Notes on Rudolf Allers and his thought -- Introduction -- Cause in psychology -- Irresistible impulses -- Vis cogitativa and evaluation -- The cognitive aspect of emotion -- The limitations of medical psychology -- Intuition and abstraction -- Philosophia-philanthropia -- Ethics and anthropology -- The dialectics of freedom -- Psychiatry and the role of personal belief -- Reflections on co-operation and communication -- Ontoanalysis : a new trend in psychiatry -- Work and play -- The Freud legend.

O presente artigo insere-se no quadro da Didática da Matemática, alicerçando na Teoria Antropológica do didático, uma teoria que tem o objeto de saber como seu foco, analisando-o a nível epistemológico e institucional e tem entre os seus elementos primitivos de analise, a abordagem ecologia, praxeológica e a noção de relação ao objeto. É sobre a relação ao objeto que o artigo concentra a sua discussão, a nível teórico, objetivando mostrar como a DM pode contribuir para um debate sobre a (...) decolonização epistemológica de saberes no ensino da Matemática. Em nossa analise, destacamos a abordagem ecológica como o principal elemento de análise na TAD que, ao se situar na análise das condições e restrições de vida do objeto em seu ambiente conceitual, procura compreender como o objeto está posto nos currículos, ao questionar sobre o que existe? o que não existe? o que desapareceu e porquê? o que existe em outros ambientes de vida e não estão aqui? Porque que não estão aqui? Etc. A DM procura por este meio, questionar e denunciar as práticas de ensino que tem as epistemologias do pensamento moderno colonial, eurocêntrico/ocidental como únicas formas de produção do conhecimento matemático, e que por via disso, tendem a subjugar, subalternizar, primitivizar sabedorias outras, não eurocêntricas/ocidentais. Ao mesmo tempo que denuncia, por meio da abordagem praxeológica, propõe ações, mecanismos que possibilitem trazer e discutir as sabedorias não eurocêntricas/ocidentais em espaços escolares, para participarem do processo de produção do conhecimento científico, através do processo de circulação de saberes ou praxeologias entre instituições. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to relate two trending topics in contemporary epistemology: the discussion of group knowledge and the discussion of knowledge-first approach. In social epistemology no one has seriously applied and developed Williamson’s theory of knowledge-first approach to the case of group knowledge yet. For example, scholars of group knowledge typically assume that knowledge is analyzed in terms of more basic concepts, such as group belief or acceptance, group justification, and so on. However, if Williamson’s theory of (...) knowledge is correct, these are not good analyzes for understanding group knowledge. For, in such framework, knowledge is not analyzed in terms of belief and justification, and the same should apply to group knowledge. Thus, we propose to analyze which consequences Williamson’s theory has for social epistemology, namely for an understanding of group knowledge. The questions that will guide this article are the following: What is a knowledge-first approach to group knowledge? And what does a knowledge-first approach teach us with regard to one of the most pressing issues of social epistemology, namely the dispute between summativists and non-summativists accounts of groups? We claim that a knowledge-first account of group knowledge can be offered and that it favors non-summativism. (shrink)

The idea of solidarity is in vogue, especially since the eruption of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the term “solidarity,” as used in nursing, is imprecise and vague, lacking clear definition and connoting a variety of general meanings. Based on the original meaning of “solidarity” in ancient Roman law, this article captures the archetypical idea of solidarity from a historical and interdisciplinary perspective. This archetypical or primary meaning comes before the development of any other meanings of the word, and it is (...) therefore authentic and genuine because it does not derive from something else. After establishing the archetypical meaning of solidarity, the article translates this meaning into the area of nursing and demonstrates a deep connectivity between healthcare and solidarity. The second part of the article offers and develops a new definition of nursing solidarity as the responsibility for the healthcare of a person (unit) shared as a whole (entirety) by that person and a nurse or a nursing team (plurality). This new definition has some implications for nursing practice and education, since the definition emphasizes the idea that solidarity helps to (a) foster respect and avoid discrimination, (b) promote cohesion in health communities, (c) increase individual responsibility and a spirit of service, (d) stimulate motivation, (e) improve communication, (f) create an engaging workplace, and (g) develop leadership. (shrink)

La apertura al cognitivismo ético representa la principal línea argumental en defensa del positivismo jurídico. A partir de ella se han examinado las relaciones entre derecho y moral para ver en qué medida se puede seguir manteniendo la tesis de la separación. En este trabajo se sostiene que el problema del positivismo radica en su concepto de derecho y se plantea como alternativa una indagación que exige recuperar la filosofía del derecho como actividad orientada a comprender la raíz del fenómeno (...) jurídico. Esta aproximación alternativa permite, entre otras cosas, examinar la tesis de la separación entre derecho y moral desde una perspectiva no normativista. (shrink)

Con esta comunicación pretendemos evaluar el alcance de lo que podemos denominar «neurohermenéutica». ¿Qué es? ¿Cómo puede caracterizarse? Se trata de aplicar el desarrollo de las cuestiones de neurociencia y ciencias cognitivas al desarrollo de la hermenéutica contemporánea. Dos son las estrategias posibles: 1) «hermenéutica de la neurociencia», y mostrar sus presupuestos, su estrategia conceptual y analizar sus implicaciones sociales y culturales, y 2) «neurociencia de la hermenéutica», e intentar analizar el sustrato mental de nuestras interpretaciones del mundo; así se (...) ha desarrollado la llamada «neurología de la narración». Ponderamos la consideración que afirma que nuestro cerebro es creador de cultura y que a su vez él es producto cultural. Decir «neurohermenéutica» es preguntarnos, por tanto: ¿Qué interpretación del mundo y de nosotros mismos nos ofrecen la neurociencias? ¿Cuáles son las bases neurológicas de nuestra definición como seres hermenéuticos e interpretadores? (shrink)

La crisis contemporánea sobre la iniciación sacramental demanda una clarificación doctrinal y una nueva re-programación en la vida de las comunidades. Tras constatar su actualidad paradoja en la deshilachada cultura contemporánea, este estudio, selectivo y sucinto, aborda en su parte nuclear los ejes definidores de la novedad cristiano-pascual, desde las sugerentes bases antropológicas a su semántica teológica propia, con un especial detenimiento en los rasgos formales que, desde su unidad orgánica, le dan su singular sentido procesal y su identidad en (...) el ámbito de la vida eclesial. A partir de ellos, se imponen, como urgencias inaplazables, una serie de cuestionamientos y retos a la praxis de la fe de las comunidades. (shrink)

Karl Rahner’s thinking can be understood by looking at several of its coordinates. First, it unfolds in close connection with the fundamental dynamics of human existence. Second, it is prompted by a personal and immediate experience of God, namely, the one of the author himself. Third, it is influenced by the spirituality of Saint Ignatius of Loyola. Fourth, it aims to show the reasonableness and, therefore, the credibility of the Christian faith. Fifth, it is guided by intellectual honesty that leads (...) to facing reality without reduction or concealment. Finally, it combines philosophy and theology, more precisely, treats philosophy as a necessary moment in theology. Karl Rahner is remembered for operating the “anthropological turn” in theology. This means that, in his view, one should not reflect on God without reflecting on the human being as well. Rahner is particularly interested in examining the human’s ability to receive what comes from God’s self-revelation. It is an aspect that gives occasion to the discussion that Hans Urs von Balthasar has with him. At the heart of Rahner’s anthropology is the “transcendental experience”. It is originated by the absolute mystery that is present in human existence, precisely that mystery that Christians call God. It is such a fundamental experience that it must be taken into account when leading one’s own existence. (shrink)

This book provides an overview of the institutional and intellectual development of sociology in Brazil from the early 1900s to the present day; through military coups, dictatorships and democracies. It charts the profound impact of sociology on Brazilian public life and how, in turn, upheavals in the history of the country and its universities affected its scientific agenda. This engaging account highlights the extent of the discipline’s colonial inheritance, its early institutionalization in São Paulo, and its congruent rise and fall (...) during repeated regime changes. The authors’ analysis draws on original research that maps the concentration of research interests, new developments, publications and centers of production in Brazilian sociology, using qualitative and quantitative data. It concludes with a reflection on the potential impact of the recent far-right turn in Brazilian politics on the future of the discipline. This book contributes a valuable country study to the history of sociology and will appeal to a range of social scientists in addition to scholars of disciplinary historiography, intellectual and Brazilian history. (shrink)

Beliefs are commonly attributed to groups or collective entities. But what is the nature of group belief? Summativism and nonsummativism are two main rival views regarding the nature of group belief. On the one hand, summativism holds that, necessarily, a group g has a belief B only if at least one individual i is both a member of g and has B. On the other hand, non-summativism holds that it is possible for a group g to have a belief B (...) even if no member of g has B. My aim in this paper is to consider whether divergence arguments for non-summativism and against summativism about group belief are sound. Such divergence arguments aim to show that there can be a divergence between belief at the group level and the corresponding belief at the individual level. I will argue that these divergence arguments do not decisively defeat a minimal version of summativism. In order to accomplish this goal, I have the following plan: In section 2, I will analyze the structure of two important counterexamples against the summativist view, which are based on divergence arguments. Such counterexamples are based on the idea that a group decides to adopt a particular group belief, even if none of its members holds the belief in question. However, in section 3, I will show that these counterexamples fail, because they can be explained without the need to posit group beliefs. More specifically, I argue that in these apparent counterexamples, we have only a ‘group acceptance’ phenomenon and not a ‘group belief’ phenomenon. For this conclusion, I advance two arguments: in subsection 3.1, I formulate an argument from doxastic involuntarism, and in subsection 3.2, I develop an argument from truth connection. Thus, summativism is not defeated by divergence arguments. Lastly, in section 4, I will conclude with some advantages of summativism. (shrink)

Este artículo se propone confrontar el concepto de opinión pública con la realidad y las expectativas de una sociedad digitalizada para analizar si la actual colonización algorítmica exige un nuevo cambio estructural de la opinión pública o más bien la retirada de este concepto. Los datos y metadatos masivos se han vuelto un arma de doble filo para la sociedad democrática digitalmente hiperconectada. Mientras que, por un lado, el increíble potencial que atesora el _big data_ y sus diferentes técnicas y (...) tecnologías de explotación de los datos y metadatos lo convierten en un producto codiciado por sistema de instituciones que componen tanto el estado como la sociedad civil; por otro, los altos impactos negativos que su uso instrumental e irresponsable está produciendo y puede llegar a producir, hacen del _big data_ una herramienta controvertida y altamente criticada por alejarnos de cualquier intento de construir una ciudadanía digital. Si bien la democracia algorítmica no se apoya solo en la opinión pública, el objetivo es mostrar la incompatibilidad entre opinión pública artificial y democracia. Nuestro hilo conductor es el concepto habermasiano de opinión pública, puesto que será precisamente la fuerza de la sociedad civil, a través del diseño en su seno de espacios de participación, de donde podemos extraer el potencial necesario para enfrentarnos a la actual colonización algorítmica, para recuperar una deliberación autónoma y crítica sin la cual no existe opinión pública alguna y, por tanto, tampoco democracia. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to critically assess Plantinga’s modal ontological argument for existence of God, such as it is presented in the book “The Nature of Necessity”. Plantinga tries to show that this argument is valid and it is rational to believe in his main premise, namely “there is a possible world in which maximal greatness is instantiated”. On the one hand, I want to show that this argument is logically valid in both systems B and S5 of (...) modal logic. On the other hand, I think that this argument is not a good argument to show that God exists or that it is rational to believe in God. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es situar la ética del cuidado en contexto de las éticas de la responsabilidad. Para ello analizamos la orientación hacia el cuidado en las éticas de la responsabilidad mostrando la transición de una responsabilidad limitada por el cálculo consecuencialista en la actividad política, a una responsabilidad integral exigida por la preservación de la naturaleza ante los desafíos de la ciencia y la técnica. Interpretamos la aportación de Carol Gilligan en términos de «provocación » a la (...) ética contemporánea para que el cuidado no sea únicamente una categoría sentimental o afectiva sino una categoría con la que reconstruir reflexivamente la justicia social. Esta interpretación evita que la orientación al cuidado se reduzca a una introducción del género en la ética de la justicia y minusvalore el papel de la fundamentación en detrimento del activismo. Este fortalecimiento el cuidado de la responsabilidad resulta fecundo si leemos a Gilligan desde Hans Jonas. Se construye así una responsabilidad sustantiva e integral que levanta la «voz» y se convierte en grito para romper con el descuido, la indiferencia y la insensibilidad. (shrink)

Our main question in this paper is as follow: (Q) What are the epistemic norms governing our responses in the face of disagreement? In order to answer it, we begin with some clarification. First, following McHugh (2012), if we employ a useful distinction in normativity theory between evaluative and prescriptive norms, there are two readings of (Q)––we explore such distinction in section 2. And secondly, we accept gnosticism, that is, the account that the fundamental epistemic good is knowledge. It is (...) with this assumption that we want to answer (Q). So, if gnosticism is true, what is the plausible answer to (Q)? In section 3 we argue for gnostic disagreement norms as response to (Q) and in section 4 we apply such norms to particular cases of disagreement. (shrink)

BackgroundThe H2020 i-CONSENT project has developed a set of guidelines that offer ethical recommendations and practical tools aimed at making the informed consent process in clinical studies more comprehensive, tailored, and inclusive. An analysis of the appropriateness of some of its novel recommendations was carried out by a group of experts representing different stakeholders.MethodsAn adaptation of the RAND/ucla Appropriateness Method was used to assess the level of agreement on the recommendations among 14 representatives of different stakeholders, including patients, regulators, investigators, (...) ethics experts, and the pharmaceutical industry. The process included two rounds of rating and a virtual meeting.ResultsFifty-three recommendations were evaluated. After the first round, 34 recommendations were judged “appropriate”; 19 were judged “uncertain”; and none was judged “inappropriate”. After the second round, 9 “uncertains” changed to “appropriate”. All recommendations rated medians of 6.5–9 on a 1–9 scale (1 = “extremely inappropriate”, 5 = “uncertain”, 9 = “extremely appropriate”). The sections “General recommendations” and “Gender perspective during the consent process for clinical studies” showed the highest “uncertainty” rating. The four keys to improving the understanding of the ICP in clinical studies are to: (1) consider consent a two-way continuous interaction that begins at the first contact with the potential participant and continues until the end of the study; (2) improve investigators’ communication skills; (3) co-create the information; and (4) use a layered approach, including information to compensate for the potential participant’s possible lack of health literacy and a glossary of terms.ConclusionsThe RAND/ucla method has demonstrated validity for assessing the appropriateness of recommendations in ethical guidelines. The recommendations of the i-CONSENT guidelines were mostly judged “appropriate” by all stakeholders involved in the informed consent process. (shrink)

In my thesis A Dialogue between Nin and de Beauvoir I use two different hterary forms; the interview and the dispute. In this paper I want to give an impression of how I use one of these literary forms - the interview - and discuss why I have chosen for a combination of different literary forms in my thesis.

The aim of this paper is to raise some issues that relate to disciplinary status of bioethics. I am particularly interested in entering to consider here its relation to philosophy and the role it should play in different areas of research and medical practice. The question is whether bioethics can be understood and practiced as part of an action protocol or requires a philosophical foundation that will provide strength and consistency.

A epistemologia da crença religiosa é uma área da filosofia da religião que procura responder ao seguinte problema: haverá justificação para se ter fé sem provas, argumentos ou indícios? Ou formulando de outra forma: será epistemicamente legítimo acreditar em Deus sem provas, argumentos ou indícios? Além das respostas tradicionais de William Clifford e de William James a esse problema, há uma resposta mais contemporânea e filosoficamente prometedora: a epistemologia reformista de Alvin Plantinga (n. 1932). Chama-se “reformista” à sua epistemologia porque (...) este filósofo se identifica com o pensamento reformista, tradição protestante que remonta a João Calvino. (shrink)

Desde la separación estricta de ética y derecho, la Rechtslehre kantiana sostiene que es la ética la que exige al sujeto que haga suya la máxima de actuar conforme al derecho. En la misma línea defiende J. F. Kervégan que los sujetos habríamos de reconocer como un deber ético el respeto a las normas jurídicas, sin que esto quiera decir que el derecho dependa de la ética, pues en estricto derecho no podría tenerse a la intención de conciencia como móvil (...) de la acción justa. Lo que el derecho regula y juzga son las acciones exteriores, y también el móvil tiene que es el poder coercitivo, que el derecho, a diferencia de la ética, tiene la facultad de imponer a la sociedad a fin de que cada miembro de ella en su acción externa evite por su propio interés perjudicar la libertad de cualquier otro. Por esta unicidad del móvil sostiene Kant que derecho y facultad de coaccionar significan una y la misma cosa. El formalismo de su planteamiento impide a Kant entrar en la complejidad del entramado de derechos y deberes, de bienes y cargas, que hace de la justicia distributiva el verdadero objeto del arte jurídico. Y por su externalización estricta del derecho reduce al jurista a la observancia de los textos, ignora el procedimiento de la controversia judicial, excluye la equidad como ajena al derecho, y convierte al derecho en el gendarme de la moral . En cuanto a la intención interior, una cosa es que las leyes no puedan motivar el albedrío por la conciencia de la obligación, y otra que si derecho y coacción significaran lo mismo no habría diferencia entre cumplir la ley para evitar el castigo o eludir el castigo burlando la ley -opción ésta que a muchos resultaría más provechosa, dado que el poder del Estado es incapaz de vigilar en cada momento a cada sujeto, y que los vigilantes mismos necesitan ser vigilados, ad infinitum. Tras una breve alusión a los conocidos argumentos de Platón, Hobbes y Montesquieu sobre la obediencia voluntaria como el otro móvil del derecho, no menos necesario que la coerción, se recuerda que también el profesor Kervégan ha defendido en otro contexto que un orden jurídico cualquiera tiene dos componentes irreductibles entre sí: el sistema de normas que define lo que debe ser y la decisión que conforma el ser al deber-ser. Finalmente, en el derecho interestatal no puede Kant invocar la facultad de coaccionar, que deja de significar lo mismo que "derecho" porque, al no haber ninguna fuerza superior a la soberanía de los Estados, el pacto durará hasta que alguno de ellos lo incumpla por su libre y soberana decisión. From a firm distinction between ethics and right, the Kantian Rechtslehre holds that the demand to adopt the maxim to act according to the right is an ethical demand. Also J.F. Kervégan defends that individuals should recognize the ethical obligation to respect juridical rules, but this does not mean that right depends on ethics, because, in strict right, internal disposition or intention could not be considered as motive for the rightful action. Law regulates and judges the external actions and also the motive has to be external as it is external the coercion that right -but not ethics- can impose on society so that each member of it, for his own interest, does not damage in his external agency any other member's freedom. Because of this only one motive, Kant declares that right and coercion's capacity signify the same thing. His formalist position stops him to go into the complex network of rights and duties, of advantages and burdens, which makes distributive justice the true subject of juridical art. Moreover, because of the strict externals of the law Kant is unaware of the juridical controversy, reduces the jurist to the observance of texts, ejects the equity as not right's own, and risks to transform the right in the gendarme of morals . With regard to intention, one thing is that in strict law the internal disposition can not be deemed as the motive, and other thing is that if law and coercion's capacity signify the same thing, there is no difference between obeing the law to avoide the punishment, or avoiding the punishment in breaking the law; then, the last option would be profitable for too many people, since the coercion power is not able to survey in every moment each individual, and the watchmen themselves need to be watched over and so on. After a short mention of the well known Plato, Hobbes and Montesquieu's arguments about the voluntary obedience as the other motive of the strict right, not less necessary than coercion, we remember that J. F. Kervégan also defended in another context that any juridical order has two irreducible le système des normes générales qui définissent ce qui doit être, et la décision qui conforme l'être au devoir-être. Finally, in the interstates right, Kant can not maintain that right and capacity of coercion mean the same thing, because there is not any force over the sovereignty of the States, and therefore the contract will last till one of them breaks it by its free and sovereign decision. (shrink)