In this book, Gianni Vattimo examines the notion of "difference" in scientific knowledge and contemporary mass society and illustrates the importance of Nietzsche and Heidegger in both formulating the concept and exploring its implications for current debates on the nature of modernity.

Back in vogue today is the tendency of Italian philosophy toward reflection on itself that has always characterized an important part of our historiographical tradition. The present essay firstly analyzes the various interpretative positions in respect to the legitimacy, the risks, and the benefits of such a discourse, which intends to distinguish the different traditions of thought by resorting to a criterion of territorial or national kind. Secondly, the essay examines diverse paradigms that identify – in “precursory genius”; in ethical (...) and civil vocation; and in “living thought” – the distinctive hallmark of the Italian philosophical tradition from the Renaissance to today. (shrink)

Qu’est-ce que la philosophie de la religion. Comment en faire? La réponse à ces deux questions suppose aujourd’hui d’examiner la différence entre philosophie « continentale » et philosophie « analytique ». Par bien des aspects, la seconde reprend les problèmes de la métaphysique classique et prétend leur apporter de nouvelles réponses ou, plus souvent, les mêmes réponses sous de nouvelles formes. La première entend tirer de certains événements philosophiques jugés décisifs, particulièrement « la fin de la métaphysique (...) », une façon très différente de parler de Dieu, si c’est jamais possible, et d’envisager l’expérience religieuse. Avons-nous alors affaire à deux domaines exclusifs, sans entre-deux ni dialogue possible, ou bien faut-il tenter une conciliation œcuménique des opposés? Une méta-philosophie de la religion examine ce que veut la philosophie de la religion, qu’elle soit continentale ou analytique, et ce qu’on peut en attendre. (shrink)

À la différence du sermon chrétien, le sermon juif n’est pas essentiel à la vie religieuse et le prédicateur n’a guère de statut. Il est pourtant une réalité sociale et littéraire de premier plan en Espagne. Que la philosophie ait place dans ce genre qui s’adresse à tous s’éclaire par trois choses : les textes que la liturgie amène à prendre pour occasions de la prédication ; la « reconfiguration rationaliste du judaïsme » par Maïmonide ; la résistance au (...) prosélytisme. D’où des sujets spéculatifs (création, libre arbitre, justice absolue ou dans l’intérêt public, service par crainte ou par amour, etc.), des références aux auteurs philosophiques, juifs ou non, un lexique et un type d’argumentation. Les conversions nombreuses lors des persécutions de 1391 firent apparaître la nécessité d’une prédication adaptée aux besoins du peuple. Les perspectives ouvertes par l’ Éthique à Nicomaque traduite en hébreu vers 1400 et l’exemple de la prédication chrétienne donnèrent lieu au milieu du xv e s. au programme de Joseph Ibn Shem Tov regardant le rôle du prédicateur, qui exprimait l’emprise de la philosophie sur les penseurs juifs les plus soucieux de sauvegarder la foi. La spécificité du judaïsme se désignait comme un savoir, selon deux modèles : celui, non avoué, de la scolastique chrétienne, avec une théologie au-dessus de la philosophie, et celui d’un niveau inaccessible aux autres hommes. Mais ce savoir spécifique ne se laisse guère cerner. Après 1492, des réfugiés d’Espagne dans l’Empire Ottoman tendirent à l’identifier au corpus des homélies des rabbins anciens : Jacob Ibn Ḥabib en procura le recueil, Salomon ha-Lévi en fit la théorie. L’avantage définitif pris par la kabbale de Safed à la fin du xvi e s. a-t-il pour cause l’échec de cette recherche, ou bien en va-t-il autrement? (shrink)

La philosophie expérimentale est un mouvement récent qui tente de faire progresser certains débats philosophiques grâce à l'utilisation de méthodes expérimentales. À la différence de la philosophie conventionnelle qui privilégie l'analyse conceptuelle ou la spéculation, la philosophie expérimentale préconise le recours aux études empiriques pour mieux comprendre les concepts philosophiques. Apparue il y a une dizaine d'années dans les pays anglo-saxons, cette approche constitue actuellement l'une des branches les plus dynamiques de la philosophie contemporaine. -/- L'objectif (...) de cet ouvrage est d'offrir un contact direct avec les travaux les plus connus et les plus discutés des philosophes expérimentaux. Il regroupe ainsi dix textes représentatifs de ce domaine jeune, mais déjà florissant, et couvre une large partie du champ philosophique contemporain (philosophie du langage, théorie de la connaissance, conscience, théorie de l'action, éthique et philosophie des sciences). (shrink)

"Ce qui s'écrit ici différance marque l'étrange mouvement, l'unité irréductiblement impure d'un différer (détour, délai, délégation, division, inégalité, espacement) dont l'économie excède les ressources déclarées du logos classique. C'est ce mouvement qui donne unité aux essais ici enchaînés. Qu'ils questionnent l'écriture littéraire ou le motif structuraliste (dans les champs de la critique, des “sciences de l'homme” ou de la philosophie), que par une lecture configurante ils en appellent à Nietzsche ou à Freud, à Husserl ou à Heidegger, à Artaud, (...) Bataille, Blanchot, Foucault, Jabès, Levinas, ils n'ont qu'un lieu d'insistance : le point d'articulation dérobée entre l'écriture et la différence. A peser sur cette articulation, ils tentent de déplacer les deux termes."--Page 4 de la couverture. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.1 (2001) 153-155 [Access article in PDF] Dieter Sturma. Philosophie der Person. Die Selbstverhältnisse von Subjektivität und Moralität. Paderborn: Schöningh, 1997. Pp. 376. DM 68.00. According to Sturma, it was John Locke who first developed the concept of a person, molding it into an "elaborated theory of personal identity" (27). His approach was continued first by Hume, Rousseau, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and (...) Hegel, and then in the 20th Century—via Freud, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Sartre—by Anglo-American philosophers such as Strawson, Rawls, Frankfurt, Nagel, Parfit, and Taylor. While these authors provide the main orientation for Sturma, Kant seems to assume a leading position. The aim of the book is to trace out a non-reductionist philosophy of the person. Sturma believes that personhood consists in the fully developed subjectivity together with the moral components included in it" and he intends to uncover the "consequences for practical self-relation arising from it" (38). These relations are, first of all, relations to oneself.The book consists of eleven chapters. The last one is a kind of summary. The other ten can be subdivided into three parts. The first part serves as introduction and propedeutic. In it, Sturma first presents "Subjects and Problems of the Philosophy of the Person" (chapter I), then gives a compendium of "The History of the Philosophy of the Person" (chapter II), and finally presents a "Critique of Reductionism"(chapter III). The last part is the largest. Its main thesis is "that persons are at least in principle subjects who are due freedom, accountability, and self-determination, and who [... ] can initiate reflective and practical self-relations within the social space" (59). After claiming that in practice "every reductionism conceals a kind of determinism" (60), Sturma gives a sketch of his critical approach. Dealing with different forms of determinism, physicalism, logical empiricism, with Wittgenstein's position between reductionism and non-reductionism, and with Thomas Nagel's critique of reductionism, Sturma arrives at a discussion of the difference between (mental) experience (Erlebnis) and events (Ereignis). As a proponent of a "moderate naturalism" (95), he tries in the style of Davidson to take up a middle position, which neither denies events in space and time nor eliminates the personal standpoint of experience.The next two chapters, "Self-Consciousness"(chapter IV) and "Consciousness and [End Page 153] Personal Identity"(chapter V) form the second, more theoretical, part of the book. According to Sturma, Descartes deserves credit for revealing the irreducibility of self-consciousness. This irreducibility is revealed by the fact "that persons become aware of their existence in a way which differs from all other states of consciousness" (103). After discussing mainly analytical objections—above all Wittgenstein's 'private-language' argument and Ayers' critique of the Cogito argument—he summarizes the position of the Heidelberg school (Henrich, et al.). His effort is directed primarily at showing that reflexivity and self-reference are essential to self-consciousness. He tries to develop a concept of self-consciousness that is capable of tying together self-acquaintance and reflection. He believes that only in this way can "the project for a philosophy of the person that is critical of reductionism be transferred to a constructive concept of self-determination"(107). In self-consciousness a person always behaves in relation "to her concrete existence and her concrete behavior in ontological and social space." This explains why the immediate self-relation of self-consciousness is "always an alteration and its subject at once the altering instance and the altered person" (144f). This is followed in the fifth chapter by an examination of the relation between person and identity, where Sturma_starting with the Locke-Leibniz controversy_shows that a person refers to her identity as a given as well as something that needs to be produced (cf.187).The next chapter, "Personal Identity and Practical Self-relations" (chapter VI) is the beginning of the third part of the book, which is essentially practical. In this and the following chapters—"Contexts of Practical Self-relations: The Unconscious and... (shrink)

Rawls intended the difference principle to be a liberal egalitarian principle of justice. By that I mean he intended it to provide a moral justification for a moderate amount of redistribution of income from the most advantaged members of society to the least. But since the difference principle was introduced, economic inequality has increased dramatically, reaching levels now not seen since just before the Great Depression, levels that Rawls surely would have thought perverse. Many blame this increase on the rise (...) of supply-side economics and the dramatic cuts in marginal tax rates enacted by the supply-siders for corporations and those already at the top of the income distribution. But I contend that the difference principle, or at least the ethos that the difference principle embodies and represents, is also partially to blame. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to explain how the difference principle, the ideas and arguments of the supply-siders, and this dramatic rise in inequality are connected, to identify where the difference principle went wrong, and to discuss what those who remain committed to the liberal egalitarian ideals that the difference principle was thought to represent might do about it. (shrink)

Que Wittgenstein ait été un admirateur de Freud n'est pas surprenant, puisque Freud possédait au plus haut point une qualité que Wittgenstein considérait comme fondamentale en philosophie, à savoir l'aptitude à proposer des analogies nouvelles et éclairantes pour la compréhension de faits qui sont à la fois familiers et énigmatiques. Ce que fait Freud consiste pour lui essentiellement à proposer d'excellentes comparaisons, comme par exemple la comparaison d'un rêve et d'un rébus. Mais les mérites de Freud ne vont pas (...) au-delà de ce qu'on peut exprimer en disant qu'il nous fournit une " représentation des faits " dont personne n'avait eu l'idée avant lui et qui est, en tout état de cause, extrêmement convaincante. Ce que Wittgenstein n'accepte pas est l'aspect proprement explicatif de la théorie, c'est-à-dire, en fin de compte l'inconscient lui-même. Freud a tort de s'exprimer comme s'il avait découvert qu'il y a dans l'esprit humain des haines, des volitions, etc., " inconsciente ", ce qui est tout à fait trompeur, parce que nous pensons à la différence entre une haine " consciente " et une haine " inconscientes ", comme à celle qui existe entre une chaise " vue " et une chaise " non vue ". Freud nous a appris à discerner un but, une intention ou un sens dans des phénomènes qui, comme le rêve ou le lapsus, semblaient à première vue n'en avoir aucun. Mais il les a, pour ce faire, simplement placés dans une perspective entièrement différente de celle à laquelle nous étions habitués. Il commet, selon Wittgenstein, une confusion philosophique caractérisée, lorsqu'il estime avoir mis en évidence l'existence d'une activité psychique inconsciente qui constitue la cause supposée des phénomènes en question. (shrink)

In the first English translation of his work, Laruelle explores the major European thinkers from Nietzsche to Derrida to define his own 'non-philosophical' ...

Phenomenal Difference' grants new attention to contemporary black British art, exploring its critical and social significance through attention to embodied experience, affectivity, the senses and perception. Much before scholars in the arts and humanities took their recent 'ontological turn' toward the new materialism, black British art had begun to expose cultural criticism's overreliance on the concepts of textuality, representation, identity and difference. Illuminating that original field of aesthetics and creativity, this book shows how black British artworks themselves can become the (...) basis for an engaged and widely-reaching philosophy. (shrink)

By unfolding the meaning of a Deleuzian formula from Difference and Repetition —“the virtual possesses the reality of a task to be performed, or a problem to be solved”— we attempt to show that the Deleuzian concept of the virtual implies the three main features of a philosophy of nature: a theory of ontogenesis, a theory of regimes of individuation and an ontological foundation of ethics. After demonstrating that the virtual-actual pair makes it possible to form a theory of ontogenesis, (...) we show that, by distinguishing different regimes of individuation (physico-chemical, biological, psychic), Deleuze grants a certain privilege to thought, the only one capable of fully expressing the virtual reality that conditions it. By comparing this theory with that of Étienne Souriau, we show how this privilege is inseparable from an ethical task, and implies no anthropocentrism: for Deleuze, man is not the subject of thought. (shrink)

Cette étude met en rapport quelques notions fondamentales de la pensée indienne avec la phénoménologie de la vie. En avouant d’emblée les limites d’une telle démarche, l’auteur offre une ouverture sur la phénoménologie, notamment dans le cadre de la dimension non dualiste de la pensée indienne. Il s’attache à expliciter les recoupements entre l’affirmation henryenne de la réciprocité interne entre la Vie et les vivants et le fait que, pour la pensée indienne, toutes les réalités spirituelles et matérielles non seulement (...) procèdent d’un Absolu, mais sont habitées par lui. L’auteur se demande notamment comment expliquer, dans une telle approche, la différence entre la Vie et les vivants. Cette contribution met donc en avant la pertinence et les enjeux d’une approche henryenne pour la compréhension des dimensions théologique, anthropologique, cosmologique et, en particulier, christique de la culture philosophique indienne. (shrink)

This book challenges the dominant agenda in the discipline of philosophy of religion by exploring issues of difference that have hitherto been obscured.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Das Begreifen des Unbegreiflichen, Philosophie, und Religion bei Johann Gottlieb Fichte 1800-1806Dorothea WildenburgChristoph Asmuth. Das Begreifen des Unbegreiflichen, Philosophie, und Religion bei Johann Gottlieb Fichte 1800-1806. Stuttgart/Bad Cannstadt: frommann-holzboog, 1999. Pp. 411. DM 118.00."God is neither One nor Many... all these predicates are suited only to finite natures, not for the Incomprehensible... Yet if we attribute even one of them to Him, it is all the (...) same no matter which; the error is always the same, that one wants to comprehend the Incomprehensible." These remarks of the Verantwortungsschrift gegen die Anklage des Atheismus (1799) indicate a main concern of Fichte's later philosophy. This is the problematical relation between the "Absolute" or "God" as origin and principle of all knowing on the one hand, and the possibility of comprehending the Absolute on the other. The Absolute, as knowing, is always finite and differentiated within itself. Asmuth's purpose is to clarify this relation in Fichte.The chief emphasis of this book lies on the presentation and interpretation of two later writings, Die Anweisung zum seeligen Leben (1806) and the Wissenschaftslehre 18042, the second of three series of lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre held in Berlin. Another important [End Page 288] topic is the relationship between strictly philosophical and popular writings, because the Anweisung belongs to Fichte's popular texts, while the Wissenschaftslehre 18042 is a scholarly or scientific one. Asmuth shows that the methodological difference between the popular and the scientific approach is based on the structure of the Wissenschaftslehre, which for Fichte is always situated between realism and idealism: "The popular is the real form of lecturing; the scholarly, the ideal form" (18).The work thus covers a whole thematic complex, which the author presents in its multiple entanglements: He discusses the topic of Comprehending the Incomprehensible, asking whether and how the unity of the Absolute and the differences of knowing are compatible, and how this topic is connected with the relation between popular philosophy and Wissenschaftslehre. He links this question in turn to the methodological standpoint in the Wissenschaftslehre, thus its realism and idealism.In the first three of seven chapters the work turns to religion, thus toward the "real" side of knowing, to popular philosophy. At first Asmuth deals with this subject historically, presenting Fichte's assessment of popular lecturing and showing that it was for Fichte realistic and corresponding to "ordinary knowing" (47). After representing Fichte's position within its historical context, he provides a detailed analysis of the Anweisung, emphasizing its rational character and rejecting any mystical interpretation, such as he finds in Edith Düsing's recent publications, for example (68). The task of religion is not, Asmuth points out, to clarify the relation between concept and what is incomprehensible, but rather merely to state this relation factually: "Religion conceives the relation of finite and absolute... in its That" (112). Fichte does not separate religion from Wissenschaftslehre. They are both complementary accesses to the Absolute, but not of equal value: "Thinking in its constitutive function remains predominant." (121)After the representation of Fichte's view of Christianity, we find (chapters IV-VI) the discussion of the Wissenschaftslehre, the "ideal" side of knowing. The discussion starts with the problem of appropriate terminology. Taking Fichte's difficult language as the occasion to ask whether it is possible in principle to seek through language the "pre-linguistic An sich of what has been thought (des Gedachten)" (164), he tries to make clear how the problem of language can be used to explain Fichte. Yet it remains unclear whether language as such can be used to explain the fact that Fichte's texts themselves are partly "cryptic." The fact that the Absolute cannot be attained through language does not itself provide a sufficient reason for incomprehensible writing.The fifth and sixth chapter contain a philosophical-historical analysis of the Wissenschaftslehre 18042. Asmuth argues against Wolfgang Janke and Michael Brüggen that the Wissenschaftslehre proper does not start before lecture 15. The preceding lectures, which Asmuth considers as Propraedeutics, serve only as preparation for the Doctrine of Truth, which is finally followed by the Phenomenology. The Propraedeutics... (shrink)

Peu de philosophes ont autant insisté sur la différence entre la lettre et l’esprit d’une philosophie que Fichte. Breazeale prend Fichte au mot concernant cette distinction et tente de reconstituer ce qu’il appelle l’esprit de la philosophie d’Iéna, soit la première version de la philosophie que Fichte construisit entre 1793 et 1799. L’auteur montre combien Fichte est loin de la caricature de l’idéalisme débridé, interprétation qui prévalut chez les commentateurs classiques comme dans une certaine philosophie analytique. (...) Il montre aussi comment une vulgate plus contemporaine qui tend à surinvestir l’aspect religieux (en valorisant notamment ce qu’on appelle la dernière philosophie) manque le sens et l’esprit de la philosophie d’Iéna et renoue ainsi avec l’interprétation traditionnelle d’un Fichte dogmatique et métaphysicien. (shrink)

Je voudrais commencer par exprimer ma reconnaissance envers Rossella Fabbrichesi, Claude Gautier et Philippe Sabot. Non seulement ils ont pris le temps et la peine de lire et commenter mon livre, mais, chacun à leur manière, ils ont compté dans le parcours intellectuel qui y a mené. Claude Gautier m’a généreusement accompagné depuis quinze ans dans toutes mes aventures pragmatistes, jusque dans cette exploration exotique de la philosophie française d’un point de vue états-unien. Tout pragmati...

Article SUR LA DIFFERENCE ET L’IDENTITE DES METHODES DE LA METAPHYSIQUE ET DES MATHEMATIQUES CHEZ DESCARTES ET LEIBNIZ ET SUR LA CONCEPTION CLASSIQUE DES PRINCIPES DE CAUSALITE ET DE CORRESPONDANCE was published on January 1, 1961 in the journal Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (volume 43, issue 3).

Philosophies of Difference engages with the concept of difference in relation to a number of fundamental philosophical and political problems. Insisting on the inseparability of ontology, ethics and politics, the essays and interview in this volume offer original and timely approaches to thinking nature, sexuate difference, racism, and decoloniality. The collection draws on a range of sources, including Latin American Indigenous ontologies and philosophers such as Henri Bergson, Jacques Derrida, Luce Irigaray, Immanuel Kant, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Charles Mills, and Eduardo Viveiros (...) de Castro. -/- The contributors think embodiment and life by bringing continental philosophy into generative dialogue with fields including plant studies, animal studies, decoloniality, feminist theory, philosophy of race, and law. Affirming the importance of interdisciplinarity, Philosophies of Difference contributes to a creative and critical intervention into established norms, limits, and categories. Invoking a conception of difference as both constitutive and generative, this collection offers new and important insights into how a rethinking of difference may ground new and more ethical modes of being and being-with. Philosophies of Difference unearths the constructive possibilities of difference for an ethics of relationality, and for elaborating non-anthropocentric sociality. -/- The chapters in this book were originally published in a special issue in Australian Feminist Law Journal. (shrink)

Cet article essaie de montrer, contre l’interprétation donnée par Morrison, que la théorie aristotélicienne de la différence est assez cohérente et unitaire. Puisque cette théorie englobe celle des modes d’être (catégories) et celle de la prédication, la première partie de l’article montre le relations qui existent entre ces deux doctrines, en analysant surtout le difficile chapitre I, 9 des Topiques. La deuxième partie essaie de résoudre les apparentes contradictions qu’on trouve dans l’exposé de la différence aux premiers traités de l’Organon.

Comment penser l'être ou la nature indépendamment de la figure de l'ordre ou du monde? On pourrait caractériser par cette question le défi philosophique de Giordano Bruno. On sait qu'il conduit à une cosmologie infinitiste qui en constitue le versant le plus spectaculaire et le mieux connu. Le travail qui est ici présenté propose une autre voie, centrée autour de la pensée de l'« être un et infini » élaborée par Bruno dans le De la causa, qui constitue le noyau (...) théorique de sa philosophie. Partant d'une réflexion sur la puissance expressive des concepts philosophiques traditionnels (cause et principe, forme et matière, genre et différence) et rapportant les articulations de la pensée de l'être aux conditions de notre connaissance, et non à une structure propre de l'être, Bruno propose une interprétation « dialectique » du discours métaphysique qui fait procéder les formes d'éminence et d'analogie de l'activité figuratrice de la raison humaine. Si, selon une formule célèbre, le philosophe est un peintre et un poète, cela ne veut pas dire qu'il s'affranchisse des normes rationnelles du discours démonstratif pour se faire prophète, cela signifie que ces règles de la pensée ne constituent en aucun cas une grammaire de l'être : elles sont des instruments de figuration de l'être infini et univoque dont il s'agit de saisir tout à la fois la fécondité et les limites. Il s'agissait au départ de s'interroger sur les nouveaux enjeux de la philosophie de la Renaissance et sur ses pratiques discursives souvent si déroutantes. Ce travail tente ainsi de situer la pensée de Bruno par rapport à la critique humaniste des modi significandi médiévaux et de la conception architectonique de la philosophie, identifiable aussi bien dans le projet de réforme dialectique de Valla, dans le plurilinguisme philosophique de Pic de la Mirandole, que chez des auteurs aussi différents que Ficin ou Pomponazzi. (shrink)

In this paper the understanding of the term “stasis” in Plato’s works is investigated. This term usually characterizes internal conflicts among the Greeks and has been increasingly discussed in newer debates on political philosophy. To approach the concept of stasis, its difference from the concept of “polemos” (the Greek word for war) is discussed. The aim is to show the functions of the various differentiations of these terms, in order to draw essential lessons from Plato’s work for today’s research about (...) violent conflicts within political orders. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence and Philosophy. Artificial Intelligence can be considered as the so far last attempt to decode the anthropological comparison between human beings and machines. Thereby it also represents in a prominent way what can be called "systemic thought". Searle's conclusive argument against strong AI (that is the idea of computers having intention in a literal way) refers to his precise distinction between syntax and semantics. This difference obviously opposing some of Searle's other essential ideas will only convince if it (...) also explains the genetic-pragmatic aspect. A theory explaining the "life of mind" and the possibility of understanding needs to combine representation and intention with the subjective causation of signs. At the same time they have to be contextualized within a model of teleologically interpreted life recognized with the help of self-experience and self-reflection. This suggests that AI is a simulation which wrongly believes to be a real duplication. Actually it is a semiotic reduction (syntax and semantic surface of signs only) and a psychological compensation (Turing test) connected with a genetic or abductive fallacy. The biological decontextualization, in fact the elimination of teleology and intention, the deconstruction of subjectivity, the loss of the genetic-pragmatic dimension and the abductive fallacy induce the strong AI to confuse its surface-illusion of simulated understanding with the real process itself. (shrink)

Johann Michel’s Homo Interpretans aims at giving an account of the common ground to the question of interpretation, in a general sense covering ordinary as well as scholarly practices and conceptions, and to the question of philosophical anthropology. Important aspects of Ricoeur’s philosophy are also discussed throughout the book. The author’s thesis is that interpretation takes place whenever an understanding of the world is missing, be it on an ordinary way or in a more elaborate relationship to knowledge. This common (...) ground gives rise to an interpretive anthropology which rearticulates the connection between philosophical discourse, the human and social sciences, and hermeneutics. Finally, the universality of homo interpretans is discussed as it relates to this project of reformulating hermeneutics and the difference between the more ordinary, exploratory level of interpretation and the level of interpretations institutionalized in human and social sciences. (shrink)

La manifestation artistique Mothership (Nantes, 2010), conçue par Michaël Sellam, artiste invité à l'école des beaux-arts de Nantes, autour d'un scénario inspiré du cinéma de science-fiction et de " mondes parallèles ", nous a permis de mener un questionnement inédit portant sur le travail d'artistes émergents faisant appel aux techniques du numérique (son, multimédia...) Si les oeuvres ont été abordées sous l'angle classique de l'analyse voire de la psychanalyse, et de la déconstruction, elles ont surtout été le point de départ (...) de discussions et réflexions philosophiques originales prenant appui sur une théorie des appareils - à distinguer des simples dispositifs et systèmes de communication - visant à appréhender les enjeux actuels de l'art et de la culture, innervés par une techno-science qui se voudrait porteuse d'espoir et d'utopie, quand elle se trouve bien souvent emportée dans des dérives commerciales, totalitaires et sectaires : l'individu, pris dans une temporalité vide, effrénée, et dépossédé d'une technique qu'il n'a pu intérioriser, se retrouve prolétarisé (Stiegler). Quelles seraient les alternatives à un tel phénomène? Comment, par l'expérience, matérialiser les immatériaux. La figure polymorphe - à la fois fantastique, imaginaire, sociale et politique - de l'extraterrestre (étranger, handicapé, hérétique, parasite, fou, génie, monstre, ange ou sauveur...) s'est progressivement imposée, nous conduisant à interroger les problématiques portant sur la différence et sur les différends qu'elle suscite, sur l'errance, la spectralité, l'événement et l'univers infini, l'archaïque et l'ultramoderne... Le rapport entre art et croyance, science et idéologie, foi et savoir (Derrida) s'est révélé déterminant dans notre réflexion, la pierre angulaire se situant dans la technique, potentiellement aliénante du fait des normes qu'elle met en jeu, ou au contraire émancipatrice, quand elle parvient à dépasser sa condition hylémorphique. (shrink)

The question to which I seek here to address myself may be formulated in the following way. Is philosophy to be thought of as essentially one and the same subject in all its different manifestations, carried on, certainly, in noticeably differing ways by different people at different times and in different places, but to be understood nevertheless as consisting of one overall body of knowledge? Or should the term ‘philosophy’ be regarded rather as standing for a ‘family resemblance concept’, and (...) the family in question as containing among its members some who may be hardly capable of establishing any mutually agreed channels of communication with each other? In what follows I shall try to display, if not necessarily to disentangle, some of the underlying complexities on which, as it seems to me, answers to these questions may depend. (shrink)

The beginning of a universal culture of rationality in Judaism did not begin in the so called »Medieval Jewish philosophy« but had its precedents in the Biblical Wisdom Literature and in Rabbinic legal rationality. The Medieval Jewish authors, therefore, did not regard the medieval Philosophy propounded by Jewish authors as »Jewish philosophy« but as a participation of Jews in just another specific phase of universal rationalism. The reason why Jewish authors in the 19th century nevertheless alleged that there existed a (...) specific »Jewish philosophy« at the side of a German, Christian or English philosophy had its reason in the exclusion of Jewish thought from the new leading science of interpretation of human existence in Europe, namely philosophy, by German intellectuals and universities. If we despite this want to retain the term of »Jewish philosophy« we should be aware that there cannot be an essential difference to general philosophy but merely a heuristic pragmatism. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce que la "non-politique"? Est-elle pensable? Pourquoi l'évidence de la politique est-elle si forte? L'histoire de la philosophie occidentale est une tentation toujours renouvelée de "penser la politique depuis la non-politique". Nous pouvons indiquer qu'au moins, dans la modernité, les théoriciens du contrat social inventent déjà une idée révolutionnaire de "l'état de nature" qui est une notion non politique par excellence. Si nous admettons qu'il y a quelque chose de non politique, il y a au moins trois possibilités de (...) penser la non-politique qui nous conduisent à étudier trois théories radicalement distinctes : la "philosophie de l'avenir" de Nietzsche, la "psychanalyse" de Freud et la "non-philosophie" de François Laruelle. Non seulement ce sont les trois possibles conceptions de la non-politique, mais elles mettent en jeu le devenir historique de la notion non politique chez ces trois penseurs d'immanence. Nietzsche est le représentant du primat de la politique : la non-politique finit toujours par être surmontée et absorbée par le politique. Freud observe une différence irréductible entre politique et non-politique : l'une ne domine pas l'autre et vice versa. Enfin, Laruelle démontre que c'est la non-politique qui détermine en dernière instance la politique ; c'est l'Un qui fait un usage unilatéral du matériau occasionnel qu'est l'Autorité dont le coeur est la Pensée-Monde. (shrink)

Before crystallizing into works, music as a field of sensible organization of sound poses a problem: how is it possible that something audible is set apart from the acoustic world to constitute a distinct sphere of sense, holding people′s attention in an unparalleled way? To deal with this question, the text proceeds in three steps: using a concept from art theory, Boehm′s “iconic difference”, music is conceptualized as an ongoing differentiation within the audible; the means that accomplish this differentiation, namely (...) musical tone and the tonal system, are investigated; and finally the gestural element in music is introduced as the form these means take on in the musical process. Throughout, the text draws on classical philosophical resources such as Hegelian dialectics, current research in parallel fields like language development, psychological insights into the structure of perception in early infancy, and various examples from contemporary music and art. (shrink)

This text is about Martin Seel’s philosophical experiment on »not wanting to be right« in the light of concepts of the neutral, as found in French philosophy (Nancy, Blanchot). In the »neither-nor« and »both-as-well« positionings neutralize themselves undialectically. In relation to this, the relationship between art and philosophy can be systematically redefined. According to the thesis of this essay, both fields gain their comparability, difference, and specific contour through their complementary relationship to the neutral.

This paper sketches the antilogism of Christine Ladd-Franklin and historical advancement about antilogism, mainly constructs an axiomatic system Atl based on first-order logic with equality and the wholly-exclusion and not-wholly-exclusion relations abstracted from the algebra of Ladd-Franklin, with soundness and completeness of Atl proved, providing a simple and convenient tool on syllogistic reasoning. Atl depicts the empty class and the whole class differently from normal set theories, e.g. ZFC, revealing another perspective on sets and set theories. Two series of Dotterer (...) and the theorem proved by Russinoff are re-characterized in antilogistic formulas corresponding to the square of opposition and twenty-four moods of syllogism. Then the restricted equivalence between two forms of antilogism and minimal inconsistency is built up, implying the internal connection between antilogisms and minimal inconsistency and leaving two related conjectures not proved. Besides, this paper provides a new explanation for the reason why contrariety, subcontrariety, and subalternation and the nine special moods require the non-empty assumption. (shrink)

Polanyi belongs to a tradition which is neither modernist nor postmodernist, but which affirms speculative philosophy as an alternative to both and as an important form of public discourse. With his origins in the philosophical culture of central Europe, he may well emerge as a bridge between continental and Anglo-American analytic philosophy. He was a moral philosopher in the Aristotelian tradition who anticipated the turn in recent years away from the modern ethics of rules to the classical ethics of virtue. (...) Within this context he espoused a new kind of liberalism and a different understanding of liberty. (shrink)

Au XIXe siècle se constitue le monde moderne que nous connaissons aujourd’hui. Non seulement la formation des sociétés, mais aussi les formes de connaissance sont considérées comme socialement et culturellement variables. La tentative d’arrêter ou de renverser ce processus en inventant des traditions via la construction de concepts généraux tels que, par exemple, « esprit », « culture », « peuple », « nation » ou « race » ne peut pas arrêter le processus d’historicisation radicale de nos formes de (...) vie et de connaissance. Cet article tente de montrer les conséquences de ce développement pour une architecture de la connaissance dans les sciences humaines et les études culturelles. L’hypothèse de travail est qu’une différence entre les disciplines du savoir provient de la différence de vitesse à laquelle elles se ferment ou, au contraire, s’ouvrent à la pensée historique. Plus précisément, il s’agit de montrer comment la discipline qu’est la « philosophie » continue à se développer dans l’ambivalence de l’ouverture et du refus de la pensée historique – et, ce faisant, pose sans cesse à nouveau la question fondamentale du rapport entre vérité et histoire. (shrink)

AS formas históricas e institucionais do cristianismo em Itália fazem com que a filosofia se deva necessariamente confrontar com ele. Além disso, é também evidente que autores como Nietzsche ou Heidegger têm igualmente uma grande influência na península itálica. O artigo examina os escritos de quatro autores contemporêneos os quais, uns mais do que outros, se inspiram nos autores alemães antes mencionados para dar um sentido, frequentemente redutor, mas por vezes também respeitoso da fé dos crentes, ao cristianismo de que (...) a cultura italiana não pode fazer abstracção. Estes filósofos, unidos numa comum sensibilidade ao ser humano, estão também particularmente atentos, ainda que de maneiras muito variadas, à provocação do mal. A categoria da 'Kenose', derivada da meditação sobre a diferença ontológica e da contestação de um saber absoluto disponível para a razão religiosa, acompanha a reconstrução filosófica daquilo que, no cristianismo, mais profundamente toca os autores estudados neste artigo; o seu entendimento do cristianismo, contudo, depende muito da percepção nietzscheana do instante. /// The article starts with the assumption that the historical and institutional forms of Christianity in Italy make it unavoidable for philosophy to confront itself with it. It also mentions the great influence that authors like Nietzsche and Heidegger have in the Italian peninsula. The article proceeds to analyze the writings of four contemporary Italian thinkers. All these authors are inspired by the above mentioned German thinkers and aim at making sense, frequently in a reductive manner but also in a mode respectful of the believers' faith, of Christianity, something of which the Italian culture cannot make abstraction. These four Italian philosophers are particularly united in a common sensibility to the human being and attentive, even though in very different manners, to the provocation of evil. For them, the category of 'Kenosis', derived from the meditation on the ontological difference and the protest against an absolute knowledge available to the religious reason, goes together with the philosophical reconstruction of what in Christianity most touches them. The article also shows, finally, that for these authors the understanding of Christianity depends to a great extent of the impact of nietzschean thought. (shrink)

In this article, Gregory of Nyssa is presented as a trinitarian thinker. It is argued that, in order to appreciate the relevance of triadic structures for his thought, one must take into consideration that the central place the Trinity held in his thought was the result of his involvement in the final phase of the so‑called trinitarian controversy of the fourth century. The article therefore begins with a brief account of the theoretical problems that arose within the later stages of (...) this debate. Particular attention is paid in this connection to the positions of Athanasius and his moderate opponents. In a second step, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory’s older brother, is introduced as a radically innovative voice in the debate. While previous thinkers were agreed on the derivative character of the divinity as passed on from the Father to the other members of the Trinity, Basil insisted on their ontological coordination with the help of terminology taken from Aristotle’s Categories. Gregory’s trinitarian system, which is presented in the remainder of the essay, builds on Basil’s foundations. Through an examination of key texts it is shown, however, that he added a greater concern for the common or shared ousia or physis by means of which divine unity was guaranteed. In this connection, Gregory developed a realistic theory of the universal which he also applied in other parts of his thought, notably his doctrine of creation. The article concludes with the observation that Gregory’s interest in trinitarian structures was different from that of Augustine in that the fundamental problem was the relationship of unity and difference, whereas the number ‘three’ did not play a recognisable role in the Cappadocian’s speculations. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 493 an improvement over what is available. In this way the English reader unable to go to the Spanish originals could benefit greatly. ANTON DONOSO University of Detroit Das Verhdltnis von Philosophie und Theologie im Denken Martin Heideggers. By Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert. Symposium, no. 47. (Freiburg/Miinchen: Karl Alber, 1974. Pp. 340) Sie'fert deals competently not only with Heidegger's own views on the relation between philosophy and theology (...) but with the response they found among philosophers and theologians. From the beginning Heidegger has insisted on the difference in experience at the root of philosophy and theology. This remains true even after the "turn" when Heidegger has much to say about God or gods. At the time when Sein und Zeit appeared Heidegger gave a lecture entitled Phenomenology and Theology, which was published only in 1970.1 He claimed that theology as positive science is not independent from philosophy. What does this mean? A few quotations from the lecture may clarify his viewpoint and show how theological concepts are related to the ontological understanding of secular human existence. "The factual matter [das Vorliegende] (Positum) for theology is its being Christian.... Christian we call faith.... Christ, the crucified God, is for the 'Christian' faith the being that is manifest primarily in faith.... -2 Thus Heidegger holds that "theology itself is primarily founded on faith. ''3 Furthermore, faith as regeneration of the soul transcends the non-Christian existence.4 This means that the believer finds himself in an existential situation in which he cannot avoid taking into consideration the pretheological existence. Therefore, Heidegger says that "in the Christian event as regeneration.., the prebelieving that is disbelieving of Dasein is surpassed. Surpassed does not mean disposed of but lifted on to the new creation and kept and preserved by it. ''~ Thus Heidegger maintains that the concept of "sin as the counterphenomenon to faith as regeneration.., can only be made clear in its meaning by the concept of guilt as an existential of Dasein. ''6 Both the publication of Sein und Zeit and the lecture Phenomenology and Theology belong to the period when Heidegger was a professor at Marburg University and in close contact with R. Bultmann. The historical-temporal structure of Dasein together with the hermeneutic circle, as these terms were developed in Sein und Zeit, became the pivotal issues of Bultmann's theology. Bultmann justifies his reliance on Heidegger (according to a quotation by Siefert, p. 146), claiming that theology as a positive science deals with a specific being (Seiendes) and presupposes a sense of Being that it takes from philosophy. The much-discussed result of Heidegger's influence on Bultmann is his demythologizing of Scripture. Biblical myths, Bultmann argues, are based on a cosmology that, because it belongs to a prescientific age, can no longer be taken for granted by modern man. 7He further agrees with Heidegger that faith is the quality that identifies a Christian. Only "the man of faith" will "hear" the message contained in the Bible. Moreover, faith as regeneration has a temporal character insofar as it liberates the person from his sinful past and directs him to the "new" man in the future. Because of Bultmann's emphasis on faith some critics have reproached him for neglecting Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Klostermann. 2Ibid., p. 18. Translations in this review are my own. Ibid., p. 27. 4Ibid., p. 29. Ibid. 6Ibid., p. 30. 7See Kerygma and Myth, ed. H. W. Bartsch (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p. 3. 494 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY divine grace. In her critique Siefert joins these critics in arguing that Bultmann gains his theological concepts not through being open to the substance of existential structures of Dasein as a matter of principle but on the ground of faith (p. 153). G. Noller, a theologian educated at Tiabingen University, rejects Bultmann's theology and starts with Heidegger's concept of Being. Siefert argues that Noller "misinterprets Heidegger in that he defines God as a being (Seiendes) and falls back into a metaphysical position (p. 157). In Sein und Existenz, says Siefert, Noller states that "God is the destiny (Schickung) of Being, but Being qua nothing may negate God and usher in... (shrink)

Le ms. 608 de la Bibliothèque Brukenthal de Sibiu contient la première partie de la Summa theologiae et, de manière incomplète, la Summa contra Gentiles de St. Thomas d’Aquin. L’auteur analyse le manuscrit sous l’angle paléographique et relève les principales caractéristiques de son écriture, une littera Parisiensis currens du XIIIe siècle. L’écriture et la décoration suggèrent en effet une datation du manuscrit à la fin du XIIIe siècle. D’autres éléments, tel le système des peciae, semblent confirmer l’origine parisienne du livre. (...) L’intérêt de ce manuscrit thomiste peu connu aux chercheurs réside dans son histoire médiévale. À la différence des livres médiévaux des autres bibliothèques roumaines, qui ont pour la plupart été acquis par des bibliophiles modernes, lesmanuscrits de Sibiu proviennent des anciennes bibliothèques de la ville, attestées dès le XIVe siècle. Bien qu’il ne se retrouve pas tel quel dans les inventaires de livres rédigés à Sibiu aux XIVe-XVe siècles, et notamment dans la liste transmise par la Matricula plebaniae cibiniensis , le ms. 608 pourrait être un des livres du couvent dominicain de Sibiu. (shrink)

Answering a question of B. Karsenti on the relation between ontology and politics, E. Balibar reaffirms the irreducible character of politics, including the most philosophical objects. Between the two ontological and transcendental poles of politics, it appears in order to articulate the political and the anthropological. The social relations, functioning by introducing differences in the species, are constitutive of the question of violence that is at the heart of the it-reducibility of politics.

At first glance it might appear that experimental philosophers and feminist philosophers would make good allies. Nonetheless, experimental philosophy has received criticism from feminist fronts, both for its methodology and for some of its guiding assumptions. Adding to this critical literature, I raise questions concerning the ways in which “differences” in intuitions are employed in experimental philosophy. Specifically, I distinguish between two ways in which differences in intuitions might play a role in philosophical practice, one which puts an end to (...) philosophical conversation and the other which provides impetus for beginning one. Insofar as experimental philosophers are engaged in deploying “differences” in intuitions in the former rather than the latter sense, I argue that their approach is antithetical to feminist projects. Moreover, this is even the case when experimental philosophers deploy “differences” in intuitions along lines of gender. (shrink)

What if philosophy, theology, and science spent a little more time together? These fields often seem at odds, butting metaphysical heads. Instead of talking at, how about talking with one another? This book engages three academic disciplines--distinct yet sharing much in common--in a slice of conversation and community in which participants have aimed at validating the other and the way the other sees the world. The result is a collection of essays united by a thread that can be hard to (...) find in academia. In bringing together a wide range of contributors on a project that at first seemed unlikely, Irreconcilable Differences? is also a testament to the spirit of cooperation and hard work--evidence that small acts and events can make a big difference, and that sometimes all you need in order to make something good happen is an idea with a little support along the way. The editors of this collection are hopeful that its contributors and readers will keep looking for ways to bridge academic, social, and political gaps. We need to forge relationships based on personal knowledge and proper confidence seeking to make meaningful claims in an increasingly complex world. (shrink)

Entre les états (2, 3) et (2, 4), le Principe de Différence (PD) choisit-t-il le premier, le second, ou est-il indifférent? Cette dernière interprétation est confortée par le choix par Rawls des courbes en L pour illustrer le PD (Rawls 1999 [1971], § 13, fig. 5), formellement analogue au Maximin en théorie de la décision, et qui admettrait des courbes d’indifférence ; une fois le plus mal loti maximisé, on est indifférent entre les états des mieux lotis ; le Leximin (...) enjoint lui de choisir le second état, puisqu’il réitère le PD sur le dernier plus mal loti. La plupart des commentateurs choisissent le Leximin ; or ce principe est inégalitaire, car il peut laisser s’enrichir les riches alors que les pauvres stagnent. Le PD sélectionne en fait le premier état. Si l’on peut passer du premier état au second, on doit pouvoir passer du premier à un état (2+n, 3-n). Le PD est univoque, différent du Maximin et du Leximin, qui peut favoriser des sociétés duales, où seuls les riches s’enrichissent. On n’a pu généraliser le résultat à plus de deux classes, même en tenant compte de la « connexion en chaîne », laquelle exprime l’idée fondamentale de Rawls : la solidarité via la coopération.Code JEL : I13. (shrink)