This book is an introduction to medieval economic thought, mainly from the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries, as it emerges from the works of academic theologians and lawyers and other sources - from Italian merchants' writings to vernacular poetry, Parliamentary legislation, and manorial court rolls. It raises a number of questions based on the Aristotelian idea of the mean, the balance and harmony underlying justice, as applied by medieval thinkers to the changing economy. How could private ownership of property be (...) reconciled with God's gift of the earth to all in common? How could charity balance resources between rich and poor? What was money? What were the just price and the just wage? How was a balance to be achieved between lender and borrower and how did the idea of usury change to reflect this? The answers emerge from a wide variety of ecclesiastical and secular sources. (shrink)

The current paper proposes the Dysexecutive Luck hypothesis; that beliefs in being unlucky are associated with deficits in executive functioning. Four studies suggest initial support for the Dysexecutive Luck hypothesis via four aspects of executive functioning. Study 1 established that self-reports of dysexecutive symptoms predicted unique variance in beliefs in being unlucky after controlling for a number of other variables previously reported to be related to beliefs around luck. Studies 2 to 4 demonstrated support for the Dysexecutive Luck hypothesis via (...) assessment of executive functioning via: two fundamental executive functions , emotional processes related to executive functioning as described by the Somatic Marker hypothesis, and higher executive functions as accessed via divergent thinking. The findings suggest that individuals’ beliefs in being unlucky are accompanied by a range of deficits in executive functioning. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 124.2 (2003) 317-320 [Access article in PDF] Julia T. Dyson. King of the Wood: The Sacrificial Victor in Virgil's Aeneid. Oklahoma Series in Classical Culture 27. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001. xii + 264 pp. Paper, $19.95. In this interesting study, Julia Dyson argues that the cult of Diana Nemorensis constitutes a crucial intertext for the interpretation of Aeneas' killing of Turnus (...) at the end of Virgil's Aeneidand the politico-religious order his action founds, namely, the Roman Empire. The project takes its bearings from the current renewal of scholarly interest in religion and sacrifice in Roman literature (e.g., Denis Feeney, Literature and Religion at Rome: Cultures, Contexts, and Beliefs [Cambridge, 1998] and Philip Hardie, The Epic Successors of Virgil[Cambridge, 1993]). In the first part of the book, "Sacrificial Victory," Dyson revisits the much-discussed scenes in which sacrifice, both literal (Laocoön's rites in Troy, Aeneas' in Thrace) and symbolic (the deaths of Laocoön, Palinurus, Misenus, etc.), are described. In the second part, "The Ghastly Priest," Dyson breaks new ground by focusing on specific details of the ritual in Diana's Arician grove and their evocation in the Aeneid, rather than appealing to an abstract concept of "sacrifice," to document a systematic pattern of allusion to the cult throughout the poem. The resulting work advances our understanding of Virgil's use of an important cult in Roman religion to give thematic coherence to his poem.Each part comprises six chapters. Part 1 examines the poem's various sacrifice-scenes, which have received considerable attention in the scholarly literature—e.g., C. Bandera, "Sacrificial Levels in Virgil's Aeneid" (Arethusa14, 1981, 217-39) and J. J. O'Hara, Death and the Optimistic Prophecy in Vergil's Aeneid(Princeton, 1990). Dyson is particularly concerned, however, to demonstrate that sacrifice fails consistently in the poem in order to develop the argument that Aeneas' death is demanded as the final sacrifice in the sequence. In her first chapter, "The Piaculaof Aeneas," she shows that Aeneas repeatedly fails to conduct sacrificial rites correctly, a failure that necessarily entails the gods' unceasing demand for further sacrifices. Chapter 2, "Tiber and Numicus," explores Virgil's allusions to the sacrificial fate of Aeneas—implied in the two divergent traditions of his end (either drowned or translated to heaven and deified while offering sacrifice on the banks of the river Numicus)—through the association, on the one hand, of Tiber with Numicus and, on the other, of Aeneas with Palinurus and other "sacrificial" victims.In chapter 3, "The Unburied Dead," Dyson develops her thesis further by demonstrating that such sacrificial deaths—often at sea and involving lack of burial—proliferate in the poem (Palinurus, Orontes, Leucaspis, Misenus, Caieta, Priam, Tarquitus) and thereby, she argues, prefigure the ultimate fate of Aeneas. Chapter 4, "Victor and Victim," examines instances of role-reversal in which sacrificer is transformed into sacrificial victim, not only in overtly religious contexts (as, e.g., Laocoön) but also, indeed primarily, on the battlefield in combat scenes which Virgil frequently invests with sacrificial detail. The diverse themes of rivers, sacrifice, and victory come together [End Page 317] in chapter 5, "Aeneas and Turnus," where Dyson analyses Aeneas' killing of Turnus (who is characterized, she argues, by association with the Tiber) in the final duel as a sacrifice that "both foreshadows and necessitates the sacrifice of Aeneas" (112). The last chapter in Part 1, "Juno's Honores," argues that Jupiter's promise to his consort that the Romans will outdo other nations in honoring her (Aen. 12.838-40) must be interpreted against Juno's demand for proper honors (i.e., sacrifices) at the poem's outset (1.46-49), a demand that can only be satisfied by further sacrifices—including that of Aeneas himself.Part 1 contains much interesting and innovative discussion of sacrifice along with some inevitable rehearsal of well-trodden ground, but it certainly establishes Dyson's thesis that Virgil alludes throughout the Aeneidto Aeneas' sacrificial... (shrink)

Hermeneutics, the Bible and Literary Criticism. Edited by Ann Loades and Michael McLain.The Craft of Theology: From Symbol to System. By Avery Dulles.The Shape of Soreriology. By John McIntyre.Not the Cross But the Crucfied. By H.‐E. Mertens.Verbum Curo: An Encyclopedia on Jesus, the Christ. By Michael O'Carroll.The Search for the Origins of Christian Worship: Sources and Methods for the Study of the Early Liturgy. By Paul Bradshaw.Worship: Initiation and the Churches. By Leonel L. Mitchell.The Eucharistic Mystery: Revitalizing the Tradition. By (...) David Power.Church of Churches: The Ecclesiology of Communion. By J.‐M. Tillard.God and History, Aspects of British Theology 1875‐1914. By Peter Hinchliff.Clear Heads and Holy Hearts: The Religious and Theological Ideal of John Henry Newman. By Terrence Merrigan.The Desert Fathers on Monastic Community. By Graham Gould.John Moschos, ‘The Spiritual Meadow’. Introduction, translation and notes by John Wortley.A Gentle Touch. By David Pailin.The Eye of the Storm: Spiritual Resources for rhe Pursuit of Justice. By Kenneth Leech.The Church and the Arts. Edited by Diana Wood.Anti‐Christian Polemic in Early Islam: Abu Isa al‐Warraq's ‘Against the Trinity’. Edited by David Thomas.Bernardus Magister: Papers Presented at the Nonacentenary Celebration of the Birth of St Bernard of Clairvaux. Edited by John R. Sommerfeldt.Church and City 1000‐1500: Essays in Honour of Christopher Brooke. Edited by David Abulafia, Michael Franklin and Miri Rubin.‘Piers Plowman’ and the Problem of Belief. By Britton J. Harwood.Ignutius of Luyola: The Psychology of a Saint. By W. W. Meissner.Jerome Naahl, S. J., 1507‐1580: Tracking the First Generation of Jesuits. By William V. Bangert, edited and completed by Thomas M. McCoog.From Bishop to Witch: The System of the Sacred in Early Modern Terra d'Otranto. By David Gentilcore.Civic Politics in the Rome of Urban VIII. By Laurie Nussdorfer.Michel de Montaigne: The Complete Essays. Translated by M. A. Screech.Montaigne and Melancholy: The Wisdom of the ‘Essays’. By M. A. Screech.Religion and Philosophy. Edited by Martin Warner.What is Faith? Essays in the Philosophy of Religion. By Anthony Kenny.Truth and Hisroriciry. By Richard Campbell. (shrink)

Warfare is becoming increasingly automated, from automatic missile defense systems to micro-UAVs (WASPs) that can maneuver through urban environments with ease, and each advance brings with it ethical questions in need of resolving. Proponents of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) provide varied arguments in their favor; robots are capable of better identifying combatants and civilians, thus reducing "collateral damage"; robots need not protect themselves and so can incur more risks to protect innocents or gather more information before using deadly force; (...) robots can assess situations more quickly and do so without emotion, reducing the likelihood of fatal mistakes due to human error; and sending robots to war protects our own soldiers from harm. However, these arguments only point in favor of autonomous weapons systems, failing to demonstrate why such systems need be made *lethal*. In this paper I argue that if one grants all of the proponents' points in favor of LAWS, then, contrary to what might be expected, this leads to the conclusion that it would be both immoral and illegal to deploy *lethal* autonomous weapons, because the many features that speak in favor of them also undermine the need for them to be programmed to take lives. In particular, I argue that such systems, if lethal, would violate the moral and legal principle of necessity, which forbids the use of weapons that impose superfluous injury or unnecessary harm. I conclude by highlighting that the argument is not against autonomous weapons per se, but only against *lethal* autonomous weapons. (shrink)

The principle of proportionality demands that a war (or action in war) achieve more goods than bads. In the philosophical literature there has been a wealth of work examining precisely which goods and bads may count toward this evaluation. However, in all of these discussions there is no mention of one of the most certain bads of war, namely the psychological harm(s) likely to be suffered by the combatants who ultimately must fight and kill for the purposes of winning in (...) conflict. This paper argues that harms to one’s own soldiers must be included in proportionality judgments, and goes on to argue that one of the most significant harms one’s soldiers face are the psychological stresses and traumas associated with combat. The arguments draw on a growing wealth of psychological literature exploring the connections between combatancy and psychological trauma, and highlight, in particular, the uniquely negative impact which killing has on a combatant’s mental well-being. The paper concludes that these factors place an almost certain and rather weighty negative weight in any proportionality calculations concerning wars with ground combatants who must fight “up close and personal”, and that for more remote warfighters, there is also evidence to show that they may suffer deep psychological harm as a result of their combat roles as well. The argument, however, does not attempt to demonstrate that these factors render war impermissible. Rather, it merely shows that these harms, or bads, which can be quite significant, must be factored into our considerations of proportionality. The arguments themselves are rather uncontroversial, but they bring to light an element in the moral calculus which is sadly overlooked in most discussions of the ethics of war. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) has become nearly ubiquitous in modern society, from components of mobile applications to medical support systems, and everything in between. In societally impactful systems imbued with AI, there has been increasing concern related to opaque AI, that is, artificial intelligence where it is unclear how or why certain decisions are reached. This has led to a recent boom in research on “explainable AI” (XAI), or approaches to making AI more explainable and understandable to human users. In the (...) military domain, numerous bodies have argued that autonomous and AI-enabled weapon systems ought not incorporate unexplainable AI, with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United States Department of Defense both explicitly including explainability as a relevant factor in the development and use of such systems. In this article, I present a cautiously critical assessment of this view, arguing that explainability will be irrelevant for many current and near-future autonomous systems in the military (which do not incorporate any AI), that it will be trivially incorporated into most military systems which do possess AI (as these generally possess simpler AI systems), and that for those systems with genuinely opaque AI, explainability will prove to be of more limited value than one might imagine. In particular, I argue that explainability, while indeed a virtue in design, is a virtue aimed primarily at designers and troubleshooters of AI-enabled systems, but is far less relevant for users and handlers actually deploying these systems. I further argue that human–machine teaming is a far more important element of responsibly using AI for military purposes, adding that explainability may undermine efforts to improve human–machine teamings by creating aprima faciesense that the AI, due to its explainability, may be utilized with little (or less) potential for mistakes. I conclude by clarifying that the arguments are not against XAI in the military, but are instead intended as a caution against over-inflating the value of XAI in this domain, or ignoring the limitations and potential pitfalls of this approach. (shrink)

Sexual violence during war varies in extent and takes distinct forms. In some conflicts, sexual violence is widespread, yet in other conflicts—including some cases of ethnic conflict—it is quite limited. In some conflicts, sexual violence takes the form of sexual slavery; in others, torture in detention. I document this variation, particularly its absence in some conflicts and on the part of some groups. In the conclusion, I explore the relationship between strategic choices on the part of armed group leadership, the (...) norms of combatants, dynamics within small units, and the effectiveness of military discipline. (shrink)

Broadly speaking, ancient concepts of causality in terms of explanatory priority have been contrasted with modern discussions of causality concerned with agents or events sufficient to produce effects. As Richard Taylor claimed in the 1967 Encyclopedia of Philosophy, of the four causes considered by Aristotle, all but the notion of efficient cause is now archaic. What we will consider here is a notion even less familiar than Aristotelian material, formal, and final causes—what we will call 'demonstrational causality'. Demonstrational causality refers (...) to the dependence of the conclusion on the premises of a demonstration. Here, if ever, we have a case of explanational priority, since among other things what is required of the premises is that they be better known or more manifest than the conclusion. But, oddly enough, Aristotle and his medieval commentators describe demonstrational causality in the same terms as efficient causality. Aristotle speaks of the conclusion as an "effect" of the premises; his commentators speak of the "sufficiency" of first principles or axioms in producing the conclusion. (shrink)

Redish et al. trace vulnerabilities in habit and planning systems almost exclusively to pharmacological effects of addictive substances on underlying brain systems. As we discuss, however, these systems also can be disrupted by purely psychological factors inherent in normal decision-making and everyday behavior. A truly unified model must integrate the contribution of both sets of factors in driving addiction.

This article explores a particular pattern of wartime violence, the relative absence of sexual violence on the part of many armed groups. This neglected fact has important policy implications: If some groups do not engage in sexual violence, then rape is not inevitable in war as is sometimes claimed, and there are stronger grounds for holding responsible those groups that do engage in sexual violence. After developing a theoretical framework for understanding the observed variation in wartime sexual violence, the article (...) analyzes the puzzling absence of sexual violence on the part of the secessionist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam of Sri Lanka. (shrink)

Novalis. Kant Studies (1797). Introduced, translated from the German, by David W. Wood. In: Philosophical Forum 32 (2001): 323-338.

This article reports a study of how leading U.S. business schools incorporate one important dimension of corporate citizenship—corporate involvement in community economic development (CI/CED)—in their curricula and programs. Corporate citizenship, or social responsibility, is shown to have several important and unexpected locations in business education. In addition, the authors develop a rationale forwhy and howspecific topics such as CI/CED as well as the general topic of corporate citizenship are appropriate for business school attention.

Screening for dementia and mild cognitive impairment (MCI) in community-based settings helps connect vulnerable older adults to medical and social support services promoting well-being. Referencing a universal screening program for unhoused older adults seeking emergency shelter services as a case example, this paper calls attention to alignment of programmatic features with the four principles of biomedical ethics, beneficence, nonmaleficence, autonomy, and justice. Regarding beneficence, homeless services workers gain insight into clients’ needs and can facilitate engagement with resources to aid in (...) their successful exiting of homelessness. Using assessment findings to promote safety in shelter environments incorporates nonmaleficence. Concerning autonomy, by choosing to share screening results with healthcare providers and other human service stakeholders such as public safety officials and social service professionals, older adults are empowered to take charge of their care. Justice is embodied by the ability to influence policy changes related to homelessness prevention and equitable distribution of health resources. (shrink)

How might experimental media art help theorise what falls by the wayside in the digital public sphere? Working in the years immediately following the launch of YouTube in 2005, some media artists centred their creative praxis towards the end of that decade upon rescuing, revalorising, and placing back into digital circulation audiovisual media formats and technologies that appeared aged or obsolete. Although there may be a degree of nostalgia behind such practices, these artworks articulate a cogent critique of the drive (...) towards constant innovation that was responsible for the invention and global expansion of cinema, but in recent decades has been responsible for its decay—or, perhaps more accurately, for its perpetual transformation. The article explores this 'media-archaeology' sensibility as a way of thinking about AI more widely: an approach that sees histories of media not as a linear, chronological search for origins, but as a critical recovery of artefacts lodged discontinuously in multiple layers of the past. Although digital technologies form a central part of the creative process of the artists considered in this article, their works also act as a critical conscience about digital change, asking what the so-called digital revolution is leaving out, and leaving behind. In so doing, it illuminates some potential positive and negative impacts of digital technologies' mediation of new forms of public engagement, whether in art, archives, or on social media. (shrink)

The German Aufklärung was only one of at least three distinct Eighteenth Century Movements we now call ‘the Enlightenment’. But what is enlightenment? This question was posed in a Berlin journal in 1783 and answered in the same journal a year later by two of the movement’s leading representatives: Moses Mendelssohn and Immanuel Kant. Kant’s answer, which is expounded in this essay, changed the understanding of the movement. Kant sees enlightenment not as only a development of intellect but a liberation (...) of mind and character from the authority of others that keeps us all, at least to some extent, from thinking for ourselves. But Kant holds that thinking for oneself requires communication with others and searching for an intellectual standpoint that is valid for all. It is a process that is never completed. We are all to some degree in need of enlightenment. And Kant’s call for enlightenment is as urgent today as it was in his own age. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Hayek's reputation has gone through a remarkable cycle. An eminent exponent of the Austrian theory of business cycles in the 1930s, he was worsted in the controversy over Keynes' _Treatise on Money_. Following this defeat, Hayek retreated into capital theory, an esoteric branch of economics in which few economists then took an active interest. He gave up economics altogether after the war and turned to psychology, political philosophy, philosophy of law and the history of ideas. However, in 1974 he won (...) the Nobel Prize and returned to mainstream economics as a leading critic of Keynesianism and an advocate of free banking as the answer to inflation. Today Hayek reigns supreme as the kind of moral philosopher and political economist that economics has not seen since Adam Smith. Also forthcoming in this series is _Paul A. Samuelson, 2nd Series_. (shrink)

The philosophy of science embraces the metaphysical, epistemological and methodological problems which arise in the study of the special sciences and perhaps no branch of the philosophy of science is more deserving of careful investigation than the borderline discipline between philosophy and scientific psychology. The philosophical problems resulting from the impact of psychology upon philosophy include such traditional problems as the existence, nature and origin of consciousness, the relation of the conscious to the unconscious and subconscious mind, the nature and (...) continuity of the self, and the relation of consciousness to its neural conditions. All these problems originate in empirical psychology and are soluble, if at all, only by appeal to psychological evidence and thus through the cooperative efforts of the philosopher and the psychologist. Unfortunately the gulf between philosophers and psychologists is as wide if not wider than that which exists between philosophers and other groups of scientists. The chief obstacle to a philosophical psychology is the alienation of psychology from philosophy which followed the attainment by psychology of its status as an independent science. Psychology as a young and vigorous science, revolting against the parental restraint of philosophy, utterly repudiated philosophy and philosophical modes of thought and, at the same time, philosophy on its side breathed a sigh of relief to be rid of a difficult and recalcitrant offspring. Thus psychological science became more hostile to philosophy than her elder sister sciences, and philosophy went its own speculative way in utter disregard of scientific psychology. Indeed “Psychologismus” has become among philosophers a term of such severe reproach that to refute a philosophical position in certain quarters one need only demonstrate that it is psychological in its origin and foundation. Thus the revolt of psychology against philosophy, natural and inevitable though it was, has been so violent and prolonged as to be detrimental to both psychology and philosophy alike. (shrink)

First published in 1992. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 1994. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The debate between Jurgen Habermas and Charles Taylor is reflective of the enduring conflict between liberal philosophy with its emphasis upon freedom, equality, and legal rights, and Aristotelianism with its accent upon the cultivation of virtue, personal responsibility and shared notions of the Good. Though grounded in opposite ends of the philosophical spectrum, both men remain critical of the burgeoning effects of instrumental rationality and the social atomization and anomie it continues to generate; both understand the extent to which the (...) self is a social construct and the role of interpersonal intersubjectivity in the development of their individual and collective identities; both argue for the centrality of certain goods in maintaining a minimal degree of social cohesion; and both affirm that the crucial feature of human life is communication and its dialogical character. ;To overcome the adverse manifestations of our positivistic ethos with its over-reliance upon purposive-instrumental reason, each has responded with a countervailing notion of rationality---"phronesis" or Aristotelian practical reason for Taylor and "communicative reason" for Habermas. Each's choice of reason has led to profound differences in their respective notions of the self as well as fundamental incongruities in their moral and political philosophies. In the interest of preserving the autonomy and integrity of the individual while yet affirming universal justice, Habermas argues for the formalism of a "proceduralistic" ethics. Taylor, on the other hand, advocates a "substantialist" one, a communal ethics that arises from out of people's deepest moral intuitions; an ethics bound up with historical values and ideals that stresses the cultivation of virtue and shared notions of the common good. ;I argue that although Habermas's "communicative action" with its focus upon intersubjective communication helps to bridge the competing philosophies of communitarianism and classical liberalism, a basic incommensurability still persists. However, rather than being mutually exclusive, there needs to be a creative, dialectical tension maintained between them whereby each continues to inform and influence the other. In this way, a postmodern ethics rooted in dialogue and communication can be constructed which maintains people's integrity and autonomy while similarly addressing their multiple needs and concerns, but also an ethics grounded in one's deepest moral intuitions which remains sensitive to the concrete, historical, and particularistic distinctions which differentiate their identities. (shrink)

First published in 2004. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.