Duncan Pritchard has recently defended a view he calls ‘epistemological disjunctivism’, largely inspired by John McDowell. I argue that Pritchard is right to associate the view with McDowell, and that McDowell’s ‘inference-blocking’ argument against the sceptic succeeds only if epistemological disjunctivism is accepted. However, Pritchard also recognises that epistemological disjunctivism appears to conflict with our belief that genuine and illusory experiences are indistinguishable (the ‘distinguishability problem’). Since the indistinguishability of experiences is the antecedent in the inference McDowell intends to block, (...) I suggest that his argument rests on an inconsistent set of premises. In support of this, I show that Pritchard’s response to the distinguishability problem is incompatible with the conclusion of the ‘inference-blocking’ argument, and that the response available in McDowell’s work relies on a mistaken conception of fallibility. Either McDowell must deny the sceptic’s premise that perceptual experiences are indistinguishable, or he must give up his conclusion that perceptual warrant can be indefeasible. (shrink)

They say that argumentative writing skills are best learned through writing argumentative essays. I say that while this is excellent practice for argumentative writing, an important exercise to practice structuring such essays and build critical thinking skills simultaneously is what I call the four-sentence paper. The exercise has the template They say..., I say..., one might object..., I reply... One might object that the assignment oversimplifies argumentative writing, stifles creativity, promotes an adversarial attitude, or that students can’t consider objections well (...) anyway. I reply that a simplified form of argumentative writing is fine for beginners, especially since the template is ubiquitous in philosophy; that any assignment template has room for creativity; that considering objections is consistent with good manners; and that despite some pitfalls of trying to defend a thesis and consider objections, students are capable of considering objections well with proper instruction and practice. (shrink)

This book offers an array of important perspectives on Kant and nonconceptualism from some of the leading scholars in current Kant studies. As well as discussing the various arguments surrounding Kantian nonconceptualism, the book provides broad insight into the theory of perception, philosophy of mind, philosophy of mathematics, epistemology, and aesthetics. His idealism aside, Kantian nonconceptualism is the most topical contemporary issue in Kant’s theoretical philosophy. In this collection of specially commissioned essays, major players in the current debate, including Robert (...) Hanna and Lucy Allais, engage with each other and with the broader literature in the field addressing all the important aspects of Kantian nonconceptualism. Among other topics, the authors analyse the notion of intuition and the conditions of its generation, Kant’s theory of space, including his pre-Critical view of space, the relation between nonconceptualism and the Transcendental Deduction, and various challenges to both conceptualist and nonconceptualist interpretations of Kant. Two further chapters explore a prominent Hegelian conceptualist reading of Kant and Kant’s nonconceptualist position in the Third Critique. The volume also contains a helpful survey of the recent literature on Kant and nonconceptual content. Kantian Nonconceptualism provides a comprehensive overview of recent perspectives on Kant and nonconceptual content, and will be a key resource for Kant scholars and philosophers interested in the topic of nonconceptualism. (shrink)

Democracy is prone to what may be called presentism – a bias in the laws in favor of present over future generations. I identify the characteristics of democracies that lead to presentism, and examine the reasons that make it a serious problem. Then I consider why conventional theories are not adequate to deal with it, and develop a more satisfactory alternative approach, which I call democratic trusteeship. Present generations can represent future generations by acting as trustees of the democratic process. (...) The general principle is that present generations should act to protect the democratic process itself over time. They should try to make sure that future citizens continue to have competent control over their collective decision‐making. (shrink)

For any normative domain, we can theorize about what is good in that domain. Such theories include utilitarianism, a view about what is good morally. But there are many domains other than the moral; these include the prudential, the aesthetic, and the intellectual or epistemic. In this last domain, it is good to be knowledgeable and bad to ignore evidence, quite apart from the morality, prudence, and aesthetics of these things. This dissertation builds a theory that stands to the epistemic (...) domain as utilitarianism stands to the moral domain. It builds an epistemic value theory. (shrink)

Textbooks present classical particle and field physics as theories of physical systems situated in Newtonian absolute space. This absolute space has an influence on the evolution of physical processes, and can therefore be seen as a physical system itself; it is substantival. It turns out to be possible, however, to interpret the classical theories in another way. According to this rival interpretation, spatiotemporal position is a property of physical systems, and there is no substantival spacetime. The traditional objection that such (...) a relationist view could not cope with the existence of inertial effects and other manifestations of the causal efficacy of spacetime can be answered successfully. According to the new point of view, the spacetime manifold of classical physics is a purely representational device. It represents possible locations of physical objects or events; but these locations are physical properties inherent in the physical objects or events themselves and having no existence independently of them. In relativistic quantum field theory the physical meaning of the spacetime manifold becomes even less tangible. Not only does the manifold lose its status as a substantival container, but also its function as a representation of spacetime properties possessed by physical systems becomes problematic. 'Space and time' become ordering parameters in the web of properties of physical systems. They seem to regain their traditional meaning only in the non-relativistic limit in which the classical particle concept becomes approximately applicable. (shrink)

In this paper I reply to the critiques of my recent book *Kant's Radical Subjectivism* by Andrew Brook, Anil Gomes, Robert Howell and Alexandra Newton.

Schopenhauer’s bifurcation between optimistic and pessimistic religions is made, so I argue here, by means of five criteria: to perceive of existence as punishment, to believe that salvation is not attained through ‘works’, to preach compassion so as to lead towards ascetics, to manifest an aura of mystery around religious doctrines and to, at some deep level, admit to the allegorical nature of religious creeds. By clearly showing what makes up the ‘pessimism’ of a ‘pessimistic religion’, Schopenhauer’s own philosophical pessimism (...) can be clarified since he posits a strict correlation between the truth of philosophy and religion. Accordingly, Schopenhauer’s pessimism is by means of this process clarified as non-radical and providing a genuine ‘highest good’ that is more than absolute denial. (shrink)

The suggestion that particles of the same kind may be indistinguishable in a fundamental sense, even so that challenges to traditional notions of individuality and identity may arise, has first come up in the context of classical statistical mechanics. In particular, the Gibbs paradox has sometimes been interpreted as a sign of the untenability of the classical concept of a particle and as a premonition that quantum theory is needed. This idea of a ‘quantum connection’ stubbornly persists in the literature, (...) even though it has also been criticized frequently. Here we shall argue that although this criticism is justified, the proposed alternative solutions have often been wrong and have not put the paradox in its right perspective. In fact, the Gibbs paradox is unrelated to fundamental issues of particle identity; only distinguishability in a pragmatic sense plays a role , and in principle the paradox always is there as long as the concept of a particle applies at all. In line with this we show that the paradox survives even in quantum mechanics, in spite of the quantum mechanical symmetrization postulates. (shrink)

I argue that there is natural relationist interpretation of Newtonian and relativistic non-quantum physics. Although relationist, this interpretation does not fall prey to the traditional objections based on the existence of inertial effects.

While the roots of the common law of restitution reach back hundreds of years, the idea that it constitutes a domain of private law was first clearly articulated in the American Law Institute’s Restatement of Restitution in 1932. The U.S. was at the forefront of development in the law of restitution but interest has declined. Recently John Langbein offered an explanation, first in terms of law and economics and then through legal realism. Realism, by Langbein’s estimation, has exacted “a terrible (...) toll” on doctrinal study in the postwar period. One of the principal aims of The Law and Ethics of Restitution, Hanoch Dagan writes, is to disprove this claim. Realism, properly understood, is supportive of doctrine and, he argues, in this context, provides a better account of the law than the prevailing view. This book is a challenging and important work not only in the law of restitution but also in legal theory. My main interest in this Critical Notice is to ask whether the kind of justification for liability in restitution Dagan offers is compelling. While part of what separates Dagan from Langbein is their understanding of legal realism, I take Dagan to be right on this point, and ask whether he’s made the case in favour of a realist account of restitution. I do that by considering two examples of the doctrinal analyses that form the bulk of the book: first by outlining a pair of issues on which Dagan takes a position by setting up the question he aims to ask, and then by considering his rejection of the view to which>The Law and Ethics of Restitutionoffers an alternative. (shrink)

Many important issues in economic and political science can be adequately analyzed under the assumption that individuals are certain about the consequences of their actions, possess perfect information. Many cannot, however, and models that incorporate uncertainty and asymmetric information have become increasingly popular over the last fifty years or so.

Using data from user comments to the official social networking account of the Hubei Red Cross Foundation on a participatory web platform, this study attends to the offensive and hateful comments produced by ordinary Internet users to blame the elite authorities for their malfeasance in managing the donation during the COVID-19 in China. Drawing on Discursive Psychology, we focus on the rhetorical strategies that users employ to legitimise their actions as well-founded evidential blame against a norm-breaking act rather than radical (...) extremist speech. The associated hatred among discussants are moral, social judgements. That said, hate speech also helps construct the moral standards of a normalised society. (shrink)

In den Gesellschaftsdiagnosen soziologischer wie feuilletonistischer Provenienz spielt die Angst eine zentrale Rolle. So zeichnet etwa Heinz Bude in seiner Diagnose einer Gesellschaft der Angst ein buntes Spektrum insbesondere sozialer Abstiegs- und Exklusionsängste, die sich seit der Nachkriegszeit vervielfacht und zu einer diffusen sozialen Grundbefindlichkeit erzeugt hätten. Das Aufstiegsversprechen des deutschen Sozialstaates habe sich in eine latente Drohung prekärer Existenz verkehrt und vor dem Hintergrund der umfassenden Zurückverwiesenheit der Individuen auf sich selbst zur Entstehung einer Gesellschaft geführt, in der Angst (...) den größten gemeinsamen Nenner aller Mitglieder bilde. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the principle of respect for autonomy can serve as the basis for laws that significantly limit conduct, including orders mandating isolation and quarantine. This thesis is fundamentally at odds with an overwhelming consensus in contemporary bioethics that the principle of respect for autonomy, while important in everyday clinical encounters, must be 'curtailed', 'constrained', or 'overridden' by other principles in times of crisis. I contend that bioethicists have embraced an indefensibly 'thin' notion of autonomy that (...) uproots the concept from its foundations in Kantian ethics. According to this thin conception, respect for autonomy, if unconditioned by competing principles (beneficence, justice, non-maleficence) would give competent adults the right to do anything they desired to do so long as they satisfied certain baseline psychological conditions. I argue that the dominant 'principlist' model of bioethical reasoning depends on this thin view of autonomy and show how it deprives us of powerful analytical tools that would help us to think seriously about the foundations of human rights, justice, and law. Then, I offer a brief sketch of a 'thick', historically grounded notion of autonomy and show what we could gain by taking it seriously. (shrink)

The paper uses Heideggerian concepts of world to contrast the lived environment of the animal in the wild to nature as [re]constructed through Geographical Information Systems (GIS). With the animal Umwelt and GIS Weltbilt/Ge-stell side by side, we can see the “contradiction” between the animal’s lived space and the techno-human space of GIS, appreciate the risk of the GIS-constructed world to animals in the wild, and seek a way to address the risk. The paper suggests that humans, as beings which (...) properly have a world, can stand as fiduciaries for nonhuman animals in relation to the peculiar risk of geospatial environmental management technology. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzsche-Studien Jahrgang: 44 Heft: 1 Seiten: 553-568.

Ethics Introduced: Readings in Moral Philosophy in an anthology that provides students with foundational knowledge in moral philosophy by exposing them to a variety of classical and contemporary readings in ethical theory and application. The anthology is divided into four parts. In Part 1, students learn about meta-ethics and question the status of moral truths through selections by Nietzsche, Ruth Benedict, and Smith. In Part 2, the question of what we should value most is addressed through readings on hedonism, Aristotelian (...) Virtue Ethics, Confucianism, and Buddhism. Part 3 focuses on normative ethics, diving into theories such as egoism, divine command theory, utilitarianism, Kantianism, care ethics, and more. Part 4 rounds out the anthology by helping students think through moral problems and contemporary controversies. Readings in this section address death and dying, abortion, war, treatment of animals and the environment, and the nature of moral obligations to people in need. Throughout the text, each reading is supported by an introduction, study questions, and suggestions for further reading and exploration to inspire critical thinking and additional analysis. Ethics Introduced is ideal for introductory ethics courses and can also be used in comparative religion, philosophy, and humanities courses. Dennis Arjo earned his B.A. in philosophy from the University of California, Santa Cruz, M.A. in philosophy from University of Colorado, and Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is a professor of philosophy at Johnson County Community College, where he teaches introduction to philosophy, ethics, ancient philosophy, and Asian philosophy. Omar Conrad earned his B.A. in sociology, his M.A. in sociology, and his M.A. in philosophy from the University of Kansas. He is a professor of philosophy at Johnson County Community College, where he teaches introduction to philosophy, ethics, logic and critical thinking, and philosophy of religion. Dawn Gale earned her B.A. in philosophy and psychology from the University of Wisconsin, Madison, her graduate certificate in women and gender studies, and her M.A. in philosophy from the University of Kansas. She is a professor of philosophy at Johnson County Community College, where she teaches introduction to philosophy, ethics, environmental ethics, and logic and critical thinking. (shrink)

Talk at University of Turin, 'Kant, oltre Kant, May 5th 2023. --- -/- It is useful, while keeping in mind a holistic approach, to concentrate on a common theme in Kant’s text, which it will turn out is the quintessential element of his novel ‘way of thinking’, as he himself put it in preface of the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. This common theme is the idea of synthesis, which is what holds together, and is the entryway (...) to, all the other familiar aspects of Kant’s thought: his concept of self-consciousness or how mind is involved in cognition, his ideas about the role of the imagination, his theory of knowledge and his metaphysics of experience, and not unimportantly, its relation to what is probably the most Kantian element here: the categories of the understanding as the first principles of knowledge. But the meaning of synthesis and its role in its various facets, though frequently the subject of discussion in papers and monographs alike, is hardly understood in contemporary Kant scholarship. Most readings of the text of the Deduction, the part in which Kant elucidates his concept of synthesis, exhibit a shallow, mechanical understanding of it. -/- A compounding factor is that synthesis can’t really be understood independently of the other aforementioned elements of Kant’s thought. Grasping the meaning of synthesis implies coming to grips with his concept of self-consciousness and the way both self-consciousness and the categories are intricately and intimately involved. Most interpretations consider these aspects too much as if they were indeed separable faculties or entities that serve separable functions, undercutting an important feature of Kant’s metaphysics: the possibility of a priori unified cognition, for which an indivisible self-legislating subject is responsible. Rather, they are expressions of various aspects of a singular function of the mind as the ground of possible unified knowledge. -/- One striking example of such a superficial reading of the text is the way the relation between figurative synthesis and intellectual synthesis—or in the case of the A-Deduction the threefold synthesis—is standardly interpreted, as if the two are independent or quasi-independent functions of different faculties of the mind, the imagination and the understanding. In this paper, I focus on the relation between figurative and intellectual synthesis, while arguing that failing to understand this properly, indeed the relation between the imagination and the understanding, leads to a vicious regress in the explanation of the ground of knowledge, for which a priori synthesis is specifically designed. In other words, failing to see the intimate relation between the imagination and the understanding, the very identity that lies at their root, risks losing sight of the primary aim of Kant’s thought: the possibility of a priori unified knowledge. (shrink)

In De Mysteriis VIII Iamblichus gives two orderings of first principles, one in purely Neoplatonic terms drawn from his own philosophical system, and the other in the form of several Egyptian gods, glossed with Neoplatonic language again taken from his own system. The first ordering or taxis includes the Simple One and the One Existent, two of the elements of Iamblichus' realm of the One. The second taxis includes the Egyptian (H)eikton, which has now been identified with the god of (...) magic, Heka, glossed as the One Existent. The Egyptian god Kmeph is also a member of this taxis, and is the Egyptian Kematef, a god of creation associated with the solar Amun-Re. Iamblichus refers to this god also as the Hegemon of the celestial gods, which should be equated to Helios, specifically the noeric Helios as described by Julian in his Hymn to Helios. Iamblichus describes Kmeph as an “intellect knowing himself”, and so the noeric Kmeph/Helios should also be seen as the Paternal Demiurgic Zeus, explicitly described also by Proclus as an intellect knowing himself. This notion of a self-thinking intellect may offer a solution to the problematic formulation by Proclus in his Timaeus commentary of Iamblichus' view of the Demiurgy encompassing all the noeric realm. The identification of Kmeph as the noeric Helios now also allows the first direct parallels to de Mysteriis to be found in extant Hermetica. In addition it can be inferred from the specific Neoplatonic terminology employed that the noetic Father of Demiurges, Kronos, appears, as well as the secondary Demiurgic triad of Zeus, Poseidon, and Pluto, in the forms of the Egyptian Amun, Ptah, and Osiris, thus raising the question that much of the theology documented only in Proclus might appear already to have been established by Iamblichus. (shrink)

No man can live without ideas, for every human action, internal or external, is of necessity enacted by virtue of certain ideas. In these ideas a man believes; they guide his actions, and ultimately his whole life. Study of these ideas and principles is one of the distinctive tasks of the history of philosophy. But were we to restrict the field of interest of the history of philosophy to a mere detached academic "cataloguing" of past ideas, the history of philosophy (...) itself would have joined long ago the interminable line of barren catalogued ideas. The study of the wisdom of past ages, however, is very much alive. Not only is it alive, but in the words ot Wilhelm Dilthey: "What man is, he learns through history. "l Thus, the culture of every generation is inevitably related, whether thetically or antithetically, to the previous one, and the politi cal and economic struggles of any present are always the consequences of an earlier and perhaps even fiercer battle of ideas. I t is imperative to know the history of the philosophies that nourish the present if we wish to know ourselves and the world about us. The Socratic call to self-knowledge is as indispensable a condition of a truly human existence today as it was in the fifth century B. C. (shrink)

Those who invoke the word self-deception to represent one phenomenon often argue that those who use it to represent another are misusing the construct. Better to recognize that self-deception is a fuzzy concept that may be used to represent a variety of mental processes and states, and to direct our energy toward distinguishing empirically among its forms and functions.

Representationalism emerges unscathed from Pessoa et al.'s attack. They fail to undermine a key reason for its influence: it has the theoretical resources to explain many illusory visual experiences such as illusory contours and features. Furthermore, in attempting to undermine representationalism, the authors seem to erect an unduly inflated distinction between neural accounts of perception and personal-level accounts of perception.

Currently there is considerable interest in the notion that dorsal and ventral visual systems might differ in their specializations for thought and action. Behavior invariably involves multiple processes such as perception, judgment, and response execution. It is not clear that characteristics of the dorsal and ventral processing streams, as described by Norman, are entirely of a perceptual nature.

El presente artículo reconstruye la lectura fenomenológica del autor contemporáneo francés Jean-Luc Marion de las Confesiones de San Agustín, en su libro Au lieu de soi. Marion se presenta como un filósofo que busca llevar la filosofía más allá de la ontología, en particular a través de una fenomenología de la donación. La donación se caracteriza por una triple desaparición: la del donatario, la del donador, y finalmente lo dado. El uso de la metáfora del espacio muestra la apariencia de (...) dos espacios vacíos, relacionado por un movimiento múltiple. El artículo concluye con algunoscuestionamientos acerca de la desaparición del yo y de Dios en la lectura de las Confesiones. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:OBJECTIVITY AND RELlGIOUS TRUTH: A COMPARISON OF WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH AND BERNARD LONERGAN DENNIS M. DOYLE University of Dayton Dayton, Ohio WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH •and Bernard Lonergan both propose a new agenda for theology n response to ;the same basic cultura.I developments.1 Both Smith and Lonergan pinpoint the crux of the current siturution!aJS the convergence of various cultures in a world where Western culture had.been heM by its (...) pwrticiipants to be univers•al.and normrutive. The majo'l" problem concerning religious truth :that 1 arises out of this situation concerns universality. Formulrutions tha:t were once taken for granted are now seen to he relative to their context. Concepts that it.T1anscend particular formulations are themselves recognized irus indigenous to 1a culture. T·ruth itself is questioned as to whether it too is not!l'elative to eaich oontert. The responses of Smith and Lonergan to this situa:tion are remarkably ·similar in structure. In the midst of these similarities, 1 however, arise some differences with important implications concerning oibjectivity, itruth, and theology in a global context. Objec:tivity, Method, and Human Knowledge Smith and Lonergan both 'address rthe issue of human knowing before establishing their programs for theo1 logy.2 For botih, 1 Smith's proposal is put forth in Towards a World Theology (Phila.: Westminster Press, 1981 )• Lonergan's proposal can be found in Method in Theology (N.Y.: Herder and Herder, 1972). 2 Smith's reflections on human knowing are in "Objectivity and the Humane Sciences,'' in Towards a World Theology, pp. 56·80'. Lonergan's 461 462 DENNIS M. DOYLE a major problem in wayis of conceiving human knowing in recent centuries has heen an ohjectivism according to which knowledge was iheld to he absolute without regard to human SUJbjectivity and without an openness to other cultures. Both find a £acile cultural remtivism to he.an unsatisfactory reaction to this problem. In response, :both Smith and Lonergan try to re-root human knowing in a human conte:rl. Lonergan does ·this hy establishing the ground of knowing in an analysis of human intentionality. Smith does this by estaiblishing the ground of knowing in a mutual interchange between persons who participate in some traditions and who are observers of other traditions. Smith la.bels such knowing ·a" 001·iporaite critica1 self-iconsciousness." What emerges from such consciousness is "humane knowledge." Although some major di:ffevences arise at this point, the context of istructul'lal similarities must he noted.3 For hoth Smith and Lonergan, hruman knowing is intrinsically connected with :the quality of living both individually and oommullla1ly. Eiach in his own way stresses that knowing is vitally linked to the consciousness of individuals. Each in his own way stresses that knowing takes place within ·community, and that the breadth and quality of the community affects the breadth and quality of the knowing. Smith •and Lonergan both, furthermore, envision the taisk of theology as the conceptualization and articulation in a new context of wihat was once known in a strictly objective, theoretical f:vame;work. Both, finailily, 'lay ouit the major work on human knowing is Insight: A Study of Human Understo;nding (N.Y.: Philosophical Library, 1957). For a summary view, see chapter one of Method in Theology. For Lonergan's position on objectivity, see "The Origins of Christian Realism" in A Second Collection (Phila.: Westminster Press, 1974), ·pp. 239-61. a For an earlier comparison of the methods of Smith and Lonergan, see Walter E. Conn, "'Faith' and 'Cumulative Tradition' in Functional Specialization : A Study in the Methodologies of Wilfred Cantwell Smith and Bernard Lonergan," Studies in ReligiOn/Soiences Religieuses 5 (1975/76) : 221-46•.Although this article was published before several of Smith's major works in the area, the methodological similarities unearthed by Conn still hold true. WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH & BERNARD LONERGAN 463 problem specifically in terms of tmnscending false subject/object :dichotomies. At this point, however, differences between Smith and Lonwgian begin to emerge, foir each attempts to transcend false.suibjoot/oibject dichotomies in a different way. Lonergan holds that objectivity is the fruit of authentic ;subjectivity.4 1t is intended hy the self-transcending subject who loves... (shrink)