Elias Baumgarten taught philosophy at the University of Michigan-Dearborn from 1972 to 2018. He was born in Brooklyn, grew up in California, and went to schools in Boston and Chicago. He was one of the first recipients of the campus’s “Distinguished Teaching Award.” He taught a wide variety of courses including Medical Ethics, Ethics of War and Peace, Ethics of Nationalism, and Darwinism and Philosophy. Most of his publications are in ethics, including “Zionism, Nationalism, and Morality” and “Curiosity as (...) a Moral Virtue.” Dr. Baumgarten also served for over 30 years on hospital ethics committees at the University of Michigan Health System in Ann Arbor. A child of immigrants, Prof. Baumgarten was passionate, both as teacher and citizen, in celebrating multicultural diversity both on our campus and in our country. He sees travel as a form of education and traveled to over 70 countries. (shrink)

Elias wrote in both English and German, and in all his work runs to 14 books and around 90 other essays, along with poems and numerous interviews. The 18 volumes of the collected works contain many writings not previously published in English, and a small number never published before. All of the texts have thoroughly checked and revised, by editors who have a deep knowledge of Elia's thinking; they have inserted many clarifications, cross-references and explanatory notes.

Intellectualism is the doctrine that knowing how to do something consists in knowing that something is the case. Drawing on contemporary linguistic theories of indirect questions, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson have recently revived intellectualism, proposing to interpret a sentence of the form ‘s knows how to F’ as ascribing to s knowledge of a certain way w of Fing that she can F in w. In order to preserve knowledgehow’s connection to action and thus avoid an overgeneration problem, they (...) add that this knowledge must be had under a “practical” mode of presentation of w. I argue that (i) there can be non-knowledgeable true beliefs under a practical mode of presentation and that (ii) some such beliefs would nevertheless be sufficient to establish knowledge-how’s characteristic connection to action, and thus count as knowledge-how. If so, Stanley & Williamson’s account is faced with a serious undergeneration problem. Moreover, the structural features on which the argument relies make it likely to present a quite general challenge for intellectualist strategies. (shrink)

Supervenience is one of the 'hot discoveries' of analytic philosophy, and this collection of essays on the topic represents an examination of it and its application to major areas of philosophy. The interest in supervenience has much to do with the flexibility of the concept. To say that x supervenes on y indicates a degree of dependence without committing one to the view that x can be reduced to y. Thus supervenience is a relationship that has the potential of replacing (...) the traditional notion of dependence, while performing at least part of the function reductive relationships were supposed to fulfil. Moreover, since it is a topic-neutral concept, supervenience has a wide range of applicability. (shrink)

As soon as 'modernity' was defined as a particular way of con ceiving of time, the questions of tempo rality came to be situated at the heart of the ongoing debate regarding the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the 'modern age'. This has, in turn, readily led to a no less passionate search for the assessment of modernity's foundations which are thought to rest in its typical sense of experiencing temporality. This polemic instance, however, involves polarized perspectives and the consequent risk, (...) always present in dichotomous approaches, of oversimplifying the concepts at stake and smoothing over the intricacies of their history and meaning. Does there really exist something like a ' time of modernity'? This is the central question that the present article examines. 1 Key Words: evolution • modemity • philosophy of history • time irreversibility. (shrink)

After introducing semantic anti-realism and the paradox of knowability, the paper offers a reconstruction of the anti-realist argument from understanding. The proposed reconstruction validates an unrestricted principle to the effect that truth requires the existence of a certain kind of “demonstration”. The paper shows that that principle fails to imply the problematic instances of the original unrestricted feasible-knowability principle but that the overall view underlying the new principle still has unrestricted epistemic consequences. Appealing precisely to the paradox of knowability, the (...) paper also argues, against the BHK semantics, for the non- constructive character of the demonstrations envisaged by semantic anti-realism, and contends that, in such setting, one of the most natural arguments for a broadly intuitionist revision of classical logic loses all its force.Tras presentar el anti-realismo semántico y la paradoja de la cognoscibilidad, el artículo ofrece una reconstrucción del argumento anti-realista basado en la comprensión. La reconstrucción que se propone valida un principio irrestricto, del que se sigue que la verdad requiere la existencia de un determinado tipo de “demostración”. El artículo muestra que este principio no implica las instancias problemáticas del original principio irrestricto de la cognoscibilidad realizable, y que la concepción general que subyace al nuevo principio todavía tiene consecuencias epistémicas irrestrictas. Apelando precisamente a la paradoja de la cognoscibilidad, el artículo argumenta además, en contra de la semántica BHK, a favor del carácter no constructivo de las demostraciones que contempla el anti-realismo semántico, y defiende que, en ese marco, uno de los argumentos más naturales a favor de una revisión a grandes rasgos intuicionista de la lógica clásica pierde toda su fuerza. (shrink)

In a series of works, Pablo Cobreros, Paul Égré, David Ripley and Robert van Rooij have proposed a nontransitive system (call it ‘_K__3__L__P_’) as a basis for a solution to the semantic paradoxes. I critically consider that proposal at three levels. At the level of the background logic, I present a conception of classical logic on which _K__3__L__P_ fails to vindicate classical logic not only in terms of structural principles, but also in terms of operational ones. At the level of (...) the theory of truth, I raise a cluster of philosophical difficulties for a _K__3__L__P_-based system of naive truth, all variously related to the fact that such a system proves things that would seem already by themselves repugnant, even in the absence of transitivity. At the level of the theory of validity, I consider an extension of the _K__3__L__P_-based system of naive validity that is supposed to certify that validity in that system does not fall short of naive validity, argue that such an extension is untenable in that its nontriviality depends on the inadmissibility of a certain irresistible instance of transitivity (whence the advertised “final cut”) and conclude on this basis that the _K__3__L__P_-based system of naive validity cannot coherently be adopted either. At all these levels, a crucial role is played by certain metaentailments and by the extra strength they afford over the corresponding entailments: on the one hand, such strength derives from considerations that would seem just as compelling in a general nontransitive framework, but, on the other hand, such strength wreaks havoc in the particular setting of _K__3__L__P_. (shrink)

The information loss paradox is often presented as an unavoidable consequence of well-established physics. However, in order for a genuine paradox to ensue, not-trivial assumptions about, e.g., quantum effects on spacetime, are necessary. In this work we will be explicit about these additional, speculative assumptions required. We will also sketch a map of the available routes to tackle the issue, highlighting the, often overlooked, commitments demanded of each alternative. Finally, we will display the strong link between black holes, the issue (...) of information loss and the measurement problem. (shrink)

According to the naive theory of vagueness, the vagueness of an expression consists in the existence of both positive and negative cases of application of the expression and in the non- existence of a sharp cut-off point between them. The sorites paradox shows the naive theory to be inconsistent in most logics proposed for a vague language. The paper explores the prospects of saving the naive theory by revising the logic in a novel way, placing principled restrictions on the transitivity (...) of the consequence relation. A lattice-theoretical framework for a whole family of “tolerant logics” is proposed and developed. Particular care is devoted to the relation between the salient features of the formal apparatus and the informal logical and semantic notions they are supposed to model. A suitable non-transitive counterpart to classical logic is defined. Some of its properties are studied, and it is eventually shown how an appropriate regimentation of the naive theory of vagueness is consistent in such a logic. (shrink)

The paper is concerned with a logical difficulty which Lionel Shapiro’s deflationist theory of logical consequence (as well as the author’s favoured, non-deflationist theory) gives rise to. It is argued that Shapiro’s non-contractive approach to solving the difficulty, although correct in its broad outlines, is nevertheless extremely problematic in some of its specifics, in particular in its failure to validate certain intuitive rules and laws associated with the principle of modus ponens. An alternative non-contractive theory is offered which does not (...) suffer from the same problem. (shrink)

Desde la tradición de los estudios de gubernamentalidad y sus resonancias en las sociologías políticas y de la educación, en este artículo se recuperan los debates vigentes en torno a las nociones de gubernamentalidad, gobierno y biopolítica desarrolladas en la vasta obra de Michel Foucault y sus continuadoras/es para enlazarlas con las discusiones sobre el objeto de estudio y el campo teórico de la política educativa, enfatizando el potencial analítico que ofrece su grilla de inteligibilidad para los fenómenos educativos propios (...) de las sociedades posdisciplinares. En esa dirección, este trabajo esboza una serie de propuestas epistemológicas, teóricas y metodológicas producidas a partir de una investigación empírica recientemente finalizada (Aguirre, 2022), de corte descriptivo y de carácter cualitativo. En vistas a estos propósitos, se producen diálogos interdisciplinares a la vez que se tensionan y discuten algunos supuestos clásicos y tradicionales de la política educativa, para incitar una renovación analítica que posibilite el estudio de las relaciones sociales de autogobierno y gobierno de las/os otras/os en tanto articulaciones históricas entre el saber, el poder y la subjetividad. Finalmente, se exponen algunos indicios y propuestas para el abordaje sociológico de los fenómenos educativos contemporáneos, que convocan y promueven la necesidad de producir ciertos desplazamientos epistemológicos en el campo teórico de la política educativa, así como invitan a la reconfiguración de sus objetos de estudio en el marco de la adscripción a un enfoque posestructuralista. (shrink)

We put forward a proposal that combines objective collapse models, developed in connection with quantum-foundational questions, with the so-called Weyl curvature hypothesis, introduced by Roger Penrose as an attempt to account for the very special initial state of the universe. In particular, we explain how a curvature dependence of the collapse rate in such models, an idea already shown to help in the context of black holes and information loss, could also offer a dynamical justification for Penrose's conjecture.

Moses Mendelssohn is often described as the founder of modern Jewish thought and as a leading philosopher of the late Enlightenment. One of Mendelssohn's main concerns was how to conceive of the relationship between Judaism, philosophy, and the civic life of a modern state. Elias Sacks explores Mendelssohn's landmark account of Jewish practice--Judaism's "living script," to use his famous phrase--to present a broader reading of Mendelssohn's writings and extend inquiry into conversations about modernity and religion. By studying Mendelssohn's thought (...) in these dimensions, Sacks suggests that he shows a deep concern with history. Sacks affords a view of a foundational moment in Jewish modernity and forwards new ways of thinking about ritual practice, the development of traditions, and the role of religion in society. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Patchwork of Non-Integrated OthersMichael Elias (bio)It has been a long time since I first presented a paper at a Colloquium on Violence & Religion (COV&R) conference, in 1994 in Wiesbaden, entitled "Neck Riddles in Mimetic Theory." It discusses riddle stories in which a man sentenced to death saves his life by propounding to the judge a riddle that he cannot possibly solve, because it is based on (...) bizarre experiences, unique to the condemned person. This was somewhat similar to what I did in my lecture, because I hid the fact that my research, which I would later base my doctorate on, was inspired by the eccentric experiences from psychoses that overtook me between 1979 and 1983 and landed me in a psychiatric hospital. Moreover, the motif of a condemned person saving his life is related for me to the experiences of my father, who spent weeks on death row at Buchenwald concentration camp during World War II—and miraculously escaped death. As the eldest in the family, I was definitely "the boy who had to make everything right."I am convinced that a lot of research is related to a researcher's own experiences. Our maître à penser, René Girard, tells his interviewer Michel Treguer, in answer to a question about the last chapter of Mensonge romantique, "You're [End Page 121] right, of course, about there being a personal experience behind what I say. I ended up understanding that I was going through an experience of the kind that I was describing."1 In his overview of Girard's work, Wolfgang Palaver wrote, "He began to turn away from his own pride and to see himself as a puppet of his own mimetic desire."2 But Girard adds a caveat in 1994: There is the danger of narcissism.3I also experience that when I do not stick to the theory, but try to clarify parts of my life story from the moment I started reading Girard's Des choses cachées depuis la fondation du monde, which offered me a new opening to my Christian background. It stimulated me to start learning Hebrew to investigate the roots of Christianity.My learning still continues, in a study group: what Jews do in a beth hamidrash. The Torah is too great to be owned by any of us, so the mimetic rivalry that is always there becomes a fruitful mimesis: Lernen leads to freedom. The last ten years we have been studying the book of Exodus, with midrashim from the long rabbinic tradition. It's a book of liberation that finally gave me the courage to write about that profound period in the psychiatric hospital.From the third part of Des choses cachées, I learned a lot about interdividuality, and also from J.-M. Oughourlian's The Mimetic Brain, in which he distinguishes between the rational, emotional, and mimetic brain. And from Henri Grivois, who published on incipient psychosis. Initially I steered toward a kind of psycho-philosophical self-analysis using insights from mimetic theory. However, in the end I decided: What I learned will not be put in a scientific treatise, but a novel. For several reasons:1. I learned from Mensonge romantique that real knowledge can be conveyed very well through a novel.2. Hungarian writer and Nobel Prize winner Imre Kertész, explaining why he was unable to describe his real-life concentration camp experiences, gave me the freedom to paradoxically tell my "real story" in fiction.3. I could by no means always remember exactly what had happened, and therefore had to resort to fiction, even though I had preserved material from those years.4. I wanted to make people in my immediate surroundings unrecognizable by literary means. The American writer David Vann once said (according to a Dutch writer), "You must sacrifice your family on the altar of fiction." I didn't want that, especially with regard to my mother. [End Page 122]5. Finally, I was inspired by a Jewish sage from the eighteenth century in Lithuania (the maggid of Doubno). He explains why the truth of the Torah is not presented as a philosophy or code of law... (shrink)

In other works, I’ve proposed a solution to the semantic paradoxes which, at the technical level, basically relies on failure of contraction. I’ve also suggested that, at the philosophical level, contraction fails because of the instability of certain states of affairs. In this paper, I try to make good on that suggestion.

In Crull it is argued that, in order to confront outstanding problems in cosmology and quantum gravity, interpretational aspects of quantum theory can by bypassed because decoherence is able to resolve them. As a result, Crull concludes that our focus on conceptual and interpretational issues, while dealing with such matters in Okon and Sudarsky, is avoidable and even pernicious. Here we will defend our position by showing in detail why decoherence does not help in the resolution of foundational questions in (...) quantum mechanics, such as the measurement problem or the emergence of classicality. (shrink)

The Consistent Histories (CH) formalism aims at a quantum mechanical framework which could be applied even to the universe as a whole. CH stresses the importance of histories for quantum mechanics, as opposed to measurements, and maintains that a satisfactory formulation of quantum mechanics allows one to assign probabilities to alternative histories of a quantum system. It further proposes that each realm, that is, each set of histories to which probabilities can be assigned, provides a valid quantum-mechanical account, but that (...) different realms can be mutually incompatible. Finally, some of its proponents offer an “evolutionary” explanation of our existence in the universe and of our preference for quasiclassical descriptions of nature. The present work questions the validity of claims offered by CH proponents asserting that it solves many interpretational problems in quantum mechanics. In particular, we point out that the interpretation of the framework leaves vague two crucial points, namely, whether realms are fixed or chosen and the link between measurements and histories. Our claim is that by doing so, CH overlooks the main interpretational problems of quantum mechanics. Furthermore, we challenge the evolutionary explanation offered and we critically examine the proposed notion of a realm-dependent reality. (shrink)

The concept of truth arguably plays a central role in many areas of philosophical theorizing. Yet, what seems to be one of the most fundamental principles governing that concept, i.e. the equivalence between P and , is inconsistent in full classical logic, as shown by the semantic paradoxes. I propose a new solution to those paradoxes, based on a principled revision of classical logic. Technically, the key idea consists in the rejection of the unrestricted validity of the structural principle of (...) contraction. I first motivate philosophically this idea with the metaphysical picture of the states-of-affairs expressed by paradoxical sentences as being distinctively . I then proceed to demonstrate that the theory of truth resulting from this metaphysical picture is, in many philosophically interesting respects, surprisingly stronger than most other theories of truth endorsing the equivalence between P and (for example, the theory vindicates the validity of the traditional laws of excluded middle and of non-contradiction, and also vindicates the traditional constraint of truth preservation on logical consequence). I conclude by proving a cutelimination theorem that shows the consistency of the theory. (shrink)

In [E. Baro, M. Otero, On o-minimal homotopy, Quart. J. Math. 15pp, in press ] o-minimal homotopy was developed for the definable category, proving o-minimal versions of the Hurewicz theorems and the Whitehead theorem. Here, we extend these results to the category of locally definable spaces, for which we introduce homology and homotopy functors. We also study the concept of connectedness in -definable groups — which are examples of locally definable spaces. We show that the various concepts of connectedness associated (...) to these groups, which have appeared in the literature, are non-equivalent. (shrink)

Some apparently valid arguments crucially rely on context change. To take a kind of example first discussed by Frege, ‘Tomorrow, it’ll be sunny’ taken on a day seems to entail ‘Today, it’s sunny’ taken on the next day, but the first sentence taken on a day sadly does not seem to entail the second sentence taken on the second next day. Mid-argument context change has not been accounted for by the tradition that has extensively studied the distinctive logical properties of (...) context-dependent languages, for that tradition has focussed on arguments whose premises and conclusions are taken at the same context. I first argue for the desiderability of having a logic that accounts for mid-argument context change and I explain how one can informally understand such context change in a standard framework in which the relation of logical consequence holds among sentences. I then propose a family of simple temporal “intercontextual” logics that adequately model the validity of certain arguments in which the context changes. In particular, such logics validate the apparently valid argument in the Fregean example. The logics lack many traditional structural properties (reflexivity, contraction, commutativity etc.) as a consequence of the logical significance acquired by the sequence structure of premises and conclusions. The logics are however strong enough to capture in the form of logical truths all the valid arguments of both classical logic and Kaplan-style “intracontextual” logic. Finally, I extend the framework by introducing new operations into the object language, such as intercontextual conjunction, disjunction and implication, which, contrary to intracontextual conjunction, disjunction and implication, perfectly match the metalinguistic, intercontextual notions of premise combination, conclusion combination and logical consequence by representing their respective two operands as taken at different contexts. (shrink)

This article contributes to the literature on national varieties of socially responsible investment (SRI) by demonstrating how Scandinavian SRI developed from the 60s and onwards. Combining findings on Scandinavian SRI with insights from previous research and institutional theory, the article accounts for the role of changes in societal values and norms, the mechanisms by which SRI practices spread, and how investors adopt and transform practices to suit their surrounding institutional contexts. Especially, the article draws attention to how different categories of (...) investors act as institutional entrepreneurs during specific historical periods, and how these roles come to shift as institutional rule systems of varying societal levels change. Thus, the insights gained are useful in the future research agenda concerned with advancing knowledge on idiosyncrasies and commonalities of national SRI manifestations, and to understand the reasons underlying such characteristics. (shrink)

A unified answer is offered to two distinct fundamental questions: whether a nonclassical solution to the semantic paradoxes should be extended to other apparently similar paradoxes and whether a nonclassical logic should be expressed in a nonclassical metalanguage. The paper starts by reviewing a budget of paradoxes involving the logical properties of validity, inconsistency, and compatibility. The author’s favored substructural approach to naive truth is then presented and it is explained how that approach can be extended in a very natural (...) way so as to solve a certain paradox of validity. However, three individually decisive reasons are later provided for thinking that no approach adopting a classical metalanguage can adequately account for all the features involved in the paradoxes of logical properties. Consequently, the paper undertakes the task to do better, and, building on the system already developed, introduces a theory in a nonclassical metalanguage that expresses an adequate logic of naive truth and of some naive logical properties. (shrink)

The distinction that Ainslie draws among the triple-phenomena “suppression,” “resolve,” and “habit” is a great advance in decision making theory. But the conceptual machinery “willpower,” and its underpinning distinction between small/soon rewards as opposed to large/later rewards, provides a faulty framework to understand the triple-phenomena.

What is Sociology? presents in concise and provocative form the major ideas of a seminal thinker whose work--spanning more than four decades--is only now gaining the recognition here it has long had in Germany and France. Unlike other post-war sociologists, Norbert Elias has always held the concept of historical development among his central concerns; his dynamic theories of the evolution of modern man have remedied the historical and epistemological shortcomings of structualism and ethno-methodology. What is Sociology? refines the arguments (...) that were first found in Elias' massive work on the civilizing process, in which he formulated his major assertions about the interdependence of the making of modern man and modern society. It is Elias' contention that changes in personality structure--embodied in phenomena ranging from table manners and hygiene habits to rites of punishment and courtly love--inevitably reflect and mould patterns of control generated by new political and social instututions. Elias' rejection of a dichotomy between individual and society, and his use of psychoanalysis, political theory, and social history, help restore a fullness of resource to sociology. (shrink)

The themes of this volume represent major extensions of and reflections upon the ideas first advanced in Elias' The Civilizing Process.

The paper critically discusses two prominent arguments against closure principles for knowledge. The first one is the “argument from aggregation”, claiming that closure under conjunction has the consequence that, if one individually knows i premises, one also knows their i-fold conjunction—yet, every one of the premises might exhibit interesting positive epistemic properties while the i-fold conjunction might fail to do so. The second one is the “argument from concatenation”, claiming that closure under entailment has the consequence that, if one knows (...) a premise, one also knows each of its remote consequences one arrives at—yet, again, the premise might exhibit interesting positive epistemic properties while some of its remote consequences might fail to do so. The paper firstly observes that the ways in which these two arguments try to establish that the relevant closure principle has the relevant problematic consequence are strikingly similar. They both crucially involve showing that, given the features of the case, the relevant closure principle acts in effect as a soritical principle, which is in turn assumed to lead validly to the relevant problematic consequence. There are however nontransitive logics of vagueness where soritical principles do not have any problematic consequence. Assuming that one of these logics is the correct logic of vagueness, the paper secondly observes that both arguments describe situations where knowledge is arguably vague in the relevant respects, so that a tolerant logic should be used in reasoning about it, with the effect that the relevant soritical principle no longer validly leads to the relevant problematic consequence. This shows an interesting respect in which the gap between validity and good inference that arguably arises in a transitive framework can be bridged in a tolerant one, thereby approximating better certain features of our epistemic lives as finite subjects. Moreover, even for those who do not subscribe to tolerant logics, the paper’s two observations jointly indicate that, for all the arguments from aggregation and concatenation show, the status of the relevant closure principles should be no worse than that assigned by one’s favoured theory of vagueness to soritical principles, which only rarely is plain falsity and can indeed get arbitrarily close to full truth. (shrink)

The paper discusses some ways in which vagueness and its phenomena may be thought to impose certain limits on our knowledge and, more specifically, may be thought to bear on the traditional philosophical idea that certain domains of facts are luminous, i.e., roughly, fully open to our view. The discussion focuses on a very influential argument to the effect that almost no such interesting domains exist. Many commentators have felt that the vagueness unavoidably inherent in the description of the facts (...) that are best candidates for being luminous plays an illicit role in such argument. The paper centres around the idea that vagueness brings with itself the prima facie plausibility of soritical principles. Using the diagnostics of sharpenings, it is first pointed out that, despite certain considerations to the contrary, the margin‐for‐error principle required by the anti‐luminosity argument may well derive all of its plausibility from an underlying soritical principle. The notion of confidence that is relevant to the argument is then isolated and sharply distinguished from the notion of subjective probability. Against this background, it is argued that the reasoning about confidence involved in the argument in favour of the problematic margin‐for‐error principle is fallacious in the same way in which sorites reasoning is. This reveals the possibility of having reliable knowledge even at the penumbral limit with falsity, a possibility for which a concrete formal model is constructed. The model in turn permits a deeper appreciation of the role played in the dialectic by the distinction between confidence and subjective probability as well as by confidence requirements on knowledge. It is concluded that careful heeding of vagueness and its phenomena, far from forcing new and surprising limits on our knowledge, actually removes one of the main barriers – unreliability – often thought to stand in its way. (shrink)

The black hole information paradox arises from an apparent conflict between the Hawking black hole radiation and the fact that time evolution in quantum mechanics is unitary. The trouble is that while the former suggests that information of a system falling into a black hole disappears, the latter implies that information must be conserved. In this work we discuss the current divergence in views regarding the paradox, we evaluate the role that objective collapse theories could play in its resolution and (...) we propose a link between spontaneous collapse events and microscopic virtual black holes. (shrink)

I argue that curiosity about the world deserves attention as a moral virtue, even apart from the role it may play in (the more generally praised) love of wisdom. First, close relationships and caring are reasonably considered part of a well-lived life, and curiosity is important for caring both about people and about things in the world. Second, curiosity helps us to define an appropriate way for persons to be affected by certain situations. Perhaps most important, curiosity can help one (...) to live well because it addresses the most fundamental existential task humans face, the need to see their lives as meaningful. I argue that curiosity is a distinctive virtue but suggest that related virtues (e.g., receptivity, reverence) may contribute to different kinds of worthy engagement with the world. (shrink)

Contents: 1. Razón del presente estudio -- 2. La formación del Derecho -- 3. Ortega y el Derecho natural -- 4. Ortega y el espíritu popular o "Volksgeist" -- 5. El Derecho y la Moral -- 6. Derecho y ley positiva -- 7. Colofón.

Resumo: Analisaremos o conceito foucaultiano de governamentalidade e os seus impactos sobre a memória. Veremos como aquilo que Foucault chama de governo contém em si uma forma específica de conduzir os sujeitos ao exame das próprias consciências, direcionando-as para um objetivo pré-estabelecido. Trataremos de explicitar a articulação entre memória e reflexão a fim de verificarmos como o sujeito que examina a sua própria consciência é um sujeito que reflete, essa reflexão, no entanto, quando influenciada pelo governo, se torna aquilo que (...) chamaremos de flexão. Em seguida, veremos como a flexão é um modo particular de memória da sociedade competitiva, uma memória que contém em seu íntimo a competitividade. Por fim, indicaremos os impactos da flexão na memória e, por conseguinte, na educação. Palavras-chave: Governamentalidade; Memória; Reflexão; Flexão; Consciência. Governmentality and memory: when reflection becomes flexion Abstract: We will analyze the foucauldian concept of governmentality and its impacts on memory. We will see how what Foucault calls government contains in itself a specific way of leading subjects to examine their own consciences, directing them to a pre-established objective. We will try to explain the articulation between memory and reflection in order to verify how the subject who examines his own conscience is a subject who reflects, this reflection, however, when influenced by the government, becomes what we will call flexion. Next, we will see how flexion is a particular mode of memory of the competitive society, a memory that contains competitiveness in its heart. Finally, we will indicate the impacts of flexion on memory and, therefore, on education. Key-words: Governamentality; Memory; Reflection; Flexion; Consciousness. Gubernamentalidad y memoria: cuando la reflexión se convierte en flexión Resumen: Analizaremos el concepto foucaultiano de gubernamentalidad y sus impactos en la memoria. Veremos cómo lo que Foucault llama gobierno contiene en sí mismo una forma específica de llevar a los sujetos a examinar sus propias conciencias, orientándolos hacia un objetivo preestablecido. Intentaremos explicar la articulación entre memoria y reflexión para verificar cómo el sujeto que examina su propia conciencia es un sujeto que reflexiona, esta reflexión, sin embargo, al ser influida por el gobierno, se convierte en lo que llamaremos flexión. A continuación, veremos cómo la flexión es un modo particular de memoria de la sociedad competitiva, una memoria que contiene la competitividad en su seno. Finalmente, indicaremos los impactos de la flexión sobre la memoria y, por tanto, sobre la educación. Palabras clave: Gubernamentalidad; Memoria; Reflexión; Flexión; Conciencia. Data de registro: 05/05/2022 Data de aceite: 26/10/2022. (shrink)

Die Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen UN hat im September 2015 eine Übereinkunft über die globalen Entwicklungsziele der Periode 2015 bis 2030 getroffen. In der »Agenda 2030« werden insgesamt siebzehn »Sustainable Development Goals« festgehalten. Die Vereinbarung gilt ab 2015 als Ersatz für ihre Vorgängerin, die Agenda 2021 mit ihren »Millennium Development Goals«. Die Intention der Übereinkunft besteht darin, die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in allen Ländern voranzutreiben und sie gleichzeitig mit sozialen und ökologischen Zielen zu vereinbaren. Die Agenda 2030 beinhaltet somit eine Ausbalancierung (...) wirtschaftlicher, sozialer und ökonomischer Zielsetzungen. (shrink)

Resumo O cenário religioso mutável e plural do nosso tempo implica na teologia cristã, particularmente aquela produzida nas universidades, espaços catalisadores de questões mundiais, sendo a religiosa uma das mais relevantes. O objetivo deste artigo é verificar como a teologia acadêmica, especialmente aquela produzida na universidade, expressa essa característica da atualidade: a pluralidade. O método é a análise qualitativa de estudos que valorizam o plural na fé e na teologia cristã. A hipótese é que as perspectivas ecumênicas e inter-religiosas são (...) fundamentais para uma teologia plural hoje. E isso requer uma revisão tanto no aspecto formal e epistemológico da teologia, quanto em seu conteúdo. A conclusão é que a teologia precisa ser construída como conhecimento plural, não só porque dialoga com culturas, ciências e diferentes formas de crer, mas também porque ela mesma é plural. Resumen El escenario religioso, cambiante y plural, del nuestro tiempo implica en la teología cristiana, particularmente la que se produce en las universidades, espacios catalizadores de las cuestiones mundiales, siendo la religiosa una de las más relevantes. El objetivo de este artículo es verificar como la teología académica, en especial la producida en la universidad, expresa esta característica de la actualidad: la pluralidad. El método es el análisis cualitativo de estudios que valorizan el plural en la fe y en la teología cristiana. La hipótesis es que las perspectivas ecuménica e interreligiosa son fundamentales para una teología plural hoy. Y esto exige una revisión tanto en el aspecto formal y epistemológico de la teología, cuanto en su contenido. La conclusión es que la teología necesita construirse como conocimiento plural, no solo porque dialoga con culturas, ciencias y diferentes formas de creer, sino porque ella misma es plural.The changing and plural religious scenario of our time implies in Christian theology, particularly that produced in universities, spaces that are catalysts for world issues, with religion being one of the most relevant. The objective of this article is to verify how the academic theology, especially that produced in the university, expresses this current characteristic: plurality. The method is the qualitative analysis of studies that value plurality in faith and in Christian theology. The hypothesis is that ecumenical and interreligious perspectives are fundamental for a plural theology today. And this requires a review both in the formal and epistemologia aspect of theology, as well as in its content. The conclusion is that theology needs to be constructed as plural knowledge, not only because it dialogues with cultures, sciences and different ways of believing, but also because it is itself plural. (shrink)

The paper offers a critical examination of a prominent, “quasi-deflationist” argument advanced in the contemporary debate on the semantic paradoxes against non-naive and non-transparent theories of truth. The argument claims that truth unrestrictedly fulfils certain expressive functions, and that its so doing requires the unrestricted validity of naivety and transparency principles. The paper criticises the quasi-deflationist argument by considering some kinds of cases in which transparency and naivety arguably fail. In some such cases truth still fulfils the relevant expressive functions (...) without being transparent or naive; in some other such cases, truth does not fulfil the relevant expressive functions and other conceptual resources must be called upon. Thus, in different ways, all such cases belie the quasi-deflationist argument’s insistence that naivety and transparency should be unrestrictedly valid for truth unrestrictedly to fulfil the relevant expressive functions. There might however be other reasons for solving the semantic paradoxes by revising classical logic, and the paper in effect closes by offering versions of the liar paradox that rely on compelling but opacity-friendly truth-theoretic principles. (shrink)

This paper investigates how naive theories of truth fare with respect to a set of extremely plausible principles of restricted quantification. It is first shown that both nonsubstructural theories as well as certain substructural theories cannot validate all those principles. Then, pursuing further an approach to the semantic paradoxes that the author has defended elsewhere, the theory of restricted quantification available in a specific naive theory that rejects the structural property of contraction is explored. It is shown that the theory (...) validates all the principles in question, and it is argued that other prima facie plausible principles that the theory fails to validate are objectionable on independent grounds. (shrink)

Civil society consists of members obligated to respect each other’s rights and, hence, trade with each other as equals. What determines the boundary, rather than the nature, of civil society? For Adam Smith, the boundary consists of humanity itself because it is determined by identification: humans identify with other humans because of common humanness. While Smith’s theory can explain the emotions associated with justice (jubilance) and injustice (resentment), it provides a mushy ground for the boundary question: Why not extend the (...) common identity to nonhuman animals? Or why not restrict the boundary to one’s own dialect, ethnicity or race? For David Hume, the boundary need not consist of humanity itself because it is determined by self-interest: a European need not respect the property of outsiders such as Native Americans, if the European benefits more by exploiting them than including them in the European society. While Hume’s theory can provide a solid ground for the boundary question, it cannot explain the emotions associated with justice. This paper suggests a framework that combines the strengths, and avoids the shortcomings, of Smith’s and Hume’s theories. (shrink)

Objetivo: Realizar un estudio retrospectivo, descriptivo e histórico sobre la Ortodoncia en Camagüey. Método: Se revisaron las bases de datos Scielo, Cumed y documentos impresos disponibles en bibliotecas, sobre evolución de la Ortodoncia a nivel mundial, nacional y provincial. Resultados: Se analizaron los resultados según diferentes momentos: desarrollo mundial de la Ortodoncia durante el siglo XIX; práctica de la Ortodoncia en Cuba desde el siglo XIX hasta después del triunfo de la Revolución; y el desarrollo de la Ortodoncia en Camagüey. (...) Conclusiones: El triunfo revolucionario provocó profundas transformaciones en la Estomatología. Los profesores que asumieron la enseñanza contribuyeron al desarrollo del país y la formación de profesionales competentes. También fue útil la comprensión y apoyo brindado por las direcciones provincial y nacional del Ministerio de Salud Pública. Objective: To carry out a retrospective, descriptive and historical study on the beginning and development of this specialization in the county of Camagüey. Method: Documents were revised it has more than enough history and evolution of the world Orthodontics, in the country and databases Scielo, Cumed and printed documents in books and magazines in libraries. Results: Their results were analyzed according to different moments: the develop of the Orthodontics during the XIX century; practice of the Orthodontics in Cuba during the XX century before and after the victory of the Cuban revolution; year 1962 and dentistry changes in the county of Camagüey and development of the Orthodontics in the territory. Conclusions: The revolutionary victory in Cuba caused deep transformations in the dentistry. The professors that assumed the teaching in Cuba contributed to the development of the country and the formation of competent professionals with positive values. The understanding and support toasted by the provincial and national addresses of the Ministry of Public health also useful. (shrink)