En su primera obra, Kant discute la posibilidad de que exista más de un universo. Partiendo del principio de que las substancias tienen una fuerza esencial para actuar fuera de sí y de que ellas se vinculan solo en el ejercicio de esta fuerza, Kant concluye que la totalidad de las substancias vinculadas entre sí conforma un universo. Sin embargo, es perfectamente posible que una substancia exista sin estar vinculada con las substancias de un determinado universo, no formando parte de (...) él, y que lo esté con otras substancias ajenas, conformando con ellas un universo aparte. Pero la posibilidad de múltiples universos requiere que haya espacios de distinta naturaleza o dimensionalidad para que tales universos se mantengan inconexos y sean realmente distintos universos y no partes distantes de un mismo universo. Esto sucede así porque la naturaleza del espacio depende específicamente de la fuerza con la que interactúan las substancias. (shrink)

Metascientific criteria used for explaining or constraining physical space dimensionality and their historical relationship to prevailing causal systems are discussed. The important contributions by Aristotle, Kant and Ehrenfest to the dimensionality of space problem are considered and shown to be grounded on different causal explanations: causa materialis for Aristotle, causa efficiens for young Kant and an ingenious combination of causa efficiens and causa formalis for Ehrenfest. The prominent and growing rôle played by causa formalis in modern physical approaches to this (...) problem is emphasized. (shrink)

Este artigo trata da ontologia do tempo na teoria da relatividade com relação ao caráter temporal dos objetos. Esse aspecto não é explicitamente tratado pelo realismo estrutural em sua versão chamada “realismo estrutural moderado”, que coloca objetos e estruturas no mesmo status ontológico. Assim, mostra-se que em tal posição há uma tensão que se desenvolve em torno da ontologia temporal dos objetos e que o realismo estrutural, dado o estágio argumentativo em que se encontra, não consegue conjugar argumentos suficientes para (...) explicar essa tensão. (shrink)

Los planteamientos que se esgrimen en este breve artículo buscan interpelar aquellos lugares de enunciación, producción y reproducción sociales que se han visto cooptados discursivamente con el objetivo de perpetuar un determinado tipo de alienación subjetiva y su consecuente inoperancia política. Siguiendo tropos extraídos de lecturas metamodernas en el campo de la política, epistemología y sociología, además de intuiciones y nociones provenientes de casos clínicos psicoanalíticos discutidos in extenso en campos de transferencia y discusión entre analistas y analizantes, la pregunta (...) que estructura el siguiente escrito es la siguiente: ¿dónde ha ido a parar la agencia política? ¿Qué se ha institucionalizado en su lugar? ¿Cómo recobrar dicha dimensionalidad crítica? (shrink)

Resumo: Nos Conceitos fundamentais da metafísica, Heidegger esboçou uma ontologia da vida que concebe os animais e as plantas como totalidades relacionais compostas por aptidões, complexidade orgânica e relação ao ambiente. A estrutura da aptidão é apresentada como formalmente determinada pelo fenômeno da pulsão. Tal determinação concede à aptidão a característica de uma dimensão em sentido formal. Neste artigo, realizo uma análise da dimensionalidade orgânica, a partir de dois aspectos da dimensão enquanto tal: a travessia de algo para algo e (...) o domínio de regra para a acolhida de uma multiplicidade. Esses aspectos proporcionam o marco para examinar a dimensionalidade da aptidão pulsional. Da análise resulta que o traço dimensional das aptidões compromete a ontologia da vida, com a aceitação de características como não fixidez, desenvolvimento plástico e relacionalidade ao ambiente e a si mesmo.: In The fundamental concepts of metaphysics, Heidegger outlined an ontology of life that conceives animals and plants as relational totalities composed of capabilities, organic complexity, and environmental relations. The structure of capability is presented as formally determined by the phenomenon of drive. This determination gives to capability the character of a dimension in the formal sense. In this paper, I undertake an analysis of the dimensionality of organic capability based on two formal aspects of dimension as such: the traversing from something to something, and the domain of a rule for taking up a multiplicity. These two aspects provide a framework for examining the dimensionality of instinctually driven capability. It is argued that the dimensional character of capabilities implies that the ontology of organic life in general must admit features like non-fixity, plastic development, and relations to the environment and to itself. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that, if it is true that maximum self-development is better both for individuals and society, and if it is true that that self-development is being seriously curtailed by pervasive environmental tech forces, then clearly educational systems, since they are guardians of “developing” young humans, have a moral imperative to push back against forces that diminish the self. On the other hand, if it is not true that “more self is always better,” that perhaps “goodness of (...) fit” between self and society is optimum, then education systems are justified in continuing to pay scant attention to the forces of self-development (or lack thereof). In line with Sherry Turkle’s (2011) argument that tech forces are diminishing the sort of reflective reasoning necessary for self-development, we will argue that since communicative interchange is necessary for self-development, and an ever-developing self is necessary for ever deeper and more meaningful dialogue (hence forming a dialectic), the fact that social media and other forms of tech connection stunts deep and meaningful interchange has serious implications. Specifically, we will argue that, in contemporary high-tech society (what we are calling Society 2.0), the dialectic between self and communication is going the “wrong” way; that genuine dialogue is becoming ever more rare, which in turn is resulting in “diminished-I’s,” which in turn is resulting in ever more complacency in the face of utterly superficial communicative interchange. We will begin with an overview of what we mean by a “diminished-I,” and then follow by noting how social media, the reading vacuum, roboticism, crowd communication, and decreasing social capital are resulting in diminished-I’s. Since this is resulting in an “I-diminished” society, we will reflect on the question of whether those dialogical educational initiatives that promote self-development are, in fact, making dodos, i.e., making youngsters unfit for the environment in which they find themselves. Ultimately, we will argue that, if educators choose to fight back against the I-diminishing forces of Society 2.0, they need to take selves seriously and actively engage youngsters in dialogue with those with opposing viewpoints. Ultimately, youngsters in Society 2.0 will need all the assistance educators can muster to fight the addictive, literally mind-numbing forces of being “happily” “alone together,” and instead chose the riskier often unhappy-making option of diving into the truth-seeking process with varying coalitions of the willing. (shrink)