How far, if at all, do our intrapersonal and our interpersonal epistemic obligations run in parallel? This paper treats the question as addressing the stability of doxastic commitment in the two dimensions. In the background lies an analogy between doxastic and practical commitment. We’ll pursue the question of doxastic stability by coining a doxastic analogue of Gregory Kavka’s much-discussed toxin case. In this new case, you foresee that you will rationally abandon a doxastic commitment by undergoing a shift in (...) the context in which you doxastically deliberate. The case reveals an important stability condition on doxastic commitment that plays no role in cases modeled on Ulysses and the Sirens, the scenario that has shaped previous attempts to draw an analogy between doxastic and practical commitment. The stability condition thereby revealed is not diachronic -- it does not involve a shift in belief -- but we can construct specifically diachronic cases that reveal an important intrapersonal epistemic obligation. This obligation arises when you expect the shift in belief by ‘projecting’ yourself into a future doxastic context -- thus vindicating a restricted, but only this restricted, application of Bas van Fraassen’s Reflection Principle. Despite some important differences, we can use these diachronic cases as a model for interpersonal cases that reveal an important role for doxastic context in the epistemology of disagreement. But the roles played by projection and context in disagreement ensure that there is no general obligation to be responsive to the opinion of an epistemic peer who disagrees with you. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Legacy of Boston PersonalismJ. Edward Hackett1. IntroductionWhen the question of the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s philosophical legacy arises in the academy, so far, the question remains open-ended (though, as I will shortly argue, the question has already been answered by King himself). Beyond his presence in public American consciousness, King left behind speeches, sermons, correspondence, and writings that inspire both (...) philosophical and theological reflection. However, King is also interpreted on the merits of the biases and philosophical traditions that we scholars navigate. Such biases and philosophical traditions mediate our experience of encountering King, and this mediation can impact our understanding of what exactly King’s philosophical legacy is.1Accordingly, we should seek to reconstruct King’s thoughts in the philosophical vocabulary King employed rather than displacing King from his own agency and the contexts that shaped him.2 In doing so, we prevent mistakes and misunderstandings that plague the public knowledge of King’s legacy. And yet, serious misunderstanding occurs every January with light fluff pieces in major newspapers and websites from authors who do not read King’s corpus. What’s more, some scholars are guilty of this lack of reading King widely. Consider Martha Nussbaum and her glaring error and omission in her recent contribution to a recent book that purports to look at King as a philosopher: “Although a religious man, [King] did not advance in his political writings a comprehensive and religious doctrine, as Gandhi did” (Nussbaum 123). In an otherwise interesting article about political emotions, Nussbaum completely neglects any historical consideration or development where King describes himself as a personalist.3 Like others, Nussbaum disregards King’s own self-description. This disregard is tantamount to a silent [End Page 45] and implicit racism that results in scholarly efforts that deprive King of his own intellectual agency when interpreting his work. This tendency prevails in both philosophy and theology departments, and this neglect has also been the larger challenge of African American philosophy gaining more acceptance as a field of philosophical inquiry (McClendon and Ferguson 38). My efforts in this article are to put an end to continual misreadings of King. First and foremost, King is a personalist.While this essay defends the personalist interpretation of King, let me lay out briefly those pieces of evidence. The interpretation of King as a personalist rests on four evidential sources: (1) King’s own words, (2) family background, (3) influence of personalist ideas on his writings, and (4) the tradition of King’s reception by other Boston personalists. First, King describes himself in his own words as a personalist. This is perhaps the biggest piece of evidence for why we should read King as a personalist. Second, King was influenced by personalism before studying Brightman’s philosophy with Gregory Davis at Crozers Theological Seminary.4 Before Morehouse College and Crozers Theological Seminary, according to Rufus Burrow, homespun personalism emerges out of King’s upbringing within the Black Church. For this reason, scholars should not doubt that King synthesizes personalist influences with how he was raised (Burrow, God and Human Dignity 17–31). Moreover, given that King chose to go to Boston University to study with Brightman and to be where Boston personalism was known to be strong, all of these facts indicate that King was a personalist (Burrow, God and Human Dignity 24).Homespun personalism gave King a vocabulary to bring together and synthesize many intellectual forces in his life, and this synthesis is recognized by other personalists. Walter Muelder is one such personalist. Muelder was Dean of Boston University’s School of Theology from 1945–1972 when King attended. Muelder and King exchanged correspondence, and Muelder delivered many lectures, some published and others unpublished, on the personalism of King. The most famous of these lectures is one Muelder gave to Morehouse College in 1983, in which Brightman’s moral law system is read into King’s own words. Taking this historical background and also that, to this day, some teachers at Morehouse College, like Lawrence Carter, make their students learn the personalist moral law system from Muelder and Bright-man, the personalist interpretation... (shrink)

This volume explores the role of both “mere habits” and sophisticated habitus in the formation of moral character and the virtues, incorporating perspectives from philosophy, theology, psychology, and neuroscience.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:EDWARD W. STRONG, 1901--1990 Edward W. Strong, one.of the founders and leaders of the Journal of the HistoryofPhilosophy,passed away on January 13, 199o, after a long struggle with cancer. Born in Dallas, Oregon in 19~ 1, he was eighty-eight years old when he died. He did his undergraduate studies at Stanford, receiving his B.A. in 1925. Then he went on to graduate studies at Columbia, where he (...) received a master's degree in 1927 and a Ph.D. in 1937. He taught at City College in New York from 1927 to 1932, and then began his long career at the University of California, Berkeley, where he remained for the rest of his academic life. During World War II, he became laboratory manager of the university's Radiation Laboratory (now called the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory), which was part of the Manhattan Project to develop the atomic bomb. After the war, Strong became a full professor in 1947, chairman of the Sociology Department from 1946 to 1952, Associate Dean of the College of Letters and Sciences from 1947 to 1955, a leader of the Academic Senate and its Educational Policy Committee, and Chancellor of the Berkeley campus from 1961 to 1965.This was a period of very rapid growth for the campus as well as its most troubled time. When the student rebellion--the Free Speech Movement--broke out, Strong tried valiantly but unsuccessfully to preserve those academic values he felt most challenged. As the conflict wore on, he ceased to have the full support of his superiors, the President of the Universityand the Board of Regents, who negotiated a resolution with the students, the effects of which are still being felt at Berkeley and elsewhere in the United States. Some feel that Strong's position in the struggle that transformed American universities has not been properly understood, and that his role has been portrayed unfairly to enhance that of his superiors. In any event, he resigned as Chancellor and became Professor Emeritus in 1967. Strong developed his interest in the history of philosophy, history of science, and history of ideas at Columbia during its heyday as a center for such concerns, under the leadership of John Dewey and Frederick Woodbridge. He told me that he was also very much influenced by the historical interests of Morris Raphael Cohen, his senior colleague at City College. His dissertation, Proceduresand Methods,was, and still is, a basic study of the origin and development of modern science. (It was mentioned approvingly in an article by Ernst [9] 10 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 29:1 JANUARY 1991 Cassirer, in 194o). In contrast to E. A. Burtt, whose MetaphysicalFoundationsof ModernPhysicalSciencestressed the philosophical and theological concerns of the early scientists, Strong emphasized the practical engineering concerns that were involved at the time. This led him to studies of Kepler, Galileo, and Newton, as well as to the scientific views of medieval thinkers, and modern views in the philosophy of science. Philosophically he was a naturalist, continuing the Columbia tradition. He was also very interested in Bergson's views, especially as they related to modern scientific ideas. He was the inspirer and founder of the History of Science discussion group at Berkeley, which became an important forum for creative research in this area. Strong was President of the American Philosophical Association in 1959. Because of the limited attention and concern given to the history of philosophy in most of the then-existing philosophicaljournals in America, the American Philosophical Association in 1957 approved in principle the establishment of a journal devoted to the history of philosophy, and appointed a committee of six members--Paul Kristeller, Gregory Vlastos, Richard McKeon, Julius Weinberg, John Goheen, and Edward Strong--to explore "ways and means to this end." Since all American philosophical journals at that time were published in the East and Midwest, Strong and Goheen were encouraged to try to establish the journal in the West. Strong has detailed the efforts to do this in his article, "The Founding of theJournal oftheHistoryofPhilosophy,"Journalof theHistoryofPhilosophy~5 (1987): 179-83. I first met Ed Strong at Trinity College, Dublin, in the summer of 1953, when I was a... (shrink)

Colour has been shown to facilitate the recognition of scene images, but only when these images contain natural scenes, for which colour is ‘diagnostic’. Here we investigate whether colour can also facilitate memory for scene images, and whether this would hold for natural scenes in particular. In the first experiment participants first studied a set of colour and greyscale natural and man-made scene images. Next, the same images were presented, randomly mixed with a different set. Participants were asked to indicate (...) whether they had seen the images during the study phase. Surprisingly, performance was better for greyscale than for coloured images, and this difference is due to the higher false alarm rate for both natural and man-made coloured scenes. We hypothesized that this increase in false alarm rate was due to a shift from scrutinizing details of the image to recognition of the gist of the image. A second experiment, utilizing images without a nameable gist, confirmed this hypothesis as participants now performed equally on greyscale and coloured images. In the final experiment we specifically targeted the more detail-based perception and recognition for greyscale images versus the more gist-based perception and recognition for coloured images with a change detection paradigm. The results show that changes to images are detected faster when image-pairs were presented in greyscale than in colour. This counterintuitive result held for both natural and man-made scenes and thus corroborates the shift from more detailed processing of images in greyscale to more gist-based processing of coloured images. (shrink)

Some philosophers have offered structural representations as an alternative to indicator-based representations. Motivating these philosophers is the belief that an indication-based analysis of representation exhibits two fatal inadequacies from which structural representations are spared: such an analysis cannot account for the causal role of representational content and cannot explain how representational content can be made determinate. In fact, we argue, indicator and structural representations are on a par with respect to these two problems. This should not be surprising, we contend, (...) given that the distinction between indicator and structural representations is better conceived as one involving degree rather than kind. (shrink)

According to the Perceptual Symbols Theory of cognition (), modality‐specific simulations underlie the representation of concepts. A strong prediction of this view is that perceptual processing affects conceptual processing. In this study, participants performed a perceptual detection task and a conceptual property‐verification task in alternation. Responses on the property‐verification task were slower for those trials that were preceded by a perceptual trial in a different modality than for those that were preceded by a perceptual trial in the same modality. This (...) finding of a modality‐switch effect across perceptual processing and conceptual processing supports the hypothesis that perceptual and conceptual representations are partially based on the same systems. (shrink)

Evidence suggests that humans might have neurological specializations for music processing, but a compelling adaptationist account of music and dance is lacking. The sexual selection hypothesis cannot easily account for the widespread performance of music and dance in groups (especially synchronized performances), and the social bonding hypothesis has severe theoretical difficulties. Humans are unique among the primates in their ability to form cooperative alliances between groups in the absence of consanguineal ties. We propose that this unique form of social organization (...) is predicated on music and dance. Music and dance may have evolved as a coalition signaling system that could, among other things, credibly communicate coalition quality, thus permitting meaningful cooperative relationships between groups. This capability may have evolved from coordinated territorial defense signals that are common in many social species, including chimpanzees. We present a study in which manipulation of music synchrony significantly altered subjects’ perceptions of music quality, and in which subjects’ perceptions of music quality were correlated with their perceptions of coalition quality, supporting our hypothesis. Our hypothesis also has implications for the evolution of psychological mechanisms underlying cultural production in other domains such as food preparation, clothing and body decoration, storytelling and ritual, and tools and other artifacts. (shrink)

The concept of population is central to ecology, yet it has received little attention from philosophers of ecology. Furthermore, the work that has been done often recycles ideas that have been developed for evolutionary biology. We argue that ecological populations and evolutionary populations, though intimately related, are distinct, and that the distinction matters to practicing ecologists. We offer a definition of ecological population in terms of demographic independence, where changes in abundance are a function of birth and death processes alone. (...) However, demographic independence is insufficient on its own so we supplement it with the idea of shared habitat. An ecological population is a group of organisms of the same species in a habitat that manifests DI. Given the importance of metapopulation dynamics to modern ecology, an account of ecological population must apply to this domain as well. Thus, we extend our definition of ecological population to the metapopulation. To facilitate the extension, we introduce the metahabitat—a collection of spatially segregated habitat patches shared by a single DI population. This enables us to diagnose some unhelpful trends in the metapopulation literature and emphasize the importance of habitat dynamics in pursuit of the goals of theoretical ecology and conservation biology. (shrink)

In Prajñā and Reason Nishitani presents a powerful vision of philosophy as Absolute knowing. Nishitani’s conclusions are striking: Absolute knowing can only fulill its potential by beginning without any presuppositions and affirming the truth of contradiction. Because Hegel’s philosophy also purports to be a science of Absolute knowing, in Prajñā and Reason Nishitani develops his own account of the Absolute in conversation with Hegel’s philosophy. We reconstruct Nishitani’s reading and various critiques of Hegel, and thereafter evaluate its merits. Our inquiry (...) shows that Hegel too begins without presuppositions and affirms the truth of contradiction. As a result, we argue that Nishitani’s profound reflections on Absolute knowing draw him into close proximity with Hegel’s thinking and call us to re-think the very being of philosophy and philosophical practice today. (shrink)

"Dealing with the Visual will be of great use to advanced students because it offers an overview of current debates, and to graduate students and professionals in the field because the essays offer in-depth investigations of the methodological issues involved and various historical ways of defining visuality. The topics included range from early modern ways of viewing pictures and sixteenth-century views of Palladio's villas in their landscape settings to contemporary debate about whether there is life yet in painting."--BOOK JACKET.

Recent advances in wireless data transmission technology have the potential to revolutionize clinical neuroscience. Today sensing-capable electrical stimulators, known as “bidirectional devices”, are used to acquire chronic brain activity from humans in natural environments. However, with wireless transmission come potential failures in data transmission, and not all available devices correctly account for missing data or provide precise timing for when data losses occur. Our inability to precisely reconstruct time-domain neural signals makes it difficult to apply subsequent neural signal processing techniques (...) and analyses. Here, our goal was to accurately reconstruct time-domain neural signals impacted by data loss during wireless transmission. Towards this end, we developed a method termed Periodic Estimation of Lost Packets. PELP leverages the highly periodic nature of stimulation artifacts to precisely determine when data losses occur. Using simulated stimulation waveforms added to human EEG data, we show that PELP is robust to a range of stimulation waveforms and noise characteristics. Then, we applied PELP to local field potential recordings collected using an implantable, bidirectional DBS platform operating at various telemetry bandwidths. By effectively accounting for the timing of missing data, PELP enables the analysis of neural time series data collected via wireless transmission—a prerequisite for better understanding the brain-behavior relationships underlying neurological and psychiatric disorders. (shrink)

This book analyzes the sociopolitical sensibilities of Black aesthetics in society by examining the historical and political context in which Black aesthetics emerged; analyzing various Black aesthetic perspectives that speak to social justice; exploring the interpretive conditions necessary to perceive Black aesthetics as a language of social justice.

ABSTRACT:Profit maximizers have reasons to agree with stakeholder theorists that managers may need to consider different values simultaneously in decision making. However, it remains unclear how maximizing a single value can be reconciled with simultaneously considering different values. A solution can neither be found in substantive normative philosophical theories, nor in postulating the maximization of profit. Managers make sense of the values in a situation by means of the many thick value concepts of ordinary language. Thick evaluation involves the simultaneous (...) consideration of different values: making sense of a value always involves knowing how to engage with it given the other values in the situation. This also goes for profit: maximization is only one way of engaging with the value of profit, and grasping whether maximization is appropriate involves considering other values. We discuss some consequences of our approach for stakeholder theorists and profit maximizers. (shrink)