A great deal of ink has been spilled trying to define political conservatism. Yet, far too many of these definitions have failed to isolate a unified and distinctive set of normative commitments that conservatives can be said to share. This has led some critics to allege that the view has no definition. In this paper, I show that there are in fact two perfectly comprehensible conceptions of the theory that meet these criteria. However, I argue that, given some fairly uncontroversial (...) facts about human institutions, neither version represents a believable political philosophy. I conclude that there are legitimate and distinctive conservative political reasons, but that any attempt to describe these as our sole or primary political reasons is doomed to fail. (shrink)

Provides a true starting point for the study of the "phenomenological" movement of which Husserl is the founder.

An important philosophical issue in the study of addiction is what difference the fact that a person is addicted makes to attributions of autonomy (and responsibility) to their drug-oriented behavior. In spite of accumulating evidence suggesting the role of emotional dysregulation in understanding addiction, it has received surprisingly little attention in the debate about this issue. I claim that, as a result, an important aspect of the autonomy impairment of many addicted individuals has been largely overlooked. A widely shared assumption (...) in the philosophical literature is that for addiction to impair a person’s autonomy it has to make them (in some sense) take drugs against their will. So-called “willing addicts” are therefore usually seen as exempted from the autonomy impairment believed to characterize “unwilling addicts”, the latter being those who ‘truly want’ to stop using drugs but find their attempts repeatedly derailed by failures of self-control. In this article, I argue that the association between addiction and emotional dysregulation shows why this assumption is false. Emotional dysregulation is not only consistent with the possibility that many addicts take drugs ‘willingly’, it supports the hypothesis that they use drugs because they truly want to. The article proposes an explanation for why emotional dysregulation should nevertheless be seen as an aspect of their loss of control and an important reason why they have impaired autonomy. I end by exploring some implications of this account for addict’s decision-making capacity when they are prescribed the drugs to which they are addicted. -/- . (shrink)

This is the first English translation of Husserliana XXIII, the volume in the critical edition of Edmund Husserl's works that gathers together a rich array of posthumous texts on representational consciousness. The lectures and sketches comprising this work make available the most profound and comprehensive Husserlian account of image consciousness. They explore phantasy in depth, and furnish nuanced accounts of perception and memory.

stufe oder Unterstufe im emporsteigenden Gang zur absoluten Er kenntnis gewinnen. Man kann sagen, daB das philosophisehe Interesse in vollbe wuBter Weise als leitendes Ziel das vor Augen hat, was sieh in jedem 5 rein theoretisehen Interesse als gleiehsam verborgene Tendenz be kundet: Die Tendenz auf vollkommene Erkenntnis liegt in allem rein theoretisehen Bestreben. a) Immerfort ftihlt es sieh fortgetrieben im Sinne mOgliehster Verdeutliehung, Klarung, mogliehst vollkom mener Begriindung. b) Immerfort ftihlt es sieh mit der vereinzelten 10 Tatsaehe, mit dem (...) vereinzelten Gesetz unbefriedigt; es kann daran nieht haften bleiben. Es ftihlt sich gedrangt, von dem Besonderen emporzusteigen zum Allgemeineren, von der Tatsaehe zum Gesetz, von der niederen Allgemeinheit zu der hoheren. Damit nieht zufrie den, muB es aIle mogliehen theoretisehen Lehren durehlaufen, um- 15 spannende Theorien bauen, die Theorien zu umfassenden Theorien verbinden, und so immer weiter. Dabei erweitert sieh der enge Kreis der yom theoretisehen Interesse zunaehst ins Auge gefaBten Gegen standliehkeiten; Einheit der theoretisehen Erkenntnis greift immer weiter von Gebiet zu Gebiet, ohne Grenze. 20 Bringen wir uns diese Tendenzen zur Klarheit, so sehen wir, daB sie im Verborgenen dem Ziel der hoehsten Vereinheitliehung die nen, daB sie verstreuten, zusammenhangslosen Erkenntnissen feind sind, daB sie gleiehsam niehts Untheoretisehes, Unvereinheitlichtes dulden wollen ebensowenig als ein Ende, soweit irgend noeh ein plus 25 ultra denkbar ist. Und zu alledem gehort offenbar aueh die Tendenz zu voll ausweisender Klarheit. (shrink)

Teilband 1. Verstand und Gegenstand : Texte aus dem Nachlass (1909-1927) -- Teilband 2. Gefühl und Wert : Texte aus dem Nachlass (1896-1925) -- Teilband 3. Wille und Handlung : Texte aus dem Nachlass (1902-1934) -- Teilband 4. Textkritischer Anhang.

The stated subject of these lecture courses given by Husserlbetween 1910 and 1918is ‘reason, the word for the mental activities and accomplishments that govern knowledge, give it form and supply it with norms.’ They show their author still pursuing the course set out in the Logical Investigations up to the end of the second decade of the century and displaying utter consistency with stands that he began taking on meaning, analyticity, Platonism, manifolds, mathematics, psychologism, etc. in the 1890s. Thus, they (...) undermine many idées reçues about the development of his thought. The centerpiece of this work is an exploration of the realm of meaning. Moreover, they add new dimensions to standard discussions by taking readers back to the place where phenomenology and analytic philosophy diverged. They show that Husserl tangled long and hard with the very ideas that went into the making of the latter and offer a wealth of interesting insights into sense and meaning, theory of judgment, complete and incomplete meanings, states of affairs, extensional logic, the relationship between logic and mathematics, functions and arguments, propositional functions, quantification, existential generalization, the word ‘all,’ number theory, sets, modality, deductive theory, ideas that are still under discussion today. Prepared for oral delivery in the classroom, they are refreshingly lively and spontaneous. They are clearer, more explicit, and readable than the books Husserl published during his lifetime. (shrink)

Hierbei beruhrt Husserl auch Themen, welche die Grenzen der Methode aufzeigen, z.B. die eidetische Variation meines eigenen Charakters.

Women typically report more pain than men, as well as exhibit specific sex differences in the perception and emotional expression of pain. We present evidence that sex is a significant variable in the evolution of facial expression of pain.

What are the limits of the imagination in morality? What role does fiction play in moral thought? My starting point in addressing these questions is Tamar Szabo Gendler's ‘puzzle of imaginative resistance’, the problem of explaining the special difficulties we seem to encounter in imagining to be right what we take to be morally wrong in fiction, and Gendler's claim that those difficulties are due to our unwillingness to imagine these things, rather than our inability to imagine what is logically (...) or conceptually impossible. Using a wide range of examples, I argue that there is no puzzle of imaginative resistance and that to think that there is such a puzzle is to miss almost entirely the role fiction plays in moral thought. That, however, does not mean that there are no limits to what we can imagine in morality. In fact, I argue, the imagination is limited in morality, as elsewhere, by what is logically or conceptually possible. Together, those claims suggest that fiction and the imagination play a fundamental role in shaping our conception of the moral landscape. The paper concludes by drawing some of the consequences of these views for the nature of moral thought. (shrink)

We agree with Rachlin's argument that altruism is best understood as a case of self-control, and that a behavioral analysis is appropriate. However, the appeal to teleological behaviorism and the value of behavioral patterns may be unnecessary. Instead, we argue that altruism can generally be explained with traditional behavioral principles such as negative reinforcement, conditioned reinforcement, and rule-governed behavior.

Das von Husserl als "wissenschaftstheoretischer Teil" bezeichnete dritte Buch seiner Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie (1913) wurde, entgegen der ursprünglichen Absicht, von ihm selbst nie zur Veröffentlichung gebracht. Dessen ungeachtet verdient dieser Text jedoch gerade für das frühe Denken Husserls besondere Beachtung. So zeigt sich an ihm die deutliche Trennung von phänomenologischer und ontologischer Forschung, wird hier der applikative Wert der Phänomenologie für die empirische Wissenschaft betont und stellen sich vor allem mögliche Wege in die transzendentale Phänomenologie (...) dar. (shrink)

Acts of futile resistance—harms against an aggressor which could not reasonably hope to avert the threat the aggressor poses—give rise to a puzzle: on the one hand, many such acts are intuitively permissible, yet on the other, these acts fail to meet the justificatory standards of defensive action. The most widely accepted solution to this puzzle is that victims in such cases permissibly defend against a secondary threat to their honour, dignity, or moral standing. I argue that this solution fails, (...) because futile resistance is not plausibly regarded as defensive in the relevant sense. I propose instead that futile resistance is justified as a form of protest, where protest is analysed as an expression of rejection of victims’ wrongs. Such protest is justified, I argue, when and because it is the fitting response to the circumstances of futility. (shrink)

In this study I defend an account of 'dispositional coercion' and coercive offers which hinges primarily on the intentions of both the coercer and the victim. In doing so I argue against various baseline accounts of coercion. ;Baseline accounts center on the victim's estimation of a proposal's effect, the determination of coercive threats and offers primarily hinging on the victim's beliefs and preferences. I believe that it is the intended action of the individual making the proposal that provides the core (...) consideration for defining coercive threats and offers. ;The following is my set of jointly necessary and sufficient conditions for 'dispositional coercion' wherein X coerces Y to do A: X threatens Y, that is, X intentionally attempts to create the belief in Y that X will be responsible for harm coming to Y should Y fail to do A. X's motive for attempting to create this belief is his desire to bring about a state of affairs in which Y's recognition of this possible harm to himself influences Y to do A. X successfully creates the belief in Y that Y may be harmed if he fails to do A, that is, X is successful in causing Y to recognize that harm may come to him should he fail to do A. Y intends to do A, and Y's motive for intending to do A is Y's desire to avoid harm to himself. Y does A. ;I also argue that X makes Y a coercive offer if and only if: ; X either intentionally attempts to create the following beliefs in Y, or for cases in which X believes that Y already holds beliefs and , attempts to create belief in Y: X is able to prevent some harm from coming to Y. Y needs X's assistance in preventing this harm. X will not assist Y in preventing this harm if Y does not do A. ; X's motive for attempting to create beliefs - in Y, or for cases in which Y already holds beliefs and , to attempt to create belief in Y is his desire to bring about a state of affairs in which Y's recognition of this possible harm to himself influences Y to do A. (shrink)

A recent innovation in the study of methods in the history of ideas is the introduction of elements of semantic externalism from the philosophy of language. Studies that rely on semantic externalism have done so to address particular questions of method in political theorising, including the interpretation of ‘essentially contested concepts’, and the issue of relativism in historical contextualism. In this paper, I critically review the use of semantic externalism, and associated methods such as Kripke’s causal theory of reference, in (...) the history of ideas. I explore the barriers that might prevent the use of externalism, and how studies relying on externalism seek to overcome such barriers. I then assess both the implications of relying on externalism, as well as a set of limitations. (shrink)

On accorde d'ordinaire un rôle important à la phonétique dans la description et l'explication phonologiques, en synchronie comme en diachronie. Le présent article met en doute la pertinence de ces facteurs. La palatalisation des consonnes vélaires en polonais remonte au 16ème siècle et s'observe devant voyelle antérieure. Son résultat moderne sont des alternances entre [k, g, x] et [c, ɟ, ç], alternances qui produisent également une distribution sérieusement restreinte de la seconde série de consonnes. En s'appuyant sur des faits synchroniques, (...) diachroniques et dialectaux, l'auteur montre qu'il n'existe aucun lien de cause à effet entre le changement et son contexte. Les analyses antérieures sont basées sur un examen incomplet des données et un enracinement fort dans l'approche phonéticienne qui fait crédit au conditionnement phonétique des régularités phonologiques. Si l'on apprécie l'ensemble des données pertinentes qui sont à notre disposition, la supposée naturalité du processus qui palatalise des consonnes vélaires devant de voyelle antérieure s'avère relever de l'illusion. La conclusion provisoire est que tout conditionnement phonétique qui se veut linguistiquement pertinent doit être phonologiquement fondé. (shrink)

Edmund D. Pellegrino, John Collins Harvey, Kevin T. Fitzgerald, SJ; Must the Church be Mute Lest Its Truths be Distorted? A Response to Engelhardt, Christian bi.