This book focuses on two important, interlinked themes in psychiatry, i.e., the relation between self (or: person), context and psychopathology; and the intrinsic value-ladenness of psychiatry as a practice. -/- Written against the background of scientistic tendencies in today’s psychiatry, it is argued in Part I that psychiatry needs a clinical conception of psychopathology alongside more traditional scientific conceptions; that this clinical conception of psychopathology must be based on a fundamental rethinking of the interaction between illness manifestations, contextual influences and (...) the patient as person, such that psychopathology is conceived as the product of this interaction rather than as the outward manifestation of a broken mechanism within the patient. -/- In Part II, it is shown that self- and context-related factors have a large impact on who one is as a professional. I argue that an analysis is needed of the normative aspects of the relations that sustain and frame professional role-fulfilment. This analysis culminates into a so-called normative practice model (NPM) which distinguishes between qualifying, conditioning and foundational principles (or: rules, norms). The normative practice model helps to locate and resist scientistic defenses of the legitimacy of psychiatry and to replace them by a positive account that provides clinicians (and scientists) the conceptual tools they need to justify what they do in broader contexts. The main thrust of the argument is to show that psychiatry needs a value-sensitive account of its legitimacy, in which other normative dimensions are recognized than those that sustain the expert role. Psychiatrists should in other words not defend the legitimacy of their profession by referring to the expert role solely but provide a broader account in which justice is done to the broader social, legal, and economic contexts of professional activity. The analysis of this inherent normativity begins within clinical practice, it extends to the concept of disease as well as to wider domains of psychiatric care and the sociology of professions, and, finally, amounts into an analysis of the value-ladenness of interactions between healthcare institutions, the government, professional organizations and patient groups. (shrink)

Pesquisa qualitativa : conceitos básicos -- Pesquisa qualitativa : apilcações nos estudos rurais -- Pesquisa qualitativa : apilcações nos estudos urbanos -- Pesquisa qualitativa : apilcações em outros estudos geográficos.

Fundado em 14 de janeiro de 1933 como remanescente das associações culturais criadas pelo movimento anarquista e anarco-sindicalista nas primeiras décadas do século XX, o Centro de Cultura Social de São Paulo tem por objetivo o aprimoramento intelectual, a prática pedagógica e os debates públicos. Nesse intuito, organiza palestras, cursos, seminários, filmes, peças teatrais, entre outros, além de manter um acervo de arquivo e biblioteca voltada principalmente para os estudos. Desenvolve formas de ação e formação de militantes e de livres (...) pensadores, tendo sido comum a formação de diversos centros de cultura ou congêneres em meados do século XX. A obra Pedagogia, sujeitos e resistências é resultado de um seminário promovido pelo Centro de Cultura Social de São Paulo em Junho de 2009 com o propósito de discutir o funcionamento das verdades do poder e dos poderes da verdade que circundam as várias práticas políticas e pedagógicas na contemporaneidade. Nesse sentido, a obra em questão, como bem apresenta Silvio Gallo, é resultado do esforço intelectual de jovens pesquisadores que transformaram um encontro de estudos em matéria concreta e viva de resistência ao instituído em prol da liberdade de expressão e de criação de novos modos de vida. Esta coletânea de textos apresenta-se extremamente inovadora no que concerne a educação e a pedagogia porque apresenta o funcionamento de micropolíticas cotidianas capazes de mobilização-transformação do mesmo e da mesmidade político,pedagógica e educacional tão correntes nos dias de hoje. (shrink)

The title of this article is ambiguous in the sense that it may direct the attention to either theism as a system of beliefs of persons who are referring to particular facts that serve as external grounds for the foundation of theist beliefs or to theism as a system of beliefs of persons who are convinced of theism’s truth on grounds that are intrinsic to their belief . Traces of both conceptions of theism can be found in Alvin Plantinga’s thesis (...) of the ‘proper basicality’ of religious belief, for instance in the distinction between evidence of the ‘on the basis of …’- type and evidence of the ‘inclination’- type. However, these two types of evidence do only lead to doxastic experience. In order to be warranted with respect to a particular knowledge claim, beliefs must be produced by noetic capacities that function properly, i.e. according to their design plan and in contexts that are appropriate to these capacities. This externalist epistemology exerts its greatest power in the criticism of the ‘evidentialist objection to belief in God’. However, it raises a number of objections with respect to its positive account of theism. When every community of thinkers creates its own relevant set of examples in order to establish criteria of proper basicality, does this not lead to skepticism? And, can doxastic experience not be honoured as a proper response to being called by divine discourse and, correspondingly, be seen as the relational foundation of theist belief? (shrink)

In this paper, we explore the conceptual problems arising when using network analysis in person- centered care (PCC) in psychiatry. Personalized network models are potentially helpful tools for PCC, but we argue that using them in psychiatric practice raises boundary problems, i.e., problems in demarcating what should and should not be included in the model, which may limit their ability to provide clinically-relevant knowledge. Models can have explanatory and representational boundaries, among others. We argue that we can make more explicit (...) what kind of questions personalized network models can address in PCC, given their representational and explanatory boundaries, using perspectival reasoning. (shrink)

This article introduces a new hybrid intake procedure developed for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) screening, which combines an automated textual assessment of respondents’ self-narratives and item-based measures that are administered consequently. Text mining technique and item response modeling were used to analyze long constructed response (i.e., self-narratives) and responses to standardized questionnaires (i.e., multiple choices), respectively. The whole procedure is combined in a Bayesian framework where the textual assessment functions as prior information for the estimation of the PTSD latent trait. (...) The purpose of this study is twofold: first, to investigate whether the combination model of textual analysis and item-based scaling could enhance the classification accuracy of PTSD, and second, to examine whether the standard error of estimates could be reduced through the use of the narrative as a sort of routing test. With the sample at hand, the combination model resulted in a reduction in the misclassification rate, as well as a decrease of standard error of latent trait estimation. These findings highlight the benefits of combining textual assessment and item-based measures in a psychiatric screening process. We conclude that the hybrid test design is a promising approach to increase test efficiency and is expected to be applicable in a broader scope of educational and psychological measurement in the future. (shrink)

Questo studio investiga quali siano i punti di contatto tra il filosofo tedesco Friedrich Nietzsche e lo scrittore svedese Hjalmar Söderberg nel romanzo di quest’ultimo Doktor Glas. L’articolo prende in esame due testi nietzschiani finora poco messi in relazione con l’opera söderberghiana, Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne e Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, evidenziando gli influssi che il pensiero del filosofo tedesco ha esercitato sulla concezione del Doktor Glas. L’analisi prende le mosse dai concetti di menzogna e conoscenza (...) così come formulati in Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne e dal concetto di “morte di Dio”, identificando in quest’ultimo il crollo della metafisica nel pensiero filosofico europeo a partire dalla rivoluzione copernicana. Il saggio illustra come a questo cambiamento sia sopraggiunto lo svilupparsi di una nuova sensibilità tecnico-scientifica legata alla physis, cambiamento che vede nella figura del medico il suo massimo esponente. L’articolo mette dunque in luce come nel Doktor Glas il passaggio dalla metafisica alla physis venga rappresentato come un momento di crisi esistenziale, non avendo il medico la capacità di superare il trauma della perdita della metafisica. Quest’incapacità è causata dalla conoscenza, la quale se offre la possibilità di scoprire le menzogne usate dalla società, non consente però di trovare lo stimolo per superare la condizione di vuoto causata dalla “morte di Dio”. Söderberg fornisce dunque nel suo romanzo un’interpretazione pessimistica della crisi di Fin de siècle, inquadrando nella paralisi interiore del dottor Tyko Gabriel Glas e l’omicidio inconcludente del pastore Gregorius il fallimento del passaggio dal paradigma metafisico al paradigma della physis e l’impossibilità di superare la crisi tramite una metamorfosi nella condizione di Übermensch. (shrink)

E l conflict o entr e l a democraci a a g r e gat iva (basad a e n e l v alo r igualitari o d e l a r e gla d e l a m a y oría ) y l a deliberat iva (centrad a e n l a fuerz a epistémic a de l mejo r a r gumento) constitu ye un a d e la s principale s tensione s d e l a (...) teorí a contemporáne a d e l a democracia. Est e trabaj o sostien e qu e quiene s dibuja n dich o conflict o l o hace n a pa r ti r d e un a visión e xces iv ament e optimist a de l v alo r mora l d e l a primer a y demasiad o pesimist a de l carácte r no igualitari o d e l a s e gunda . N i l a con e xió n d e l a r e gl a d e l a m a y orí a co n l a igualda d política sería n ta n fue r t e y e xclus iv a , n i l a deliberació n u n proces o controla b l e únicament e po r la búsqued a objet iva d e solucione s política s co r recta s y n o tambié n po r e xigencia s d e justicia procedimental . N o obstante , aunqu e co n una s proporcione s mucho s meno s e xagerada s a la sugeridas , e xistirí a entr e ambo s procedimiento s u n cie r t o g rad o d e incompatibilida d que podría , s i n o superars e po r completo , s í relajars e d e admiti r qu e cualquie r justi f icació n de u n procedimient o d e tom a d e decisione s n o pued e desa r rollars e d e fo r m a completamente abstracta , sin o qu e h a d e ajustars e a l cont e xto. (shrink)

E l auto r pa r t e de l reconocimient o d e qu e lo s parámetro s e n lo s qu e s e inscribía n las institucione s d e l a democraci a representat iva ha n cambiad o sustancialmente . E n es e nu evo cont e xt o sitú a e l debat e sobr e lo s posi b le s dé f icit s d e l a democraci a (...) representat iva y espe- cí f icament e e l crecient e desapoderamient o d e l a capacida d popula r d e influi r y condicionar la s decisiones , qu e hac e perde r l e gitimida d a un a democraci a qu e sól o mantien e abie r tas la s pue r ta s d e lo s rito s fo r male s e institucionales . E n s e gund o luga r , e l a r tícul o s e centra e n lo s efecto s qu e tien e l a generalizació n d e inte r ne t e n es e escenario . E l auto r constata cóm o la s estrat e gia s d e us o d e la s TI C hast a ahor a desa r rollada s e n e l espaci o polític o se ha n centrad o e n l a mejor a d e l a capacida d d e prestació n d e se r vicio s o e n l a ampliació n de l a capacida d d e elecció n d e lo s consumidores-ciudadanos , per o n o e xist e un a v olunta d d e ir má s all á d e un a concepció n d e l a democraci a qu e s e centr a e n la s r e gla s procedimentales y e n un a visió n mu y estrict a de l principi o d e representación . F rent e a esta s estrat e gias, e l a r tícul o aborda , po r u n lado , la s relacione s entr e Inte r net , m o vimiento s sociale s y las nu ev a s fo r ma s d e hace r polític a (centrándos e e n l a e xperienci a de l 15M ) y , po r otr o lado , la posibilida d d e repensa r d e nu evo e l viej o tem a d e l a democraci a direct a y l a pa r ticipación ciudadan a qu e l a e xtensió n y generalizació n d e Inte r ne t pe r miten . E n amba s estrat e gia s late l a preocupació n po r l a calida d d e l a pa r ticipació n y l a capacida d d e implicació n d e l a gente e n lo s asunto s colect iv o s tant o a n i v e l polític o com o ví a necesari a n o sól o par a defender su s intereses , sin o com o fo r m a d e entende r l a democracia , un a democraci a relaciona l y pa r ticipat iv a. (shrink)

Leçon 1. L'être et l'histoire -- La lettre morte et la finitude -- L'image du monde -- L'histoire, le récit d'un événement -- Leçon 2. Glas, un roman philosophique -- Reliques -- Le fils de Hegel ou le perce-oreille -- Leçon 3. Statue de Condillac -- Régimes de signes -- L'écriture de la sensation -- Leçon 4. L'écriture -- Reste et résistance -- Aborder la finitude -- Sensation de statue -- Leçon 5. Entendre les différences -- Avoir des oreilles (...) -- Hors de la finitude -- Les fins de l'homme -- Leçon 6. Matérialité -- Khôra -- Synthèses passives -- Surface d'inscription -- Leçon 7. L'insensible du sensible -- Le toucher -- Espacements -- Le réalisme -- Leçon 8. Toucher au monde -- Effleurer, tendre, étendre -- Limites, liminaires, limbes -- Empirisme transcendantal -- Leçon 9. Sommeil et fatigue de la raison -- Rêve de Derrida -- L'effort -- De l'habitude -- Leçon 10. De la grammatologie -- Le supplément -- Tangence de la technique -- La Trace -- Leçon 11. Papier Machine -- Matière de papier -- Le ruban -- Hors-d'oeuvre -- Leçon 12. Restitution -- Déboîter le cadre -- L'infra-mince -- Logique du fantôme -- Leçon 13. Spectres -- L'esprit -- La hantologie -- Leçon 14. Revisiter Hegel -- La carte du jardin -- L'allégorie -- Face et préface. (shrink)

Haben wir noch Grundsätze? Von A. Bengsch.--Das evolutive Weltbild im Lichre der Offenbarung, von M. Schmaus.--Das Selbstverständnis des gläubigen Menschen, von E. Gössmann.

Though Derrida had often appealed to the notion of le reste, in works ranging from Glas to Shibbloth to Cinders, it was not until his 2002 essay Reste – le maître that he would devote an entire work to the topic. In this essay, I look at a few of Derrida's early attempts to think le reste, particularly in relationship to poetry in ‘Che cos'è la poesia?’ before concentrating on Reste – le maître. I show that it is only (...) in this latter work that Derrida develops a full ‘theory’ of le reste as a ‘quasi-transcendental’ along the lines of différance or, indeed – and Derrida himself makes the comparison – the ‘Good beyond being’ in Plato and Plotinus. But it is also in this latter text that Derrida uses the notion of the reste to suggest a relationship, an analogy, between the logic of sacrifice and mastery in Western onto-theology and the logic of sacrifice and mastery in the Brahmin culture of India. As such, I suggest in conclusion, le reste is perhaps the most suggestive and the most powerful notion in all of Derrida's work for thinking today the relationship between deconstruction and the rest of the world. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 12.1 (2005) 59-61 [Access article in PDF] Space and Normativity Jennifer Church Keywords space, normativity, reasons, unconscious I appreciate the thoughtful criticisms and helpful suggestions of my commentators. In this brief reply, I can only begin to address the many interesting issues that they raise.I am not sure whether R.D. Hinshelwood views my paper as operating within the constraints of analytic philosophy, which he equates (...) with "rationalist" philosophy and traces back to Aristotle, or as moving beyond those boundaries. Three initial remarks may help to situate my position. (1) My paper is in the analytic tradition insofar as it is an attempt to articulate the constitutive structure of concepts that are especially interesting and fundamental, where such articulation may or may not lead to conceptual revision. (2) My particular focus is on the concept of reason, with the aim of thinking through its appropriate use with respect to unconscious thought and the emotions; implicit in this project is the assumption that there are some things that should not be explained by appeal to reasons. (3) I wish to show how some peculiarities surrounding the attribution of unconscious reasons and emotional reasons can be understood by reference to spatial reasoning rather than reasoning that is more linguistic in character.Hinshelwood sympathizes with my attempt to describe a kind of reasoning that is not "rationalist" insofar as it does not rely on the manipulation of symbols and, indeed, tends to ignore the distinction between symbol and thing. He agrees that there is something spatial about such ways of reasoning. But Hinshelwood argues that more needs to be said to establish a connection between the spatial maneuverings of animals and the nonpropositional thinking of humans. He thinks that "psychoanalysis can in effect fill in the gap in Church's argument with a developmental argument" (2005, 47). The developmental account he has in mind is based on Freud's description of how an infant who automatically tries to ingest what feels good and excrete what feels bad will also come to introject (i.e., to imagine ingesting) what seems good and eject (i.e., imagine excreting) what seems bad. In the words of Hinshelwood, this is a hypothesis about how "bodily space becomes psychic space, and emerges in the sense of having a mind" (2005, 47). I am sympathetic to this account of how we acquire a sense of having a mind, but I do not think that we need to have a sense of having a mind in order to have a mind. A cat can have beliefs and desires (and can have the normative experience of having taken the wrong turn) without ever imagining an inner space with mental contents. Likewise, a cat can experience anger or fear in virtue of experiencing certain changes within its body despite having no experience of its mind as such. In short, I view an account of introjection as an important contribution to developmental psychology, but I think it comes [End Page 59] after, not before, an account of unconscious and emotional reasons.Gerrit Glas maintains that my attempt to ground the normativity of unconscious reasoning (or spatial reasoning) in the feeling of 'getting it right' versus getting it wrong' runs afoul of this dilemma: either (a) the normativity of unconscious reasoning ends up very much like the normativity of conscious reasoning, and the needed normativity is already built into the feeling that I appeal to, or (b) the normativity of unconscious reasoning is reduced to physical sensations and is no longer normative at all. I do not view this as a dilemma because I embrace option (a). I agree that the feel of being on the right track is much the same, whether or not we can say what that track is, let alone why it is right rather than wrong. Likewise, it feels the same to realize that I have made a wrong turn, whether or not I know what the wrong turn was. Also, I agree that normativity is implicit in the feel of getting it right. I am not appealing to such a feeling... (shrink)

"Dimensions of Shared Agency" investigates the way in which standard philosophical accounts have been dealing with the issue of collective actions. In particular, the book focuses on the 'Big Five' of analytical social ontology and their accounts of shared/collective intentions and actions. Through systematic readings of different positions in the debate, the author proposes original ways of analyzing and classifying current theories of shared agency according to whether they advance a member-level or a group-level account of shared agency. While member-level (...) accounts are theories of shared agency based on individuals' attitudes and actions, group-level accounts give attention to the group of individuals considered as a whole, i.e., as an agent itself. Criticism arises against the idea that the Big Five have proposed stable group-level accounts suitable for explaining the case of shared agency as a group-level phenomenon. The widespread tendency in the debate is to endorse a perspective called holistic individualism, which maintains that high-level explanations are objective even though social facts are ontologically reducible to facts about individuals. Lasagni argues that as long as holistic individualism is held, the GLA is reducible to the MLA because holistic individualism upholds ontological individualism based on a deep individualistic premise, fixing the special status of individual agents as natural persons. The premise makes the claim to treat groups as agents contradictory to the general framework of the theory. This book profiles an alternative interpretation according to which agency should be considered as a functional kind, which is equally instantiated by different systems, such as individual human beings and organized social groups. In this way, the author claims, the reduction of the social can be avoided. "Dimensions of Shared Agency" will be of interest to doctoral students, researchers, and scholars interested in social ontology and the philosophy of the social sciences. It can also be utilised as supplementary reading or an introduction to philosophy students and scholars who are first approaching the philosophy of collective intentionality and shared agency. (shrink)

What is it for a realist metaethical theory to be agent-focused? Is Huang’s metaethical realism agent-focused, as he claims? After dismissing as unviable some other ways of making sense of distinctively metaethical (rather than first-order) agent-focused-ness, this commentary explores the thought that for a realist metaethical theory to be agent-focused is for it to ground the realist metaphysical and semantic status of moral evaluations of actions in the realist metaphysical and semantic status of moral evaluations of agents. I argue that (...) Huang’s theory is not—and, given his motivations, need not be—one of this kind, but rather is simply the conjunction of an agent-focused first-order ethical theory with a realist metaethical theory that isn’t distinctively metaethically agent-focused in any interesting way. (shrink)

In 2005 St Andrews Studies published a volume of essays by Anscombe entitled Human Life, Action and Ethics, followed in 2008 by a second with the title Faith in a Hard Ground. Both books were highly praised. This third volume brings essays on the thought of historical philosophers in which Anscombe engages directly with their ideas and arguments. Many are published here for the first time and the collection provides further testimony to Anscombe's insight and intellectual imagination.

The literature on demonstratives mostly focuses on DPs (demonstrative pronouns and determiners), which denote in the entity domain. However, demonstratives can also belong to other categories and denote in the domains of manners _(she acted like this/like that/thus_), locations (_she was here/there_), degrees (_she was yay tall_), amounts (Russian: _ona vypila stolʲko vody_ ‘she drank that_much water’), qualities (Russian: _ona uže pila takoe vino_ ‘she drank that_kind_of wine’), and even times (_she arrived then_). The problem I address is twofold. How (...) can we define a unified semantics for these expressions that incorporates a single concept of demonstration, yet allows denotations to vary across domains? And how can we make sense of demonstrative feature values such as proximal or distal in domains that have no spatial component, such as degrees or manners? I argue that the solution comes from a generalized application of the familiar phenomenon of deferred reference: all demonstrative reference outside the entity and (possibly) spatial domains is deferred. (shrink)

Public discussion of new medical trials is desirable, but not moment‐by‐moment disclosure of patients' ups and down. Nor is such disclosure necessary: the public is not entitled to all information about a trial as soon as it is available. What should be given the press, and what withheld, cannot be decided without appreciating the surprising number and intricate interrelations of the parties' needs and interests.

Ancient and modern scholars are so unanimous in their condemnation of Varro as a writer, that a study of his ‘style’ may seem to be valueless. Cicero paid ready tribute to his great contemporary's learning, but studiously forbore to say anything about his writing, a fact which was observed by Augustine, who admitted Varro's inferiority in this respect. Quintilian, in a guarded way, makes the same criticism; for him Varro is ‘plus scientiae collaturus quam eloquentiae’. In recent times Norden has (...) castigated the De, Lingua Latina as exhibiting the worst Latin style of any prose work, and his opinion of the Res Rusticae is not much higher. (shrink)

The federal government's introduction in 1983 of DRG‐based reimbursement for Medicare patients shook the entire health care industry into the vigorous and dramatic cost containment efforts which today are reshaping health care in America.

We argue that the experience of knowing and having the truth about oneself known in the context of therapy is not an end in itself; rather, it is important because the trust engendered by this experience opens one up to learning about one’s social world and finding better ways to live in it. We consider the consequences of a lack of epistemic trust in terms of psychopathology.

Translator's summary The translated paper is an extract, published in 1945, of an unpublished thesis, of both historical and technical import, dealing with notions of definability and their relation to invariance under automorphisms. The author develops a metamathematical Galois theory, and discusses and anticipates some aspects of higher-order model theory in an informal but conceptually rich manner.

The definition of society as identity group is most likely to be useful when combined with the instrumental functions of identity groupings. These take two key forms, with important differences. First, identity groupings are useful for individual decision making. Second, societies can be units of collective behavior and information processing. Disentanglement of these forms is needed.

Rescher has presented a proof that a completed science is logically impossible; not every truth can be known. I show that the proof is valid only if it is read de re. One of its premises, however, is an obvious truth only on a de dicto reading; read de re it is false. What the proof shows, therefore, is that science has no limits and any true proposition can be known. We can, however, know it only in the meagre de (...) re, and not in the informationally rich de dicto, sense of 'know'. (shrink)

In contrast to most Western countries, routine offer of prenatal screening is considered problematic in the Netherlands. The main argument against offering it to every pregnant woman is that women would be brought into a moral dilemma when deciding whether to use screening or not. This paper explores whether the active offer of a prenatal screening test indeed confronts women with a moral dilemma. A qualitative study was developed, based on a randomised controlled trial that aimed to assess the decision-making (...) process of women when confronted with a test offer. A sample of 59 women was interviewed about the different factors balanced in decision-making. Participants felt themselves caught between a need for knowledge and their unwillingness to take on responsibility. Conflict was reported between wishes, preferences and ethical views regarding parenthood; however, women did not seem to be caught in a choice between two or more ethical principles. Participants balanced the interests of the family against that of the fetus in line with their values and their personal circumstances. Therefore, we conclude that they are not so much faced with an ethical dilemma as conflicting interests. We propose that caregivers should provide the opportunity for the woman to discuss her wishes and doubts to facilitate her decision. This approach would help women to assess the meaning of testing within their parental duties towards their unborn child and their current offspring. (shrink)

In 1954 H. L. A. Hart wrote that Austin's work has ‘never, since his death … been ignored’. If it never has been completely ignored, interest in it has periodically waxed and waned. The interest definitely waxed in the 1980s. More books were published about Austin in this period than in any other decade since his death in 1859. Although this literature contains discussions of some of the nineteenth-century responses to his work, they are not the focus of it. Certain (...) of the responses remain completely in the dark, while there is more light to shed on at least some of the others. In short, our knowledge of nineteenth-century interpretations of Austin's legal philosophy is very incomplete. (shrink)