Should we aspire to aesthetic consistency? Two kinds of aesthetic consistency are considered, following Ted Cohen’s discussion of consistency in personal aesthetics: consistency of aesthetic reasons and coherence of aesthetic personality. Neither of these kinds of consistency seems like something to aspire to, possibly because we cannot do so – if we are not typically reasoning at the level of aesthetic response that is envisaged – or because consistent, coherent responsiveness does not seem like a worthwhile aesthetic goal. A (...) third kind of consistency is defended, at the level of reflection on the desirable functions of art. We can try to be consistent about broadly ethical principles, showing our commitments as to the goods that art should provide in a life or to a society. These very broad principles do not make direct or clear aesthetic contact with individual artworks, so we cannot straightforwardly apply them as evaluative principles. But we can be consistent in trying to link the very specific achievements of works with these reflective values. (shrink)

In these writings by one of our most creative legal philosophers, Meir Dan-Cohen explores the nature of the self and its response to legal commands and mounts a challenge to some prevailing tenets of legal theory and the neighboring moral, political, and economic thought. The result is an insider's critique of liberalism that extends contemporary liberalism's Kantian strand, combining it with postmodernist ideas about the contingent and socially constructed self to build a thoroughly original perspective on some of the (...) most vital concerns of legal and moral theory.Dan-Cohen looks first at the ubiquity of legal coercion and considers its decisive impact on the nature of legal discourse and communication, on law's normative aspirations and claim to obedience, and on the ideal of the rule of law. He moves on to discuss basic values, stressing the preeminence of individual identity and human dignity over the more traditional liberal preoccupations with preference-based choice and experiential harm. Dan-Cohen then focuses more directly on the normative ramifications of the socially constructed self. Fundamental concepts such as responsibility and ownership are reinterpreted to take account of the constitutive role that social practices--particularly law and morality--play in the formation of the self.Throughout, Dan-Cohen draws on a uniquely productive mix of philosophical traditions and subjects, blending the methods of analytic philosophy with the concerns of Continental philosophers to reconceive the self and its relation to ethics and the law. (shrink)

Introduction to Logic is a proven textbook that has been honed through the collaborative efforts of many scholars over the last five decades. Its scrupulous attention to detail and precision in exposition and explanation is matched by the greatest accuracy in all associated detail. In addition, it continues to capture student interest through its personalized human setting and current examples. The 14th Edition of Introduction to Logic, written by Copi, Cohen & McMahon, is dedicated to the many thousands of (...) students and their teachers - at hundreds of universities in the United States and around the world - who have used its fundamental methods and techniques of correct reasoning in their everyday lives. (shrink)

I take a close look at Bernard Williams’s paper "Moral Luck," which put this notion on the philosophical agenda. Williams’s focal example is the painter Paul Gauguin. According to Williams, Gauguin’s morally dubious decision to desert his family so as to pursue an artistic career can be redeemed only by his partially fortuitous success as a painter. This is shown by the consideration that a successful Gauguin would not be able to regret his decision, whereas failure would have prompted regret. (...) I suggest that the best way to understand this claim is to see Gauguin’s decision to become an artist as a constitutive decision, which launches what for him proved to be a defining project. One cannot coherently regret the realization of such a project or the decision that gave rise to it because that would amount to wishing to be someone else: conditions of personal identity set the limits on the counterfactuals about ourselves that we can intelligibly entertain. However, not being able to regret the constitutive elements of one’s life is not the same as approving of these elements. So I disagree with Williams’s ultimate conclusion that the inability to regret a decision signals some justification for it, no matter how attenuated. (shrink)

This paper links two domains of recent interest in science and technology studies, complexity and ignorance, in the context of knowledge practices observed among synthetic biologists. Synthetic biologists are recruiting concepts and methods from computer science and electrical engineering in order to design and construct novel organisms in the lab. Their field has taken shape amidst revised assessments of life’s complexity in the aftermath of the Human Genome Project. While this complexity is commonly taken to be an immanent property of (...) biological systems, this article presents an epistemological view of complexity according to which complexity relates to a specific scientific theory or model and refers to that which exceeds the theory or model’s explanatory power. This epistemological view allows us to narrate a particular story about the changing relationship between biology and synthetic biology in the last decade and accounts for early knowledge practices in synthetic biology that “ignored” biology. This article further argues that while the failure of ignorance to produce clear-cut results for synthetic biologists has led practitioners back to biology, the entanglements between different pragmatic orientations and ways of knowing trouble the implications of this return for assessments of the complexity of biological systems. (shrink)

GEOMETRY AND SEMANTICS: AN EXAMINATION OF PUTNAM'S PHILOSOPHY OF GEOMETRY There are many ways to shed light on how and why our conception of geometry changed during the last two centuries. One fruitful strategy is to relate those ...

Obstetric violence—violence in the labor room—has been described in terms not only of violence in general but specifically of gender violence. We offer a philosophical analysis of obstetric violence, focused on the central role of gendered shame for construing and perpetuating such violence. Gendered shame in labor derives both from the reifying gaze that transforms women's laboring bodies into dirty, overly sexual, and “not‐feminine‐enough” dysfunctional bodies and from a structural tendency to relate to laboring women mainly as mothers‐to‐be, from whom (...) “good motherhood” is demanded. We show that women who desire a humane birth are thus easily made to feel ashamed of wanting to be respected and cared for as subjects, rather than caring exclusively for the baby's well‐being as a good altruistic mother supposedly should. We explore how obstetric violence is perpetuated and expanded through shaming mechanisms that paralyze women, rendering them passive and barely able to face and fight against this violence. Gendered shame has a crucial role in returning women to “femininity” and construing them as “fit mothers.” To stand against gendered shame, to resist it, on the other hand, is to clearly challenge obstetric violence and its oppressive power. (shrink)

Recent years have witnessed an effort to explicate the concept of explanatory power in a Bayesian framework by constructing explanatory measures. It has been argued that those measures should not violate the principle of explanatory justice, which states that explanatory power cannot be extended “for free.” I argue, by formal means, that one recent measure claiming to be immune from explanatory injustice fails to be so. I end by concluding that the explanatory justice criticism can be dissolved, given a natural (...) interpretation of the concept of negative explanatory power. (shrink)

Edwin J. Delattre, Character and Cops: Ethics in Policing Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1989, xviii + 247 pp.

Everyday there are revelations of organizations behaving in discreditable ways. Sometimes these actions result in damage to an organization's reputation, but often they do not. In this article, we examine the question of why external stakeholders may overlook disclosed discreditable actions, even those entailing ethical breaches. Drawing on stigmatization theory, we develop a model to explain the likelihood of reputational loss following revelations of discreditable actions. The model integrates four properties of actions (perceived control, perceived certainty, perceived threat, and perceived (...) deviance), stakeholder motivation, and media coverage. Implications for theory and for practitioners concerned with reputation management are discussed. (shrink)

The Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science began 2S years ago as an interdisciplinary, interuniversity collaboration of friends and colleagues in philosophy, logic, the natural sciences and the social sciences, psychology, religious studies, arts and literature, and often the celebrated man-in-the street. Boston University came to be the home base. Within a few years, pro ceedings were seen to be candidates for publication, first suggested by Gerald Holton for the journal Synthese within the Synthese Library, both from the D. (...) Reidel Publishing Company of Dordrecht, then and now in Boston and Lancaster too. Our colloquium was inheritor of the Institute for the Unity of Science, itself the American transplant of the Vienna Circle, and we were repeatedly honored by encouragement and participation of the Institute's central figure, Philipp Frank. The proceedings were selected, edited, revised in the light of the discussions at our colloquia, and then other volumes were added which were derived from other symposia, in Boston or elsewhere. A friendly autonomy, in dependent of the Synthese Library proper, existed for more than a decade and then the Boston Studies became fully separate. We were grateful to Jaakko Hintikka for his continued encouragement within that Library. The series Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science was conceived in the broadest framework of interdisciplinary and international concerns. Natural scientists, mathematicians, social scientists and philosophers have contributed to the series, as have historians and sociologists of science, linguists, psychologists, physicians, and literary critics. (shrink)

Part I: Science and the human prospect -- The spirit of modern science -- The human difference -- Bioethics in wartime -- Part II: The ethics of progress -- The embryo question -- Our genetic condition -- The commerce of the body -- A Jewish-Catholic bioethics -- Part III: From generation to generation -- Why have children -- In whose image shall we die.

The prelim contains section titled: Further reading on Deep Thought: a brief history Further reading on the A‐Z How to Experiment.

LOGIC, EXPERIENCE, AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD Holmes, The Common Law Radin, Law as Logic and Experience Cardozo, Paradoxes of Legal Science Pound, ...

This paper examines two models of thinking relating to the issue of the right to die in dignity: one takes into consideration the rights and interests of the individual; the other supposes that human life is inherently valuable. I contend that preference should be given to the first model, and further assert that the second model may be justified in moral terms only as long as it does not resort to paternalism. The view that holds that certain patients are not (...) able to comprehend their own interests in a fully rational manner, and therefore ‘we’ know what is good for these patients better than ‘they’ do, is morally unjustifiable. I proceed by refuting the ‘quality of life’ argument, asserting that each person is entitled to decide for herself when it is worth living and when it is not. In this connection, a caveat will be made regarding the role of the family. (shrink)

International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 20, Issue 3, Page 315-317, July 2012.

No one disputes that certain cognitive tasks involve the use of images. On the other hand, there has been substantial disagreement over whether the representations in which imaginal tasks are carried out are imaginal or propositional. The empirical literature on the topic which has accrued over the last twenty years suggests that there is a functional equivalence between mental imagery and perception: when peopIe imagine a scene or event, the mental processes that occur are functionally similar in important senses to (...) what happens when they visually perceive an analogous scene or event. What is in dispute is not this principle of equivalence, but rather what conclusions should be drawn from it about the representational medium used in imagery.The problem to be explained is what internal cognitive events transpire when people answer questions like “What color is a bee’s head?” Most people report that they imagine a picture of the insect and then look at the head in the image to determine its color. Although there is no more reason to accept these introspective reports as a good account of cognitive processes than in any other cognitive phenomena, there are many empirical results which lend credence to the idea that there are mental images of some kind.Some theorists have taken the empirical results as evidence that there exists a special, non-symbolic representational medium for imagery. Others have insisted that the imagery data can be explained best in terms of the more general, symbolic representations which are usually taken to underly higher level cognitive tasks. In this paper I shall evaluate the arguments for both imaginal and propositional representations in the hope of assessing the status of the imagery debate. I shall conclude that imaginal theories represent the most reasonable account of imagery. (shrink)

Objective: To analyse the time variation of topics in bioethical publications as a proxy of the relative importance.Methods: We searched the Medline database for bioethics publications using the words “ethics or bioethics”, and for 360 specific topics publications, associating Medical Subject Heading topic descriptors to those words. We calculated the ratio of bioethics publications to the total publications of Medline, and the ratio of each topic publications to the total bioethics publications, for five-year intervals, from 1970 to 2004. We calculated (...) the time variation of ratios, dividing the difference between the highest and lowest ratio of each topic by its highest ratio. Four topics were described, selected to illustrate different patterns of variation: “Induced Abortion”, “Conflict of Interest”, “Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome”, “Medical Education.”Results: The ratio of bioethics publications to total Medline publications increased from 0.003 to 0.012. The variation of the topic’s ratios was higher than 0.7 for 68% of the topics. The Induced Abortion ratios decreased from 0.12 to 0.02. Conflict of Interest ratios increased from zero to 0.07. The Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome ratios were nearly zero in the first three intervals, had a peak of 0.06 during 1985–9, followed by a decrease to 0.01. Medical Education ratios varied few, from 0.04 to 0.03.Conclusions: There was an increase of bioethical publications in the Medline database. The topics in bioethics literature have an important time variation. Some factors were suggested to explain this variation: current legal cases, resolution of the issue, saturation of a discussion and epidemiologic importance. (shrink)

Hermann Cohen. Hermann Cohen Band 113. Kommentar' zu Immanuel Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Kommentar Zu Immanuel Kants Kritik Der Reinen Vernunft (Job an, Kommentar z. Kants Kritik d. rein. Vernunft. 1. Front Cover.

This paper develops particular Strausian-like themes on the formation and structure of the Cartesian problematic. Particularly, my interest is to link the Cartesian ‘invention’ of consciousness (or ‘the mental’) in the philosophy of mind with the issues of representation and ‘the problem of the external world’ in epistemology. The Cartesian novelty becomes clear by comparing Cartesian scepticism with Greek classical scepticism. I end with some speculative clinical (i.e., psychiatric) suggestions on possible roots of the Cartesian invention. Keywords: Consciousness, Externalization, Dualism, (...) Self-World CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Gedankenexperimente haben im Laufe der Jahrtausende eine entscheidende Rolle als Mittel der Wahl sowohl in der Philosophie als auch in der Naturwissenschaft gespielt. Im Gegensatz zu echten Experimenten kann im "gedanklichen Labor" auch Fragen nachgegangen werden, die man sonst nicht empirisch untersuchen kann. Gedankenexperimente lösen damit zwar sicher nicht die akuten Probleme der Menschheit, aber sie zeigen auf, wie schon leichte Veränderungen der Perspektive oder alltäglicher Grundannahmen zu verblüffenden Lösungen oder zu ganz neuen, spannenden Fragen führen können. Dieses Buch nimmt (...) den Leser mit auf eine Reise durch alle Epochen philosophischen Denkens und stellt, in prägnanter Auflistung von A bis Z, 26 besonders interessante Gedankenexperimente berühmter Philosophen vor. Durchaus anspruchsvoll, aber doch sehr unterhaltsam geschrieben, lädt es nicht nur zum Lesen, sondern vor allem zum Miträtseln und philosophieren ein. Anschauliche, teils auch abwegige Beispiele aus den unterschiedlichsten Gebieten der Wissenschaft lassen keine Langweile aufkommen. Dazu gibt es Hinweise zur Durchführung eigener Gedankenexperimente und kurze Erläuterungen zu den wichtigsten der angeführten Denker von Aristoteles bis Wittgenstein. (shrink)