Bei seiner -- wie vorausgeschickt -- strategischen Bestimmung des ganzheitlichen Standortes der Philosophie in ihrem Entfaltungsprozeß verfährt Hegel in der Differenzschrift zweigleisig. Auf der einen, mehr sichtbaren und auch in der philosophischen Tradition gründlicher und tiefer rezipierten Ebene liefert er die berühmte und bei jeder Bestimmung der Philosophie und des »philosophischen Bedürfnisses« bis heute überhaupt viel zitierte Definition, wonach in dem neuen welthistorischen Weltalter der Entzweiung ein qualitativ neues Bedürfnis nach der Vereinigung der Gegensätze, d.h. nach »Philosophie« artikuliert wird. (...) Weil es nicht zum direkten Gegenstand unseres Versuchs gehört, deuten wir nur in unausgeführter Form an, wie und warum wir einen spezifischen Verdacht gegenüber dieser allseits ohne jegliche Kritik akzeptierten Definition hegen. Dieser Verdacht gründet sich einerseits auf der Tatsache, daß diese Definition ein starkes Zugeständnis an die aufkommenden romantischen Evidenzvorstellungen enthält. Im Anbetracht von Hegels stets artikulierter antiromantischer Einstellung dürfte es direkt auffallen, warum er gerade bei einer so unmittelbaren Kategorisierung des allerneuesten Weltalters eine in ihrer Struktur und in ihren Wertvorstellungen »romantische« Ansicht vertritt. Versucht man ferner den Gehalt dieser Einschätzung interpretativ noch weiter zu rekonstruieren, so läßt sich dieser Gehalt bald geradezu antihegelianisch auslegen. Denn eine »Vereinigung«, deren »Macht« unterging und eine »Einheit«, deren Macht und Geltung deshalb wiederhergestellt werden muß, klingt nicht nur als romantische »Grundbefindlichkeit«, sondern läßt sich auch als eine Auffassung verstehen, die den Grundintentionen der Geschichtsbetrachtung auch des jungen Hegel diametral widerspricht, denn wo ließe sich bei ihm eine mögliche Periode, oder zumindest eine Antizipation der möglichen »Einheit« in seinen Gedanken nachweisen? (shrink)

Dieser Band zu Hegels 'Differenzschrift' und zur 'Phänomenologie des Geistes' ist Teil eines dreibändigen Kommentars zu Hegels Hauptwerken. Es ist das Ziel dieser Kommentare, Hegels philosophisches Werk einem breiteren Lesepublikum zu erschließen. Sie wollen die selbständige Lektüre der meist sehr schwierigen Hegel-Texte nicht durch referierende Darstellung ersetzen, sondern sie gerade ermöglichen - durch textnahe Erläuterungen, systematische Begriffsklärungen und den Aufweis von inhaltlichen Querverbindungen im Riesengebäude des Hegeischen Werkes. Auch die philosophie- und wissenschaftsgeschichtlichen Zusammenhänge, in denen Hegels System entsteht und (...) Struktur gewinnt, werden herausgestellt. --. (shrink)

Hegel's very first acknowledged publication was, among other things, an attack on Fichte. In 1801, Hegel was still laboring in almost complete obscurity, while Fichte was an international sensation, though already somewhat past the peak of his meteoric career. In the 1801 Differenzschrift, Hegel cut his teeth by criticizing Fichte's already widelycriticised Wissenschaftslehre, and by demonstrating that Schelling's philosophical system was not simply to be equated with it. Fichte himself never bothered to respond to Hegel's criticisms; indeed he never (...) publicly acknowledged their existence. This was not because he was unconcerned with criticisms of his views; quite the contrary. But at the time he had bigger fish to fry. He responded to Jacobi's criticisms, and to Schelling's; he replied in great detail to critical questions raised by Reinhold, and with vituperative intensity to objections raised by skeptics and purportedly loyal Kantians. But Hegel's Differenzschrift was left without a Fichtean rebuttal. This is a pity, both because of the missed opportunity to illuminate by controversy central issues at stake in the post-Kantian period, but also because it made it easier for Hegel simply to reiterate his youthful criticism as if it were the last word. And reiterate it he did: in one form or another Hegel's early criticisms of Fichte reappear at every subsequent stage of his career: in the Phenomenology, in the Science of Logic, in the Encyclopaedia, as the final chapter in Hegel's History of Philosophy, and in countless other minor works and documents from the Nachlass and correspondence. (shrink)

The Differenzschrift is Hegel’s first distinctively philosophical work. Traditionally, the chief significance of the work has been said to be its announcement of the breach between Fichte and Schelling. The purpose of the present paper is to move from this proximate perspective to a systematic-teleological perspective. From the latter perspective we can see that it is in the Differenzschrift that Hegel not only criticizes and comprehends the work of his immediate predecessors but also constructs the conceptual-hermeneutic frame which (...) makes his critique possible.Essentially Hegel argues that philosophy-as-science advances by means of text and commentary, but its advance is not continuous. Its history is characterized by violent, epoch-making leaps, which must be viewed as necessary organic constituents of telic progress. The impulse or force behind this telic advance is the concrete historical situation, in Hegel’s words, “the need of the times.”. (shrink)

In the Differenzschrift of 1801 Hegel declares himself to be in agreement with Schelling that the most fundamental task of philosophy is to overcome [aufheben] traditional oppositions such as subjectivity and objectivity, reason and sensuality, intelligence and nature. It has been claimed that Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807 and Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism can be fruitfully interpreted as parallel attempts to overcome these oppositions, identified by Hegel as ultimately derived from the dichotomy between absolute subjectivity and absolute (...) objectivity. Since Schelling claims to present a history of consciousness, whereas Hegel intends to demonstrate the history of spirit in its alienation and progress toward knowledge of itself as spirit, it has often been supposed that the System was a preliminary, abortive attempt at the all-embracing vision the Phenomenology claims to provide. Hegel himself seems to have held such a view, yet Schelling vigorously disputes this assessment of the System. (shrink)

Introduction -- Suspension -- Hegel and Schelling -- Outline of the whole -- The surge of reason : faculty epistemology in Kant and Fichte -- The first critique's basic distinction -- The third critique -- Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre -- Ascendant reason : the early Schelling -- Of the I -- The treatises -- Metastatic reason : Schelling's nature philosophy -- Organic reason : ideas for a philosophy of nature -- Rational nature : on the world-soul -- Inhibition of nature : the (...) Erster entwurf -- Synthetic reason : the system of transcendental idealism -- The idea of system -- The synthetic method -- History and art -- Reason as reflection and speculation : Hegel's collaboration with Schelling -- The differenzschrift -- Krug's pen -- The sacred abyss : Schelling's identity philosophy -- The darstellung -- System of philosophy in general -- Space, time, and suspension : Hegel's absolute knowing -- The phenomenology's critique of Schelling -- Absolute knowing -- Suspended reason : Hegel on the certainty and truth of reason -- Empty idealism -- Observing nature -- Observing self-consciousness -- Self-actualizing reason -- The project of individuality -- Reason on the periphery : Schelling's freedom essay -- Reason as peripheral -- Pantheism and freedom -- God as existing -- Longing for ground -- The possibility of evil -- The actuality of evil -- System, ground, and indifference -- Reason's systematic excess -- Hegel's system -- The myth of totalizing reason -- The philosophy of nature -- History -- Reason's systematic excess -- Schelling's positive philosophy -- The natural history of reason -- The critique of Hegel -- Now what? (shrink)

The following presents an excerpt from Nishitani Keiji’s “Prajña and Reason” (1979), which can be considered Nishitani’s last attempt to make his case for the importance of the “standpoint of śūnyatā (‘emptiness’)” in confrontation with the history of Western philosophy. The translator’s preface situates “Prajña and Reason” (1) in Nishitani’s oeuvre and (2) in the context of his broader reception of Western thought, before (3) outlining the place of the excerpt within the full study. The translation here excerpts section six (...) and a portion of the final section seven. Where the prior sections develop and motivate his unified interpretation of G. W. F. Hegel (from the Differenzschrift to the Encyclopedia), in this excerpt, Nishitani diagnoses a problem in the relationships between the domains of Absolute Spirit, specifically, philosophy and religion. As argued in the translator’s preface, the arch of this study points to the contributions that religion (and art) make in evincing “living activity,” a “Knowing” that, while perhaps “un-Scientific” and, in that way, a “not-Knowing,” is for all that “Truthful.”. (shrink)

O artigo pretende revisitar a interpretação hegeliana dos Fundamentos do DireitoNatural de Fichte, não propriamente seus elementos críticos, presentes na Differenzschrifte no Naturrechtaufsatz, mas antes a possibilidade de uma assimilação positiva. Em primeirolugar, oferecemos uma interpretação da passagem entre os §3 e §4 da obra de Fichte, entrea discussão da Aufforderung e a dedução do reconhecimento jurídico, que procura articulálacomo interface entre educação e direito. Na segunda parte, procuramos revelar o panode fundo “histórico-espiritual” que permite considerar, no jovem Hegel, um (...) embate entreformas inclusivas e excludentes de intersubjetividade. Na terceira parte, o objetivo éconsiderar a relação entre a eticidade, enquanto Einssein do universal e do singular, o direitoe a educação. Finalmente, pretende-se mostrar que a assimilação positiva de Fichte porHegel pode ser visualizada na articulação entre formas excludente e participativa de intersubjetividadeno conceito de eticidade natural do System der Sittlichkeit, a qual sugere umamediação entre amor e direito oferecida pela formação. (shrink)

Given the importance of imagination for Kant, Fichte and Schelling, it is significant that the word only comes up once in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, and that it is not a chapter heading alongside "Sense-Certainty," "Perception," "Understanding" and "Reason." ;Part I. "Imagination in Theory" looks at the development in Hegel's theory of imagination from the Differenzschrift and Faith and Knowledge, through three different versions of the Philosophy of Spirit . Part II. "Imagination in Practice," focuses on the final moment (...) of the imagination according to the 1830 Philosophy of Spirit--Sign-making Phantasie. I discuss two examples--the artist's activity as described in the Aesthetics, and the 'religion of imagination'--Hinduism as Hegel understood it in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. Part III synthesizes the two previous parts, showing that the Phenomenology of Spirit is the culmination of the imagination's theoretical and practical activity: while in theory imagination is the middle moment of Vorstellen, practically it is at the heart of Aufhebung and thus of Spirit's inception and development. The Phenomenology is the story of consciousness' progress through its self-presentations. Imagination is therefore present throughout the entire book. I do not engage the moments of the Phenomenology, but focus instead on the single appearance of the word imagination in the Preface, and on how Hegel reinterprets Fichte's wavering imagination as a moment within the reflection--the "medium" of this 'Science of Experience.' ;Between 1801-1807 language becomes an increasingly important moment of imagination; by 1830 the externalizing of representations in communication is a moment of imagination. Hegel's psychology of the genesis of imagination and its moments reveals Spirit to be the community of interpreters. In the thesis Hegel's imagination is thought through to the Phenomenology, however, it is in the final transition of the Phenomenology--from Religion to Absolute Knowing, from picture thinking to knowing according to the Concept--that Hegel thinks the imagination through to its end. My Epilogue briefly discusses that transition, and the end of imagination in Absolute Knowing. (shrink)

Je vais reconstruire quelques aspects de la genèse naturelle de la conscience dans les écrits hégéliens d’Iéna, avec le but de montrer que cette reconstruction est essentielle pour comprendre la genèse des capacités fondamentales qui sont présupposées par l’interaction de la reconnaissance. En particulier, je vais défendre la thèse suivante: Hegel a jeté une base pour une Naturphilosophie de la reconnaissance, en esquissant une sorte d'histoire naturelle de l’évolution de la relation consciente à soi-même, relation qui commence par le soi (...) organique étant doué des capacités communicatives qui lui permettent d’interagir avec l’environnement et avec ses semblables. Avant touts, je vais suivre le fil rouge qui mène de la Differenzschrift aux leçons de philosophie de la nature et de philosophie de l’esprit dispensées par Hegel à Iéna pendant le semestre d’été deu 1803 et le semestre d’hiver du 1803-4 et qui seront le sujet principale de ma reconstruction interprétative. Cette reconstruction s’articule en cinq phases. Dans une première partie, j’aborderai la question de la reconnaissance naturelle a partir du problème de la différentiation et de l’interaction sexuelle. Dans une deuxième partie, je parlerai de la conception hégélienne du soi organique proto-intentionnel et de sa structure proprioceptive et communicative. Dans une troisième partie, j’aborderai le sujet de la structure pratique de la Begierde (de l’appétit) en tant que forme d’intentionnalité pratique et des formes d’interactions conflictuelles proto-recognitives qui surgissent de cette intentionnalité. Dans une quatrième partie je vais m’occuper de la question de la voix animale comme acte expressive expressif qui manifeste l’aspiration par l’être naturel à voir reconnue sa propre individualité.Dans une cinquième partie je vais analyser la forme de reconnaissance qui se manifeste avec la génération du fils et qui constitue la matrice naturelle de la raison en tant que première forme d’objectivation. Après avoir esquissé les aspects défectueuxifs des formes naturelles de la reconnaissance, j’avancerai enfine vais finalement avancer la thèse à laquelle ma reconstruction aboutit : les formes de conscience spirituelle réflexive qui se déploient dans l’esprit présupposent la conscience reconnaissante préréflexive et sont des réorganisations plus complexes de ses structures fondamentales. (shrink)

Seit einiger Zeit mehren sich in der Fichte-Forschung die Versuche, Fichtes Philosophie aus ihrer Interpretation durch Hegel herauszulösen und damit ihre Eigenständigkeit neu sichtbar zu machen. Dabei wird u.a. die Auffassung vertreten, Hegel habe Fichte falsch oder zumindest einseitig verstanden, wenn er in seiner Differenzschrift oder in Glauben und Wissen dessen Philosophie als »Reflexionsphilosophie« oder »formalen Idealismus« bezeichnet. Dagegen gibt es Stimmen, die Hegels Interpretation Fichtes als gerechtfertigt verteidigen. Diese Diskussion verweist nicht nur auf Defizite in den philosophischen Theorien (...) von Fichte und Hegel, die nicht geleugnet werden können, sondern mehr noch darauf, dass es in den Standpunkten beider erhebliche Unterschiede gibt, die zunächst herausgearbeitet und bedacht werden müssen. (shrink)

Reason and World, a collection of lectures and essays, ranges in terms of the date of authorship from a lecture on Heidegger published while Marx was at the New School for Social Research to his Inaugural Lecture upon succession to Heidegger’s chair in Freiburg/br. to the Woodward Lecture at Yale in 1970. Although some of the papers were delivered in English, others are appearing here in English translation for the first time. The papers are reflections on German Idealism, Husserl, and (...) Heidegger. They are not arranged chronologically but rather in terms of the history of philosophy, yet their order is not meant merely to reflect this history. What is at issue is rather what Marx, playing on Hegel’s phrase, believes to be the contemporary Bedürfnis der Philosophie. The subject of the initial paper is what constitutes this requirement or need for Hegel and how the Differenzschrift is crucial for an understanding of German Idealism. In a similar fashion, Marx holds that contemporary philosophy must come to terms with the requirement of its time. Through reflection of philosophy since Hegel, the contemporary period is depicted as one of transition. The need is to secure "the older thought in its domain" and to legitimize that thought in terms of the questions it asked while still remaining open for a new and different type of philosophy. The fact that the contemporary period is to be understood as one of transition finds expression in the sub-title of the book itself: Between Tradition and Another Beginning. Those two philosophical issues which Marx believes respectively to be the basis for the tradition and the other beginning are reflected by the title: Reason and World. This new beginning and the emergence of the world as a focal philosophical concern represent none other than the overcoming of tradition with its presuppositions of telos and logos. In his analyses of Heidegger, Marx discloses the world to be, in the last instance, the crucial problem of contemporary philosophy in its turn towards ateleological and pre-logical experience. Implicitly, the tradition was for him already called into question by Husserl insofar as the lifeworld together with its possible salutary effect on Western man became the subject of Husserl’s later philosophy. In this book Marx pursues the theme he first enunciated in Heidegger and the Tradition. In my opinion, however, the title of the present work might have been more accurately Reason, Language, and World. For, as Marx seeks to establish, the transition from traditional philosophy is characterized simultaneously by a change in our understanding of language. According to his interpretation of Hegel, Hegel thought of language as a "servant of logos"; on the other hand, contemporary philosophy "attributes power to language in the same measure as it denies it to logos." The question is, then, about the role of language in the emergence of world. In place of reason is the problem of the world and of the possibility of a poetic dwelling in it. The purpose of historical studies is to show via negativa the difference between the tradition and the other beginning proclaimed by Heidegger. In the latter regard, Marx contents himself with an immanent critique and asks simply whether Heidegger’s thought "has been conceived consistently and whether it has been thought through to the end." To be sure, this work is a significant contribution to the literature on Heidegger and its importance in this respect cannot be overlooked. On the other hand, the difficulty of the book lies precisely in its method. Heidegger’s claim for another beginning is itself never evaluated. Marx underscores the point that, if Heidegger is correct, traditional criteria are not applicable to the thought required by another beginning. We are left in the dilemma of simply being or not being Heideggerians. For those who are not, the only insight we gain is through a via negativa. Even if Heidegger’s thought should prove to be consistent and consequential, this fact would not suffice to establish its validity. And what are these if not traditional criteria?—A. G. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Band enthält Beiträge zu allen systematisch wichtigen Texten aus Hegels Jenaer Zeit. Das gilt für die Differenzschrift über die systematisch relevanten Aufsätze des Kritischen Journals der Philosophie, die Systementwürfe von 180/04, 1804/05 und 1805/06 bis hin zur Phänomenologie des Geistes. Die Studien basieren auf Vorträgen, die auf der ersten gemeinsamen Arbeitstagung der Internationalen Hegel-Gesellschaft und der Internationalen Hegel-Vereinigung gehalten wurden, an der sich auch Hegel-Forscher aus Deutschland, Belgien, den Niederlanden und Frankreich beteiligten, die nicht fest zu einer (...) der beiden Gesellschaften gehören. Die im Buch versammelten Beiträge besitzen exegetischen, kommentierenden und aktualisierenden Charakter. Die Erforschung der Jenaer Periode Hegels erhält durch diesen Band, der die Eigenbedeutung seiner Jenaer Systemkonzeptionen eindrucksvoll dokumentiert, kräftige neue Impulse. (shrink)

The Introduction outlines how the topic of imagination developed in Kant and German Idealism. Bates focuses on Fichte’s establishing of imagination as the primary dynamic structure of consciousness itself, and on Schelling’s transformation of this epistemological conception into a metaphysical one, interpreting imagination as the very self-sundering of the Absolute. Chapter 1, “The Sundering Imagination of the Absolute,” then looks at Hegel’s early, Schellingian interpretation of imagination. In Hegel’s Differenzschrift and in Faith and Knowledge, philosophy is construed as a (...) self-conscious reconstruction of the acts of imaginative synthesis by which the factual world of experience was generated. (shrink)

Die Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie (1801) ist Hegels erste philosophische Veröffentlichung. Hier nimmt Hegel erstmals und ganz eigenständig Stellung zu grundlegenden Fragen einer Philosophie des Absoluten: Er äußert sich über Organ und Methode des Philosophierens, über das Verhältnis von Reflexion und Spekulation, von Philosophie und System, über Aufgabe und Bedürfnis der Philosophie sowie über die geschichtliche Bedingung und Bedingtheit des Philosophierens. Die Differenzschrift ist deshalb besonders geeignet, in Anfang, Bereich und Duktus des Hegelschen Denkens einzuführen.

Hartkopf’s monograph promises by virtue of its title to be a critical evaluation of both the continuity and discontinuity in Hegel’s thinking as he joins Schelling in Jena and publishes in 1801 his Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie. His question is to what extent the dialectical aspects of the Differenzschrift “are related to the dialectical traits already available in Hegel’s Frankfurt fragments as consequences or further developments, or whether these are inspired or even definitively co-determined by (...) Schelling’s dialectic, which is already clearly further developed, especially his concept of identity which is in the making” Together the title and the question Hartkopf claims to be addressing lead us to expect a study of the Differenzschrift which extends and is comparable to Dilthey’s Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels. This is misleading. What we have instead, as the series title correctly indicates, is part of an ongoing study of the development of “modern dialectic.”. (shrink)