributed to the five institutional helices related to educational system, economic development, political–legal system, cultural orientation, and the natural capital. Using a set of listed European firms for the 2015–2020 period, we show that firms with better emission reduction effectiveness operate in nations with more public educational expenditure and scientific production, more extensive economic development, and better institutional and governance quality. (...) Moreover, emission reduction strategies are more pronounced in firms located in countries characterized by less masculinity, individualism, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance, and more long-term orientation and indulgence. In addition, we find that companies with better emission reduction effectiveness are found in countries with more natural capital, characterized by a life in harmony with nature and employing the finite resources available in a sustainable and environmentally conscious manner. Moreover, employing a two-stage model to identify the most relevant helix, we find that the political–legal system helix is the most pivotal in promoting firms' commitment to reducing environmental emissions. (shrink)

We examine whether the behavior of institutional investors representatives on boards leads to observable differences in corporate finance. We find that directors representing pressure-sensitive investors prefer lower financial leverage whereas pressure-resistant directors show no particular preference. When analyzed separately, directors appointed by banks and insurance firms have different attitudes. Bank representatives on boards increase both the financial leverage and the banking debt. This result suggests that some types of institutional directors provide financial resources to the firms on whose board they (...) sit, supporting the view that boards manage the uncertainty associated with strategic decision making and provide firms with preferential access to resources and financial expertise. This research has interesting academic and policy implications for the debate over the proper degree of institutional involvement in corporate governance. Different institutional investors have different agendas and incentives for corporate governance, and, therefore, both researchers and policy makers should no longer consider institutional investors as a whole. In addition, our paper calls for new research on the causes and implications of institutional investor involvement in the corporate governance of nonfinancial firms. This new research could require new insights on the dynamics within the boards and on the interplay among the knowledge, incentives and attitudes of quite different directors. (shrink)

For the period 2015–2019 and based on a Spanish sample of 145 listed companies, this paper provides insights into how narcissistic chief executive officers (CEOs) influence the proportion of women in top management teams (TMTs). As a further analysis and in line with social psychology and upper echelons theories, we study whether the power and gender of a CEO and the female proportion in the firm's board moderate the relationship. Our results reveal that narcissistic CEOs are less likely to support (...) women in TMTs, confirming that CEO personality traits influence team structure. Further results suggest that this aversion increases as the CEO's power grows and is a woman, and when female proportion in board decreases. The results have an impact on the gender equality goal, demonstrating that the behavior of women toward promoting gender equality in TMTs depends both on the specific position of women in the firm's hierarchy and on their personal psychological attributes. We find that women directors support social identity values and that narcissistic female CEOs act like queen bees. (shrink)