Psychiatry is rapidly adopting digital phenotyping and artificial intelligence/machine learning tools to study mental illness based on tracking participants’ locations, online activity, phone and text message usage, heart rate, sleep, physical activity, and more. Existing ethical frameworks for return of individual research results (IRRs) are inadequate to guide researchers for when, if, and how to return this unprecedented number of potentially sensitive results about each participant’s real-world behavior. To address this gap, we convened an interdisciplinary expert working group, supported by (...) a National Institute of Mental Health grant. Building on established guidelines and the emerging norm of returning results in participant-centered research, we present a novel framework specific to the ethical, legal, and social implications of returning IRRs in digital phenotyping research. Our framework offers researchers, clinicians, and Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) urgently needed guidance, and the principles developed here in the context of psychiatry will be readily adaptable to other therapeutic areas. (shrink)

Given the need for enforceable guardrails for artificial intelligence (AI) that protect the public and allow for innovation, the U.S. Government recently issued a Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights which outlines five principles of safe AI design, use, and implementation. One in particular, the right to notice and explanation, requires accurately informing the public about the use of AI that impacts them in ways that are easy to understand. Yet, in the healthcare setting, it is unclear what goal (...) the right to notice and explanation serves, and the moral importance of patient-level disclosure. We propose three normative functions of this right: (1) to notify patients about their care, (2) to educate patients and promote trust, and (3) to meet standards for informed consent. Additional clarity is needed to guide practices that respect the right to notice and explanation of AI in healthcare while providing meaningful benefits to patients. (shrink)

In their paper, “Conversational Artificial Intelligence in Psychotherapy: A New Therapeutic Tool or Agent?” Sedlakova and Trachsel (2023) claim that therapeutic insights and therapeutic changes are...

In “What are Humans Doing in the Loop?” Salloch and Eriksen (2024) argue for a collaborative decision-making approach to using machine learning-based AI decisional support systems in medicine, rece...

The primary purpose of Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) is to protect the rights and welfare of human research participants. Evaluation and measurement of how IRBs satisfy this purpose and other important goals are open questions that demand empirical research. Research on IRBs, and the Human Research Protection Programs (HRPPs) of which they are often a part, is necessary to inform evidence-based practices, policies, and approaches to quality improvement in human research protections. However, to date, HRPP and IRB engagement in empirical (...) research about their own activities and performance has been limited. To promote engagement of HRPPs and IRBs in self-reflective research on HRPP and IRB quality and effectiveness, barriers to their participation need to be addressed. These include: extensive workloads, limited information technology systems, and few universally accepted or consistently measured metrics for HRPP/irb quality and effectiveness. Additionally, institutional leaders may have concerns about confidentiality. Professional norms around the value of participating in this type of research are lacking. Lastly, obtaining external funding for research on IRBs and HRPPs is challenging. As a group of HRPP professionals and researchers actively involved in a research consortium focused on IRB quality and effectiveness, we identify potential levers for supporting and encouraging HRPP and IRB engagement in research on quality and effectiveness. We maintain that this research should be informed by the core principles of patient- and community-engaged research, in which members and key stakeholders of the community to be studied are included as key informants and members of the research team. This ensures that relevant questions are asked and that data are interpreted to produce meaningful recommendations. As such, we offer several ways to increase the participation of HRPP professionals in research as participants, as data sharers, and as investigators. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉL'interprétation de la philosophie pratique de Donald Davidson proposée par Robert Myers représente correctement maints aspects fondamentaux de sa pensée. Myers soutient à juste titre que Davidson évite les incohérences entre la position internaliste, l'objectivité éthique et le modèle croyance-désir en modifiant des éléments centraux de ce modèle, et que l'alternative proposée par Davidson rend légitime l'extension des arguments de l'interprétation et de la triangulation dans la sphère pratique. Cependant, Myers s’égare à une bifurcation cruciale de la route interprétative. Davidson (...) suit G.E.M. Anscombe sur une voie différente, une voie qui considère les désirs individuels comme constitués en partie par des jugements évaluatifs. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:How Philosophers Trivialize Art: Bleak House, Oedipus Rex, "Leda and the Swan"Michael D. HurleyIIt is a Perverse but unsurprising irony that answers to the question of whether art can give us knowledge characteristically trivialize that which draws us to individual artworks in the first place. The experience of art is sidelined in favor of the apparent after-effect of that experience. Even those writing against each other tend to converge (...) on this. In an essay contesting Nelson Goodman's epistemic claims for art, Gordon Graham nonetheless agrees that, "The question to be asked of such a work is not, 'Does this effectively capture the scene portrayed?', but 'Does this make us see this sort of occasion differently?'"1 Even attempts to distinguish art as "gift" as opposed to commodity predictably figure its value in terms of what might be taken away: "I went to see a landscape painter's works, and that evening, walking among pine trees near my home, I could see the shapes and the colors I had not seen the day before."2This state of affairs is perversely ironic for two reasons. Firstly, because the possibility of art's cognitive content is only prompted at all by the immediate experience it offers: without this, art would not excite us the way it does and there would be no debate to be had. Secondly, and more significantly, because a defining part of what constitutes an interest in art is, I should like to suggest, an experience of knowledge; or, more accurately, an experience of knowing. This irony is unsurprising because it is merely another expression of a recalcitrant prejudice in western epistemology that idealizes knowledge as an objectively true, justified belief—perforce excluding the possibility of knowing as a subjective [End Page 107] experience of believing. No wonder the author of Theætetus elsewhere finds poets incapable of offering anything but lies.Plato's lingering legacy assures that the cognitive content of art be assized according to what might be extracted from the artwork—cashed in like so many casino chips—when we are done with our experience of it. This applies whether the knowledge-bearing being argued for, or against, is conceptual or propositional (e.g., Putnam, Novitz, John),3 or imaginative (e.g., Goodman, Robinson, Currie),4 as well as for the claim that art can offer us moral instruction (e.g., Beardsmore, Eldridge, Nussbaum, Sharpe, Kieran, John).5 There is less consensus as to whether the capacity of art to give us knowledge enriches the aesthetic value of that artwork, but those who would advance this position have been on the back-foot in recent years following a wave of criticisms from, among others, Beardsley, Lamarque and Olsen, Diffey, and Gaut.6This article addresses art's capacity to give us knowledge as well as the conjunct of whether such knowledge might inform its value qua art. In so doing, it presses a case that has already been disallowed by the terms in which the question of the relationship between art and knowledge is typically put. Whatever efferent knowledge art might offer, it also provides the conditions for a kind of knowing that cannot be translated beyond itself. Only such an experience of knowledge-as-knowing, which is realized through the untranslatable singularity of an artwork, may be considered constitutive of art's aesthetic value. Couched another way: epistemology meets aesthetics not where it has most often been located, in the perfective, at the congruence of the thought and the felt, but in the present continuous, in the engagement of thinking and feeling. Connecting the epistemic and the aesthetic in this way is, then, exactly the opposite proposition to that presented by Douglas Morgan, for whom, "although many words in many arts can and do give us knowledge of many kinds, nonetheless if this knowledge were the key and limit to the love of art, the world of art would be even sorrier than it now is."7IILiterature has generated by far the greatest volume of commentary in the debate on art and knowledge. This is to be expected given the bias towards categorizing knowledge as something like data... (shrink)

Philosophy of neuroscience may seem an odd thing to do. What can a philosopher add to what neuroscience itself has to say, other than at some very abstract level, far removed from empirical details and the interests of scientists? At some point you take a deep breath, acknowledge the methodological questions, and just go ahead, spurred on by the sheer philosophical interest and excitement abroad in the neurosciences today. So it is very gratifying to a philosopher of neuroscience for such (...) a distinguished neuropsychologist as Marcel Kinsbourne to find added value in the result. (shrink)

Книга адресована специалистам в области теории познания, обществоведам, преподавателям философских дисциплин, аспирантам и студентам философских факультетов вузов, всем тем, кто интересуется данной проблемой.

Bhartṛhari, the famous Indian linguistic philosopher (V CE) in his ‘Vākyapadīya’ discussed different doctrines on the nature of language, tending to demonstrate, that each of the doctrines is justified in a certain context and represents a certain aspect of reality. Modern scholars usually designate Bhartṛhari’s philosophy as perspectivism, though there are also disagreements with this interpretation. E.g. G. Cardona claims that Bhartṛhari’s perspectivism is generally exaggerated, and the true teaching expressed in VP is the monistic theory of the “Pāṇini-darśana”. So, (...) the concept of Bhartṛhari's perspectivism needs to be further eleborated. In this paper two characteristic features of Bhartṛhari’s perspectivism are discussed, in order to clarify the essence of his philosophical strategy: (1) Functional attitude; (2) Relative incompleteness of every single doctrine. These features elucidate the essence of Bhartṛhari's philosophical method and provide us with the key to the problem of the balance between monistic and pluralistic tendencies in the ‘Vākyapadīya’. (shrink)

In some young children brought by their parents for diagnosis of acute life-threatening events investigations suggested imposed apnoea as the cause rather than spontaneous occurrence. Covert video surveillance of the cot in which the baby was monitored allowed confirmation or rebuttal of this diagnosis. That parents were not informed of the video recording was essential for diagnosis and we assert ethically justifiable as the child was the patient to whom a predominant duty of care was owed. The procedure also avoids (...) the risk of separation of child from parent on inadequate information. (shrink)