Volume 10, Issue 2, June 2019, Page 300-312.

While it is often taken for granted that the concepts of property and of distributive justice are capable of working together to generate norms which can enhance positive social and political relations, in particular the value of community, this Article argues otherwise. Relying on critical tools deriving from Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and Marx’s notion of fetishism, the author claims that the Rawlsian conception of distributive justice fetishizes the institution of property, and claims to "distribute" participation in society amongst its (...) members as if this amounted to a distribution of so many objects. Taken in this way, the concept of distributive justice has no respectable content. What social justice requires is a means to ensure that people are not "socially excluded," which requires each individual’s participation in the social and cultural enterprise. This sort of participation can no more be "distributed" than can life itself, and the realization of this point undermines the cogency of most discussions of distributive justice. (shrink)

By building upon Raz's analysis of the spectrum of voluntary obligations, the author produces a typology of agreements, and then assesses the extent to which these different kinds of agreements underpin the common law of contract. While recognizing that the law of contract purports to deal with a broad range of voluntarily undertaken obligations, the typology of agreements suggests that the present law is primarily suited to dealing only with bargains. This suggests that there are situations in which agreements should (...) be legally recognized, but which should not be dealt with by all of the conceptual tools of contract law, for these agreements and voluntary undertakings serve the interests of those undertaking them in significantly different ways than do bargains. (shrink)

Suárez distingue entre cuatro formas diferentes de intentar un fin de acción: con una intención actual, virtual, habitual o interpretativa. Esta distinción se repite en muchos libros y artículos en siglos posteriores como una parte estándar de la teoría de la acción, y Suárez es evidentemente la fuente de muchos de los autores posteriores. Este artículo examina el tratamiento de Suárez de la distinción. La intención interpretativa recibe la mayor atención, ya que Suárez parece dar varias caracterizaciones inconsistentes de ella (...) en diferentes obras. El artículo concluye con algunas notas sobre la posterior recepción de la distinción y comenta brevemente las lecciones que se deben aprender sobre cómo rastrear la influencia de Suárez. (shrink)

Introduction. Regardless of the perturbations and transformations of the external, a person realizes himself and presents himself to others in the direction of the so-called subjectivity. The topic of subjectivity, including the social identity of the subject, is widely represented in modern academic discourses. However, already in the first decade of the XXI century in the context of social and humanitarian reflections on the subject, the idea of the so-called digital subject was raised. In comparison with its biosociocultural counterpart, the (...) digital subject occupies a specific position, a position between the real world of physical objects and the information space. Therefore, reflections on the social identity of a modern person are brought into the digital space, into those of its variants where the digital subject “dwells” and creates narratives about himself. The definitions of “social identity” and “digital subject” proposed in the article will be taken as basic. The purpose of the article is to identify and analyze the key variants of social identity that are presented today in the Internet. Methods. The study is based on general scientific methods, analysis and synthesis, induction, deduction, abstraction. The analysis of variants of social identity in the Internet was carried out primarily on the basis of content analysis, the method of interpretation and a systematic approach. Scientific novelty of the study. The article presents options for designing social identity in the digital space, e-mail and instant messengers, contextual advertising, social networks; the specifics of designing in each of the named options are analyzed. Results. The exposition of options for designing social identity on digital material opens up a spectrum of different forms of being a subject in the Internet. To the greatest extent, these forms are associated with the communicative nature of a person. Increasingly, the social subject is turning to digital communication options, which include instant messengers, social networks and e-mail. It seems that in the 21st century, when the Internet has its own specific signs, including emoji, the so-called literacy qualification, the ability to communicate via the Internet, is available to anyone. At the same time, the real subject not only leaves its unique imprint on the network; the information he receives from the Internet leaves its mark on his decisions, in a series of diverse elections, from a grocery store to a political leader. Conclusion. In modern academic reflections on the specifics of human existence in the Internet, the idea of a digital subject has taken shape. In the discourses of domestic and foreign researchers, the digital subject is usually represented as a prefabricated construct. It has a connection with the real subject and social groups, but its origin is ideological. According to its purpose, it carries some idea that inclines the real subject to make just such a decision, not another. Hence, digital research acquires epistemological value, more precisely, the search and analysis of options through which a person realizes his identity in the network. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: On What the Forms Are: the Present State of the Question Sketch of the View to be Offered Here Plan of this Discussion of the Forms The Republic's Project as a Whole The First Group of Passages on the Forms (V.472b—e with 454a–456c) The Second Group of Passages (X.596a–602b) The Third Group of Passages on the Forms (V.475e–480b, VI.484b–485b, 486d‐e, 490a—b, 493e–494a, 500b–502d) The Fourth Group of Passages (VI.502c‐VII.541b: Sun, Line, and Cave) as Describing the (...) “Longer Road”: Plato's Identification of the Good with the Form of the Good The Anti‐reductionism of the Sun, Line, and Cave about the Real Natures of Things that Structure the Universe Conclusion. (shrink)

James Penner has probably done more than anyone else in legal philosophy to set the terms of debate in property theory for the past two decades. His 1997 book, The Idea of Property in Law initiated...

Thinking Radical Democracy is an introduction to nine key political thinkers who contributed to the emergence of radical democratic thought in post-war French political theory: Hannah Arendt, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Pierre Clastres, Claude Lefort, Cornelius Castoriadis, Guy Debord, Jacques Rancière, Étienne Balibar, and Miguel Abensour. The essays in this collection connect these writers through their shared contribution to the idea that division and difference in politics can be perceived as productive, creative, and fundamentally democratic. The questions they raise regarding equality and (...) emancipation in a democratic society will be of interest to those studying social and political thought or democratic activist movements like the Occupy movements and Idle No More. --Provided by publisher. (shrink)

La plupart des études récentes sur le Lysis de Platon considèrent ce dialogue comme un échec philosophique. Si quelques parties du Lysis ont retenu l’at­tention des commentateurs, il en est peu qui ont essayé, dans leur analyse, de défendre l’idée que ce court texte offre un contenu philosophique construit et cohérent. Terry Penner et Christopher Rowe (P&R) relèvent ce défi dans leur commentaire philosophique de ce dialogue en affirmant qu’une analyse systéma­tique du Lysis est insuffisante e...

The volume brings together a collection of original papers on some of the main tenets of Joseph Raz's legal and political philosophy: Legal positivism and the nature of law, practical reason, authority, the value of equality, incommensurability, harm, group rights, and multiculturalism. James Griffin and Yael Tamir raise questions concerning Raz's notion of group rights and its application to claims of cultural and political autonomy, while Will Kymlicka and Bernhard Peters examine Raz's theory of multicultural society. Lukas Meyer investigates the (...) applicability of the notion of harm in the intergenerational context. Other papers are devoted to fundamental theoretical tenets of Raz's work. Hillel Steiner and Andrei Marmor examine Raz's account of value pluralism and incommensurability in light of what these authors consider to be goods whose equal distribution must be valued for its own sake. Robert Alexy and Timothy Endicott discuss traditional issues of jurisprudence and legal philosphy with special attention to Raz's contribution. Rüdiger Bittner, Bruno Celano, and J. E. Penner discuss and criticize aspects of Raz's theory of practical reason. Jeremy Waldron presents a critique of Raz's interpretation of authority.This volume concludes with a chapter by Joseph Raz in which he responds to arguments in the foregoing essays. (shrink)

If metaphysics is centrally concerned with charting the domain of the possible, the only coherent account of the ground of metaphysical possibility and of our capacity for modal knowledge is to be found in a version of essentialism: a version that I call serious essentialism, to distinguish it from certain other views which may superficially appear very similar to it but which, in fact, differ from it fundamentally in certain crucial respects. This version of essentialism eschews any appeal whatever to (...) the notion of possible worlds in its account of the nature and ground of metaphysical possibility, for reasons that which I shall endeavour to explain and justify in this paper. (shrink)

Legal philosophers and property scholars sometimes disagree over one or more of the following: the meaning of the word 'property,' the concept of property, and the nature of property. For much of the twentieth century, the work of W.N. Hohfeld and Tony Honoré represented a consensus around property. The consensus often went under the heading of property as bundle of rights, or more accurately as a set of normative relations between persons with respect to things. But by the mid-l 990s, (...) the consensus was under attack. Key figures in the attack were James Penner, a legal philosopher, and Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, two highly regarded professors of property law. This article aims to repel the attack and argues for property as a set of normative relations between persons with respect to things. The positive case for this view of property pays special attention to the philosophy of language and the analysis of concepts. The positive case also maintains that the right to use and the power to transfer are as central to property as the right to exclude. It is possible that the virtues of Smith's modular theory of property differ from the virtues of a well-crafted bundle theory. Indeed, it may be the case that these two theories throw light on different features of property law and are not, save at the margin, competitors with each other. The label 'new essentialism' sometimes applied to the work of Penner, Merrill, and Smith seems inapt if property does not have an essence. Of course, they might refuse the label. (shrink)

In the Protagoras, Socrates appears to affirm and defend a paradoxical doctrine: the unity of virtue. Plato scholars do not agree on how the doctrine should be understood. Some, following Vlastos (1972), take Socrates to hold that the virtues are biconditionally related, i.e. that anyone who has one of the virtues has them all. Others, following Penner (1973), take Socrates’ position to be that the names of the virtues all refer to the same thing, namely virtue. In this paper, (...) I argue that both of these interpretations are mistaken: the main thesis of the Protagoras is, very simply, that each of the virtues is a kind of knowledge or wisdom. (shrink)

Se discuten dos argumentos del diálogo Protágoras sobre la relación entre las virtudes individuales. En primer lugar se defiende -frente a Terry Penner- la tesis de Vlastos de que cuando Sócrates dice que "la justicia es justa", "la justicia es piadosa", etc., está destacando la mutua implicación entre las virtudes, y no su identidad; y se formula una hipótesis para explicar la razón de tal reciprocidad. En segundo lugar, se examina el argumento de que, puesto que la insensatez se (...) opone tanto a la moderación como a la sabiduría, y un término contrario no puede tener más de un contrario, moderación y sabiduría serían "una sola cosa". Se asevera que Platón quiere que rechacemos esta última conclusión, basada en el fondo en la idea de que las distintas virtudes se relacionan entre sí como las partes de un mismo rostro. Se concluye que los argumentos analizados no implican realmente la idea contraintuitiva de la identifi cación mutua de las virtudes.Two arguments from the Protagoras on the unity of the virtues are here dwelt with. First, it is claimed - with G. Vlastos and contra T. Penner - that when Socrates says that “justice is just”, “justice is pious”, etc. he wants to highlight the reciprocity of the individual virtues, not their mutual identity . Second, it is argued that Plato does not really want us to infer from folly’s opposition to both temperance and wisdom the need to identify these two virtues . He is only drawing our attention to their close relationship. This is enough to reject the hypothesis initially defended by Protagoras, i.e. that the different virtues relate to each other as the parts of a face. I conclude that the two aforesaid arguments do not really support the mutual identity of the virtues. (shrink)

E. Rae Harcum argues that Christians do not have to give up their religious faith to keep the contributions of science. He confronts the relation between the human body and its non-material parts—the mind and spirit—and provides a way of looking at these metaphysical issues.

This paper assesses several prominent recent attacks on the view that epistemic justification is conceptually prior to knowledge. I argue that this view—call it the Received View (RV)—emerges from these attacks unscathed. I start with Timothy Williamson’s two strongest arguments for the claim that all evidence is knowledge (E>K), which impugns RV when combined with the claim that justification depends on evidence. One of Williamson’s arguments assumes a false epistemic closure principle; the other misses some alternative (to E>K) explanations of (...) a putative fact about the evidence a particular subject has. Next, I neutralize each of Jonathan Sutton’s three recent arguments to the conclusion that any justified belief constitutes knowledge. Finally, I consider a recent analysis of justification due to Alexander Bird, according to which justified belief is possible knowledge. I argue that Bird’s analysis delivers neither a sufficient nor (more importantly) a necessary condition for justification. [Word count: 149]. (shrink)

This book is about the mind and its connection to the brain. The first two chapters discuss the basic characteristics of the mind, and places it in historical context by noting trends in popular culture, and various people's ideas about the mind. This discussion ends by concluding that the most fruitful approach to studying the mind is a scientific approach that looks for connections between the mind and the brain. The last four chapters focus on the following specific principles: The (...) operation of the mind is hidden; Prediction is an important function of the mind; and Connectivity and communication between different areas of the mind are crucial for the mind's operation. An important feature of this discussion is that it is supported by empirical research, by briefly describing experiments. This book therefore goes beyond simply presenting conclusions, by elucidating the procedures and reasoning that led to those conclusions. The intent of the book is to give readers a feel for the latest scientific thinking about the mind, by focusing on basic principles that hold across many different functions of the mind. One key to marketing the book is to emphasize the fact that the writing makes a fascinating, but complex, subject accessible to the general reader. (shrink)