Numerous philosophical theories of joint agency and its intentional structure have been developed in the past few decades. These theories have offered accounts of joint agency that appeal to higher-level states that are?shared? in some way. These accounts have enhanced our understanding of joint agency, yet there are a number of lower-level cognitive phenomena involved in joint action that philosophers rarely acknowledge. In particular, empirical research in cognitive science has revealed that when individuals engage in a joint activity such as (...) conversation or joint problem solving, they become aligned at multiple levels. We argue that this phenomenon of alignment is crucial to understanding joint actions and should be integrated with philosophical approaches. In this paper, we sketch a possible integration, and draw out its implications for understanding of joint agency and collective intentionality. The result is a process-based, dynamic account of joint action that integrates both low-level and high-level states, and seeks to capture the separate processes of how a joint action is initiated and sustained. (shrink)

Germund Hesslow has argued recently [2] that a probabilistic theory of causality as advocated by Patrick Suppes [4] has two problems that a deterministic theory avoids. In this paper, I argue that Suppes' probabilistic causal calculus is free of each of these problems and, moreover, that several broader issues raised by Hesslow's discussion tend to support a probabilistic conception of causes.

There are different narratives on mathematics as part of our world, some of which are more appropriate than others. Such narratives might be of the form ‘Mathematics is useful’, ‘Mathematics is beautiful’, or ‘Mathematicians aim at theorem-credit’. These narratives play a crucial role in mathematics education and in society as they are influencing people’s willingness to engage with the subject or the way they interpret mathematical results in relation to real-world questions; the latter yielding important normative considerations. Our strategy is (...) to frame current narratives of mathematics from a virtue-theoretic perspective. We identify the practice of mathematizing, put forward by Freudenthal’s ‘Realistic mathematics education’, as virtuous and use it to evaluate different narratives. We show that this can help to render the narratives more adequately, and to provide implications for societal organization. (shrink)

Situationist research in social psychology focuses on the situational factors that influence behavior. Doris and Harman argue that this research has powerful implications for ethics, and virtue ethics in particular. First, they claim that situationist research presents an empirical challenge to the moral psychology presumed within virtue ethics. Second, they argue that situationist research supports a theoretical challenge to virtue ethics as a foundation for ethical behavior and moral development. I offer a response from moral psychology using an interpretation of (...) Xunzi—a Confucian virtue ethicist from the Classical period. This Confucian account serves as a foil to the situationist critique in that it uncovers many problematic ontological and normative assumptions at work in this debate regarding the prediction and explanation of behavior, psychological posits, moral development, and moral education. Xunzi’s account of virtue ethics not only responds to the situationist empirical challenge by uncovering problematic assumptions about moral psychology, but also demonstrates that it is not a separate empirical hypothesis. Further, Xunzi’s virtue ethic responds to the theoretical challenge by offering a new account of moral development and a ground for ethical norms that fully attends to situational features while upholding robust character traits. (shrink)

Adorno and Foucault are among the 20th century’s most renowned social critics but little work has been done to compare their ideas about the activity of critique. ‘Adorno, Foucault and Critique’ attempts to fill this lacuna. It takes as its starting point the Kantian legacy that informs Adorno’s and Foucault’s notions of critique, or their ‘ontologies of the present’, as Foucault calls them. Exploring the ontological foundations of critique, the article then addresses the principal objects of critique: domination and fascism. (...) It ends with a comparative account of the central aims of Adorno’s and Foucault’s critiques of western societies. (shrink)

Background: Ethical issues are increasingly being reported by care-providers; however, little is known about the nature of these issues within the nursing home. Ethical issues are unavoidable in healthcare and can result in opportunities for improving work and care conditions; however, they are also associated with detrimental outcomes including staff burnout and moral distress. Objectives: The purpose of this review was to identify prior research which focuses on ethical issues in the nursing home and to explore staffs’ experiences of ethical (...) issues. Methods: Using a systematic approach based on Aveyard (2014), a literature review was conducted which focused on ethical and moral issues, nurses and nursing assistants, and the nursing home. Findings: The most salient themes identified in the review included clashing ethical principles, issues related to communication, lack of resources and quality of care provision. The review also identified solutions for overcoming the ethical issues that were identified and revealed the definitional challenges that permeate this area of work. Conclusions: The review highlighted a need for improved ethics education for care-providers. (shrink)

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has repeatedly been described as an “essentially contested concept,” which means that its signification is subject to continuous struggle. We argue that the “CSR institution” (CSRI; i.e., the set of standards and rules regulating corporate conduct under the banner of CSR) is legitimized by narratives which “decontest” the underlying concept of CSR in a manner that safeguards the CSRI from calls for alternative institutional arrangements. Examining several such narratives from a structuralist perspective, we find them to (...) be permeated with six recurrent ambiguities that we show to be reflective of three deep-set taboos: the taboo of the noncongruency between corporate profit objectives and societal needs, the taboo of multinational firms’ continued contribution to the emergence of global socioenvironmental issues, and the taboo of the CSRI’s moderate results in solving these problems. We contend that the perpetuation of these taboos contributes to inhibiting substantial change in the way of doing business, and we sketch out possibilities for initiating a “recontestation” of CSR’s meaning. (shrink)

Despite eschewing the utility of ends or purposes in natural philosophy, Descartes frequently engages in functional explanation, which many have assumed is an essentially teleological form of explanation. This article considers the consistency of Descartes's appeal to natural functions, advancing the idea that he is utilizing a non-normative, non-teleological form of functional explanation. It will be argued that Cartesian functional analysis resembles modern causal functional analysis, and yet, by emphasizing the interdependency of parts of biological systems, is able to avoid (...) many of the problems attendant upon modern causal theories. It is for this reason, if no other, that the study of Descartes's natural philosophy should be of interest to contemporary theorists of functional analysis. (shrink)

Recent discussions of rational deliberation in science present us with two extremes: unbounded optimism and sober pessimism. Helen Longino (1990) sees rational deliberation as the foundation of scientific objectivity. Miriam Solomon (1991) thinks it is overrated. Indeed, she has recently argued (2006) that group deliberation is detrimental to empirical success because it often involves groupthink and the suppression of dissent. But we need not embrace either extreme. To determine the value of rational deliberation we need to look more closely at (...) the practice and practitioners of science. I offer a closer look here by exploring the joint agency of small research teams. Although there are factors that contribute to the suppression of dissent in group contexts, a closer look at the literature on group dynamics suggests that there are ways to mitigate the effects of groupthink. Thus, there is reason to be cautiously optimistic about the value of rational deliberation within certain scientific contexts. (shrink)

Much light has been shed on important features of teaching and learning by Alasdair MacIntyre's writings. Yet there are experiences that are crucial to teaching and learning that are unaddressed in MacIntyre's arguments; experiences that reveal education as a distinctive kind of practice. This paper examines one kind of such experience: an experience I call ‘being pulled up short’. Drawing on the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Gerald L. Bruns, I analyse an example of teaching King Lear to argue that (...) being pulled up short is a unique experience of disorientation that cannot be taught merely by pedagogical skill, including the modern tools and approaches provided by constructivist learning theory and meta-cognition. The paper concludes by identifying challenges that being pulled up short poses for the education of disposition, and for the aims and activities of teaching. (shrink)

An important theme to have emerged from the new experimentalist movement is that much of actual scientific practice deals not with appraising full-blown theories but with the manifold local tasks required to arrive at data, distinguish fact from artifact, and estimate backgrounds. Still, no program for working out a philosophy of experiment based on this recognition has been demarcated. I suggest why the new experimentalism has come up short, and propose a remedy appealing to the practice of standard error statistics. (...) I illustrate a portion of my proposal using Galison's experimental narrative on neutral currents. (shrink)

Trust is frequently discussed with reference to the professional–patient relationship. However, trust is less explored in relation to the ways in which understanding of, and responses to, questions of ethics are discussed by both the “public” and “experts.” Public engagement activity in healthcare ethics may invoke “trust” in analysing a moral question or problem but less frequently conceives of trust as integral to “public engagement” itself. This paper explores the relationship between trust and the ways in which questions of healthcare (...) ethics are identified and negotiated by both “experts” and the public. Drawing on two examples from the author’s “public engagement” work—a radio programme for the British Broadcasting Corporation and work with a playwright and theatre—the paper interrogates the ways in which “public engagement” is often characterized. The author argues that the common approach to public engagement in questions of ethics is unhelpfully constrained by a systemic disposition which continues to privilege the professional or expert voice at the expense of meaningful exchange and dialogue. By creating space for novel interactions between the “expert” and the “public,” authentic engagement is achieved that enables not only the participants to flourish but also contributes to trust itself. (shrink)

The status of independent statements is the main problem in the philosophy of set theory. We address this problem by presenting the perspective of a practising set theorist. We thus give an authentic insight in the current state of thinking in set-theoretic practice, which is to a large extent determined by independence results. During several meetings, the second author asked the first author about the development of forcing, the use of new axioms and set-theoretic intuition on independence. Parts of these (...) conversations are directly presented in this article. They are supplemented by important mathematical results as well as discussion sections. Finally, we present three hypotheses about set-theoretic practice: First, that most set theorists were surprised by the introduction of the forcing method. Second, that most set theorists think that forcing is a natural part of contemporary set theory. Third, that most set theorists prefer an answer to a problem with the help of a new axiom of lowest possible consistency strength, and that for most set theorists, a difference in consistency strength weighs much more than the difference between Forcing Axiom and Large Cardinal Axiom. (shrink)

Research on detrimental workplace behaviors has increased recently, predominantly focusing on justice issues. Research from the integrity testing literature, which is grounded in trait theory, has not received as much attention in the management literature. Trait theory, agency theory, and psychological contracts theory each have different predictions about employee performance that is harmful to the organization. While on the surface they appear contradictory, this paper describes how each can be integrated to increase our understanding of detrimental workplace behaviors.

: This paper focuses on Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia's philosophical views as exhibited in her early correspondence with René Descartes. Elisabeth's criticisms of Descartes's interactionism as well as her solution to the problem of mind-body interaction are examined in detail. The aim here is to develop a richer picture of Elisabeth as a philosophical thinker and to dispel the myth that she is simply a Cartesian muse.

Aristotle, pundits often say, has a 'nous'-body problem. The psychophysical account that succeeds in the case of other psychological faculties and activities, they charge, breaks down in the case of the intellect. One formulation of this difficulty claims that the definition of the soul given in 'De Anima' II.1 is incompatible with the account of 'nous' in 'De Anima' lll and elsewhere in the corpus. Indeed there are four psychological concepts that raise the 'nous'-body problem: the faculty for thought as (...) described in 'De Anima' III.4, the intellection of indivisible objects of thought in 'De Anima' III.6, the active intellect of 'De Anima' III.5 and the type of thinking likened to the activity of the divine mind in _Metaphysics<D> XII.6-8 and _Nicomachean Ethics<D> X.6-8. I consider each in turn and argue that Aristotle is on firmer ground here than is often believed. (shrink)

It is considered the right of children to have their pain managed effectively. Yet, despite extensive research findings, policy guidelines and practice standard recommendations for the optimal management of paediatric pain, clinical practices remain inadequate. Empirical evidence definitively shows that unrelieved pain in children has only harmful consequences, with no benefits. Contributing factors identified in this undermanaged pain include the significant role of nurses. Nursing attitudes and beliefs about children’s pain experiences, the relationships nurses share with children who are suffering, (...) and knowledge deficits in pain management practices are all shown to impact unresolved pain in children. In this article, a relational ethics perspective is used to explore the need for nurses to engage in authentic relationships with children who are experiencing pain, and to use evidence-based practices to manage that pain in order for this indefensible suffering of children to end. (shrink)

This article explores the temporal organization and manipulation of time in the production and presentation of news reports. Time is often cited as one of the most central organizing concepts of news production; indeed one of the major features of news reporting is the breaking of stories and the reporting of events `as they happen'. However, whilst much emphasis is placed upon time within media production, much of this pertains to the reporting of past and present events rather than the (...) reporting of the future. This article explores the future within news reporting through an examination of sequential events leading up to a main scheduled newsworthy event: the execution of Timothy McVeigh. It analyses how the production of `news' utilizes the future by relying upon prediction and speculation about what will happen and examines: how news can be seen to depend to a large degree on uncertainty for its value; the use of time frames within media reporting; and the way time is manipulated in the service of the recency and immediacy of news reporting. (shrink)

Cartwright argues for being a realist about theoretical entities but non-realist about theoretical laws. Her reason is that while the former involves causal explanation, the latter involves theoretical explanation; and inferences to causes, unlike inferences to theories, can avoid the redundancy objection--that one cannot rule out alternatives that explain the phenomena equally well. I sketch Cartwright's argument for inferring the most probable cause, focusing on Perrin's inference to molecular collisions as the cause of Brownian motion. I argue that either the (...) inference she describes fails to be a genuinely causal one, or else it too is open to the redundancy objection. However, I claim there is a way to sustain Cartwright's main insight: that it is possible to avoid the redundancy objection in certain cases of causal inference from experiments (e.g., Perrin). But, contrary to Cartwright, I argue that in those cases one is able to infer causes only by inferring some theoretical laws about how they produce experimental effects. (shrink)

Despite its widespread use in science, the Neyman-Pearson Theory of Statistics (NPT) has been rejected as inadequate by most philosophers of induction and statistics. They base their rejection largely upon what the author refers to as after-trial criticisms of NPT. Such criticisms attempt to show that NPT fails to provide an adequate analysis of specific inferences after the trial is made, and the data is known. In this paper, the key types of after-trial criticisms are considered and it is argued (...) that each fails to demonstrate the inadequacy of NPT because each is based on judging NPT on the grounds of a criterion that is fundamentally alien to NPT. As such, each may be seen to either misconstrue the aims of NPT, or to beg the question against it. (shrink)

Background: Palliative care is acknowledged as an appropriate approach to support older people in nursing homes. Ethical issues arise from many aspects of palliative care provision in nursing homes; however, they have not been investigated in this context. Aim: To explore the ethical issues associated with palliative care in nursing homes in the United Kingdom. Design: Exploratory, sequential, mixed-methods design. Methods: Semi-structured interviews with 13 registered nurses and 10 healthcare assistants (HCAs) working in 13 nursing homes in the United Kingdom (...) were used to explore ethical issues in palliative care. The ‘Ethical Issues in Palliative Care for Nursing Homes’ instrument was used to measure the frequency and level of distress arising from ethical issues through a cross-sectional survey with 69 registered nurses and 129 healthcare assistants. Data collection occurred between December 2014 and November 2015. Ethical considerations: Ethical approval was granted by Queen’s University’s School of Nursing and Midwifery Research Ethics Committee and governance sought from each nursing home’s manager. Findings: The interviews revealed three themes: ethical issues in practice; relational issues; and organisational issues. No significant differences between registered nurses and healthcare assistants were evident, confirming the patterns emerging from the interviews. Relational issues, primarily issues with residents and families, occurred most frequently and caused greater distress. Conclusion: The shared environment is key in the experience of ethical issues; therefore, multidisciplinary education is needed for ethical decision making in palliative care. Addressing staff knowledge and service organisation may reduce ethical issues locally and provide a benchmark for global change. (shrink)

Volume 33, Issue 1, January 2025, Page 189-194.

The aim of this article1 is to provide insight into the anthropological framework that could inform the pastoral and therapeutic care of those we encounter, professionally or in our personal lives, who experience same-sex attraction. Our question here is not whether or not persons are free to ignore the natural order but to consider how to minister to those who wish to engage in the struggle to conform themselves to it—or those whom we hope to persuade to do so. Since (...) entering into such conversations often requires a starting place in experience, we need an approach that will permit us to integrate human experience into a fuller account of the human person. The thesis of this article is that the account of the human person proposed by Pope St. John Paul II, as the philosopher Karol Wojtyła provides the answers we need. I demonstrate that his approach permits us to acknowledge the experience of actual existing persons without compromising the more properly “ontological” framework that we know reveals the unchanging truth about human personhood.2 I show that his account gives us the foothold we are seeking in our efforts to help those struggling with SSA. (shrink)

“Trust” is not usually considered a Hobbesian concept, which is odd since it is central to the definition of a covenant. The key to understanding Hobbes’s concept of trust is to be found in his account of conquest— “sovereignty by acquisition”—which is a heavily revised adaptation of the Roman justification of slavery. Hobbes introduces a distinction between servants, who are trusted with liberty, and imprisoned slaves. The servant/master relationship involves mutual trust, an ongoing exchange of benefits (protection for service and (...) obedience), and performance monitoring. In contrast to Quentin Skinner’s and Philip Pettit’s shared concentration on the contrast between slavery and freedom, I argue that the salient analogy is between servants and subjects.The trust relationship between subjects and the sovereign involves defined roles, limited absolutism, and accountability in the early-modern form of licensing subjects to switch political allegiance should a regime fail. (shrink)

Following from life history and attachment theory, individuals are predicted to be sensitive to variation in environmental conditions such that risk and uncertainty are internalized by cognitive, affective, and psychobiological mechanisms. In turn, internalizing of environmental uncertainty is expected to be associated with attitudes toward risk behaviors and investments in education. Native American youth aged 10–19 years (n = 89) from reservation communities participated in a study examining this pathway. Measures included family environmental risk and uncertainty, present and future time (...) perspective, adolescent attachment, attitudes toward risk, investments in education, and salivary cortisol. Results support the idea that environmental risk and uncertainty are internalized during development. In addition, internalizing mechanisms significantly predicted attitudes toward risk and education: (1) lower scores on future time perspective and higher cortisol predicted higher scores on risk attitudes, and (2) higher scores on future time perspective and lower scores on problems with attachment predicted higher self-reported school performance. Gender differences were seen, with males anticipating a shorter lifespan than females, which predicted higher scores on risk attitudes and lower school performance. Implications for research on adolescent problem behavior and academic achievement are discussed. (shrink)

A growing number of philosophers have argued against the orthodoxy that the correct principle of composition will be a metaphysically necessary truth. With contingentism about composition a seemingly viable option, it would appear that would‐be necessitarians shoulder the burden of proof. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the contingentist, too, has a significant burden. I argue that nonbrutal principles of composition satisfy a principle according to which facts about whether or not a collection composes supervene on noncomposition (...) facts that are spatiotemporally local to the collection. I further argue that the contingentist has reason to reject both brutal composition and the supervenience principle. This reveals a significant internal tension in the contingentist's position. Unless this tension can be resolved, there will be (defeasible) reason to prefer necessitarianism about composition. (shrink)

I argue that although the judgments required to reach statistical risk assessments may reflect policy values, it does not follow that the task of evaluating whether a given risk assessment is warranted by the evidence need also be imbued with policy values. What has led many to conclude otherwise, I claim, stems from misuses of the statistical testing methods involved. I set out rules for interpreting what specific test results do and do not say about the extent of a given (...) risk. By providing a more objective understanding of the evidence, such rules help in adjudicating conflicting risk assessments. To illustrate, I consider the risk assessment conflict at the EPA concerning the carcinogenicity of formaldehyde. (shrink)

Despite the apparent contemporary irrelevance of the Old Testament, the Adam and Eve narrative in Genesis 2–3 is a deeply engrained element within Western cultural mythology. As such it virtually demands a feminist critique, because its common interpretation as a narrative demonstrating women's inferiority and legitimizing their subordination has a mutually reinforcing relationship with the patriarchal world-view that still pervades much of Western culture. A feminist reading of Genesis 2–3 highlights the difficulties with the traditional subordinationist reading, and suggests other (...) possibilities for interpretation that relativize the absolutism of patriarchal authority claims, thereby making it possible to envisage, and work towards, a different world-order. (shrink)

Crises and social revolts in the historiography of contemporary France Refusing to apprehend the category as a simple empirical fact, the article examine the notion of crisis against the perspective offered by the series of French Revolutions : . This enables the authors to question these « moments of crisis » in relation to the historiographical contribution of successive generations of historians. In opposition to a liberal vision where social revolts are devoid of any political project, such an approach on (...) the part of the historian places the focus on a people, a proletariat, a group which, above all, reveals itself to be a political subject. To be effective, and to avoid stifling the comprehension of a revolutionary phenomenon, the concept of conjunctural crisis is thus combined with the invocation of a longer temporality and with a comprehension of the organic movements of society. The focus placed on the moment of crisis enables the authors to propose a different way of apprehending revolution, to grasp its rootedness in time that is both profound and immediate, organic and circumstantial. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Blue Pearl: The Efficacy of Teaching Mindfulness Practices to College StudentsDeborah J. Haynes, Katie Irvine, and Mindy BridgesBetween fall 2003 and spring 2011 I integrated contemplative practices into ten courses with a total of 877 students. Nine of these courses carried credit for the core undergraduate curriculum, either in literature and arts or ideals and values, and students elected my courses from a menu of options. Individual courses (...) ranged from 12 to 409 students. During two of these years, I conducted detailed human subject research using a number of surveys, gathering both quantitative and qualitative data with first-year undergraduates on their experiences with contemplative pedagogy. These courses dealt specifically with art and religion, focusing on traditions where the visual arts are intricately connected to religious practice. I gathered more subjective data in all of the other courses, including large lecture courses on world art from 1500 to the present. In general, my students were not majors in art or religious studies, but came from many disciplines within the arts, social sciences, and sciences, including business and engineering. This essay describes the process and results of the research I conducted with two undergraduate assistants, Katie Irvine and Mindy Bridges. Besides summarizing the findings, I also describe student responses to teaching a specific mindfulness practice—the bow—within a large lecture course with undergraduates. It is notable how little actual data exists about student experiences, and this prompted me to undertake the research that forms the basis for this essay.1I begin with a few comments on my understanding of contemplative or mindfulness practice and my role as researcher. There is no single way to describe or engage in contemplative practice. The Latin contemplari means to observe, consider, or gaze attentively. This definition gives clues about the varied forms of contemplative practice, which include sitting, standing, walking, and lying down; using attitudes of not doing; deep listening, pondering, and radical questioning; guided imagery and active imagination; exercises with the body; focusing techniques such as those developed by Eugene Gendlin; concentrated language experiments with freewriting, poetry, and journals; beholding; and creation of visual images to represent such experiences.2 The [End Page 63] word mindfulness is often used to describe contemplative practice. In its most basic form, it means moment-by-moment present awareness, which is available to everyone, regardless of religious or spiritual orientation.Broadly understood as methods to develop concentration, to deepen understanding and insight, and to cultivate awareness and compassion, these practices can have a profound impact on a student’s experience both in college and beyond. Specifically, teaching students techniques of awareness, concentration, and means of disciplining their attention is absolutely essential in our era of fragmentation, ever-increasing speed, multitasking, and continuously interrupted attention. While contemplative practices are rooted in the world’s religious traditions, I often tell parents and students that the application of these practices in a secular educational context can enhance the educational experience in unique ways. Students develop new techniques of awareness, they learn to refine their perceptual and observational skills, and they are encouraged to take chances and to foster attitudes such as curiosity and wonder rather than cynicism about the world in which we live.Contemplative PedagogyIntroducing contemplative practices into the classroom results in new educational practices and pedagogies. For example, in a course titled The Dialogue of Art and Religion my students learn about Russian Orthodox icons, Himalayan Buddhist thangkas, and Navajo sand paintings through studying cultural and social history, religion, formal visual analysis, and creative processes. I define this interdisciplinary teaching as a form of comparative visual studies. I normally teach this class to eighteen or twenty first-year college students. Students also learn about the practices of prayer and meditation that are central to Christian, Buddhist, and Native American traditions through sustained reading and discussion. They read accessible books about contemplative practice such as Thich Nhat Hanh’s The Miracle of Mindfulness.3 In each class, we practice simple techniques such as bowing, sitting in silence, breath awareness, and daily writing exercises.Over the past decade my students have talked about how these mindfulness exercises help to foster an atmosphere of respect, noting... (shrink)

I develop a taxonomy of various approaches to leadership which I label the ethical decision-making, managerial obligation, role typology, and creativity conceptions of leadership. Each approach makes distinctive assumptions about the task and educational responsibilities in educating for ethical leadership. Although each of these approaches are extremely valuable, I find them limited in that they all rely on what I call an agentic model. Using the concepts of choice architects and choice architecture from nudge theory, I argue for a new (...) metaphysical model—a systems-design model—that captures the complex and interactive dynamic of a host of metaphysical entities and contextual factors. This new metaphysical model of the context of leadership and the function of leaders within it yields a theory of leadership, which I dub the ethical systems-design conception of leadership. (shrink)

The primary problem we face when educating for social justice involves making problems and issues ‘real’ in ways that enable deep comprehension of the nature of injustice, the effects of systemic and dynamic causes, and the interaction of structures and policies on the lives of individuals. To address this problem, I examine work from behavioral economics and moral psychology as theoretical resources. I argue that we can glean insights from the notions of behavioral nudges and virtue labeling and propose a (...) new account of nudges, which I call experiential nudges. Experiential nudges provide an important mechanism in educating for social justice, in particular, and can be extended within moral education more broadly. (shrink)

I describe four different approaches to ethics education that are commonly implemented in Ethics Across the Curriculum programs: the Case-based, Internalist, Supplementation, and Responsibilist. This typology is useful to categorize the range of institutional practices. As our Society moves into its next twenty years, I consider what we have learned about ethics education and whether we should promote a particular approach. I use a literary resource to shift our perspective and a philosophical resource to introduce a new structure. Using insights (...) from these resources, I offer two proposals. First, I develop a theoretical proposal for an integrated model of ethics education that I call the Comprehensive Ethics Education model. Second, I offer two pedagogical proposals for use in quantitative courses and degree programs as well as institution-wide EAC programs. (shrink)

Because we automatically categorize individuals into members of in- or outgroups based on their perceived similarity to us, our social identity creates limitations and bias in our thinking. I examine the ways in which banal nationalism, cultural identifications, and group membership influence our thinking, the assumptions we hold, and the intuitions we form. If our goal is to engage in ethics without borders—a laudable goal—then we must uncover the ways in which our thinking is limited and consider strategies to escape (...) or transcend such borders in our theoretical work and teaching. I offer two proposals using insights from cross-cultural psychology. First, I propose the acronym of WASPI as a description of the nonreflective assumptions held by many WEIRD university professors. Second, I offer a four-factor model of normative analysis as a concrete tool for our teaching and theoretical work. It is only through such processes of active and critical reflection that our goal of ethics without borders can succeed. (shrink)

Although moral psychologists and feminist moral theorists emphasize males’ interest in justice or fairness and females’ interest in care or empathy, recent work in evolutionary psychology links females’ interests in care and empathy for others with interests in fairness and equality. In an important work on sex differences in cognitive abilities, David Geary (1998) argues that the evolutionary mechanism of sexual selection drives the evolution of particular cognitive abilities and selection for particular interests. I mount two main challenges to Geary’s (...) claims. First, I argue that female social and intrasexual competitive environments evolve, which challenges the assumption that such environments are largely nonkin-based and characterized by reciprocity. Second, I grant Geary’s entire characterization of female environments, but argue that the natures of reciprocal relationships themselves do not require and may not select for interests in fairness and equality. This analysis not only challenges claims regarding sex differences in moral interests, but also suggests the need for a diachronic model of male and female social and intrasexual competitive environments. In addition, I propose a return to Trivers’s (1971) focus on the suite of emotions underlying reciprocal altruism as properties and features of individuals as fodder for selection. (shrink)

Situationist research highlights the fact that situational features often influence our behavior in unexpected ways. Virtue ethicists tend to think they can explain away such results, and prescribe cultivating virtue to ward against such moral failings. Situationists argue that studies like these uncover deep flaws within the moral psychology presumed by virtue ethicists, and hold that virtues may be an inadequate grounding for moral behavior and moral education. Using the concept of cognitive scripts from psychology, I describe a new approach (...) to moral education. The course focuses activities on written and performed scripts to encourage students to imagine hypothetical scenarios in real time, adopt the perspectives of others, evoke and alter their emotions, and ultimately, to revise their implicit, cognitive scripts. Attending to and altering cognitive scripts not only captures many theoretical and empirical insights from virtue ethics and situationism, but also offers a more sophisticated model of moral psychology and a better approach to moral education. (shrink)

Given the specific educational, psychological, and sociological factors of juvenile inmates, I developed a course to teach such students moral concepts and reasoning without high level theorizing. I combined Hume’s account of sympathy with current philosophical and psychological research to develop the students’ natural sympathy as an aid in developing emotional, contextual, and moral literacy. In this paper, I explain (1) how the course developed the students’ natural sympathy, (2) how sympathy can provide a simple and familiar process of moral (...) deliberation, (3) how sympathy aids in learning moral concepts, and (4) some interesting implications for public policy regarding moral education and recidivism, early childhood moral education, and teaching ethics courses generally. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Nietzsche and the Promise of Philosophy by Wayne KleinDeborah Carter MullenWayne Klein. Nietzsche and the Promise of Philosophy. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997. Pp. xviii + 256. Paper, $19.95.Wayne Klein states in his Introduction to Nietzsche and the Promise of Philosophy that “Nietzsche’s texts are anomalous…because they explicitly and inexorably force us to question our assumptions about meaning, understanding and writing in a way that (...) few other philosophical texts have” (5). From its beginning, Klein’s book challenges the reader to think beyond the dualism of the literal and figurative meaning of words. For Klein, this task is central to understanding both the content and style of Nietzsche’s writings; or rather, it is essential to the recognition that ‘content’ and ‘style’ cannot be thought separately, especially when reading a poet-philosopher such as Nietzsche who meditates extensively on the intrinsic connection of the two. In his following chapters, Klein provides the reader with an innovative way of reading Nietzsche’s corpus, a strategy of interpretation which is acutely aware that Nietzsche’s philosophy is inseparable from Nietzsche’s rhetoric (6).Chapter One questions both Heidegger’s and Kaufmann’s interpretations of Nietzsche, which, according to Klein, “share a common conviction that Nietzsche’s thought can only be understood properly if it is abstracted from its context and read against the backdrop of his philosophy as a whole” (42). Klein also criticizes Nehamas’ reading of Nietzsche which endeavors to discover “thematic connections and continuities among Nietzsche’s writings, without attempting to take the texts on their own terms as texts” (50). Ultimately, Klein views all three readers as offering an interpretation of Nietzsche in which “the ‘what’ of Nietzsche’s writings is thoroughly divorced from the ‘how’ ” (42).Klein’s strongest evidence for his position of Nietzsche as philosopher-rhetorician is presented in Chapters Two and Three. In Chapter Two, Klein argues against the view [End Page 639] of Maudemarie Clark that (l) Nietzsche’s later writings affirm a “common-sense” or empirical view of truth, and therefore, (2) Nietzsche’s earlier rhetorical descriptions of truth ought to be rejected by the reader who desires to understand Nietzsche’s mature thought (58–59). Through a detailed reading of Nietzsche’s 1872–73 Course on Rhetoric and the 1873 “On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense,” Klein presents a convincing case that Nietzsche’s analysis in his early writings of truth as metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche does not “deny that words can be true, but that with respect to their multifarious origins they are not principally concerned with truth as correspondence or identity” (70). Instead—with Heidegger’s concept of aletheia as the horizon—Klein suggests that Nietzsche’s early writings “insist on a radical undecidability between literal and figurative discourse” which leads Nietzsche to embrace “a conception of shining truth,” i.e., the veiled “shining forth of appearance” (78, 83). This notion of truth as shine or shining forth allows Klein to link Nietzsche’s earliest writings to later works such as Beyond Good and Evil and Twilight of the Idols in their portrayals of truth. Further-more, once this connection is established, Klein can challenge Clark’s reading that Nietzsche’s mature view of truth implicitly acknowledges an empirical dualism of “the true” and “the false.”After establishing that the division between style and content is an ontological dichotomy which Nietzsche’s work rejects, Klein can utilize this fundamental ambiguity between Nietzsche the philosopher and Nietzsche the rhetorician to reconsider specific concepts put forward in Nietzsche’s other writings. Chapter Three interprets The Birth of Tragedy in this vein; however, the most provocative re-reading of Nietzsche occurs in Chapter Four, where Klein brings into question Nietzsche’s “naturalism,” his reliance in his later criticisms of metaphysics and morality upon a seemingly “essentialistic understanding” of central concepts such as the will to power, life, physiology, and sickness and health (141). By returning to Nietzsche’s early writings in his analysis of the later works, Klein concludes that “the pseudo-normative concepts of life, nature, and the will to power” can be read as “contingent interpretations of existence... (shrink)