The following paper traces Husserl’s late time-analyses (concentrated especially in the so-called C-manuscripts) in the context of the problem of the life of the transcendental ego. We proceed from the constitutive stage of primal life (Urleben), in which the streaming living presence is constituted as lasting now (nunc stans). Then we trace further the structural connections of the constitution of the so-called first transcendence, that is, the transcendence of the immanent stream of consciousness, and the second transcendence, in which life (...) is constituted as living-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-Leben). It turns out that the life of the transcendental I is of the character of a striving life (strebendes Leben) and that the first and second transcendence belong to it essentially. (shrink)

In his later writings, Husserl posits the original life of transcendental consciousness as the ultimate subject of phenomenological inquiry. Through self‐criticism in his work, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Husserl realises that the transcendence of representation remains unnoticed after the transcendental reduction. Consequently, he develops the method of apodictic reduction to reveal what is apodictic in consciousness. This method specifically reveals the living presence, as well as the constitution of immanent consciousness, to which the (...) transcendence of representation belongs. Husserl refers to this transcendence as the first transcendence, in contrast to the second transcendence of the constitution of the world. The constitution of the first transcendence is not separate from the living streaming presence but rather belongs to the life of consciousness itself. And it is only through this transcendence of representation that the identifiable (and re‐identifiable) I with its life is constituted. (shrink)

V pátém Logickém zkoumání polemizuje Husserl s možností čistého Já jako funkce sjednocující intencionální prožitkové obsahy. Tato argumentace je explicitně zaměřena proti novokantovské koncepci čistého Já Paula Natorpa v jeho Úvodu do psychologie na základě kritické metody z roku 1888. Následující text zkoumá polemiku týkající se statutu jáství a dotazuje metafyzické a logické předpoklady, které jsou v této polemice aktivní. Prozkoumání těchto předpokladů je konečně využito pro načrtnutí některých klíčových motivací, které vedly Husserla při přehodnocení statutu a role čistého Já (...) v jeho Idejích k čisté fenomenologii a fenomenologické filosofii. (shrink)