The ethics of using nonhuman animals in biomedical research is usually seen as a subfield of animal ethics. In recent years, however, the ethics of animal research has increasingly become a subfield within research ethics under the term “animal research ethics”. Consequently, ethical issues have become prominent that are familiar in the context of human research ethics, such as autonomy or self-determination, harms and benefits, justice, and vulnerability. After a brief overview of the development of the field and a discussion (...) of relevant theoretical ethical frameworks, I consider two of these issues, namely autonomy and self-determination on the one hand, and harms and benefits on the other hand. My concern is with philosophical and ethical issues, rather than animal research oversight. I focus my discussion on nonhuman primates, as the most plausible nonhuman candidates for this approach. I conclude that the approach, although promising, depends strongly on the moral status of nonhuman research subjects. (shrink)

This paper discusses the formation of Castoriadis’s concept of imaginary significations and relates it to his changing readings of Marx and Weber. Castoriadis’s reflections on modern capitalism took off from the Marxian understanding of its internal contradictions, but he always had reservations about the orthodox version of this idea. His writings in the late 1950s, already critical of basic assumptions in Marx’s work, located the central contradiction in the very relationship between capital and wage labour. Labour power was not simply (...) transformed into a commodity, as Marx had argued; rather, the instituted attempt to treat it as a commodity was a contradiction in itself, between the subjectivity and the objectification of labour. Castoriadis then moved on to link this claim to Weber’s analysis of the interconnections between capitalism and bureaucracy. The main contradiction of modern capitalism, whether wholly bureaucratised as in the Soviet model or increasingly bureaucratised as in the West, now seemed to be a matter of incompatible systemic imperatives: the need to control and to mobilise the workforce. Finally, difficulties with this model – and with the revolutionary expectations based on it – led to a more decisive break with classical theories and to the formulation of a bipolar image of modernity, where the vision of an autonomous society is opposed to the logic of calculation and domination, embodied in capitalist development. On both sides there is an imaginary component, irreducible to empirical givens or systemic principles. In this regard, Castoriadis remained closer to Weber than to Marx, but he also anticipated, in a distinctive way, later emphasis on the cultural dimension of modernity, and more specifi cally the notion of modernity as a new civilisation. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the significance of the existential notion of authenticity for medical ethics. This is done by analyzing authenticity and examining its implications for the patient-professional relationship and for ethical decision-making in medical situations. It is argued that while authenticity implies important demand for individual responsibility, which has therapeutic significance, it perpetuates ideas which are antithetical both to authentic interaction between patients and professionals and to fruitful deliberation of moral dilemmas. In order to counteract (...) these consequences, an alternative idea of authenticity is introduced. According to this idea, authenticity is not regarded primarily as individual sovereignty, but as an ability to participate in a dialogue in which the subjectivity of both partners is respected. Such practice, based on mutual trust and responsibility, would enhance common decision-making and overcome the alienation between patients and professionals. (shrink)

This important new book by a major voice in the Social Imaginaries movement offers the most systematic attempt to establish conceptual and historical links between the idea of modernity as a new civilization and the notion of multiple modernities. Arnason demonstrates a theory of globalization that is still compatible with the emphasis on unity and diversity of modernity as a civilization.

Many metaphysicians accept the view that, necessarily, any collection of things composes some further thing. Necessarily, my arms, legs, head, and torso compose my body; necessarily, my arms, my heart, and the table compose something y; necessarily, my heart and the sun compose something z; and so on. 1 Though there have been a few recent attempts to argue against the necessity of this principle of unrestricted composition the consensus is that if it is true, it is necessarily true. 2In (...) what follows I will join the few dissenters and argue that this principle of unrestricted composition is not necessarily true. If I am right, it follows that either some principle of restricted composition is necessarily true or the existence of composite objects is a contingent matter. I will end by indicating why the latter option seems the most plausible. 3I proceed by reductio. Assume the following: Unrestricted composition is necessarily true.That is, assume that necessarily, any collection of things composes something. Then, necessarily, the collection of everything composes something. That is, necessarily, there exists a universal object U having all things as parts, not itself being a proper part of anything. Hence, by our assumption, we get: There must be a universal object U.It is important to note that this is so whether the world is finite or infinite. Holding that in worlds of finite cardinality there is a universal object U while in worlds of infinite cardinality there is no universal object U amounts to accepting a restricted form of composition. 4Now consider the following scenario. Everything in this world is spatially extended and just one half of something else that is also spatially extended. That is, for any thing in this world, there is something else of which …. (shrink)

A prevailing conceptualization of values in organizations regards values as preferable modes of conduct or end-states of existence. Accordingly, values are pursued through prescriptions, actions of implementation and evaluation, based on the presumption that values inform actions. Thus, holding the ‘right’ values leads to desired practice. However, this is a problematic stance, suppressing the fact that correlation between value and action is highly questioned. The article claims that proliferation of values in organizations is more plausible and influential turning the process (...) around, utilizing the ideas of sensemaking, tacit knowledge and virtue in a critical reflection-upon-action model, engaging organizational members as co-researchers of their own value constructions in context. (shrink)

I first explore the notion of the world's being such that everything in it is a proper part. I then explore the notion of the world's being such that everything in it both is and has a proper part. Given two well recognized assumptions, I argue that both notions represent genuine metaphysical possibilities. Finally I consider, but dismiss, some possible objections.

This paper defends human dignity in two ways. First, by confronting the criticism that human dignity does not serve an important function in contemporary moral discourse and that its function can be sufficiently performed by other moral terms. It is argued that this criticism invites a danger of moral reductionism, which impoverishes moral discourse. The authority of moral philosophy to correct widely shared moral intuitions, rooted in experiences of grave injustices and wrongs, is questioned. Secondly, dignity is defended by showing (...) what is needed to uphold it, both in theory and practice. It is argued, and demonstrated through examples, that human dignity as a universal value ascribed to human beings and the virtue of dignified action are intimately related. This is fleshed out in terms of Kant’s analysis of respect in the practical sense and of virtue as a commitment to the value of dignity as a constitutive end of our moral order. It is furthermore argued that theoretical attempts to ground respect for dignity in human capacities lead to a moral impasse. It is necessary to act as if every human being is worthy of respect. This practical approach requires institutions and specified moral obligations that are integral to the democratic ethos and the rule of law, which guarantees the equal status of human beings. This practical task requires that we consistently tease out and act on the implications of these principles rather than seek deeper justification for the equal worth of humans, articulated in the term human dignity. (shrink)

Abstract:This article deals with the question as to what makes bioethics a critical discipline. It considers different senses of criticism and evaluates their strengths and weaknesses. A primary method in bioethics as a philosophical discipline is critical thinking, which implies critical evaluation of concepts, positions, and arguments. It is argued that the type of analytical criticism that restricts its critical role to critical thinking of this type often suffers from other intellectual flaws. Three examples are taken to demonstrate this: premature (...) criticism, uncritical self-understanding of theoretical assumptions, and narrow framing of bioethical issues. Such flaws can lead both to unfair treatment of authors and to uncritical discussion of topics. In this context, the article makes use of Häyry’s analysis of different rationalities in bioethical approaches and argues for the need to recognize the importance of communicative rationality for critical bioethics. A radically different critical approach in bioethics, rooted in social theory, focuses on analyses of power relations neglected in mainstream critical thinking. It is argued that, although this kind of criticism provides an important alternative in bioethics, it suffers from other shortcomings that are rooted in a lack of normative dimensions. In order to complement these approaches and counter their shortcomings, there is a need for a bioethics enlightened by critical hermeneutics. Such hermeneutic bioethics is aware of its own assumptions, places the issues in a wide context, and reflects critically on the power relations that stand in the way of understanding them. Moreover, such an approach is dialogical, which provides both a critical exercise of speech and a normative dimension implied in the free exchange of reasons and arguments. This discussion is framed by Hedgecoe’s argument that critical bioethics needs four elements: to be empirically rooted, theory challenging, reflexive, and politely skeptical. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against grounding being necessarily well-founded, and provide some reasons to think it's actually not well-founded.

Prematurely born children who have underdeveloped lungs may suffer a potentially fatal condition called respiratory distress syndrome. A U.S. company developed a drug, called Surfaxin, to treat such poorly functioning lungs. A placebo-controlled study was planned in four Latin American countries. At the time, in 2001, four treatments were already on the market, although not available to the research populations used in the study. This case is usually discussed as part of the standard of care debate or offered as an (...) example of exploitation. However, what concerns us in this case is rather the choice given to the parents of a prematurely born child under these circumstances: “You can give consent for your child's participation in this study. Half of the babies enrolled will receive sham air and are as likely to die as if they had not enrolled. The other half will receive an active treatment and are more likely to survive.” The parents can vastly increase their baby's chances of survival by participating in the study. Can the consent be voluntary? Do the parents have any meaningful choice? (shrink)

In this paper I argue that composition as identity entails unrestricted composition. I also briefly consider a new take on the special composition question.

The use of corporate ethical codes has been increasing. It is argued that the use of ethical codes solely as an instrument in a company’s image management is morally questionable. Therefore, the introduction and use of ethical codes must have the intention of achieving behavioural change or the maintenance of already superior behaviour. This change or superior behaviour may apply to ethics in general, but also to the different sub‐structures of ethics, namely the areas of reliability ethics, human ethics, capability (...) ethics and future ethics. Previous research has, with some exceptions, failed to demonstrate that the introduction of ethical codes has had any behavioural effect. A survey study of Norwegian professionals in business is reported here. Using the flexibility that a multivariate analysis provides, the existence or non‐existence of ethical codes, and their influence on attitudinal differences across the four ethical sub‐structures is tested. In the following discussion, three lines of argument are used, drawing on logical, social and managerial approaches, to explain why the codes do exist and yet do not seem to influence the members of a business organisation. Finally, the paper suggests some implications for business practice and for future research. (shrink)

This study attempts to situate ethical discourse within descriptions of a moral context which do justice both to concrete individual moral experiences and to the socio-historical framework within which they are lived. In light of these descriptions it is argued that an adequate theory of morality must focus on the essential continuity between the individual moral life and the communal practices and institutions which constitute our ethical substance. ;In Chapter One it is shown how the existentialist liberation of the moral (...) subject centers ethical concerns around the concrete living individual, who, for the most part, had no place in traditional ethics. ;In Chapter Two it is argued that the existentialist revolt in morals is incomplete and misguided, insofar as the power of individual freedom is overemphasized and the weight of socio-historical reality is neglected. On the basis of hermeneutical analysis of human existence, it is shown how the cultural fabric of interpretations and practices sustains and gives meaning to the moral life. On the basis of Sartre's Marxism, it is shown how the social field of classes and violence alienates and frustrates our individual moral projects. ;In Chapter Three it is asked what implications for ethical theory and conduct emerge from these descriptions of the moral context. It is argued that while Heidegger's thought provides an important criticism of the history of ethics, it escapes all concrete applications to ethical discourse. In this respect Gadamer's hermeneutics is found more fruitful, although his Aristotelian account of the situated moral life underestimates the ideological distortions of the moral context as well as the power of moral consciousness to reject tradition and project its freedom. In order to abet such a critical account of morality, Habermas' analysis of the moral consciousness and its development within the socialization process is introduced. But it is argued that Habermas' emphasis on a theoretical grounding of ethical discourse loses touch with the concrete existential/historical dimension of the moral life. It is proposed that only by moving out from descriptions of individual experiences of injustices and wrongs will it be possible to successfully combine moral and social considerations in a critical theory with practical intent. (shrink)

Empire was never an important concept in Ottoman politics. This did not stop Ottoman rulers from laying claim to three titles that may be called imperial : halife, hakan , and kayser . Each of these pertains to different translationes imperii , or claims of descent from different empires: the Caliphate, the steppe empires of the Huns, Turks, and Mongols, and the Roman Empire. Each of the three titles was geared toward a specific audience: Muslims, Turkic nomads, and Greek-Orthodox Christians, (...) respectively. In the nineteenth century a new audience emerged as an important source of political legitimacy: European-emergent international society. With it a new political vocabulary was introduced into the Ottoman language. Among those concepts was that of empire , which found its place in Ottoman discourse by connecting it with the existing imperial claims. (shrink)

It is argued that the ethical questions and challenges raised by the project of personalizing medicine are not sufficiently addressed without considering the possible effects thereof on our system of healthcare. I argue that the framing of ethical issues in light of the main principles of bioethics, such as autonomy, welfare and even justice, tends to be too narrow and the larger social implications thus tend to be neglected. Among the possible unintended consequences of the project to increase personal responsibility (...) for health is a reduced emphasis on it’s social determinants, for which we are jointly responsible.This presents important challenges for bioethics, and calls in turn for closer attention to be paid to biopolitics and the social context of bioethical discourse. The conclusion is that the benefits or damage that might result from personalizing medicine will depend no less upon political and policy decisions than on pharmacogenomic developments. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide an argument for pannormism, the view according to which there are normative properties all the way down. In particular, I argue for what I call the trickling down principle, which says that if there is a metaphysically basic normative property, then, if whatever instantiates it has a ground, that ground instantiates it as well.

I develop and defend a version of panpsychism that avoids the combination problem by appealing to plural collective properties.

In this paper, I present the thesis of Composition as Identity as I think it should be understood, and reply to some objections to it. My aim is not to argue that CAI is true, but to show how CAI can be true, and push the debate forward in the direction I think it must and should go in light of some new objections.

In this paper I argue that we need to take irreducibly plural logic more seriously in metaphysical debates due to the fact that the verdict of many metaphysical debates hangs on it. I give two examples. The main example I focus on is the debate recently revived by Jonathan Schaffer over the fundamental cardinality of the world. I show how the three main arguments provided by Schaffer are unsound in virtue of an employment of plural logic. The second example I (...) give is a more general issue about the possibility of emergent properties of mereological wholes. Employing plural logic there is a new way to understand such cases. The upshot is that plural logic greatly matters to metaphysics and hence can no longer be ignored the way it has in this area. (shrink)

In this paper, I raise the question whether an artificial intelligence can act morally. I first sketch and defend a general picture of what is at stake in this question. I then sketch and defend a behavioral test, known as the Moral Turing Test, as a good sufficiency test for an artificial intelligence acting morally. I end by discussing some general anticipated objections.

Divine Foundationalism is the thesis that God is the source of all things (apart from God hirself). I clarify and defend the thesis, before I consider the main arguments for and against it.

Divine necessity is the thesis that God must exist. In this paper, I give a brief survey of what the thesis is more exactly, the main arguments for it, and the main arguments against it.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to attempt to resolve some unclarity about the nature and character of intercultural information ethics (IIE).Design/methodology/approachBy survey of some of the relevant literature, the paper identifies and explains the distinctive projects of IIE. In addition, to facilitate the achievement of these projects, the paper attempts to identify the most fruitful metaphysical and meta‐ethical assumptions about truth and moral truth. In particular, to identify and determine which of objectivist theories of truth and morality or intersubjectivist (...) theories of truth and morality provides a better theoretical foundation for IIE.FindingsTwo projects are identified: a descriptive project and a normative project. It is argued that moral objectivism provides a better foundation for the normative (project than moral intersubjectivism (or, as it is sometimes called, normative cultural relativism) in the sense that objectivism provides a more solid ground for the principle grounding the normative project – namely that agreement among cultures on principles of information ethics is good or desirable. In other respects, it is concluded that moral objectivism and moral intersubjectivism do equally well in grounding the normative project.Originality/valueThe paper is the first to compare the two methodological approaches and points in the direction of the most fruitful approach to take in pursuing IIE. (shrink)

Contemporary reflections on capitalism as a social-historical formation build on the legacy of classical theorists and comparative analysts. To clarify the main lines of this ongoing debate, it seems useful to distinguish three dichotomies that have been central to interpretations of capitalist development. The question of unity and diversity has been most prominent in the controversies of the past few decades; its ramifications range from micro-economic research on ‘varieties of capitalism’ to less sustained discussions about the place and role of (...) capitalism within the framework of multiple modernities. Another key distinction contrasts systemic perspectives on capitalism with historical ones. In this regard, Schumpeter’s work is particularly interesting, but as an illustration of the problematic rather than an answer to the basic questions. The notion of a spirit of capitalism is most frequently associated with Weber’s work, where the spirit appeared as the source of a dynamic to which it then fell victim. Reconsiderations of the issue have raised questions about more durable versions and more varied expressions of the spirit, less likely to be eliminated by a self-propelling dynamic. Finally, comments on the articles included in the special issue suggest that they all have something to say on all three aspects of the field, but that their most innovative content may consist in attempts to move beyond systemic models of unity. (shrink)

Roughly, the problem of the Trinity is the problem of how God can be one and yet be the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, which are three, not one. That one thing is identical with three distinct things seems to violate traditional laws of identity. I propose a solution to this problem according to which it is just an ordinary claim of one-many identity. For example, one pair of shoes is identical with two shoes; and my one body (...) is identical with its six limbs of arms, legs, head, and torso. The pair of shoes is not identical with each one of the two shoes, nor is my body identical with each one of its six limbs, but rather identical with all of them taken together, or collectively. I argue that the problem of the Trinity should be understood accordingly: God is identical with the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit collectively, but not with each one of them distributively. According to the way I develop this proposal, no traditional laws of identity are violated, but merely generalized in an intuitive way. I argue that this is compatible with Christian Orthodoxy as given by the Athanasian Creed. I end by responding to some anticipated objections. (shrink)

Brain research in neuroscience and related fields is changing our understanding of the brain and its relation to the mind and to human behavior, giving a new impetus to the problem of free will and moral responsibility. The reactions have covered the entire range, from claims to the effect that neuroscientific research is showing that our folkrnason, Ph.D., is Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Department of Social and Moral Philosophy, University of Helsinki, Finland. His research interests include bioethics, neuroethics, and (...) the philosophy of science. He coedited The Ethics and Governance of Human Genetic Databases and Blood and Data: Ethical, Legal and Social Aspects of Human Genetic Databases.FootnotesThe research for this paper was conducted as a part of Neuroscience and Norms: Ethical and Legal Aspects of Norms in Neuroimaging / Ethical Concepts and Norms, a project funded by the Academy of Finland. (shrink)

This article discusses successive positions of the Frankfurt School, contrasts them to the unfolding ideas of Castoriadis and argues for a critical theory centred on a concept of autonomy, but aware of the obstacles and complications inherent in social–historical reality and its modern configuration. To clarify this perspective, we need a concept of society that distances itself from the Parsonian paradigm, more so than recent theorists of the Frankfurt School have done. The critique of over-integrated images of society, developed by (...) various sociologists in the 1970s and 1980s but not properly assimilated by the mainstream of the discipline and never taken on board by Frankfurt theorists, is an important source of reference, and it can be taken further in the light of Castoriadis’s reflections on the social–historical. The result is a definition of autonomy as a capacity of explicit and unlimited interrogation, confronted with its own hubristic temptations in the context of a multidimensional social world. (shrink)

In his seminal work, Truth and Method, theGerman philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer distinguishesbetween three types of what he calls the experience ofthe `Thou'. In this paper, Gadamer's analysis of thisexperience is explained in terms of his philosophicalhermeneutics and brought to bear upon thepatient-professional relationship. It is argued thatwhile Gadamer's analysis implies fruitful insights fora dialogical account of the patient-professionalinteraction, it harbours elements which are conduciveto paternalistic practice of medicine. The strongattribution of value to tradition and the respect forauthority emphasized in his (...) theory result in a lack ofsensitivity for individual self-determination which isneeded for a successful account of thepatient-professional relationship. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).