H. L. A. Hart’s The Concept of Law (Hart 1994) contains many passages that have become iconic for legal theory. This essay focuses on Chapter 7, sections 1 and 2, and Hart’s comments about judicial discretion in the context of Ronald Dworkin’s well-known attack on the idea of judicial discretion in his essay “The Model of Rules”. Specifically, the paper undertakes three projects. The first project is to defend the importance of the fundamental picture that Hart presents in (...) Concept, Chapter 7 of Common-Law judicial rule-making. Hart represents such rule-making as a balance of certainty and flexibility, and he is correct to do that. The second project is to argue that Dworkin’s attack on the positivist model of common-law judicial rule-making as an exercise of “strong discretion” fails. The idea, central to the meaning of “strong discretion” that courts are not “not bound by standards set by the authority in question” cannot be established. The third is to argue that Hart is his own worst enemy. The language, metaphors and images he uses to present his account of common-law judicial rule-making open the way to Dworkin’s critique. They also reveal Hart, if the language, metaphors and images are taken seriously, to be precisely the kind of formalist or deductivist about adjudication that he is ostensibly in Concept Chapter 7 criticising.Resumen:El concepto de derecho (1994) de H. L. A. Hart, contiene muchos pasajes que se han convertido en íconos de la teoría jurídica. Este artículo se concentra en el capítulo 7, sección 1 y 2, y en los comentarios que realizara Hart sobre la discreción judicial en el contexto de la bien conocida crítica de Dworkin a esta misma idea en su ensayo “El modelo de las normas”. Específicamente, el artículo emprende tres proyectos. El primero de ellos consiste en defender la importancia del esquema fundamental que ofrece Hart en el capítulo 7 de su obra, esto es, la creación judicial de normas en el Common Law. Hart representa tal creación de normas como un balance de certeza y flexibilidad; y él está en lo correcto al presentarlo de tal modo. El segundo proyecto consiste en argumentar que la crítica de Dworkin al modelo positivista de la creación judicial de normas en el Common Law, como un ejercicio de “discreción fuerte”, no está sustentada. La idea —central para el significado de “discreción fuerte”— de que los tribunales no están “sujetos a criterios establecidos por la autoridad en cuestión” no puede ser establecida. El tercer proyecto consiste en argumentar que Hart es su peor enemigo. El lenguaje, las metáforas e imágenes que emplea para exponer su teoría de la creación judicial de normas en el Common Law abre la puerta a la crítica dworkiniana. Si tomamos en serio el lenguaje, las metáforas y las imágenes, encontraremos a un Hart del tipo formalista o deductivista sobre la adjudicación, justo como el que él mismo está abiertamente cuestionando en el capítulo 7 de El concepto. (shrink)

Este trabajo analiza los aspectos más destacados de la polémica entre Juan Carlos Bayón y Eugenio Bulygin acerca de las lagunas jurídicas, el principio de prohibición y el alcance de la discreción judicial. En esta disputa, Bulygin defiende cuatro tesis centrales, enunciadas en Normative Systems : una cuidadosa distinción entre normas y proposiciones normativas es esencial para resolver el problema de las lagunas jurídicas, la versión débil del principio de prohibición no sirve para mostrar que no existen lagunas, (...) la versión fuerte del principio de prohibición es verdadera solo cuando el sistema es completo, y en casos de lagunas jurídicas, los jueces tienen discreción para resolver estas situaciones. Sin embargo, Bayón señala que el problema no es la falta de distinción entre normas y proposiciones normativas sino el desacuerdo acerca de cuándo una solución jurídica es concluyente. La diferencia entre soluciones prima facie y concluyente es esencial porque en ciertas situaciones, el derecho no da una respuesta pero tampoco deja espacio para la discrecionalidad judicial. Según Bayón, en estos casos el principio de prohibición "todo lo que no está prohibido está permitido" juega un papel fundamental. Este trabajo muestra que los argumentos de Bayón son insuficientes para rechazar las tesis clásicas defendidas por Bulygin. In this paper I analyze the most relevant aspects of the controversy between Juan Carlos Bayón and Eugenio Bulygin about the existence of legal gaps, the so called "principle of prohibition" and the scope of judicial discretion. In this debate, Bulygin defends four classical theses advanced in his wellknown book, Normative Systems : a careful distinction between norms and norm propositions is actually needed in order to solve the problem of legal gaps, the analytical truth of the weak version of the principle of prohibition cannot guarantee the completeness of legal systems, the strong version of the principle of prohibition is true only if legal systems are complete, and judges have discretion in cases of legal gaps. However, Bayón claims that the problem is not the lack of distinction between norms and norm proposition but rather the identification of conclusive legal solutions. Conclusive legal solutions must be distinguished from the prima facie solutions provided by explicitly enacted norms. According to Bayón, the difference between conclusive and prima facie solutions is essential in legally irrelevant cases; in such cases the principle of prohibition plays an essential role because it entails the rejection of judicial discretion. In this paper I claim that the arguments advanced by Bayón fail to provide a sound ground for discarding the classical theses defended by Bulygin. (shrink)

En este trabajo analizo la autonomía y relevancia normativa de las normas permisivas. En especial, mis propósitos principales son revisar dos tesis escépticas: los permisos y las normas permisivas pueden reducirse a otras formas normativas, e.g. derogación de prohibiciones, y no se producen diferencias significativas cuando se permite una conducta que no había sido previamente regulada. Ambas tesis son examinadas en relación a la naturaleza y función del principio de clausura normativa. La conclusión de este trabajo es que las normas (...) permisivas, y en particular las normas de clausura, pueden cumplir una importante función en los sistemas normativos y son una herramienta útil para analizar otros problemas como las lagunas del derecho y la discreción judicial. (shrink)

Este trabajo analiza los aspectos más destacados de la polémica entre Juan Carlos Bayón y Eugenio Bulygin acerca de las lagunas jurídicas, el principio de prohibición y el alcance de la discreción judicial. En esta disputa, Bulygin defiende cuatro tesis centrales, enunciadas en Normative Systems : una cuidadosa distinción entre normas y proposiciones normativas es esencial para resolver el problema de las lagunas jurídicas, la versión débil del principio de prohibición no sirve para mostrar que no existen lagunas, (...) la versión fuerte del principio de prohibición es verdadera solo cuando el sistema es completo, y en casos de lagunas jurídicas, los jueces tienen discreción para resolver estas situaciones. Sin embargo, Bayón señala que el problema no es la falta de distinción entre normas y proposiciones normativas sino el desacuerdo acerca de cuándo una solución jurídica es concluyente. La diferencia entre soluciones prima facie y concluyente es esencial porque en ciertas situaciones, el derecho no da una respuesta pero tampoco deja espacio para la discrecionalidad judicial. Según Bayón, en estos casos el principio de prohibición "todo lo que no está prohibido está permitido" juega un papel fundamental. Este trabajo muestra que los argumentos de Bayón son insuficientes para rechazar las tesis clásicas defendidas por Bulygin. In this paper I analyze the most relevant aspects of the controversy between Juan Carlos Bayón and Eugenio Bulygin about the existence of legal gaps, the so called "principle of prohibition" and the scope of judicial discretion. In this debate, Bulygin defends four classical theses advanced in his wellknown book, Normative Systems : a careful distinction between norms and norm propositions is actually needed in order to solve the problem of legal gaps, the analytical truth of the weak version of the principle of prohibition cannot guarantee the completeness of legal systems, the strong version of the principle of prohibition is true only if legal systems are complete, and judges have discretion in cases of legal gaps. However, Bayón claims that the problem is not the lack of distinction between norms and norm proposition but rather the identification of conclusive legal solutions. Conclusive legal solutions must be distinguished from the prima facie solutions provided by explicitly enacted norms. According to Bayón, the difference between conclusive and prima facie solutions is essential in legally irrelevant cases; in such cases the principle of prohibition plays an essential role because it entails the rejection of judicial discretion. In this paper I claim that the arguments advanced by Bayón fail to provide a sound ground for discarding the classical theses defended by Bulygin. (shrink)

Se diserta sobre “RESISTENCIA TRIBUTARIA” JUSTIFICADA EN EL ECUADOR. Ello, porque gobierno del presidente Daniel Noboa estableció todo un “paquete” de “impuestos de guerra”, como la Contribución Temporal de Seguridad (CTS); un incremento del IVA, a discreción del presidente de la República, el pechaje del sector construcción, transferencias al exterior y otros impuestos. Ley Orgánica para Enfrentar el Conflicto Armado Interno, la Crisis Social y Económica (en adelante, la Ley), publicada en el Registro Oficial, Suplemento No. 516 del 12 (...) de marzo de 2024, trayendo a discusión los aspectos jurídicos que vician de posible inconstitucionalidad dicha Ley, con fundamento en la normativa constitucional y tributaria de Ecuador. Con la Ley, dado el contexto de su aprobación, el gobierno creó un ´impuesto de guerra´, para financiar una guerra inexistente, partiendo del hecho que la Corte Constitucional del Ecuador estableció que en el país no existe un “Conflicto Armado Interno” (CAI). Así lo estableció en sus Dictámenes 5-24-EE/24 del 9 de mayo de 2024 y 6-24-EE/24 del 13 de junio de 2024, en los que declaró inconstitucionales los decretos ejecutivos No. 250 de 30 de abril de 2024 y 275 del 22 de mayo de 2024, relacionados con el Estado de Excepción que ha regido en Ecuador desde el 10 de enero de 2024, soportado éste en la presunta existencia de un CAI, “decertado” y reconocido sin fundamento jurídico, pese a que no cumple con los supuestos fácticos y normativos fijados, con fuerza ius cogens, por el Derecho Internacional Humanitario (DIH)7 para ser calificado como tal. El ´impuesto de guerra´, fijado en la Ley, por inconstitucional, es confiscatorio. Los Dictámenes, en el plano de la reflexión tributaria, reflejan la patética violación al principio de la constitucionalidad y de la legalidad fiscal, resultando viciada de nulidad absoluta la Ley y, con ella, la configuración del tributo, porque el hecho imponible (CAI) es inexistente, implicando que el presupuesto establecido por la Ley para configurar cada `impuesto de guerra´ jamás tendrá materialización práctica (por inexistente) y nunca tendrá validez jurídica (por inconstitucional), resultando en un tributo confiscatorio, surgido contra la Carta Fundamental y evidente fraude a la legalidad tributaria del país, en perjucio del patrimonio personal o corporativo de los contribuyentes, residentes fiscales o establecimientos permanentes en el país a los que somete a un pago indebido sancionado en el artículo 122 10 , concordado con los artículo 306 al 307 del Código Tributario del Ecuador. La nulidad absoluta e ineficacia del hecho imponible, por inconstitucional, deriva en la invalidez plena y la irrelevancia constitucional del inexistente hecho generador del tributo -proveniente de un acto de naturaleza jurídica - por la no realización fáctica, tangible y concreta del presupuesto generatriz establecido (CAI) en la Ley para su configuración. Como consecuencia, nunca jamás surge válidamente la obligación tributaria, cuya exigencia resulta ineficaz, por ilegal e ilusoria. La obligación tributaria, tiene que calificarse, en tal sentido, como no nacida lícitamente en el ámbito fiscal. Con ello, habría de resultar confiscatorio el pago de la alicuota del `impuesto de guerra´ fijado por el gobierno ecuatoriano de modo inconstitucional abusando del ejercicio del poder tributario relacionado con la urgencia en materia económica. Ante las hondas repercusiones económicas que genera en la población y el sector productivo del país, se describen las posibles vías institucionales disponibles en la regulación ecuatoriana para impugnar la Ley ante la Corte Constitucional del Ecuador -o en la jurisdicción constitucional- sin menoscabo de la eventual activación de la competencia derogatoria de la Asamblea Nacional frente a la misma. Se reafirma el principio de justicia tributaria y la vigencia del Estado social de derechos y de justicia consagrado en la República del Ecuador y la plena efectividad de los derechos y garantías fundamentales de los hermanos ecuatorianos ubicados en la posición de destinatarios de un "impuesto de guerra" tan arbitrario como inconstitucional, que riñe con el enunciado constitucional y convencional del respeto a la dignidad humana y la incolumidad de la propiedad privada frente a actuaciones del Estado que representan un claro abuso en el ejercicio del poder público en desmedro de la legalidad fiscal, generador de un supuesto de patética injusticia tributaria adoptada a contracorriente de toda regulación en materia de impositiva con la publicación de la Ley Orgánica para Enfrentar el Conflicto Armado Interno, la Crisis Social y Económica. En la lucha contra conductas gubernamentales transgresoras de la dignidad humana y frente a leyes inconstitucionales que afectan los derechos fundamentales, la libertad económica y la propiedad privada de los hermanos contribuyentes ecuatorianos y sus empresas afectadas. Este esfuerzo intelectual, realizado por nuestra familia de abogados, es una reverencia a la gesta de nuestros libertadores y un llamado al pueblo ecuatoriano económicamente afectado a resistir, por medios institucionales, frente al pago de impuestos arbitrarios e ilegales que atentan contra los principios fundamentales del orden público económico previsto en la Ley Fundamental. Lo anterior, como una singular expresión reglada, lícita y avanzada de dar al traste con una ley orgánica fiscal tan arbitraria como injusta, activando los mecanismos de protección de los derechos fundamentales constitucionalmente establecidos en el Ecuador. La pretensión judicial traduciría, mutatis mutandis, en la activación institucional de la añeja figura de la "resistencia tributaria" (objeción fiscal, desobediencia tributaria), que, en sus orígenes, nació como expresión de la desobediencia civil frente a leyes impositivas injustas, con el precedente del escritor estadounidense Henry David Thoreau, encarcelado por negarse a pagar un tributo electoral, reticente a contribuir con la continuidad de la esclavitud y la financiación de la Guerra entre México y EEUU, basado en la idea de que las personas deben priorizar su conciencia sobre la obediencia a leyes injustas. -/- . (shrink)

The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association examines physicians’ professional ethical responsibility in the event that the security of patients’ electronic records is breached.

En este trabajo se explora el rol que la verdad de los enunciados fácticos juega en la aplicación de normas jurídicas y en la justificación de las decisiones judiciales. Se sostiene que la verdad es irrelevante respecto de la aplicación de normas jurídicas, entendida esta última en términos «inferenciales», y que lo es también respecto de la justificación interna de las decisiones que aplican esas normas. Se argumenta luego que la verdad de la premisa fáctica tampoco es condición necesaria de (...) la justificación externa, en diferentes sentidos. Se sostiene, en definitiva, que la verdad de la premisa fáctica no es condición necesaria de la justificación de la decisión judicial en ningún sentido plausible en que dicha justificación pueda ser evaluada. Esto no significa, sin embargo, que la verdad de dicha premisa sea irrelevante. (shrink)

Rejecting judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation, this paper argues that understanding the interpretation of constitutions to be a solely legal and judicial undertaking excludes citizens from such activity. The paper proffers a two-pronged classification of analyses of constitutional interpretation. Implicit accounts discuss interpretation without reflecting on whether such activity can or should be performed by non-judicial institutions as well. Explicit accounts ask whether interpretation of constitutions is a matter to be dealt with by courts and answer affirmatively. (...) I criticise both camps. Implicit accounts fail to explain why constitutional interpretation is purely judicial in character. Explicit accounts do not provide enough reasons why the judiciary is allegedly the ideal institution to give constitutions meaning with final authority, both in instrumental and normative terms. The paper closes by suggesting avenues for future research. (shrink)

Many scholars believe that it is procedurally undemocratic for the judiciary to have an active role in shaping the law. These scholars believe either that such practices as judicial review and creative statutory interpretation are unjustified, or that they are justified only because they improve the law substantively. This Article argues instead that the judiciary can play an important procedurally democratic role in the development of the law. Majority rule by legislatures is not the only defining feature of democracy; (...) rather, a government is democratic to the extent to which it provides egalitarian forms of political participation. One such form of participation can be the opportunity to influence the law through the courts, either directly by participating in a case or indirectly by advocating litigation. Arguing from several examples, this Article shows that judicial decision-making allows different voices to be heard that may not necessarily have influence or power in majoritarian legislative structures or popular initiatives. Giving citizens the opportunity to change, to preserve, and to obtain authoritative clarification of the law through the courts can thus make a government procedurally more democratic. (shrink)

This article provides an exploration of the relationships between a procedural account of epistemic democracy, illegitimate laws and judicial review. I first explain how there can be illegitimate laws within a procedural account of democracy. I argue that even if democratic legitimacy is conceived procedurally, it does not imply that democracy could legitimately undermine itself or adopt grossly unjust laws. I then turn to the legitimacy of judicial review with regard to these illegitimate laws. I maintain that courts (...) do not have a moral privilege on the overthrow of illegitimate laws; in this respect the refusal of royal assent has the same status. I also explain how the rule of the clear mistake fails to restrict the action of courts to only illegitimate laws. Finally, I argue for the positive epistemic inputs of weak judicial review. (shrink)

Judicial formalism is perceived as fully compliant with the requirements of the rule of law. With its reliance on plain meaning and its reluctance to apply historical, purposive and functional interpretative premises, it seems an ideal tool for constraining discretionary judicial powers and securing the predictability of law’s application, which latter is one of the main tenets of the rule of law. In this paper, I argue that judicial formalism is based on a misguided model of language, (...) and as such cannot deliver what it promises. In fact, judicial decisions based on formalistic reasoning are surprising to their addressees and instead of promoting predictability, they undermine it. A judicial strategy fully compliant with the rule of law requires a different vision of language than that proposed by judicial formalism, and as a consequence, a different, moderately non-formalistic conception of legal interpretation. (shrink)

O artigo científico visa esclarecer acerca do judicial review com enfoque no originalismo e no interpretativismo. Neste trabalho pretendemos demonstrar ser o interpretativismo um construto da Suprema Corte dos Estados Unidos oriundo do precedente Brown. Em primeiro lugar, examinaremos os precedentes da Suprema Corte, cujos fundamentos foram obtidos a partir da corrente originalista, até chegarmos ao citado caso Brown e em seguida analisaremos filosoficamente o precedente. Em conclusão, antes se buscava a intenção original do constituinte, no entanto, modernamente, almeja-se (...) controlar a constitucionalidade com parâmetro nos princípios constitucionais. (shrink)

Este artículo introduce y elabora el concepto de compromiso temporal discrecional, que se define como la asignación no forzada de un cierto número de minutos, horas, días o cualquier otra unidad de tiempo que una persona consagra, o querría consagrar, a realizar una actividad. El compromiso temporal discrecional encuentra su expresión en el ocio y en las facetas agradables del trabajo (que, en la práctica, se experimentan como ocio). Los tipos de compromisos temporales que realizan las personas les ayudan a (...) dar forma a sus estilos de vida laborales y de ocio, constituyendo así parte del modelado de estos estilos de vida. En el ocio, la naturaleza de estos compromisos varía sustancialmente en función de sus tres formas: ocio serio, casual o basado en proyectos. En el ámbito de los Estudios de Ocio se usa generalmente el “uso del tiempo” como una idea objetiva. Al contrario que la expresión “compromiso temporal discrecional”, aquella no connota habitualmente ningún sentido subjetivo de iniciativa o intencionalidad personales (asignar tiempo, reservar tiempo, etc.). (shrink)

In a new book-length treatment, Tara Smith, who has written extensively on the intersections of Objectivist philosophy and law, explains how judicial review, a feature of non-Objectivist jurisprudence, should function in a truly Objectivist legal system. Divided into two halves, Judicial Review in an Objective Legal System first sets forth what Objectivism is and how Objectivists understand law. Of particular importance in this regard, Smith stresses, is the written constitution, which Smith, following the logical premises of Objectivism, calls (...) “bedrock legal authority.” In the second half of the book, Smith moves to narrower considerations of judicial review proper. Smith’s first task in those sections is to critique the “failures” of “the reigning accounts” to understand judicial review. After dispensing with the various mistaken versions of judicial review as she sees them, Smith defines Objectivist judicial review before providing a handful of examples of how such a process might work in “contemporary conditions.”. (shrink)

O presente estudo trata-se de uma pesquisa qualitativa com objetivo de analisar as mudanças nas relações familiares provenientes da guarda judicial dos netos, em disputa com seus filhos. Nesse texto, enfatizamse as questões sobre tempo e dinheiro e suas influências sobre essas relações. Para a const..

In this paper, I investigate the nature and source of judicial reason to conform to law. I argue that a proper account of judicial normativity requires that we treat the fact of law, independent of its substantive moral content, as providing a reason for judges to maintain judicial fidelity. I then offer an explanation of the intrinsic normativity of law, viz., the fact of judicial power, and the reason-giving expectations of subordinates in power relations.

Jeremy Waldron is well known for his disdain of U.S. jurisprudential doc- trine that allows courts to invalidate democratically enacted legislation on the ground it violates certain fundamental constitutional (and quasi-moral) rights. He believes that where disagreement on the relevant substantive is- sues is widespread among citizens and officials alike, it is illegitimate for judges to impose their views on the majority by invalidating a piece of enacted law. Even if we assume, plausibly enough, there are objective moral constraints on (...) what restrictions on behavior may be enacted into law, judges have no privileged access to the objective truth and must, like everyone else, rely on their own subjective intuitions and views. Given that judges are hence no more likely than citizens or legislators to reach the correct decision about what morality requires, these disagreements should be democratically resolved. As he puts it, if disagreement about rights is to be sorted out by counting heads, it should be the heads of citizens who have ultimate sovereignty in a democracy, rather than those of unelected judges, that ought to count.In this essay, I consider Wilfrid Waluchow’s response to Waldron’s argument in his outstanding new book, A Common Law Theory of Judicial Re- view, in which he attempts to provide the practice of judicial review with something akin to the foundation that justifies allowing judges authority over the development of the common law. I will begin with a short explication of Waldron’s argument and then consider Waluchow’s objections to Waldron, as well as Waluchow’s living-tree conception of a common-law constitution with content that evolves through a common law approach to reasoning in constitutional disputes.Resumen:A Jeremy Waldron se le conoce por el desprecio que ha manifestado con relación a la doctrina constitucional estadounidense que permite a los tribunales invalidar legislación que ha sido promulgada de manera democrática, dado que según Waldron lo anterior constituye una violación a ciertos derechos constitucionales (y cuasi-morales). Él piensa que si existe un desacuerdo importante entre los ciudadanos y oficiales del derecho en relación con cierto tema sustantivo, es ilegítimo que los jueces impongan sus puntos de vista sobre los de la mayoría de la población al invalidar una ley promulgada. Incluso si suponemos, de manera lo suficientemente plausible, que existen limitantes morales objetivas sobre las restricciones que el derecho puede contemplar en relación con el comportamiento de los ciudadanos, los jueces no gozan de un privilegio especial con el que puedan acceder a estas verdades objetivas y deben, como todos los demás, basarse en sus propios puntos de vista e intuiciones subjetivas. Entonces, dado que los jueces al igual que los ciudadanos y legisladores no pueden llegar a mejores y correctas decisiones en relación con lo que exige la moralidad, estos desacuerdos se deben decidir de manera democrática. Como sostiene Waldron, si los desacuerdos sobre los derechos se deben decidir con un recuento de manos, deben ser las manos de los ciudadanos, los cuales tienen la soberanía última en una democracia, no así los jueces que no son electos.En este artículo, el autor analiza la respuesta de Wilfrid Waluchow a los argumentos de Waldron, los cuales se encuentran plasmados en el nuevo e interesante libro: A Common Law Theory of Judicial Review, donde Waluchow intenta justificar la práctica del judicial review a través de algo parecido a la justificación que otorga a los jueces autoridad para desarrollar el common law. El autor inicia con una breve explicación del argumento de Waldron y continúa con las objeciones de Waluchow a Waldron, entre las cuales destaca la concepción de Waluchow de la Constitución como árbol viviente. (shrink)

This paper investigates the phenomenon of judicial law-making in the practice of the highest courts dealing with criminal matters in Germany and Poland on the basis of 200 of their decisions. While German jurisprudence principally acknowledges the right of the judiciary to create new law, the Polish legal theory generally rejects this notion. Still, research indicates that, in practice, the differences in the frequency and intensity with which these courts pass creative rulings are not as substantial as the discrepancy (...) in the theoretical stance would suggest. Owing to circumstances, both the German Federal Court of Justice and the Polish Supreme Court are willing to create new legal norms, but the dimensions of judicial law-making presented by these bodies deviate from each other. In the research sample, the German Federal Court of Justice was more inclined to introduce legal institutions that were foreign to the statutes and rule against the will of the lawmaker explicitly stated in the preparatory works. On the other hand, the Polish Supreme Court used logical conclusions more often, but did not also refrain from passing rulings against the clear wording of the statutory law, and was just as willing to go beyond the wording of the law as was the German Federal Court of Justice. Notably, only the German apex court is willing to openly admit that it creates new legal norms, whereas the Polish Supreme Court does not concede in the reasons that its decisions are of a law-making nature, especially when it applies so-called “interpretation in the wider sense”—which is, in essence, a “concealed” way of creating new legal norms. (shrink)

This article discusses judicial recruitment in civil law countries. It introduces the emergence of comparative global studies. The United States was the first country to offer university courses on the judiciary outside of law schools. Significant empirical research has been carried out on the system of judicial recruitment since the latter half of the twentieth century and in recent years much of the work of empirically oriented judicial researchers has focused on reforming traditional ways of recruiting and (...) appointing judges. In countries with authoritarian regimes, empirical judicial studies focus on how judiciaries are developed to enforce the regime's policies. Research has shown variations among career judiciaries and their convergence with common law models of the judicial career. It is foreseen that the next wave of empirical research on judiciaries will show how differences in recruitment systems and judicial education influence judicial decision-making. (shrink)

El reconocimiento constitucional de ciertos derechos colectivos de los pueblos originarios, efectuado en algunas Repúblicas hispanoamericanas que han avanzado en procesos constituyentes hacia un Estado de carácter plurinacional, multiétnico e intercultural, ha conseguido quebrar hasta cierto punto aquella cultura jurídica hegemónica que dominó con su carácter monista durante décadas o, mejor dicho, durante siglos. La legitimación de un derecho consuetudinario indígena, poseedor de una jurisdicción especial y autónoma, esto es, la construcción de un marco dentro del cual estas comunidades tengan (...) «derecho al propio derecho», constituye sin duda un principio importante para romper la persistencia secular de aquella colonialidad jurídica que, primero desde una matriz criolla y después desde una matriz mestiza, negaba toda autonomía judicial a las distintas nacionalidades indígenas. Pero este nuevo horizonte, si bien representa un proyecto eminentemente decolonial en muchos aspectos, no está exento de problemáticas contradicciones. Porque un escenario de radical pluralismo jurídico quebrantaría la posibilidad de establecer un marco común de ciudadanía, y es éste un nudo de conflicto importantísimo. (shrink)

Does the effective protection of constitutional rights require a system of robust judicial review? This differs from the question of whether judicial review is democratically legitimate, although the two are often merged. The dominant liberal constitutional discourse concerning the requirement of judicial review has arguably suffered from a degree of insensitivity to the actual effects of specific judicial review systems. In contrast to a fact‐insensitive approach, I suggest that the ‘matrix’ of rights‐protection in any specific system (...) of judicial constitutional review must incorporate two types of calculation. The first must compare incidences of the invalidation of ‘wrong’ statutes (on the ‘gains’ side) with invalidations of ‘right’ statutes and cases of upholding ‘wrong’ statutes (on the ‘losses’ side). The second looks at the gains and losses resulting from the very existence of the system of judicial review (rather than the specific cases that have been upheld or invalidated). It thus recognizes the deep disagreement between individuals about their preferred interpretations of constitutional rights. Under some conditions, the results of this matrix may be modified by arguments about an overlap in preferred articulations of constitutional rights, prudence, and the deliberative nature of the courts that exercise constitutional review, and the paper concludes with a discussion of how this can occur. We do not have to have a court that will strike down laws—a court with the power of judicial review—to have a vibrant language of fundamental rights available to us. (shrink)

Jurisdicción; del latín iurisdictio, iuris: jus y dictio:. En la Roma clásica, para la época de la orden judicial privada, la jurisdicción fue privada, ejercida por árbitros; desde la Roma postclásica, época del conocimiento extraordinario, ha sido pública, con resurgimiento de la jurisdicción privada en la figura del arbitraje.

Legal Judgment Prediction (LJP) is an essential component of legal assistant systems, which aims to automatically predict judgment results from a given criminal fact description. As a vital subtask of LJP, researchers have paid little attention to the numerical LJP, i.e., the prediction of imprisonment and penalty. Existing methods ignore numerical information in the criminal facts, making their performances far from satisfactory. For instance, the amount of theft varies, as do the prison terms and penalties. The major challenge is how (...) the model can obtain the ability of numerical comparison and magnitude perception, e.g., 400 < 500 < 800, 500 is closer to 400 than to 800. To this end, we propose a judicial knowledge-enhanced magnitude-aware reasoning architecture, called NumLJP, for the numerical LJP task. Specifically, we first implement a contrastive learning-based judicial knowledge selector to distinguish confusing criminal cases efficiently. Unlike previous approaches that employ the law article as external knowledge, judicial knowledge is a quantitative guideline in real scenarios. It contains many numerals (called anchors) that can construct a reference frame. Then we design a masked numeral prediction task to help the model remember these anchors to acquire legal numerical commonsense from the selected judicial knowledge. We construct a scale-based numerical graph using the anchors and numerals in facts to perform magnitude-aware numerical reasoning. Finally, the representations of fact description, judicial knowledge, and numerals are fused to make decisions. We conduct extensive experiments on three real-world datasets and select several competitive baselines. The results demonstrate that the macro-F1 of NumLJP improves by at least 9.53% and 11.57% on the prediction of penalty and imprisonment, respectively. (shrink)

The legal reasons that bind a judge and the moral reasons that bind all persons can sometimes pull in different directions. There is perhaps no starker example of such judicial dilemmas than in criminal sentencing. Particularly where mandatory minimum sentences are triggered, a judge can be forced to impose sentences that even the judge regards as “immensely cruel, if not barbaric.” Beyond those directly harmed by overly harsh laws, some courts have recognized that “judges who, forced to participate in (...) such inhumane acts, suffer a loss of dignity and humanity as well.” When faced with such a judicial dilemma—a powerful tension between the judge’s legal and moral reasons—the primary question is what a judge can do to resolve it. We argue that the two standard responses—sacrificing morality to respect the law (“legalism”), or sacrificing the law to respect morality (“moralism”)—are unsatisfying. Instead, this Article defends an underexplored third response: rather than abandoning one ideal to maximally promote the other, we argue that judges should seek to at least minimally satisfy the demands of both. Judges should, in other words, look for and employ what we dub Satisficing Options. These are actions that enjoy sufficient support from both the legal reasons and the moral reasons, and thus are both legally and morally permissible—even if the acts in question would not strictly count as optimal by the lights of the law or morality. This common sensical response to the problem is not only underappreciated in the literature, but also has great practical import. Focusing on the sentencing context, this Article demonstrates that judicial dilemmas can be systematically resolved, mitigated or avoided through a range of concrete strategies that on their own or in conjunction can constitute Satisficing Options: these strategies include seeking out legally permitted but morally preferable interpretations of the law, expressing condemnation of unjust laws in dicta, and seeking assistance or cooperation from other actors to help defendants facing substantively unjust mandatory sentences. While these strategies can at times also go too far, we argue that in certain contexts they can be sufficiently defensible on both legal and moral grounds to be a justifiable response to judicial dilemmas. This Article thus provides both a novel theoretical framework for understanding the justification of judicial responses to unjust laws, as well as a practical a menu of options which judges can use to guide their responses to the judicial dilemmas that they are increasingly likely to encounter within our criminal justice system. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to clarify the dispute over judicial discretion by distinguishing the different senses in which claims about judicial discretion can be understood and by examining the arguments for these various interpretations. Three different levels of dispute need to be recognized. The first concerns whether judges actually do exercise discretion, the second involves whether judges are entitled to exercise discretion, and the third is about the proper institutional role of judges. In this context, (...) the views of Dworkin, Raz, Perry, Greenawalt, and Sartorius are examined. Finally, it is suggested that a resolution of the judicial discretion controversy requires a satisfactory theory of the justification of judicial decisions. (shrink)

How are we to understand and analyse the constitutional tension in Turkey between the judiciary and the political sphere? In this article the issue is mirrored in the political crisis which started in April 2007 with the nomination of Abdullah G l as presidential candidate by the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP). The more detailed empirical background consists primarily of the dress code problematics including the matter of party closure. Theoretically, the “hegemonic preservation” thesis elaborated by Ran Hirschl (...) turned out to be a useful instrument when it comes to explaining this political crisis as well as the origin of the so-called new constitutionalism. This is illustrated by the judicial activism in the headscarf affair as well as by the eagerness of the Republican People's Party (CHP), as the political representative of the secular establishment, to play the 'Atat rk card' and to submit the protection of their interest to an independent judiciary and not to the uncertainties of the mechanisms of majoritarian democracy. However, with regard to the current Turkish case my analysis also shows that Hirschl's thesis is too static and should be complemented with a more dynamic perspective of constitutional politics as a repeated game. One example of this is that even if the Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC) had declared the constitutional amendment on the headscarf invalid and voted for economic sanctions against the AKP, it did not close the party down. (shrink)

In an earlier article, it was established that the rules which govern the relations between universities and their students may find their legal source in prescription, royal charter, parliamentary legislation or contract. This article compares judicial review of student rules according to these different sources, whether this review forms part of public law (the review of byelaws, delegated legislation or the expression of other statutory rule‐making powers) or of contract law (as a matter of the fairness of the rules (...) as terms of the student contract or by the inherent qualification of any contractual rule‐making power in a university by reference to reasonableness). Both similarities and differences in these different types of review are identified and their implication in the student context assessed (notably, as to the exclusivity of the visitorial jurisdiction in the case of chartered universities). Finally, it is argued that the compatibility of student rules with students' human rights may be relevant to review in contract law as well as in public law as a result of the very inclusive nature of the grounds of this review. (shrink)

In my article, I want to focus on the critique Cristina Lafont makes to expertocracy and epistocracy, mainly through the institution of judicial review, to which she dedicates chapter 7 and part of...

This paper is the result of my participation in a discussion event of Problema. Anuario de filosofía y teoría del derecho entitled “The Construction of Precedent in Civil Law: Debates, Concepts and Challenges”. Several colleagues with a vast knowledge on the subject of judicial precedent participated in this seminar, which also delved into the widely debated aspects of judicial precedent focused on the case of Chile. The entire discussion aimed at proposing solutions, as well as shedding some light (...) on some of its important aspects.Starting from such transcendental concepts as, rationality and argumentative use, it is possible to find certain problems arising from the improper use of the above concepts, which in turn leads us to stare decisis, a term that if used incorrectly may result in an act against the internal independence of judges. (shrink)

This article addresses an issue overlooked in most of the literature on judicial review: the legitimacy of judicial review of a constitution's federal and structural provisions. Debates about the legitimacy of judicial review—at least as conducted throughout the Commonwealth—are usually focussed on rights. These debates appear to assume that the power of courts like the Australian High Court and the Canadian Supreme Court to interpret and enforce federal and structural provisions is unproblematic. This article tests that assumption (...) and concludes that those who hold democracy-based objections to constitutional rights should seriously reconsider, and perhaps oppose, federal and structural judicial review as well. (shrink)

There have been few studies of the Law Lords, and no study of them by a political scientist for more than ten years. This book concentrates on the arguments the Law Lords use in justifying their decisions, and is concerned as much with the legal methodology as with the substance of their decisions. Very close attention is paid to the different approaches and styles of judicial argument, but the book is not restricted to this traditional analytic approach. One chapter (...) applies the statistical techniques Americans call 'jurimetrics' and have successfully used on the US Supreme Court. The main theme is that the Law Lords enjoy and fully utilise far more discretion in their judgements than is normally admitted, and that much depends on exactly which judges happen to hear a case. the second part of the book shows the impact this extreme discretion has had in shaping both public law and areas of civil law. (shrink)

The general assumption that underlines Richard Posner’s argument in his book Not a Suicide Pact is that decisions concerning rights and security in the context of modern terrorism should be made by balancing competing interests. This assumption is obviously correct if one refers to the most rudimentary sense of balancing, namely, the idea that normative decisions should be made in light of the importance of the relevant values and considerations. However, Posner advocates a more specific conception of balancing, both substantively (...) and institutionally. Substantiality, he argues for balancing based on a consequential moral theory that rejects the ideas of deontological rights and particularly absolute or very weighty deontological rights. More specifically, it seems that Posner assumes a utilitarian theory that also rejects intrinsic concern for distributive justice. Institutionally, Posner argues that this method of reasoning should be adopted by judges when interpreting the constitution. These substantive and institutional background assumptions are of course controversial, but I do not dispute them in this Article. My critique concerns Posner’s conclusions based on these assumptions. Posner’s main claim is that given the magnitude of the danger of modern terrorism, even a small probability that an act of terror may occur justifies extreme anti-terror measures. While the general idea that even a slight risk of very serious harm justifies significant cost is plausible, I doubt Posner’s assumptions regarding the cost of various means of preventing these dangers, his claim that judicial review in this context should be very limited, and his suggestion of an absolute formal prohibition that is not strictly enforced in the context of measures such as interrogational torture. (shrink)

Predictive judicial analytics holds the promise of increasing efficiency and fairness of law. Judicial analytics can assess extra-legal factors that influence decisions. Behavioral anomalies in judicial decision-making offer an intuitive understanding of feature relevance, which can then be used for debiasing the law. A conceptual distinction between inter-judge disparities in predictions and inter-judge disparities in prediction accuracy suggests another normatively relevant criterion with regards to fairness. Predictive analytics can also be used in the first step of causal (...) inference, where the features employed in the first step are exogenous to the case. Machine learning thus offers an approach to assess bias in the law and evaluate theories about the potential consequences of legal change. (shrink)

The layering of classical and biblical language in the Story of Apollonius has fueled debate about the readership and religious contexts of the late Latin romance. This article analyzes the mixture of pagan and biblical elements in the central murder plot of Tarsia, for which two characters plead their innocence to an unnamed god. A reinterpretation of the intertexts in their parallel prayers reveals how the romance combines the formulae of judicial prayers and the Latin Vulgate to shape reader (...) response to the episode. Apollonius 32 thereby accommodates readers from diverse religious traditions and foreshadows the story's final administration of justice. (shrink)

In this revised and updated edition of a classic text, one of America's leading constitutional theorists presents a brief but well-balanced history of judicial review and summarizes the arguments both for and against judicial activism within the context of American democracy. Christopher Wolfe demonstrates how modern courts have used their power to create new "rights" with fateful political consequences and he challenges popular opinions held by many contemporary legal scholars. This is important reading for anyone interested in the (...) role of the judiciary within American politics. Praise for the first edition of Judicial Activism: "This is a splendid contribution to the literature, integrating for the first time between two covers an extensive debate, honestly and dispassionately presented, on the role of courts in American policy. —Stanley C. Brubaker, Colgate University. (shrink)

Criminal sentencing has grown into an increasingly interactive process featuring a multiplicity of potential actors—prosecution, defence, the individual convicted of the crime, probation officers and case workers, victims or their families, the police, community representatives, community workers, and even academics. The philosophical foundations of sentencing scholarship, however, regularly assume a model of judicial solitude in which sentencing judges are separate and apart from other actors. This article suggests the need to take sentencing’s interactivity and its politics seriously and draws (...) on democratic theory to address this gap. Accordingly, it argues that listening—as conceived of by deliberative democrats—is essential to a relational ethic that ensures both the legitimacy and quality of sentencing decisions, particularly in cases involving marginalized communities. In doing so, it turns to judicial practice and highlights both the need and possibilities for listening to be taken up as an explicit feature of judicial ethics. (shrink)

In a context of rapid technological innovation and expensive new products, the paper calls for the generation of real-world data to inform decision-making and an international discussion on the affordability of new medicines, particularly for low- and middle-income countries. Without these, the challenges of health judicialization will continue to grow.

Judicial review (richterliches Prüfungsrecht), administrative review (Verwaltungsgerichtbarkeit), and constitutional review (Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit) are three different ways in which the judiciary has sought to control the executive and legislative powers of the state. Historically and functionally they are closely linked. I intend to discuss them in their German context, focussing, in particular, on the Weimar Republic, that is to say, on the period between 1919 and 1932. Although I shall not be addressing the highly interesting parallels with the U.S. Supreme Court, (...) or with the comparable courts in Italy, France, and, especially, Austria, I should like to invite attention to them, for there is really no Sonderweg in Germany as far as these developments are concerned. (shrink)

How should courts interpret the law? While all agree that courts must be objective, people differ sharply over what this demands in practice: fidelity to the text? To the will of the people? To certain moral ideals? In Judicial Review in an Objective Legal System, Tara Smith breaks through the false dichotomies inherent in dominant theories - various forms of originalism, living constitutionalism, and minimalism - to present a new approach to judicial review. She contends that we cannot (...) assess judicial review in isolation from the larger enterprise of which it is a part. By providing careful clarification of both the function of the legal system as well as of objectivity itself, she produces a compelling, firmly grounded account of genuinely objective judicial review. Smith's innovative approach marks a welcome advance for anyone interested in legal objectivity and individual rights. (shrink)

The normally staid topics of judicial ethics and the standards for judicial recusal have become the focus of political debates, editorials and letter writing campaigns. Most of the recent focus falls on conservative justices of the US Supreme Court and in particular on their anticipated participation in what is expected to be an important ruling on the constitutionality of the heath care reforms championed by President Obama and the Democratic Party. But the issue is not simply about partisan (...) politics. It's also about the structure of the US federal judiciary and the need to think about the impact of two-career couples on the judicial recusal rules. (shrink)

This paper examines Jeremy Waldron’s ‘core case’ against judicial review. Waldron’s arguments, it shows, exaggerate the importance of voting to our judgements about the legitimacy and democratic credentials of a society and its government. Moreover, Waldron is insufficiently sensitive to the ways that judicial review can provide a legitimate avenue of political activity for those seeking to rectify historic injustice. While judicial review is not necessary for democratic government, the paper concludes that Waldron is wrong to believe (...) that it is a threat to democracy. (shrink)

The application of artificial intelligence (AI) to judicial decision-making has already begun in many jurisdictions around the world. While AI seems to promise greater fairness, access to justice, and legal certainty, issues of discrimination and transparency have emerged and put liberal democratic principles under pressure, most notably in the context of bail decisions. Despite this, there has been no systematic analysis of the risks to liberal democratic values from implementing AI into judicial decision-making. This article sets out to (...) fill this void by identifying and engaging with challenges arising from artificial judicial decision-making, focusing on three pillars of liberal democracy, namely equal treatment of citizens, transparency, and judicial independence. Methodologically, the work takes a comparative perspective between human and artificial decision-making, using the former as a normative benchmark to evaluate the latter. -/- The chapter first argues that AI that would improve on equal treatment of citizens has already been developed, but not yet adopted. Second, while the lack of transparency in AI decision-making poses severe risks which ought to be addressed, AI can also increase the transparency of options and trade-offs that policy makers face when considering the consequences of artificial judicial decision-making. Such transparency of options offers tremendous benefits from a democratic perspective. Third, the overall shift of power from human intuition to advanced AI may threaten judicial independence, and with it the separation of powers. While improvements regarding discrimination and transparency are available or on the horizon, it remains unclear how judicial independence can be protected, especially with the potential development of advanced artificial judicial intelligence (AAJI). Working out the political and legal infrastructure to reap the fruits of artificial judicial intelligence in a safe and stable manner should become a priority of future research in this area. (shrink)

This article reconsiders how to judge judicial independence by using the Japanese judicature, one of the allegedly-most dependent judiciary branches. In their influential work, Ramseyer and Rasmusen argue that judges who once belonged to a leftist group take longer to reach a under the long-term conservative rule of Japan. Their method does not, however, deal appropriately with the possibility of judges not reaching this position because the judge dies, retires early, or is still at the early stage of her (...) career. Ramseyer and Rasmusen also mistakenly assume that all judges will eventually obtain this position. This article develops a survival analysis model of judicial careers and attempts to solve the problems of censoring, left truncation, and split population. We also offer a way to utilize a matching procedure to estimate average treatment effects on censored time-to-event as well as event occurrence. We re-analyze a corrected version of Ramseyer and Rasmusen's data using their and our methods. One of the most important findings is that, contrary to what Ramseyer and Rasmusen argue, leftist judges are not discriminated against in terms of the timing of promotion. (shrink)

Recent republican debates about judicial review have focused on whether courts deliver legitimate forms of political contestation about rights. These ‘political constitutionalists’ frame the separation of powers as a matter of ‘friction’. The rival approach emphasizes whether the expertise and capacity of courts can ‘efficiently’ get certain jobs done to secure different ends. These rival approaches inform debates about judicial review and bills of rights. This article argues that emphasizing political contestation fails to address the problem of complicity (...) between the branches. Judicial politics in the USA, Canada, the UK and New Zealand suggests that judicial complicity with the political branches lets political actors escape democratic accountability for policy choices related to rights. Courts enable this by abusing the power to interpret law to help political factions protect or reform the status quo. As such, liberty can have something to fear from the judiciary when it does not act alone. (shrink)

This article discusses judicial recruitment in civil law countries. It introduces the emergence of comparative global studies. The United States was the first country to offer university courses on the judiciary outside of law schools. Significant empirical research has been carried out on the system of judicial recruitment since the latter half of the twentieth century and in recent years much of the work of empirically oriented judicial researchers has focused on reforming traditional ways of recruiting and (...) appointing judges. In countries with authoritarian regimes, empirical judicial studies focus on how judiciaries are developed to enforce the regime's policies. Research has shown variations among career judiciaries and their convergence with common law models of the judicial career. It is foreseen that the next wave of empirical research on judiciaries will show how differences in recruitment systems and judicial education influence judicial decision-making. (shrink)