Since 1980 effective field theories (EFT's) have been the focus of much research by quantum field theorists but their philosophical implications have gone mostly unnoticed. Some authors claim EFT's are approximations to some fundamental theory. Others claim EFT's are ends in themselves, not approximations to some fundamental theory, and that we can use them to bypass the problem of renormalization. In the present work I argue that the EFT programme can bypass the problem if ontological commitments only come from theoretical (...) predictions. Since the history of QFT suggests some form of entity realism, the EFT programme does not allow us to bypass the problem of renormalization. (shrink)

It has been suggested that the measuring apparatus used to measure quantum systems ought to be idealized as consisting of an infinite number of quantum systems. Let us call this the infinity assumption. The suggestion that we ought to make the infinity assumption has been made in connection with two closely related but distinct problems. One is the problem of determining the importance of the limitations on measurement incorporated into the Wigner-Araki-Yanase quantum theory of measurement. The other is the measurement (...) problem. These problems are not internal to the quantum mechanical formalism. They arise when we obtain particular formal results in applying the quantum mechanical formalism to measurement interactions. The formal results are problematic because they resist explanation. Various authors have claimed that by making the infinity assumption we can neglect the limitations on measurement. Bub (1988) and (1989) claims it allows us to solve the measurement problem. I will argue that both claims are unjustified. (shrink)

This paper is intended to be an introductory survey of subjects related to the problems dealt with in the three other papers in this symposium on quantum field theory. A brief history of quantum electrodynamics is given and some of the objections to it are stated. A brief history of quantum field theories from the 1970's to the present is then provided. Finally, a sketch of some of the philosophical work that has been done on quantum field theories is presented. (...) The object of the paper is to explain why philosophers of physics have tended to neglect quantum field theories and to point out several of the conceptual issues raised by quantum field theories that call out for further analysis. (shrink)

Abstract Richard Healey has recently defended an interactive and holistic interpretation of quantum mechanics. The present work focuses on the holistic aspects of this interpretation. Healey claims that symmetric causes are responsible for the experimental violations of the Bell inequalities and that relational holism is a metaphysical implication of these violations. Presented in this way, the holistic features of Healey's interpretation appear to provide metaphysical backing to the physical mechanism of symmetric causes. It is argued that relational holism is not (...) a metaphysical implication at all but is actually a physical component of Healey's interpretation. Seen in this light, Healey's interpretation no longer appears to provide further insight into the violations of the Bell inequalities. (shrink)

Interpretations of the quantum mechanical formalism true to the spirit of scientific realism satisfy not only principles of scientific realism but also principles of causality that guide realist constructions. Formally, such interpretations are hidden variables theories and are commonly believed to be ruled out by the most recent no-hidden-variables argument expressed by Bell's theorem. This dissertation investigates the possibility of constructing indeterministic hidden variables theories in light of Bell's result. A pair of arguments in the literature lead to the conclusion (...) that there is no generality to be gained in moving to the stochastic case. The author uses limitations on measurements discovered by Wigner as the basis for a response to both. Proofs of the existence of the limitations are analyzed and it is shown that, contrary to claims in the literature, we cannot always assume that measurements subject to the limitations are perfectly revealing and, therefore, that the assumption of strict anti-correlations, an assumption crucial to one of those arguments, is unjustified in the Bell case. The author suggests how Bell's 1971 inequality must be modified to incorporate these limitations . This result is used against the second argument, due to Fine, which relies on Bell's 1971 inequality. A thought experiment due to Jarrett is reviewed and it is argued that the independence assumptions incorporated into hidden variables theories are not without additional and controversial assumptions about causality related to constraints imposed by the special theory of relativity. The author concludes that Bell's theorem tells us nothing about determinism or special relativity but does tell us that there can be no interpretation of quantum mechanics that does not violate either one of three principles of scientific realism or one of three traditional principles of causality. (shrink)