The unfolding of string theory has led to a successive refinement and generalization of our understanding of geometry and topology. A brief overview of these developments is given.

This paper explores in detail an argument for epistemic expressivism, what we call the Argument from Motivation. While the Argument from Motivation has sometimes been anticipated, it has never been set out in detail. The argument has three premises, roughly, that certain judgments expressed in attributions of knowledge are intrinsically motivating in a distinct way (P1); that motivation for action requires desire-like states or conative attitudes (HTM); and that the semantic content of knowledge attributions cannot be specified without reference to (...) the intrinsically motivating judgments that such attributions express (P2). We argue that these premises entail a version of ecumenical expressivism. Since the argument from motivation has not been explicitly stated before, there is no current discussion of the argument. In this paper we therefore consider and reject various objections that one might propose to the argument, including some that stem from the idea that knowledge is factive, or that knowledge involves evidence that rules out relevant alternatives. Other objections to (P1) specifically might be derived from cases of apparent lack of epistemic motivation considered in in Kvanvig (The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding, 2003) and Brown (Nous 42(2):167–189, 2008), as well as from general forms of externalism about epistemic motivation. We consider these and find them wanting. Finally, the paper offers some critical remarks about the prospect of denying (P2). (shrink)

This book is a defense of the methods of analytic philosophy against a recent empirical challenge to the soundness of those methods. The challenge is raised by practitioners of “experimental philosophy” and concerns the extent to which analytic philosophy relies on intuition—in particular, the extent to which analytic philosophers treat intuitions as evidence in arguing for philosophical conclusions. Experimental philosophers say that analytic philosophers place a great deal of evidential weight on people’s intuitions about hypothetical cases and thought experiments. This (...) book argues that this view of traditional philosophical method is a myth, part of “metaphilosophical folklore.” Analytic philosophy makes regular use of hypothetical examples and thought experiments, but philosophers argue for their claims about what is true or not true in these examples and thought experiments. It is these arguments, not intuitions, that are treated as evidence for the claims. The book discusses xphi and some recent xphi studies; critiques a variety of other metaphilosophical claims; examines such famous arguments as Gettier’s refutation of the JTB theory and Kripke’s Gödel Case argument against descriptivism about proper names, and shows that they rely on reasoning rather than intuition; and finds existing critiques of xphi, the “Multiple Concepts” and “Expertise” replies, to be severely lacking. (shrink)

David Lewis argued that Newcomb’s Problem and the Prisoner’s Dilemma are “one and the same problem” or, to be more precise, that the Prisoner’s Dilemma is nothing else than “two Newcomb problems side by side” (Lewis Philosophy and Public Affairs 8:235–240, 1979 : 235). It has been objected that his argument fails to take into account certain epistemic asymmetries which undermine the one-problem thesis. Sobel ( 1985 ) acknowledges that many tokens satisfy the structural requirements of both problems, while questioning (...) the generality of the thesis. Bermúdez (Analysis 73:423–429, 2013 ), on the other hand, argues that there is a deeper structural conflict between the two problems in the sense that the epistemic requirements that give Newcomb’s Problem its force are precisely those that prevent it from being a Prisoner’s Dilemma. I argue that the epistemic asymmetry objections raised by Sobel and Bermúdez fail to undermine the one-problem thesis. A different type of objection raised by Bermúdez, one which relies on the contrast between parametric and strategic choices, fares no better. Although NP is a problem that has been primarily studied for its implications to decision theory, it contains enough game theoretic elements to justify the claim that a juxtaposition of two such problems can be thought of as a strategic game. (shrink)

Recently, there have been attempts at offering new justifications of the Rawlsian idea of public reason. Blain Neufeld has suggested that the ideal of political autonomy justifies public reason, while R.J. Leland and Han van Wietmarschen have sought to justify the idea by appealing to the value of political community. In this paper, I show that both proposals are vulnerable to a common problem. In realistic circumstances, they will often turn into reasons to oppose, rather than support, public reason. However, (...) this counterintuitive result can be avoided if we conceive of autonomy and community differently. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Religionsphilosophie evangelischer Theologie" verfügbar.

In this article, Emil Sætra examines how teachers and students construct and experience aims and goods in classroom discussions of controversial issues. This study is situated within the emerging tradition of empirical ethics, and the research strategy comprised two main steps. First, Sætra used interview data to analyze, via the experiences of teachers and students, the following two empirical questions: (1) What goods normatively constitute educative discussions of controversial issues? (2) How are these goods constructed in time and space? (...) Second, in the concluding discussion, Sætra makes explicit some normative implications of the empirical findings and discusses theses in relation to previous research. In brief, what emerges from the conjoined experiences of teachers and students is the notion that practice comprises multiple aims and drives. Moreover, because aims and drives are multiple, decisions regarding priorities will sometimes have to be made, and teachers may be subject to conflicting expectations. This means that practitioners must be able to make reflective judgments about what comprises acceptable ends, what projects should be undertaken to achieve those ends, and what actions ought to be performed as part of those projects. (shrink)

The "Practice Turn" in the Contemporary Socio-Human Sciences The paper provides an overview of the current situation in the socio-human sciences, which is characterised by attempts to overcome traditional one-sided approaches and look for new alternatives. One of the latest alternatives to traditional approaches in the philosophy and methodology of the social sciences is the "practice turn". It is the turn to another, non-traditional approach to practice but also to Aristotelian phronesis. The author gives an account of three main tenets (...) of this turn with reference to both ancient Greek and modern conceptions of practice. (shrink)

Materialism about the mind is the view that the mind and its properties are physical. Many believe that there is a serious problem for materialism about the mind stemming from the phenomenon of conscious experience. It is alleged by some that conscious experiences possess features that cannot be possessed by any physical thing. And, even many materialists agree that conscious experiences possess features that make it difficult to see how conscious experiences could be physical things. Consciousness and the Insignificance of (...) Materialism examines this supposed clash between consciousness and physicality. The conclusion reached is that the clash is an illusion. It is an illusion fostered by certain false assumptions, made by materialists and anti-materialists alike, about the nature of physicality. However, it is argued that this is a hollow victory for materialism about the mind. Once the nature of physicality is appropriately characterized, materialism about the mind is revealed as true, but uninterestingly true. In other words, materialism about the mind is an insignificant view concerning the nature of the mind and mentality. (shrink)

Excerpt from Goethe als Geschichtsphilosoph und die Geschichtsphilosophische Bewegung Seiner Zeit Eine Pflanze ist in ihrer Erscheinung nur recht zu begreifen, wenn man die Umgebung, wenn man den Boden kennt, dem sie entsprossen ist. Und je langer sie an einem Standorte beharrte, desto mehr kommt dieser Boden, diese Umgebung charakteristisch in ihr zum Ausdruck. Ja, wird sie verpflanzt und in andere Umgebung gebracht, nur langsam und schwer wird sie sich andern. So lange wie sie vermag, bleibt sie ihrem alten Charakter (...) getreu, und immer wieder zeigen sich von der einstigen Umgebung uberkommene Zuge. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.". (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

This paper explores the fundamental tenets of Plato’s philosophy of education, particularly his views on a practice of great educational potential: communal musical participation. According to Plato, music can attune the individual and the community to cosmic harmony and this, in turn, is the only way to form and maintain a community. The paper explores how the concepts of ethos and nomos are utilized to explain music’s role in community cohesion. It argues that Plato’s understanding of the power of immediate (...) and pre-reflective participation in music can provide valuable insight for contemporary philosophy of music education. The concept of nomos, in particular, allows music educators to take this frame of thought to better understand the role of music in creating communities. (shrink)

We sketch an account according to which the semantic concepts themselves are not pathological and the pathologies that attend the semantic predicates arise because of the intention to impose on them a role they cannot fulfill, that of expressing semantic concepts for a language that includes them. We provide a simplified model of the account and argue in its light that (i) a consequence is that our meaning intentions are unsuccessful, and such semantic predicates fail to express any concept, and (...) that (ii) in light of this it is incorrect to characterize the pathology simply as semantic inconsistency; a more nuanced view of the problem is needed. We also show that the defects of the semantic predicates need not undercut the use of a truth theory in a compositional semantics for a language containing them because the meaning theory per se need not involve commitment to the axioms of the truth theory it exploits. (shrink)

Arabic scholarship and literature flourished during the Mamlūk period, and scholars and students from across the Muslim world were drawn to Cairo and Damascus. This led to opportunities for travel, education, and employment, yet these opportunities were available almost exclusively to men. In Syria and Egypt, and most of the medieval world, women’s involvement in travel, education, and public life, was often restricted. However, there were exceptions, including the prolific writer and poet ʿĀʾisha al-Bāʿūniyya (d. 1517). As a woman, she (...) crossed a number of social and cultural borders in order to enter into the domain of religious scholarship and literary production. Drawing from historical and biographical sources, and especially from ʿĀʾisha al-Bāʿūniyya’s writings, I examine her social and intellectual background, her travels and scholarly interactions in order to highlight some of the social trends and intellectual forces at work in the late Mamlūk period. (shrink)