BackgroundGeneral practitioners often act as gatekeeper, authorizing patients’ access to hospital care. This gatekeeping role became even more important during the current COVID-19 crisis as uncertainties regarding COVID-19 made estimating the desirability of hospital referrals (for outpatient or inpatient hospitalization) complex, both for COVID and non-COVID suspected patients. This study explored Dutch general practitioners’ experiences and ethical dilemmas faced in decision making about hospital referrals in times of the COVID-19 pandemic.MethodsSemi-structured interviews with Dutch general practitioners working in the Netherlands were (...) conducted. Participants were recruited via purposive sampling. Thematic analysis was conducted using content coding.ResultsFifteen interviews were conducted, identifying four themes: one overarching regarding (1) COVID-19 uncertainties, and three themes about experienced ethical dilemmas: (2) the patients’ self-determination vs. the general practitioners’ paternalism, (3) the general practitioners’ duty of care vs. the general practitioners’ autonomy rights, (4) the general practitioners’ duty of care vs. adequate care provision.ConclusionsLack of knowledge about COVID-19, risks to infect loved ones, scarcity of hospital beds and loneliness of patients during hospital admission were central in dilemmas experienced. When developing guidelines for future crises, this should be taken into account. (shrink)

Experimental evidence of the last decades has made the status of ``collapses of the wave function'' even more shaky than it already was on conceptual grounds: interference effects turn out to be detectable even when collapses are typically expected to occur. Non-collapse interpretations should consequently be taken seriously. In this paper we argue that such interpretations suggest a perspectivalism according to which quantum objects are not characterized by monadic properties, but by relations to other systems. Accordingly, physical systems may possess (...) different properties with respect to different ``reference systems''. We discuss some of the relevant arguments, and argue that perspectivalism both evades recent arguments that single-world interpretations are inconsistent and eliminates the need for a privileged rest frame in the relativistic case. (shrink)

According to the modal interpretation, the standard mathematical framework of quantum mechanics specifies the physical magnitudes of a system, which have definite values. Probabilities are assigned to the possible values that these magnitudes may adopt. The interpretation is thus concerned with physical properties rather than with measurement results: it is a realistic interpretation. One of the notable achievements of this interpretation is that it dissolves the notorious measurement problem. The papers collected here, together with the introduction and concluding critical appraisal, (...) explain the various forms of the modal interpretation, survey its achievements, and discuss those problems that have yet to be solved. Audience: Philosophers of science, theoretical physicists, and graduate students in these disciplines. (shrink)

According to classical physics particles are basic building blocks of the world. These classical particles are distinguishable objects, individuated by unique combinations of physical properties. By contrast, in quantum mechanics the received view is that particles of the same kind are physically indistinguishable from each other and lack identity. This doctrine rests on the quantum mechanical symmetrization postulates together with the “factorist” assumption that each single particle is represented in exactly one factor space of the tensor product Hilbert space of (...) a many-particle system. Even though standard in theoretical physics and the philosophy of physics, the assumption of factorism and the ensuing indistinguishability of particles are problematic. Particle indistinguishability is irreconcilable with the everyday meaning of “particle”, and also with how this term is used in the practice of physics. Moreover, it is a consequence of the standard view that identical quantum particles remain indistinguishable even in the classical limit, which makes a smooth transition to the classical particle concept impossible. Lubberdink and Dieks and Lubberdink have proposed an alternative conception of quantum particles that does not rely on factorism and avoids these difficulties. We further explain and discuss this alternative framework here. One of its key consequences is that particles in quantum theory are not fundamental but emergent; another that once they have emerged, quantum particles are always physically distinguishable and thus possess a physically grounded identity. (shrink)

According to what has become a standard history of quantum mechanics, von Neumann in 1932 succeeded in convincing the physics community that he had proved that hidden variables were impossible as a matter of principle. Subsequently, leading proponents of the Copenhagen interpretation emphatically confirmed that von Neumann's proof showed the completeness of quantum mechanics. Then, the story continues, Bell in 1966 finally exposed the proof as seriously and obviously wrong; this rehabilitated hidden variables and made serious foundational research possible. It (...) is often added in recent accounts that von Neumann's error had been spotted almost immediately by Grete Hermann, but that her discovery was of no effect due to the dominant Copenhagen Zeitgeist. We shall attempt to tell a more balanced story. Most importantly, von Neumann did not claim to have shown the impossibility of hidden variables tout court, but argued that hidden-variable theories must possess a structure that deviates fundamentally from that of quantum mechanics. Both Hermann and Bell appear to have missed this point; moreover, both raised unjustified technical objections to the proof. Von Neumann's conclusion was basically that hidden-variables schemes must violate the "quantum principle" that all physical quantities are to be represented by operators in a Hilbert space. According to this conclusion, hidden-variables schemes are possible in principle but necessarily exhibit a certain kind of contextuality. As we shall illustrate, early reactions to Bohm's theory are in agreement with this account. Leading physicists pointed out that Bohm's theory has the strange feature that particle properties do not generally reveal themselves in measurements, in accordance with von Neumann's result. They did not conclude that the "impossible was done" and that von Neumann had been shown wrong. (shrink)

Nurse clinician‐scientists are increasingly expected to show leadership aimed at transforming healthcare. However, research on nurse clinician‐scientists' leadership (integrating researcher and practitioner roles) is scarce and hardly embedded in sociohistorical contexts. This study introduces leadership moments, that is, concrete events in practices that are perceived as acts of empowerment, in order to understand leadership in the daily work of newly appointed nurse clinician‐scientists. Following the learning history method we gathered data using multiple (qualitative) methods to get close to their daily (...) practices. A document analysis provided us with insight into the history of nursing science to illustrate how leadership moments in the everyday work of nurse clinician‐scientists in the “here and now” can be related to the particular histories from which they emerged. A qualitative analysis led to three acts of empowerment: (1) becoming visible, (2) building networks, and (3) getting wired in. These acts are illustrated with three series of events in which nurse clinician‐scientists' leadership becomes visible. This study contributes to a more socially embedded understanding of nursing leadership, enables us to get a grip on crucial leadership moments, and provides academic and practical starting points for strengthening nurse clinician‐scientists' leadership practices. Transformations in healthcare call for transformed notions of leadership. (shrink)

The foundations of quantum mechanics are attracting new and significant interest in the scientific community due to the recent striking experimental and technical progress in the fields of quantum computation, quantum teleportation and quantum information processing. However, at a more fundamental level the understanding and manipulation of these novel phenomena require not only new laboratory techniques but also new understanding, development and interpretation of the formalism of quantum mechanics itself, a mathematical structure whose connection to what happens in physical reality (...) continues to present puzzles and engender debate.The present issue of Foundations of Physics considers, from physical, philosophical and logical perspectives, a range of problems: these range from the meaning of quantum identity and individuality, through probability and complementarity, to decoherence and gauge theories.The idea of preparing this special issue was conceived in connection with the Workshop .. (shrink)

Shared governance in hospitals promotes the inclusion of nurses' expertise, knowledge and skills in organisational processes, and nurses increasingly fulfil positions in organisational hierarchies. However, incorporating nursing expertise in strategic governance structures might be complicated, as these structures are primarily linked to managerial and biomedical expertise. Drawing on a Foucauldian perspective on knowledge and power, intertwined and embedded in everyday (inter)actions, we study how newly appointed directors of nursing challenge these dominant ‘modes of knowing’. By focusing on a (Dutch) healthcare (...) organisation, a large academic medical centre, we gained insight into how the history of director of nursing roles relates to how nursing expertise is valued. We gathered qualitative data (from multiple sources) to get close to the daily practices of these directors. In this way, we were able to highlight three tactics that enable directors to relate to new ‘knowledge‐power knots’: (1) positioning, by creating more unity; (2) profiling, by showing significance and (3) powering, by being alert and intervening. With these tactics, the directors of nursing try to embed themselves and their expertise in hospital governance. This study contributes to an everyday understanding of power and the tactics that directors of nursing employ as an ongoing practice. This provides practical starting points for embedding nursing in governance and decision‐making. (shrink)

Paul Busch has emphasized on various occasions the importance for physics of going beyond a merely instrumentalist view of quantum mechanics. Even if we cannot be sure that any particular realist interpretation describes the world as it actually is, the investigation of possible realist interpretations helps us to develop new physical ideas and better intuitions about the nature of physical objects at the micro level. In this spirit, Paul Busch himself pioneered the concept of “unsharp quantum reality”, according to which (...) there is an objective non-classical indeterminacy—a lack of sharpness—in the properties of individual quantum systems. We concur with Busch’s motivation for investigating realist interpretations of quantum mechanics and with his willingness to move away from classical intuitions. In this article we try to take some further steps on this road. In particular, we pay attention to a number of prima facie implausible and counter-intuitive aspects of realist interpretations of unitary quantum mechanics. We shall argue that from a realist viewpoint, quantum contextuality naturally leads to “perspectivalism” with respect to properties of spatially extended quantum systems, and that this perspectivalism is important for making relativistic covariance possible. (shrink)

Using Althaus-Reid’s Indecent Theology as a methodology, this article contributes to reflections on the contextuality and physical dimension of Dutch theology: its relation to the Protestant white bodies of its practitioners and its support of and contributions to colonial power and colonial racializing discourse. We do this in a context of a ‘return to decency’ in political discourse in which ‘our’ Calvinist roots are evoked to construct a ‘shared’ past. Using two case studies, we analyse how the in/decent is constructed (...) in the Netherlands. As secularism is more ‘vanilla’ and Calvinism more indecent than is usually assumed, engagement with indecent texts and untidy roots of Calvinism is needed to re-member both the violent character of Calvinist hermeneutics, as well as its potential for indecent readings. (shrink)

It is a central aspect of our ordinary concept of time that history unfolds and events come into being. It is only natural to take this seriously. However, it is notoriously difficult to explain further what this `becoming' consists in, or even to show that the notion is consistent at all. In this article I first argue that the idea of a global temporal ordering, involving a succession of cosmic nows, is not indispensable for our concept of time. Our experience (...) does not support the existence of global simultaneity and arguments from modern physics further support the conclusion that time should not be seen as a succession of cosmic nows. Accordingly, I propose that if we want to make sense of becoming we should attempt to interpret it as something purely local. Second, I address the question of what this local becoming consists in. I maintain that processes of becoming are nothing but the successive happening of events, and that this happening of events consists entirely in the occurring of these events at their own spacetime locations. This leads to a consistent view of becoming, which is applicable even to rather pathological spacetimes. (shrink)

It is widely held that quantum mechanics is the first scientific theory to present scientifically internal, fundamental difficulties for a realistic interpretation (in the philosophical sense). The standard (Copenhagen) interpretation of the quantum theory is often described as the inevitable instrumentalistic response. It is the purpose of the present article to argue that quantum theory doesnot present fundamental new problems to a realistic interpretation. The formalism of quantum theory has the same states—it will be argued—as the formalisms of older physical (...) theories and is capable of the same kinds of philosophical interpretation. This result is reached via an analysis of what it means to give a realistic interpretation to a theory. The main point of difference between quantum mechanics and other theories—as far as the possibilities of interpretation are concerned—is the special treatment given tomeasurement by the “projection postulate.” But it is possible to do without this postulate. Moreover, rejection of the projection postulate does not, in spite of what is often maintained in the literature, automatically lead to the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. A realistic interpretation is possible in which only the reality ofone (our) world is recognized. It is argued that the Copenhagen interpretation as expounded by Bohr is not in conflict with the here proposed realistic interpretation of quantum theory. (shrink)

It has often been remarked that Bohr's writings on the interpretation of quantum mechanics make scant reference to the mathematical formalism of quantum theory; and it has not infrequently been suggested that this is another symptom of the general vagueness, obscurity and perhaps even incoherence of Bohr's ideas. Recent years have seen a reappreciation of Bohr, however. In this article we broadly follow this "rehabilitation program". We offer what we think is a simple and coherent reading of Bohr's statements about (...) the interpretation of quantum mechanics, basing ourselves on primary sources and making use of and filling lacunas in|recent secondary literature. We argue that Bohr's views on quantum mechanics are more firmly connected to the structure of the quantum formalism than usually acknowledged, even though Bohr's explicit use of this formalism remains on a rather global and qualitative level. In our reading, Bohr's pronouncements on the meaning of quantum mechanics should first of all be seen as responses to concrete physical problems, rather than as expressions of a preconceived philosophical doctrine. In our final section we attempt a more detailed comparison with the formalism and conclude that Bohr's interpretation is not far removed from present-day non-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Classical particles of the same kind are distinguishable: they can be labeled by their positions and follow different trajectories. This distinguishability affects the number of ways W a macrostate can be realized on the micro-level, and via S=k ln W this leads to a non-extensive expression for the entropy. This result is generally considered wrong because of its inconsistency with thermodynamics. It is sometimes concluded from this inconsistency, notoriously illustrated by the Gibbs paradox, that identical particles must be treated as (...) indistinguishable after all; and even that quantum mechanics is indispensable for making sense of this. In this article we argue, by contrast, that the classical statistics of distinguishable particles and the resulting non-extensive entropy function are perfectly all-right both from a theoretical and an experimental perspective. We remove the inconsistency with thermodynamics by pointing out that the entropy concept in statistical mechanics is not completely identical to the thermodynamical one. Finally, we observe that even identical quantum particles are in some cases distinguishable; and conclude that quantum mechanics is irrelevant to the Gibbs paradox. (shrink)

N. Maxwell (1985) has claimed that special relativity and "probabilism" are incompatible; "probabilism" he defines as the doctrine that "the universe is such that, at any instant, there is only one past but many alternative possible futures". Thus defined, the doctrine is evidently prerelativistic as it depends on the notion of a universal instant of the universe. In this note I show, however, that there is a straightforward relativistic generalization, and that therefore Maxwell's conclusion that the special theory of relativity (...) should be amended is unwarranted. I leave open the question whether or not probabilism (or the related doctrine of the flow of time) is true, but argue that the special theory of relativity has no fundamental significance for this question. (shrink)

Achieving understanding of nature is one of the aims of science. In this paper we offer an analysis of the nature of scientific understanding that accords with actual scientific practice and accommodates the historical diversity of conceptions of understanding. Its core idea is a general criterion for the intelligibility of scientific theories that is essentially contextual: which theories conform to this criterion depends on contextual factors, and can change in the course of time. Our analysis provides a general account of (...) how understanding is provided by scientific explanations of diverse types. In this way, it reconciles conflicting views of explanatory understanding, such as the causal-mechanical and the unificationist conceptions. (shrink)

The Scientific Revolution is often associated with a transition to a ``mechanistic'' world view. However, ``mechanization'' is not the term that best captures the distinctive nature of modern physics: ``mathematization'' would be a better characterization. Modern physics attempts to find mathematical relations between quantities, and does not require that these relations be interpreted in terms of mechanisms. Moreover, in modern physics there are cases in which it is unnatural to give the mathematical formalism a mechanistic interpretation, even if ``mechanistic'' is (...) broadly construed. Both on the level of ontology and that of explanation physics turns out to be more general and liberal than what is suggested by the catchphrase that physics explains by identifying mechanisms. Although mechanistic explanation remains an important conceptual tool, in particular for achieving understanding, it is not the only one available and cannot lay claim to fundamentality. (shrink)

We study the process of observation (measurement), within the framework of a “perspectival” (“relational,” “relative state”) version of the modal interpretation of quantum mechanics. We show that if we assume certain features of discreteness and determinism in the operation of the measuring device (which could be a part of the observer's nerve system), this gives rise to classical characteristics of the observed properties, in the first place to spatial localization. We investigate to what extent semi-classical behavior of the object system (...) itself (as opposed to the observational system) is needed for the emergence of classicality. Decoherence is an essential element in the mechanism of observation that we assume, but it turns out that in our approach no environment-induced decoherence on the level of the object system is required for the emergence of classical properties. (shrink)

It is argued that the symmetry and anti-symmetry of the wave functions of systems consisting of identical particles have nothing to do with the observational indistinguishability of these particles. Rather, a much stronger conceptual indistinguishability is at the bottom of the symmetry requirements. This can be used to argue further, in analogy to old arguments of De Broglie and Schrödinger, that the reality described by quantum mechanics has a wave-like rather than particle-like structure. The question of whether quantum statistics alone (...) can give rise to empirically observable correlations between results of distant measurements is also discussed. (shrink)

Two proposals for a physicalistic analysis of causation — the so-called transference model and an account given by J. L. Mackie — are examined and found wanting on the score of physical objectivity. This shortcoming can be remedied, but it is further argued that both proposals embody a too restricted conception of what a physicalistic analysis of causation should be. A more general program is proposed.

In his general theory of relativity (GR) Einstein sought to generalize the special-relativistic equivalence of inertial frames to a principle according to which all frames of reference are equivalent. He claimed to have achieved this aim through the general covariance of the equations of GR. There is broad consensus among philosophers of relativity that Einstein was mistaken in this. That equations can be made to look the same in different frames certainly does not imply in general that such frames are (...) physically equivalent. We shall argue, however, that Einstein's position is tenable. The equivalence of arbitrary frames in GR should not be equated with relativity of arbitrary motion, though. There certainly are observable differences between reference frames in GR (differences in the way particles move and fields evolve). The core of our defense of Einstein's position will be to argue that such differences should be seen as fact-like rather than law-like in GR. By contrast, in classical mechanics and in special relativity (SR) the differences between inertial systems and accelerated systems have a law-like status. The fact-like character of the differences between frames in GR justifies regarding them as equivalent in the same sense as inertial frames in SR. (shrink)

The symmetrization postulates of quantum mechanics (symmetry for bosons, antisymmetry for fermions) are usually taken to entail that quantum particles of the same kind (e.g., electrons) are all in exactly the same state and therefore indistinguishable in the strongest possible sense. These symmetrization postulates possess a general validity that survives the classical limit, and the conclusion seems therefore unavoidable that even classical particles of the same kind must all be in the same state—in clear conflict with what we know about (...) classical particles. In this article we analyze the origin of this paradox. We shall argue that in the classical limit classical particles emerge, as new entities that do not correspond to the “particle indices” defined in quantum mechanics. Put differently, we show that the quantum mechanical symmetrization postulates do not pertain to particles, as we know them from classical physics, but rather to indices that have a merely formal significance. This conclusion raises the question of whether many discussions in the literature about the status of identical quantum particles have not been misguided. (shrink)

In relativistic quantum field theory the notion of a local operation is regarded as basic: each open space-time region is associated with an algebra of observables representing possible measurements performed within this region. It is much more difficult to accommodate the notions of events taking place in such regions or of localized objects. But how can the notion of a local operation be basic in the theory if this same theory would not be able to represent localized measuring devices and (...) localized events? After briefly reviewing these difficulties we discuss a strategy for eliminating the tension, namely by interpreting quantum theory in a realist way. To implement this strategy we use the ideas of the modal interpretation of quantum mechanics. We then consider the question of whether the resulting scheme can be made Lorentz invariant. (shrink)

'Holographic' relations between theories have become a main theme in quantum gravity research. These relations entail that a theory without gravity is equivalent to a gravitational theory with an extra spatial dimension. The idea of holography was first proposed in 1993 by Gerard 't Hooft on the basis of his studies of evaporating black holes. Soon afterwards the holographic 'AdS/CFT' duality was introduced, which since has been heavily studied in the string theory community and beyond. Recently, Erik Verlinde has proposed (...) that even Newton's law of gravitation can be related holographically to the thermodynamics of information on screens. We discuss inter-theoretical relations in these scenarios: what is the status of the holographic relation in them and in what sense is gravity, or spacetime, emergent? (shrink)

Saunders has recently claimed that ``identical quantum particles'' with an anti-symmetric state (fermions) are weakly discernible objects, just like irreflexively related ordinary objects in situations with perfect symmetry (Black's spheres, for example). Weakly discernible objects have all their qualitative properties in common but nevertheless differ from each other by virtue of (a generalized version of) Leibniz's principle, since they stand in relations an entity cannot have to itself. This notion of weak discernibility has been criticized as question begging, but we (...) defend and accept it for classical cases likes Black's spheres. We argue, however, that the quantum mechanical case is different. Here the application of the notion of weak discernibility indeed is question begging and in conflict with standard interpretational ideas. We conclude that the introduction of the conceptual resource of weak discernibility does not change the interpretational status quo in quantum mechanics. (shrink)

The aim of this article is twofold. First, we shall review and analyse the neo-kantian justification for the application of probabilistic concepts in science that was defended by Hans Reichenbach early in his career, notably in his dissertation of 1916. At first sight this kantian approach seems to contrast sharply with Reichenbach’s later logical positivist, frequentist viewpoint. But, and this is our second goal, we shall attempt to show that there is an underlying continuity in Reichenbach’s thought: typical features of (...) his early kantian conceptions can still be recognized in his later work. (shrink)

An often repeated account of the genesis of special relativity tells us that relativity theory was to a considerable extent the fruit of an operationalist philosophy of science. Indeed, Einstein’s 1905 paper stresses the importance of rods and clocks for giving concrete physical content to spatial and temporal notions. I argue, however, that it would be a mistake to read too much into this. Einstein’s operationalist remarks should be seen as serving rhetoric purposes rather than as attempts to promulgate a (...) particular philosophical position --- in fact, Einstein never came close to operationalism in any of his philosophical writings. By focussing on what could actually be measured with rods and clocks Einstein shed doubt on the empirical status of a number of pre-relativistic concepts, with the intention to persuade his readers that the applicability of these concepts was not obvious. This rhetoric manoeuvre has not always been rightly appreciated in the philosophy of physics. Thus, the influence of operationalist misinterpretations, according to which associated operations strictly define what a concept means, can still be felt in present-day discussions about the conventionality of simultaneity. The standard story continues by pointing out that Minkowski in 1908 supplanted Einstein’s approach with a realist spacetime account that has no room for a foundational role of rods and clocks: relativity theory became a description of a four-dimensional ‘absolute world’. As it turns out, however, it is not at all clear that Minkowski was proposing a substantivalist position with respect to spacetime. On the contrary, it seems that from a philosophical point of view Minkowski’s general position was not very unlike the one in the back of Einstein’s mind. However, in Minkowski’s formulation of special relativity it becomes more explicit that the content of spatiotemporal concepts relates to considerations about the form of physical laws. If accepted, this position has important consequences for the discussion about the conventionality of simultaneity. (shrink)

Summary A recurrent theme in the philosophical literature on the special theory of relativity is the question as to the reality of the Lorentz contraction. It is often suggested that there is a difference between the Lorentz-FitzGerald contraction in the pre-relativistic ether theory and the Lorentz contraction from special relativity in the sense that the former is a real contraction of matter conditioned by dynamical laws, whereas the latter should be compared with the apparent changes in the size of objects (...) when the perspective of the observer changes. It is here shown, however, that the same laws of nature which are operative in the Lorentz-FitzGerald contraction also condition the relativistic Lorentz contraction. The relevant distinction therefore is not between the reality of the two contractions. What is at issue is the difference in explanatory structure of the pre-relativistic theory on the one hand and the special theory of relativity on the other. In the course of the argument the question of the conventionality of simultaneity is also discussed. (shrink)

We generalize the modal interpretation of quantum mechanics so that it may be applied to composite systems represented by arbitrary density operators. We discuss the interpretation these density operators receive and relate this to the discussion about the interpretation of proper and improper mixtures in the standard interpretation.

Saunders has recently claimed that “identical quantum particles” with an anti-symmetric state (fermions) are weakly discernible objects, just like irreflexively related ordinary objects in situations with perfect symmetry (Black’s spheres, for example). Weakly discernible objects have all their qualitative properties in common but nevertheless differ from each other by virtue of (a generalized version of) Leibniz’s principle, since they stand in relations an entity cannot have to itself. This notion of weak discernibility has been criticized as question begging, but we (...) defend and accept it for classical cases likes Black’s spheres. We argue, however, that the quantum mechanical case is different. Here the application of the notion of weak discernibility indeed is question begging and in conflict with standard interpretational ideas. We conclude that the introduction of the conceptual resource of weak discernibility does not change the interpretational status quo in quantum mechanics. (shrink)

The theories of pre-quantum physics are standardly seen as representing physical systems and their properties. Quantum mechanics in its standard form is a more problematic case: here, interpretational problems have led to doubts about the tenability of realist views. Thus, QBists and Quantum Pragmatists maintain that quantum mechanics should not be thought of as representing physical systems, but rather as an agent-centered tool for updating beliefs about such systems. It is part and parcel of such views that different agents may (...) have different beliefs and may assign different quantum states. What results is a collection of agent-centered perspectives rather than a unique representation of the physical world. In this paper we argue that the problems identified by QBism and Quantum Pragmatism do not necessitate abandoning the ideal of representing the physical world. We can avail ourselves of the same puzzle-solving strategies as employed by QBists and pragmatists by adopting a perspectival quantum realism. According to this perspectivalism objects may possess different, but equally objective properties with respect to different physically defined perspectives. We discuss two options for such a perspectivalism, a local and a nonlocal one, and apply them to Wigner’s friend and EPR scenarios. Finally, we connect quantum perspectivalism to the recently proposed philosophical position of fragmentalism. (shrink)

Modal interpretations have the ambition to construe quantum mechanics as an objective, man-independent description of physical reality. Their second leading idea is probabilism: quantum mechanics does not completely fix physical reality but yields probabilities. In working out these ideas an important motif is to stay close to the standard formalism of quantum mechanics and to refrain from introducing new structure by hand. In this paper we explain how this programme can be made concrete. In particular, we show that the Born (...) probability rule, and sets of definite-valued observables to which the Born probabilities pertain, can be uniquely defined from the quantum state and Hilbert space structure. We discuss the status of probability in modal interpretations, and to this end we make a comparison with many-worlds alternatives. An overall point that we stress is that the modal ideas define a general framework and research programme rather than one definite and finished interpretation. (shrink)

This fourth volume of the Programme “The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective” deals with new challenges in this field. In this regard, it seeks to broaden the scope of the philosophy of science in two directions. On the one hand, ...

Décio Krause is one of the staunchest defenders of the “Received View” of “identical quantum particles”, i.e. quantum particles of the same kind. According to the Received View identical quantum particles do not possess individuating properties: they are entities without identity. Still, they are “different” from each other in the weak sense that there can be more than one of them. As Décio Krause has pointed out, such identity-less objects must be handled by a non-standard set theory—quasi-set theory, a subject (...) to which he has made important contributions.In this Chapter we compare and contrast the ideas of the Received View with those of a rival interpretation that has recently started to attract attention. According to this Alternative View quantum particles are emerging entities—at a fundamental level, the world does not consist of particles. But once emerged, quantum particles of the same kind are distinguishable and possess identity, so that they can be dealt with by standard set theory and ordinary mathematics. (shrink)