This article critically evaluates current developments in marketing fair trade labelled products and "no sweat" manufactured goods, and argues that both the fair trade and ethical trade movements increasingly rely on strategies for bottom-up change, converting consumers "one cup at a time". This individualistic approach, which we call "shopping for a better world", must, we argue, be augmented by more collectivist approaches to affect transformative change. Specifically, we look at the concept of mission-driven organizations pursuing leadership roles in developing affinity (...) relationships to promote fair and ethical trade and developing ethical spaces. Increasingly, a range of organizations are restructuring their operations, so that their mission is reflected in ethical practices throughout their operations, including product sourcing and product sales. First, ethical purchasing policies operated by non-profits and public agencies represent markets through which fair/ethical products reach end consumers. The efforts discussed to create ethical spaces through direct democracy and electoral mandate build on a broad-based affinity with the principles of fair and ethical trade. Second, we explore the potential for "mission-driven" non-profit organiza- tions, such as zoos and aquaria for merging their mission of conservation education with their marketing activities through the operation of their shops and cafes. Interesting initiatives to link the conservation message to food choices is being undertaken by a number of zoos and aquaria, while there is scope for increased linkages in the giftware sold in their shops. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to highlight the clientelistic strategies and informal practices that the ruling political parties in Albania use during the elections to ensure an unfair advantage in their favour over the opposition challengers. One of the main characteristics of the political developments of the transition period in Albania since 1991 has been the flourishing of informal practices and clientelist networks of political parties within state structures, which has produced an extreme politicization of these institutions. These strategies (...) that in general terms we label as “clientelistic” and that have been used to a large extent by the incumbent political parties have had a direct negative impact on the conduct of free and fair elections in Albania by distorting their main goal: to reflect the will of the people. This is because such clientelist strategies, together with the informal practices/mechanisms that accompany them, have influenced the creation of an unlevelled playing field, and have produced a hyperincumbency advantage in the electoral contests between political parties in Albania. The case of the recent elections held in Albania on 25 April 2021 will be the empirical case of this study, in which are evidenced the electoral containment strategies and practices that the ruling political party used to provide an unfair advantage in its favour and to secure its grip on power. (shrink)

This paper aims to analyse the relationship that exists between state capture, party patronage, and the conduct of electoral processes in the settings of post-communist countries, of which Albania is one. A characteristic of the political developments of the transition period in many post-communist countries has been the phenomenon of state capture, which has occurred mainly through the endemic party patronage and politicization of state institutions. The phenomenon of state capture by the ruling political parties has had a negative (...) conditional impact on the conduct of competitive, free and fair elections in these countries, leading to distrust regarding the credibility and integrity of the process. This study argues that phenomena such as state capture and extensive party patronage as informal practices/mechanisms in the hands of the ruling political parties affect the creation of a skewed playing field and the production of hyper-incumbency advantages in holding electoral contests between political parties, making the possibility of political power rotations difficult. Albania, in the case of its last parliamentary elections, held on 25th April 2021, constitutes the case study (Section IV) to which the theoretical framework of the paper is applied, by identifying the informal practices and methods through state capture that the ruling political party used to provide structural, institutional, and financial advantages in its favour regarding elections. (shrink)

Right-wing populist parties often resort to a xenophobic rhetoric which both exploits and fuels existing illiberal anti-immigrant sentiments. Since populist anti-immigrant sentiments are at odds with fundamental liberal values and challenge the implementation of any liberal ethics of migration, this essay argues that states should adopt civic education policies to counter such sentiments and persuade citizens to develop liberal attitudes towards immigrants. Empirical evidence suggests that sentiments may be malleable, and there are already examples of local governments devising or supporting (...) initiatives aimed at dispelling prejudices and promoting positive interactions. It might be objected that a government’s involvement in shaping sentiments and opinions conflicts with liberal democratic states’ commitment to individual autonomy and electoral fairness. However, I argue that civic education policies are not necessarily incompatible with such values and I provide five criteria to identify policies that liberal democratic governments may legitimately adopt to counteract anti-immigrant sentiments. (shrink)

This article compares the ‘enfranchisement lottery’, a novel method for allocating the right to vote, with universal suffrage. The comparison is conducted exclusively on the basis of the expected consequences of the two systems. Each scheme seems to have a relative advantage. On the one hand, the enfranchisement lottery would create a better informed electorate and thus improve the quality of electoral outcomes. On the other hand, universal suffrage is more likely to ensure that elections are seen to be (...) fair, which is important for political stability. This article concludes that, on balance, universal suffrage is prima facie superior to the enfranchisement lottery. Yet the analysis shows that the instrumental case for the ‘one person, one vote’ principle is less conclusive than democratic theorists usually suppose. (shrink)

Citizenship regimes are institutionalized systems of formal and informal norms that define access to membership, as well as associated rights and duties. This paper studies illegalized migration as one of the major tests to assess whether citizenship regimes are fair institutions, based on a historical analysis of legislation meant to reduce illegalized migration in the United States between 1995 and 2022. We build our empirical research starting from a simple observation: despite the great number of bills introduced to reduce illegalized (...) migration to the US, most of such initiatives fail to become law. In fact, 93.5% of all immigration initiatives did not even pass the chamber of Congress in which they were originally presented. Such a high rate of failure shows that these proposals are motivated by electoral aspirations, rather than coming from a genuine wish to help migrants or grant them citizenship. Furthermore, there is also an economic interest that justifies the maintenance of low-cost disposable immigrant labor, with no right to citizenship. Our analysis is an example of how state regulation processes seem to work to formalize, rather than alleviate or eradicate, the precarious legal statuses of illegalized migrants. We conclude that a globalized phenomenon such as citizenship requires going beyond merely institutional and formal conceptions. We need to rethink the institutional notion of citizenship, as a merely status held under the authority of a state and consider it from a cosmopolitan perspective and a multilateral basis. But as long as citizenship remains under the responsibility of states, illegalized migrants will continue to experience precarious citizenship. (shrink)

Page 1 Informal Voting. House of Representatives. Page 4 Senate Voting. Expression of Preferences. Page 6 Voting in Subdivisions within Electorates. Page 7 New Technology outlets. Teletnarketing and internet Adverhsing authorization. Page 9 Postal Voting. Fairness and Privacy.

Nous allons revenir en détail sur certaines des « mesures de sauvetage » déjà mises en œuvre et faire un tour d’horizon des déboires de ce monde de crise 2.0, dans lequel gouvernements, ménages et acteurs de la finance s’efforcent tous de réduire leur niveau d’endettement. Les résultats de cette situation sont sans appel : stagnation, chômage, démantèlement de l’État-providence et arrivée de coalitions de technocrates sans mandat électoral. Des stratégies de résistance doivent être mises en œuvre pour traiter efficacement (...) les causes sous-jacentes de la crise. Nous appelons de nos vœux une expansion de la demande globale rendue possible par la hausse des rémunérations dans les pays à bas salaires, des annulations de dettes dans les pays pauvres comme dans les plus riches, de nouveaux mécanismes de protection sociale et des structures financières mises au service de l’intérêt public. (shrink)

‘Epistocracy’ is the name of a type of political power structure in which the power is held by the knowledgable—for example, by restricting the right to vote to those who can demonstrate sufficient knowledge. Though Plato and Mill defended epistocratic views, it has found few contemporary advocates. In a recent book, however, Jason Brennan argues that epistocratic power structures are capable of outperforming democratic ones. His argument is two-pronged: first, he argues that democratic procedures with universal suffrage allow poorly-informed voters (...) to pollute the electorate, and that doing so has negative policy-related consequences that are easily avoidable. Second, he argues that voting does not possess any non-intrinsic value, and so restricting suffrage to the educated does not result in a loss of status or standing for less well-educated persons in any meaningful way. I argue that epistocratic techniques are impossible to implement fairly, and represent an ineffective solution for the problems they are designed to solve. On these bases, I recommend rejecting it. (shrink)

Perhaps this explains why Bristol has just one memorial to Burke, a statue in Colston Avenue erected in 1894. But if Burke's connection to Bristol was fairly short-lived, it is one that will endure in the collective memory, not least because of his Speech to the Electors of Bristol of 1774. On the day of his election Burke famously argued against the idea that an MP is just the delegate of his electorate: Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from (...) different and hostile interests; which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where, not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole. You choose a member indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of parliament. The speech is cited in constitutional and political argument to this day. That it was made in Bristol makes it part of the city's history and heritage. Burke is by far the most distinguished political figure ever to have represented the city, and he is certainly the one with the most enduring international reputation. (shrink)

After four years of a so called «Rainbow» coalition, which had the support of the Socialists, the Liberals and the Greens, the electorate rewarded the first two political families and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Greens. The latter lost nearly 60 % of their electorate, which had occurred only once before to a political party since the introduction of universal suffrage in Belgium in 1919. The outcome of the elections is fairly similar in the three regions of the country.In (...) Flanders, the Socialists progress by more than 8 %, reaping the benefits of the alliance formed with «Spirit», one of the successor parties of the former Volksunie. Half of the Socialists' progress can be attributed to this effect. Moreover, the Socialist party started off from an absolute low hit in 1999 and has not regained its top scores of the 1960s. The advance of the Liberal VLD is more modest,, but it followed upon excellent previous results. With some 25 % of the vote, the VLD, which is the first party in Flanders, has reached an absolute high.Conversely, the Christian Democrats of the CD&V slightly regress, thereby continuing a downward trend. These results take them to their historical low, and make them into Flanders ' third party, with some 21.9 % of the vote. Agalev, the Green party, no langer has any representation in parliarnent and falls back from11 to 3.85 %. The far right, the Vlaams Blok, continues its advance and reaches 17,86 %, an increase of2,5 %.In Wallonia too one observes a significant advance of the Socialists. The PS remains the first party in the South of the country with 36.39 % of the vote, progressing by 7 %. It exceeds all its results of the previous twelve years, without however reaching its earlier highs. The Liberals of the Mouvement Réformateur gain 3.65 % and are at their historical high with 28.38 % of the vote. The Christian Democrats, under the denomination CDH slip back by some 1.5 %, but this decline is almost equivalent to the result of a dissident list of the CDH, which had wanted to maintain «christian» as a reference. This doesn't alter the fact that the Christian Democrats have also reached their all time low.The Greens, Ecolo, lose some 57 % of their vote and stand at 7.45 %. In contrast with 1999, one observes a slight advance ofthe Front National, a far right party, that only obtained 5.56 % of the vote however. With the exception ofan increase in the French and a decline in the Flemish vote, the Brussels districts show the same characteristics as the two other regions of the country; a very significant advance of the Socialists, a slight increase in the Liberal vote, the collapse of the Greens; the status quo ofthe Christian Democrats and an advance of the far right with almost 2 %.The 2003 election therefore seems to be a correction on the 1999 one, where the advance of the greens had been amplified by the dioxineJood scare. But the width of the swing makes it into one of the elections where the volatility of the vote will have been the highest. (shrink)

Much discussion of the ethics of participation focuses on electoral participation and whether citizens are obligated or can be coerced to vote. Yet these debates have ignored that citizens must first pay attention to politics and make up their minds about where they stand before they can engage in any form of participation. This article considers the importance for liberal democracy of citizens paying attention to politics, or attentive citizenship. It argues that the democratic state has an obligation to (...) cultivate interest in politics and that this obligation authorizes means up to and including some forms of coercion. The argument is that when citizens are inattentive to politics, it undermines political equality and social justice because it undermines what John Rawls called the fair value of the political liberties. The importance of these ends for liberal democratic states requires them to take steps to promote attentive citizenship. (shrink)

A central challenge common to democratic processes is the inability of citizens to reach agreement on any given matter. Most frequently these disagreements are settled by vote, victory going to the majority. But majority rule is a fairly recent technique. Traditionally decisions were made by some form of non-opposition. This paper describes several versions of that decision-making technique and then shows how mediation methods, also known as “ADR”, can replicate these traditional ways of overcoming disagreement. The paper argues that these (...) techniques are frequently superior to electoral methods of reaching agreement. (shrink)

Ever since the great Florida meltdown in the presidential election of 2000, Americans have had reason to suspect they may not, after all, live in the greatest democracy on the planet. We have seen breakdowns at every level of the system, from voter registration to voting machine software to provisional balloting to dubious purges of supposedly ineligible voters. Despite the lip service paid to the genius of the American system, the reality is that elections in this country have rarely been (...) about transparency and fair play; they are not about who deserves to win so much as how much each side is prepared to do to push and scrape its way over the finish line. The United States has a history of electoral malfeasance and fraud unrivalled in the rest of the western world -- a result of the unique circumstances of its democratic deve;lopment. Its claims to democratic greatness are themselves fraudulent, and now subject to closer scrutiny than ever before. (shrink)

Institutions to address short-termism in public policymaking and to more suitably discharge our duties toward future generations have elicited much recent normative research, which this chapter surveys. It focuses on two prominent institutions: insulating devices, which seek to mitigate short-termist electoral pressures by transferring authority away to independent bodies, and constraining devices, which seek to bind elected officials to intergenerationally fair rules from which deviation is costly. The chapter first discusses sufficientarian, egalitarian, and prioritarian theories of our duties toward (...) future generations, and how an excessive focus on the short term in policymaking may hinder that such duties be fulfilled. It then surveys constraining and insulating devices, and inspects their effectiveness to address the epistemic, motivational, and institutional drivers of political short-termism as well as their intra- and intergenerational legitimacy. (shrink)

Élie HALÉVY (1870-1937), philosophe et historien des idées, fut professeur à l'École libre des sciences politiques, l'ancêtre de l'actuel Sciences Po. Comme son autre grand ouvrage, l'Histoire du peuple anglais au XIXe siècle, paru en six tomes de 1913 à 1932, les trois tomes de La formation du radicalisme philosophique, parus en 1901 pour les deux premiers et en 1904 pour le troisième, reflètent pour partie ses enseignements de l'Ecole libre consacrés à l'histoire britannique. Le premier tome, La jeunesse de (...) Bentham 1776-1789, étudie la doctrine utilitariste non seulement chez celui qu'on regarde comme son fondateur principal, Jeremy Bentham, mais aussi chez les nombreux auteurs qui, en Grande-Bretagne et sur le continent, en dessinèrent avant lui les contours. Le deuxième tome, L’évolution de la doctrine utilitaire de 1789 à 1815, montre comment l'utilitarisme revêtit la forme non seulement d'une école de pensée, mais aussi d'un mouvement pour la réforme économique, sociale et politique. Le rôle coordonnateur nouveau de James Mill, ainsi qu'une convergence de vues avec les économistes, qui poussaient dans le sens des réformes, marquèrent notamment cette évolution. Le troisième tome, Le radicalisme philosophique, continue d'étudier la transformation de l'école en mouvement après la fin des guerres napoléoniennes, lorsque celle-ci commence à engranger ses premiers grands succès réformistes. Bentham, James Mill et les autres penseurs utilitaires sont alors réunis sous l'appellation de philosophic radicals. Le terme temporel de l'ouvrage est le Reform Act de 1932, première étape vers la modernisation du système électoral, que la propagande de ce groupe ne contribua pas peu à faire aboutir. Quoique l'ouvrage d'Halévy vaille en premier lieu par l'immense savoir qu'il déploie, et le nombre et l'excellence des citations qu'il propose, il comporte aussi des thèses historiques et philosophiques originales. On peut citer parmi les premières la thèse, qui relie les trois tomes, voulant que l'utilitarisme britannique trouve sa forme achevée dans l'intervention sur la société, lorsqu'il se mue en radicalisme philosophique, et parmi les secondes, la thèse, énoncée au début du premier tome, voulant qu'il existe trois modèles dominants de jonction des intérêts individuels (la fusion sympathique, l'identification naturelle et l'identification artificielle). Une autre grande thèse, à la fois historique et philosophique, affirme en substance que l'économie politique classique serait un département spécialisé de la pensée utilitaire. La question de savoir jusqu'à quel point Smith, Ricardo et Malthus ont pu adhérer au "principe d'utilité" de Bentham est toujours débattue. En même temps que les élucidations apportées à ce principe, elle contribue à expliquer l'intérêt que les historiens de la pensée économique continuent de porter à l'ouvrage. La réédition de La formation du radicalisme philosophique par les Presses Universitaires de France (P.U.F.) a impliqué un effort collectif. Monique Canto-Sperber en a conçu l'idée et assumé la direction, et l'ouvrage a paru en 1995 dans la collection Philosophie morale dont elle avait alors la responsabilité aux P.U.F. Chacun des trois tomes s'accompagne d'une postface, confiée au philosophe Jean-Pierre Dupuy pour le premier, au politologue Pierre Bouretz pour le second, et à l'économiste Philippe Mongin pour le troisième. Un travail de grande ampleur a été requis, d'une part, pour localiser les références de Halévy dans des sources plus récentes que celles dont il disposait, en particulier, s'agissant de Bentham, dans l'édition toujours en cours de ses œuvres, et d'autre part, pour traduire les très nombreux passages que Halévy citait en langue anglaise. Sophie Jallais et Mary Sokol se sont chargées de la première tâche et Jean-Pierre Cléro de la seconde. Prise après quelques années de circulation de l'ouvrage, la décision des P.U.F. d'en pilonner les exemplaires que ses responsables ne rachèteraient pas a semblé compromettre ce vaste travail. Mais grâce aux efforts du site québécois Les classiques des sciences sociales, et de son directeur Jean-Marie Tremblay, il est devenu possible d'accéder aux trois tomes électroniquement. Les adresses en sont : http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/halevy_elie/radicalisme_philo_t1/radicalisme_philo_t1.html http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/halevy_elie/radicalisme_philo_t2/radicalisme_philo_t2.html http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/halevy_elie/radicalisme_philo_t3/radicalisme_philo_t3.html Avant la réédition de 1995, l'ouvrage de Halévy n'était facilement accessible que grâce à la traduction anglaise plusieurs fois rééditée de Mary Morris, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, New York, Macmillan, 1928. (shrink)

This Paper is divided into three sections. In the first section I provide a brief historical overview of Hindu-Muslim relations in India and of the condition of Indian Muslims today. I conclude by claiming that Indian Muslims are a marginalized minority who have been persistently underrepresented in political institutions, particularly in the Indian Parliament. This section is important for those who are less informed about these issues—and I assume that most readers fall in this category. In the second section, I (...) examine the case for political representation for Muslims. This was a much debated issue in pre-independent India. It was debated with subtlety and in considerable detail in the Constituent Assembly debates on the Indian constitution. However, with the partition of the country and the formation of the separate state of Pakistan, all debate on the political representation of Muslims ceased. I examine the merits and demerits of the case for the political representation of Indian Muslims. I also attempt a brief explanation of why this issue has virtually disappeared from the public arena in India. I conclude in the section that although political representation of Muslims qua Muslims is desirable, it is still unfeasible in the prevailing situation in India. In other words, I would support the recommendation to the Indian State that political rights not to be granted to any religious community. If political theory was to remain a handmaiden of state policy, then the matter ends right here. However, since I believe that political theory must think for the long run and design just institutions and policies for the future, and since, there is, I claim, no principled objection to the political representation of Muslims, in the third and final section I briefly outline which of the several electoral mechanisms are best suited to ensure fair political representation for Muslims in the future. In my view, the principle of fair political representation for Indian Muslims is best fulfilled by a complex mechanism consisting of preferential voting in multi-member constituencies with intra-party quotas in proportion to the overall population of Muslims in the country. (shrink)

I aim to analyze in this dissertation what a desirable basic institutional structure looks like from the perspective of rationality. While the main topic is thus normative in nature, I start by clarifying in the first part what the notion of rationality exactly entails. I do so by focusing explicitly on the economic conception of rationality, according to which a rational individual is motivated to serve his self-interest on the basis of cost-benefit calculations. Such a Homo Economicus is characterized by (...) his intentional and instrumental actions, his perfectly informed beliefs and his exogenously given and egoistic preferences. In my view, however, this model is inadequate if one aims to understand what it means to be rational. The requirements that actions should be instrumental, beliefs should be based on perfect information and preferences should be exogenously given and egoistic in nature turn out to be overly demanding in this respect. That is why I propose to drop these assumptions in what I label the minimal conception of rationality. Since the latter turns out to be very formal indeed, I propose two further alternatives, which focus not so much on the choice of means to achieve certain goals, as they focus on the choice of these goals themselves. According to the first, broad conception, actions are rational if they are based on good reasons, which are further qualified as well-informed beliefs and autonomous preferences. According to the second, expressive conception, actions, beliefs and preferences are rational if they express the things the individual at hand cares about. The latter requires that individuals can reflect upon and identify with their reasons, which implies a capacity to reflect upon and distance themselves from their own bundle of preferences. In the second part of this dissertation, I try to show the value and limitations of these conceptions by applying them to the context of large-scaled elections. In this respect, it becomes immediately clear that the economic conception fails to explain why quite a lot of people go out and vote. After all, since a single vote has only an infinitesimal impact on the electoral result, it does not enable people to serve their interests or realize their goals. This leads to the so-called voting paradox, according to which no rational individual will decide to vote. The standard solution is to assume that individuals vote because they derive satisfaction from the very act itself. However, this strategy is rather ‘ad hoc’ and does not explain how people vote once they find themselves inside the voting booth. The expressive conception of rationality does better in this respect. It suggests that people vote because they care about democracy in general or about a specific political candidate or ideology. Since they conceive of themselves as being a good citizen, they express this aspect of their identity by going out to vote. In the third part of this dissertation, I analyze more fully the normative implications of the different conceptions of rationality. More specifically, I try to answer the question which basic institutional structure is desirable if one assumes that people are by and large rational. This immediately shows that both the normative issue and the explanatory issue are closely connected. In my view, proposals regarding institutional design and reform should be based on empirically adequate models of individual actions and motivations. This search for a realistic utopia goes against the conventional strategy of most economists. They rely on the Homo Economicus model, even if this fails to explain individual behavior. To explain more fully what the normative implications are of the counterfactual assumption that all people are economically rational, I focus on the work of James Buchanan. In his theory of constitutional choice, he argues in favor of a minimal state whose only task is to make sure that the market functions properly. Buchanan thus favors strict constitutional limitations for governments, which tend to expand beyond legitimate borders as soon as politicians and public servants are allowed to serve their own interests. In my view, however, the abovementioned criticisms of the Homo Economicus model have theoretical as well as normative implications. After all, the empirically supported fact that a majority of individuals does not act in economically rational ways creates more room for legitimate government intervention. Expressively rational citizens will, for example, more easily agree on the necessity and desirability of a collective provision of certain public goods. In addition, expressively rational politicians and public servants can be more easily trusted to serve the public interest rather than their narrowly defined self-interest. As an alternative to Buchanan’s one-sided focus on economic rationality and the market, I focus on the work of Samuel Bowles en Herbert Gintis. More specifically, I explore their work on the phenomenon of strong reciprocity, which refers to the widespread tendency of people to reward prosocial behavior and punish antisocial behavior, even if this is costly for themselves. Since this is clearly economically irrational, Bowles and Gintis propose to complement the Homo Economicus model with the Homo Reciprocans model. This model, which comes close to the expressive conception of rationality, is able to incorporate the insight that social norms surrounding reciprocity, cooperation and fairness are crucial in regulating interactions. At the normative level, Bowles and Gintis stress that such norms often lead to socially desirable outcomes, since they enable people to live in harmony without relying on coercive and costly government interventions. This suggests that the debate between proponents of the market on the one hand and the state on the other hand neglects the importance of communities where people spontaneously interact on the basis of generally prosocial norms. As such, the insights of Bowles and Gintis lead to a defense of a basic institutional structure in which markets, states and communities mutually complement and reinforce each other. They also justify a general optimism as regards to the capacity and motivation of people to try and improve the rules and institutions that govern their everyday lives. (shrink)

The debate on political constitutionalism has entirely neglected the constitution-making dimension. This is probably due to the fact that constitution-making usually brings with it undesirable outcomes such as the entrenchment of rights or structures. These outcomes do not respect reasonable disagreement among citizens because they violate the only fair system for settling disagreement: majority rule and equal voting rights. This article argues that political constitutionalists may regret the absence of any claim about constitution-making. Either they are overlooking certain problems inherent (...) to the electoral process that is supposed to tackle disagreement or, even worse, they are downplaying the entrenching effect of ordinary political processes by ignoring the redemptive properties of constituent power. In both cases, their claims undermine the political dimension of constitutionalism. (shrink)

Politics stoutly resists efforts to meet dire threats to human survival, such as climate change, industrial poisons, and "natural" disasters. This book seizes on new discoveries of nature's interconnective ways to demand politics and government without violence, fair and equal access to the ballot box, dialogue across differences, and electoral action from the ground up by an independent political party.

This article investigates reasons to participate in non-deterministic elections, where the outcomes incorporate elements of chance beyond mere tie-breaking. The background context situates this inquiry within democratic theory, specifically non-deterministic voting systems, which promise to re-evaluate fairness and power distribution among voting blocs. This study aims to explore the normative implications of such electoral systems and their impact on our moral duty to vote. We analyze instrumental reasons for voting, including prudential and act-consequentialist arguments, alongside non-instrumental reasons, assessing (...) their validity in the context of non-deterministic systems. The results indicate that non-deterministic elections could strengthen the case for voting based on prudential and act-consequentialist grounds due to their proportional nature and the increased influence of each vote. We conclude that, while non-deterministic elections strengthen our duty to vote overall, they do not strengthen it for all the arguments in the literature. This paper contributes to the discourse on electoral systems by critically evaluating the moral obligation to vote in non-deterministic elections. (shrink)

Is voting a duty of democratic citizenship? This article advances a new argument for the existence of a duty to vote. It argues that every normative account of electoral representation requires universal turnout to function in line with its own internal normative logic. This generates a special obligation for citizens to vote in electoral representative contexts as a function of the role morality of democratic citizenship. Because voting uniquely authorizes office holding in representative democracies, and because universal turnout (...) contributes powerfully to representation being fair, to be a good citizen of such democracies requires one to vote. Whereas previous arguments for a duty to vote have invoked basic moral principles like fairness or a Samaritan duty of rescue, this account is based on citizens occupying a vital functional role within electoral representative institutions. This institutional duty solves the “specificity problem” of justifying a duty to vote better than competing accounts and also immunizes the duty to objections that there is no duty to vote when there are only bad choices and that there is a no duty to vote but rather duty to vote well. By emphasizing the tight connection between institutions and individual conduct, the role morality approach used here supplies a less abstract and more realistic framework than much previous research on the ethics of democratic citizenship and brings the debate closer to constitutive features of democratic politics. (shrink)

Élie HALÉVY (1870-1937), philosophe et historien des idées, fut professeur à l'École libre des sciences politiques, l'ancêtre de l'actuel Sciences Po. Comme son autre grand ouvrage, l'Histoire du peuple anglais au XIXe siècle, paru en six tomes de 1913 à 1932, les trois tomes de La formation du radicalisme philosophique, parus en 1901 pour les deux premiers et en 1904 pour le troisième, reflètent pour partie ses enseignements de l'Ecole libre consacrés à l'histoire britannique. Le premier tome, La jeunesse de (...) Bentham 1776-1789, étudie la doctrine utilitariste non seulement chez celui qu'on regarde comme son fondateur principal, Jeremy Bentham, mais aussi chez les nombreux auteurs qui, en Grande-Bretagne et sur le continent, en dessinèrent avant lui les contours. Le deuxième tome, L’évolution de la doctrine utilitaire de 1789 à 1815, montre comment l'utilitarisme revêtit la forme non seulement d'une école de pensée, mais aussi d'un mouvement pour la réforme économique, sociale et politique. Le rôle coordonnateur nouveau de James Mill, ainsi qu'une convergence de vues avec les économistes, qui poussaient dans le sens des réformes, marquèrent notamment cette évolution. Le troisième tome, Le radicalisme philosophique, continue d'étudier la transformation de l'école en mouvement après la fin des guerres napoléoniennes, lorsque celle-ci commence à engranger ses premiers grands succès réformistes. Bentham, James Mill et les autres penseurs utilitaires sont alors réunis sous l'appellation de philosophic radicals. Le terme temporel de l'ouvrage est le Reform Act de 1832, première étape vers la modernisation du système électoral, que la propagande de ce groupe ne contribua pas peu à faire aboutir. Quoique l'ouvrage d'Halévy vaille en premier lieu par l'immense savoir qu'il déploie, et le nombre et l'excellence des citations qu'il propose, il comporte aussi des thèses historiques et philosophiques originales. On peut citer parmi les premières la thèse, qui relie les trois tomes, voulant que l'utilitarisme britannique trouve sa forme achevée dans l'intervention sur la société, lorsqu'il se mue en radicalisme philosophique, et parmi les secondes, la thèse, énoncée au début du premier tome, voulant qu'il existe trois modèles dominants de jonction des intérêts individuels (la fusion sympathique, l'identification naturelle et l'identification artificielle). Une autre grande thèse, à la fois historique et philosophique, affirme en substance que l'économie politique classique serait un département spécialisé de la pensée utilitaire. La question de savoir jusqu'à quel point Smith, Ricardo et Malthus ont pu adhérer au "principe d'utilité" de Bentham est toujours débattue. En même temps que les élucidations apportées à ce principe, elle contribue à expliquer l'intérêt que les historiens de la pensée économique continuent de porter à l'ouvrage. L'auteur a participé à la réédition de La formation du radicalisme philosophique en 1995 par les Presses Universitaires de France (P.U.F.), suivant un projet collectif lancé par Monique Canto-Sperber. Dans le présent article, antérieur à cette réédition, l'auteur tentait de résumer brièvement un livre qui demeure irremplaçable en dépit d'une conception et d'un style quelque peu datés. (shrink)

This year is the centenary of the birth of philosopher John Rawls and the semi-centenary of his monumental A Theory of Justice. This essay explores the differences between political opposition and political resistance as reflected in his work. Rawls is remembered for the careful conditions he imposed in the Vietnam-War era upon justifiable civil disobedience in “nearly just” societies. It is less well known that he came to regard the United States as a fundamentally unjust society. The nation has shown (...) itself not merely unserious about political equality—the cornerstone of Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness—but hostile to it. The Supreme Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence sanctifies spending as speech and denies Congress the power to try to level the electoral playing field. In the Supreme Court’s Constitution, substantive political equality is of no value. The upshot is that civil disobedience, conceived as an appeal to a just constitution, is no longer possible in the United States. Political resistance may be permissible, however, within the bounds of right, “in such ways as promise some success.” This essay ekes out Rawls’s suggestive remarks about the justification of political resistance and attempts to extend them to current conditions. (shrink)

Procedural approaches to political legitimacy have become increasingly popular amongst liberals. According to such an approach, the legitimacy of a state decision is primarily derived from the processes followed in order to make that decision and not from the quality of the decision itself. The processes that liberals have in mind are typically those found within a system of democratic institutions. These electoral and legislative procedures are supposed to allow the state’s constitutive members to reach legitimately binding agreements on (...) how the state should exercise its power. In response to this trend in liberalism, this dissertation has two goals. The first is to argue that formal results in the social decision sciences seriously question the viability of these procedural approaches. The second goal, however, is to argue that these results do not necessitate complete abandonment of procedural approaches but require liberals to more carefully specify the sorts of agreements that legitimacy requires and what procedures may reliably produce such agreements. I ultimately agree that procedures are important for liberalism but they require more careful understanding and defense. In order to carry this project out, this dissertation is divided into five chapters. In the first two chapters, I outline a fairly standard account of liberalism while arguing that it contains a serious tension that liberal democratic institutions are supposed to resolve. The second chapter in particular seeks to explain the various ways in which the procedural aspects of democracy are particularly appealing in this respect. In the third chapter, I then present Arrow’s famous impossibility result along with other formal result from social choice theory suggesting that in certain situations there simply is no correct procedure for legitimate outcomes that the liberal state may employ. The fourth chapter responds to this concern by maintaining that there exists a symmetry between how an individual person and the liberal state make decisions, and that insights into individual decision making sheds light on how it may be done by a group of people in a liberal democracy. Finally, in the fifth chapter, I move in this direction by presenting an account of the sort of agreements between individuals that legitimacy ought to be grounded upon. Ultimately, procedures like voting remain an important aspect of liberal democracy for authorizing state action, though not necessarily for the reasons that many liberal democrats endorse. (shrink)

National Baha’i elections, conducted world-wide without nominations, competitive campaigns, or parties, challenge the emerging consensus that the only truly democratic elections are multiparty elections in which each party’s candidates compete freely for votes. National Baha’i electoral institutions are based on three core values: respect for the inherent dignity of each person, the unity and solidarity of persons collectively, and the justice and fairness of institutions. While liberal political philosophy interprets respect for dignity exclusively in terms of equality and (...) freedom, the Baha’i model interprets dignity to require respect for the equality, freedom, and nobility of each person. The perfectionist focus on nobility helps explain the distinct features of national Baha’i elections and, in particular, the ban on campaigning. In light of ongoing concerns about the character of the electoral process in actually existing democracies, further research into Baha’i elections and their philosophical foundations provides a promising basis for rethinking widely held liberal assumptions about how democratic elections must be conducted. (shrink)

Power consists in the capacity of A to command B, even against B's wishes, whether directly or indirectly. Questions to do with who possesses it and in what degree are obscured by inflationary shifts of definition (as where power encompasses action as such, or right action, or co?operation). These misjudged moves are generally marked by the assumption that democracy displaces power. But if democracy ultimately persists as a voting procedure, its object is to create power?holders. Democracy may endorse three (...) class='Hi'>electoral principles: (a) majority rule, or (b) enhanced majority rule, or (c) unanimity. Its commonest electoral device is (a), but its strongest moral defence for (a) implicitly is (c), which legitimates forms of (d) veto and forms of minority rule. If (d) is fair, this need not follow from (a). Nor is (a) right in virtue of superior power. Democracy is commonly a combination of (a) plus (e) defence of individual and corporate rights. But this combination, while apt and convenient, is not incontestably coherent. Despite growing support for deliberation over election, if democracy must be impelled by (a), thus far does it sustain, not topple, power. If power persists more stably under democracies than elsewhere, sustained caution in regard to its supposed ?circularization? is fully warranted. (shrink)

There has been a lack of research into candidate selection outside the developed world. In this paper we attempt to fill this gap, with a detailed examination of the factors leading to the introduction of party primaries, their operations and their future prospects, in a third wave democracy, Taiwan. Although Taiwan is a late democratizer, the high degree of party institutionalization makes it more appropriate to compare its nomination system with those of older political parties, we particularly contrast it with (...) the leading German and British political parties. Our discussion also finds many similar trends with developments of intra-party democracy in European parties, particularly in terms of a decentralization of candidate selection and reduced mediation between party centre and members. In addition, despite technical changes in electoral campaigning, parties in Taiwan have not abandoned the mass membership model. In Taiwan, direct primary elections have been a controversial subject. By analyzing relevant data, we argue that the core problem of the party primary was its lack of fairness, because party cadres tried to monopolize the candidate selection and thus failed to remain neutral. We find signs that leaders in all parties are wary of allowing inner party democracy to go too far and losing their control over nomination. When the party centre fears the wrong candidates will be selected, they are prepared to manipulate the rules in their favour or re-centralize the selection process. (shrink)

Recently, political models which employ lottery-selection instead of ballot voting have been proposed. Proponents argue that such lottocratic models can improve the representation of the population and reduce undemocratic influences. In this paper, I argue that these proposals also satisfy the egalitarian requirement of democracy. I claim that having an equal chance to be selected by lot is equally egalitarian as having an equally weighed vote for two reasons: first, having a chance to be selected by lot satisfies the requirement (...) for political justice better than electoral democracy, and second, it provides citizens with equal political influence and not merely equal impact. (shrink)

Three recent research reports by Topping and Trickey, by Fair and colleagues, and by Gorard, Siddiqui and Huat See have produced data that support the conclusion that a Philosophy for Children program of one-hour-per-week structured discussions has a marked positive impact on students. This article presents data from a follow up study done three years after the completion of the study reported in Fair et al.. The data show that the positive gains in scores on the Cognitive Abilities Test were (...) still present and had not faded after three years. Given the strength of these confirmations of the positive durable impact of the P4C program of structured discussions and given the relatively low cost of implementing the P4C program, it is recommended that it become a standard part of the school curriculum. (shrink)

En este trabajo se intenta elaborar una indagación epistemológica crítica que contribuya a enriquecer al debate sobre la posibilidad o imposibilidad de abordar los fenómenos de las ciencias sociales y humanísticas de una manera neutral y/o objetiva.. A partir de un enfoque centrado en la teoría post-estructuralista francesa y, más específicamente, en los aportes brindados por el psicoanálisis lacaniano, se concluirá que el psicoanálisis, en su vertiente lacaniana, y retomado de un modo distinto por otros autores, como Zizek, ha mostrado (...) de una manera consistente que este supuesto objetivismo no es más que un imposible. La realidad objetiva no puede ser más que una utopía, en tanto toda realidad es construida por un lenguaje, un orden simbólico, que es contingente y, por lo tanto, relativo. Sin caer en un mero relativismo de los actuales enfoques “posmodernos”, que no exista la Verdad con mayúscula no implica que no existan verdades a medias, “minoradas”, como las denomina Lacan en su obra.Palabras clave: Objetividad, neutralidad valorativa, pos-estructuralismo lacaniano, ciencia sociales y humanísticas.This work tries to elaborate a critical epistemological inquiry that enriches the debate about the possibility or impossibility of approaching social and human science phenomena in a neutral and/or objective way. Starting from a view based on French post-structuralist theory, and more specifically, on contributions from Lacanian psychoanalysis, conclusions will be that psychoanalysis, at least Lacanian psychoanalysis, taken up again in a different way by other authors such as Zizek, has consistently shown that this supposed objectivism is impossible. Objective reality can be no more than a utopia, because all reality is constructed by a language, a symbolic order which is contingent, therefore relative. Without falling into postmodern relativism, the fact that there is no Truth with a capital letter does not imply that there are no truths.Key words: Objectivity, valuative neutrality, Lacanian post-structuralism, social and human sciences. (shrink)

En los últimos 30 años asistimos a un drástico proceso de cambio que ha modificado profundamente los parámetros con los que se guiaba la relación entre el Estado y la Sociedad civil. Este proceso, ligado a la hegemonización mundial del neoliberalismo, ha generado intensas transformaciones en los diversos campos. Este artículo se propone indagar en esas transformaciones. Para ello, examina las características principales que definen a este paradigma, dando cuenta de la apropiación que han hecho sus principales teóricos del concepto (...) de globalización. En segundo término, analiza los efectos que sus políticas han provocado en la política, la economía, la cultura y la sociedad. Se sostiene que el éxito del “sistema global neoliberal” reside en que ha logrado despolitizar en gran medida a la sociedad y a su propio discurso. En este sentido, se coloca el eje en sus efectos de despolitización, en particular durante la década del noventa, fase critica del sistema. En el tramo final, se pregunta acerca de las alternativas surgidas en las nuevas democracias latinoamericanas al modelo de globalización neoliberal. (shrink)

Three recent research reports by Topping and Trickey, by Fair and colleagues, and by Gorard, Siddiqui and Huat See have produced data that support the conclusion that a Philosophy for Children program of one-hour-per-week structured discussions has a marked positive impact on students. This article presents data from a follow up study done three years after the completion of the study reported in Fair et al.. The data show that the positive gains in scores on the Cognitive Abilities Test were (...) still present and had not faded after three years. Given the strength of these confirmations of the positive durable impact of the P4C program of structured discussions and given the relatively low cost of implementing the P4C program, it is recommended that it become a standard part of the school curriculum. (shrink)

Resumen: Este artículo analiza cómo se encadenan los planos de lo ontológico y lo óntico en la Teoría Política del Discurso de Ernesto Laclau. Se concluye que, desde el plano ontológico, la hegemonía constituye una forma político-discursiva de articulación y universalización relativa, precaria, contingente y parcial de los particularismos en significantes vacíos que actúan como puntos nodales. Desde el nivel fenoménico-político, Laclau pone en juego estos conceptos para mostrar el desplazamiento y contaminación discursiva entre lo particular y lo universal en (...) la operación hegemónica, que transforma las identidades políticas y construye un orden comunitario y un nuevo sentido común. Desde el nivel ético-político, la conceptualización de la hegemonía se articula a la construcción discursiva de una estrategia socialista y a una democracia radical. Este proyecto político lucha contra los esencialismos y las formas de explotación y opresión social y por un horizonte de liberación que amalgame las luchas de los grupos subordinados y reconozca las diferencias y particularidades como constitutivas y deseables. La teoría formal del populismo presenta algunas inconsistencias óntico-ontológicas en este esquema. Sin embargo, su sobredeterminación simbólica disuelve las disyunciones tajantes entre la lógica y el análisis histórico-político y entre la forma y el contenido. Ello pone de manifiesto el mutuo anudamiento entre lo óntico y lo ontológico y la centralidad de la noción gramsciana de hegemonía para el análisis político y crítico de fenómenos y procesos históricos contemporáneos.: This article analyzes how the ontological and ontic planes are interconnected in Laclau’s political discourse theory. It is concluded that, on the ontological level, hegemony constitutes a political-discursive form of relative, precarious, contingent and partial universalization and articulation of particularities in empty signifiers that act as nodal points. On the phenomenological-political level, Laclau shows the displacement and discursive contamination between the particular and the universal in the hegemonic operation which transforms political identities and builds a communitarian order and a new commonality. On the ethical-political level, the conceptualization of hegemony is articulated as the discursive construction of a socialist strategy and a radical democracy. This political project fights against essentialisms and forms of exploitation and social oppression of subordinate groups, and in favor of a horizon of liberation that recognizes conflicts and differences as constitutive and desirable. The formal theory of populism presents some ontic-ontological inconsistencies in this scheme. However, its symbolic overdetermination dissolves the disjunctions between logic and historical-political analysis and between form and content. This reveals the mutual interconnection between the ontic and the ontological, and the central relevance of the Gramscian notion of hegemony for the political and critical analysis of contemporary historical phenomena and processes. (shrink)

Recently, unrestrained consequentialism has been defended against the charge that it leads to unacceptable trade-offs by showing a tradeoff accepted by many of us is not justified by any of the usual nonconsequenlist arguments. The particular trade-off involves raising the speed limit on the Interstate Highway System. As a society, we seemingly accept a trade-off of lives for convenience. This defense of consequentialism may be a tu quoque, but it does challenge nonconsequentialists to adequately justify a multitude of social decisions. (...) Work by the deontologist Frances Kamm, conjoined with a perspective deployed by several economists on the relation between social costs and lives lost, is relevant. It provides a starting point by justifying decisions which involve trading lives only for other lives. But the perspective also recognizes that using resources in excess of some figure to save a life causes us to forego other live-saving activities, thus causing a net loss of life. Setting a speed limit as low as 35 miles per hour might indeed save some lives, but the loss of productivity due to the increased time spent in travel would cost an even greater number of lives. Therefore, many trade-offs do not simply involve trading lives for some lesser value, but are justified as allowing some to die in order to save a greater number. (shrink)

Causation has traditionally been analyzed either as a relation of nomic dependence or as a relation of counterfactual dependence. I argue for a third program, a physicalistic reduction of the causal relation to one of energy-momentum transference in the technical sense of physics. This physicalistic analysis is argued to have the virtues of easily handling the standard counterexamples to the nomic and counterfactual analyses, offering a plausible epistemology for our knowledge of causes, and elucidating the nature of the relation between (...) causation and physical science. (shrink)

In this article we report the findings of a randomised control clinical trial that assessed the impact of a Philosophy for Children program and replicated a previous study conducted in Scotland by Topping and Trickey. A Cognitive Abilities Test was administered as a pretest and a posttest to randomly selected experimental groups and control groups. The students in the experimental group engaged in philosophy lessons in a setting of structured, collaborative inquiry in their language arts classes for one hour per (...) week for a number of weeks. The control group received the standard language arts curriculum in that one hour. The study found that the seventh grade students who had experienced the P4C program showed significant gains relative to those in the seventh grade control group at a high level of statistical significance, but the eighth grade students in the experimental group did not show such gains over the eighth grade control group. It was discovered that the seventh grade teachers started the program early in the school year and continued it for a period of 22 to 26 weeks, while the eighth grade teachers started much later and used the program for only 4 to 10 weeks. Our findings suggest that the P4C program must involve students in activities for a significant period of time before the program shows results, but that a meaningful impact on students’ cognitive abilities can be achieved in about 24 weeks of lessons, less than half the time evidenced by the study by Topping and Trickey. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhism, Christianity, and Modern Science:A Response to Masao AbeFrank FairAfter number of years of teaching philosophy of science, a few years ago I took up the challenge of teaching philosophy of religion. As one might imagine, it has always seemed to me to be important that our religious convictions harmonize with our best scientific knowledge of how the world works, and this became a more interesting issue when the (...) change in my teaching assignment brought me into contact with the work of Masao Abe, the eminent Japanese Buddhist scholar. His essay "Religion and Science in the Global Age—Their Essential Character and Mutual Relationship" (Abe 1985: 241–248) challenged me to expand my thinking to consider not only how theistic religions such as Christianity relate to science, but also to consider how nontheistic religions, such as Buddhism, might fare when interacting with modern science.In his essay on religion and science Abe expressed his agreement with the thought of Keiji Nishitani in this way:1. It is necessary for each religion to re-examine the basis of its world view. For any religion its world view is not like clothes that one can change whenever one pleases. A world view is to religion what water is to a fish. It is the indispensable condition through which religion can actually come into existence. Water is neither the life of the fish as such, nor its body, yet it is fundamentally linked to both. For a religion to change its world view is a matter no less fatal to it than for a fish to change from salt water to fresh.2. What is even more crucial and important is that each religion re-examine and reinterpret that tradition's understanding of God or the 'ultimate' and His or its relation to human beings and the world. With regard to this second point, Buddhism which is fundamentally non-theistic, is in a somewhat different situation from Christianity, which is basically theistic. (Abe 1985: 244–245)Abe continues: "Theistic answers to the question 'why' in Christianity, such as the 'will of God' and the 'rule of God' are incompatible with modern scientific answers to the question 'how.' This is because the former strongly emphasize the personality of the ultimate while the latter is essentially impersonal" (Abe 1985: 245). In this [End Page 67] discussion, I will follow Abe's lead and consider the question of whether Buddhism is more compatible with modern science than Christianity.Christianity and Modern Science: Tensions and HarmoniesOne set of issues causing tension between modern science and Christianity has to do with history. Briefly, ideas about the creation of the universe, about the special creation of humankind, and about miracles, as in the claims about the resurrection of Jesus, are ideas about the action of God in history. These ideas relate the stance that Abe attributed to Christianity as involving an attempt to answer "why" questions about meaning and purpose, an attempt which he feels brings Christianity into conflict with modern science. I will give a brief account of what I take to be the current state of the discussion about each of these matters, and my point is to argue that Abe's conclusion about the relative superiority of Buddhism over Christianity in relation to modern science is premature at best.The Creation of the UniverseThe rise of the Big Bang theory, which traces the origin of the universe back to a tremendously powerful event several billion years ago, at first gave comfort to traditional ideas of divine creation. However, it soon became apparent that this comfort was ambiguous at best. It was not clear, for instance, that one could really prove on the basis of observational evidence that there was an absolute starting point those many billions of years ago, or whether the totality of things could be going through a huge set of cycles. Then there is the issue that even if there is a "First Cause" responsible for the Big Bang, this does not automatically give evidence that the First Cause is a personal being who cares about us or has any immediate involvement in our lives. The First Cause... (shrink)

In this article I explore two accounts of the Fallacy of Many Questions made famous by the question "Have you stopped beating your wife?" The accounts are from the works of Lennart Aqvist and Noel Belnap, and the two authors differ in their accounts of the fallacy. Then I give my own account based on understanding a facet of erotetic logic, i. e., the logic of questions.