Multifaceted models of the imago Dei attempt to capture most, if not all, of what rival views assert regarding the nature of this attribute. However, theologians have not thus far developed these models with an eye towards model-theoretical virtue. I take some first steps in that direction by formulating a version of the multifaceted model built upon the Thomistic conception of love as exposited by Eleonore Stump. I demonstrate that if one assumes the imago Dei includes the capacity for love (...) so described, then on minimal auxiliary assumptions, one can derive much of what rival views posit by entailment. (shrink)

In his 2013 monograph Modal Logic as Metaphysics, Timothy Williamson develops and defends a view he terms necessitism. According to necessitism, everything that exists does so necessarily (alternatively, necessarily everything is necessarily something). I demonstrate that necessitism is incompatible with the conjunction of two doctrines rooted in the broadly Nicene tradition: God’s metaphysical sovereignty and freedom. First, I exposit and formalize the two doctrines in question. Next, I expound Williamson’s theory of necessitism. Third, I demonstrate the formal incompatibility of the (...) conjunction of the two doctrines with necessitism. Finally, I conclude with reflections on the implications of this incompatibility. (shrink)

At the latter half of the twentieth century, Richard Swinburne proposed a model of the incarnation built upon Freud’s divided mind theory. Over the course of two publications, Tim Bayne has formulated the most robust critique of Swinburne’s model to date. In this paper, I argue that Bayne’s objections rest on key misinterpretations of Swinburne’s work. Moreover, when one properly understands the model, these objections lose their force. I begin by expositing Swinburne’s divided mind model (DM), highlighting its four foundational (...) theses. Next, I respond to Bayne’s objections against DM, demonstrating they rest upon misconceptions of the model. (shrink)