In this paper I discuss Nancey Murphy’s nonreductive physicalist perspective on personal identity and eschatological resurrection offered in her recent work, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? I argue that if we take Murphy to be presenting actual metaphysical positions on these issues, it is very difficult to see how they go together coherently. Contrary to Murphy’s explicit claim to be presenting metaphysical criteria for personal identity, I argue that it appears she is instead offering an epistemological or psychological account (...) of identity. I conclude that Murphy may need to modify or reject either her criteria for personal numerical identity or her view of the resurrection in order to consistently hold the other. Alternately, she could view this inconsistency as a failure of the underlying physicalist assumptions of her “scientific research program” and thus reject her physicalist assumptions altogether. (shrink)

Formalised knowledge systems, including universities and research institutes, are important for contemporary societies. They are, however, also arguably failing humanity when their impact is measured against the level of progress being made in stimulating the societal changes needed to address challenges like climate change. In this research we used a novel futures-oriented and participatory approach that asked what future envisioned knowledge systems might need to look like and how we might get there. Findings suggest that envisioned future systems will need (...) to be much more collaborative, open, diverse, egalitarian, and able to work with values and systemic issues. They will also need to go beyond producing knowledge about our world to generating wisdom about how to act within it. To get to envisioned systems we will need to rapidly scale methodological innovations, connect innovators, and creatively accelerate learning about working with intractable challenges. We will also need to create new funding schemes, a global knowledge commons, and challenge deeply held assumptions. To genuinely be a creative force in supporting longevity of human and non-human life on our planet, the shift in knowledge systems will probably need to be at the scale of the enlightenment and speed of the scientific and technological revolution accompanying the second World War. This will require bold and strategic action from governments, scientists, civic society and sustained transformational intent. (shrink)

Propositions about the nature of expertise, in general, and expertise in pedagogy, in particular, are discussed. The time needed to develop expertise in teaching and the highly contextual nature of teachers’ knowledge are also discussed. Four theories of teacher development are presented, with an elaboration on the heuristic value of the theory of Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986). Examples from the pedagogical literature are used to illustrate this theory. The recent research establishing causal relationships between those identified as experts in teaching (...) and their students’ academic achievement is also presented. This research allows those who study expertise in teaching to have a more objective measure for identifying and studying expert pedagogues. (shrink)

The article offers an approach to inquiry about, the foundation of medical ethics by addressing three areas of conceptual presupposition basic to medical ethical theory. First, medical ethics must presuppose a view about the nature of medicine. it is argued that the view required by a cogent medical morality entails that medicine be seen both as a healing relationship and as a practical art. Three ways in which medicine inherently involves values and valuation are presented as important, i.e., in being (...) aimed at the good of health, in being a cognitive art evaluating towards that good, and as a manifestation of a virtuous disposition concerning that good. Finally, a value ontology drawn from these considerations is seen as necessarily underlying medical ethics. A set of three such basic values are promoted as crucial: the value of health; the value of the individual patient; and the value of altruism that mediates the class of potential patients. (shrink)

The sciences use a wide range of visual devices, practices, and imaging technologies. This diversity points to an important repertoire of visual methods that scientists use to adapt representations to meet the varied demands that their work places on cognitive processes. This paper identifies key features of the use of visualization in a range of scientific domains and considers the implications of this repertoire for understanding scientists as cognitive agents.

Testimonial injustice occurs when hearers attribute speakers a credibility deficit because of an identity prejudice and consequently dismiss speakers’ testimonial assertions. Various philosophers explain testimonial injustice by appealing to interpersonal norms arising within testimonial exchanges. When conversational participants violate these interpersonal norms, they generate second-personal epistemic harms, harming speakers as epistemic agents. This focus on testimony, however, neglects how systematically misevaluating speakers’ knowledge affects conversational participants more generally. When hearers systematically misevaluate speakers’ conversational competence because of entrenched assumptions about what (...) speakers know, I call these conversational epistemic injustices. I argue the same epistemic harm in testimonial injustice arises for non-assertoric speech acts, generating conversational epistemic injustices. For across speech acts, deflated knowledge attributions create second-personal harms that prevent speakers from using their knowledge in linguistic exchanges, limiting their epistemic agency. These harms however are not reducible to linguistic harms, (e.g.,) silencing or discursive injustice. This article applies insight from how second-personal epistemic harm arises in testimonial exchanges to conversational exchanges more generally, demonstrating that epistemic injustices arise beyond testimonial exchanges and contexts of inquiry because deflated knowledge attributions undermine general conversational norms requiring participants assume each other’s conversational competence, generating conversational epistemic injustices. (shrink)

It is quite extraordinary, philosophically speaking, that according to the orthodox interpretation: (a) quantum mechanics is a complete and comprehensive theory of microphysics, and yet (b) the role of measurement, in quantum mechanics, cannot be analyzed in terms of the collective effects of the microphysical particles making up the apparatus. It follows that, if the orthodox interpretation is correct, the measurement apparatus and its quantum physical effects cannot be accounted for microreductively. This is significant because it is widely believed that (...) the relation between physical wholes and parts is microreductive. Indeed, many philosophers are persuaded of the inevitability of universal microreduction to the basic elements of microphysics. This is the viewpoint embodied in the program for the unity of science, espoused in recent years, most notably by Robert Causey (1977). (shrink)

Given its clinical significance, horror should occupy a prominent place within emotion theory. However, conceptualizations of horror within psychological science are relatively underdeveloped and conceptually confused. Through conceptual analysis of the disparate literature on the emotion, we seek to establish horror as a qualitatively distinct mode of engagement with the world and to remedy its over-intellectualization, as evident in many prior accounts. Given its etymology, we first address horror's characteristic immobilization—at the level of stereotypical facial configuration and action readiness—before analyzing (...) horror's formal object and appraisal structure. In the process, we critique schema accounts of the emotion and argue for conceptualizing horror pre-reflectively by grounding it in appraised violations of the practical dynamics of social engagement. (shrink)

Our global knowledge of different cultures and the diversity of values increases almost daily. New challenges arise for ethics. This is especially true in the field of bioethics because the technological progress of medicine throughout the world is causing dramatic interactions with traditionally held values. Science and technology are rapidly advancing beyond discussions and corresponding political struggles over human rights, leaving those debates behind. This rapid development of science is at odds with the principle of sustained development that calls for (...) measured and thoughtful planning, such that no new idea should rupture the delicate fabric of communities, environment, and cultural evolution. (shrink)

Past ages of medical care are condemned in modern philosophical and medical literature as being too paternalistic. The normal account of good medicine in the past was, indeed, paternalistic in an offensive way to modern persons. Imagine a Jean Paul Sartre going to the doctor and being treated without his consent or even his knowledge of what will transpire during treatment! From Hippocratic times until shortly after World War II, medicine operated in a closed, clubby manner. The knowledge learned in (...) medicine was not shared with the patients, who were in general poorly educated and for the most part completely ignorant of the craft of medicine and the physicians (but not, perhaps, of folk medicine). Physicians were cautioned against telling patients too much about their Illness and/or their recovery, perhaps because physicians themselves did not have an enormous armamentarium to confront disease. (shrink)

The conventional approach to law and religion assumes that these are competing domains, which raises questions about the freedom of, and from, religion; alternate commitments of religion and human rights; and respective jurisdictions of civil and religious courts. This volume moves beyond this competitive paradigm to consider law and religion as overlapping and interrelated frameworks that structure the social order, arguing that law and religion share similar properties and have a symbiotic relationship. Moreover, many legal systems exhibit religious characteristics, informing (...) their notions of authority, precedent, rituals and canonical texts, and most religions invoke legal concepts or terminology. The contributors address this blurring of law and religion in the contexts of political theology, secularism, church-state conflicts, and the foundational idea of divine law. (shrink)

In recent years, Bayesian probability theory has emerged not only as a powerful tool for building computational theories of vision, but also as a general paradigm for studying human visual perception. This book provides an introduction to and critical analysis of the Bayesian paradigm. Leading researchers in computer vision and experimental vision science describe general theoretical frameworks for modeling vision, detailed applications to specific problems and implications for experimental studies of human perception. The book provides a dialogue between different perspectives (...) both within chapters, which draw on insights from experimental and computational work, and between chapters, through commentaries written by the contributors on each other's work. Students and researchers in cognitive and visual science will find much to interest them in this thought-provoking collection. (shrink)

Technology's contribution to economic growth and competitiveness has been the subject of vigorous debate in recent years. This book demonstrates the importance of a historical perspective in understanding the role of technological innovation in the economy. The authors examine key episodes and institutions in the development of the U.S. research system and in the development of the research systems of other industrial economies. They argue that the large potential contributions of economics to the understanding of technology and economic growth have (...) been constrained by the narrow theoretical framework employed within neoclassical economies. A richer framework, they believe, will support a more fruitful dialogue among economists, policymakers, and managers on the organization of public and private institutions for innovation. David Mowery is Associate Professor of Business and Public Policy at the School of Business Administration, University of California, Berkeley. Nathan S. Rosenberg is Fairleigh Dickinson Professor of Economics at Stanford University. He is the author of Inside the Black Box: Technology and Economics. (shrink)

David Shaw has a Master of Arts degree in Philosophy from the Aquinas Institute. This three-year in-depth study of Aristotle was illuminated with commentaries by Thomas Aquinas. Many persons believe that God has created everything that is. I do not disagree with them but I am not satisfied with this generality. There is no guidance in this belief. We have endured 300 years since the revolutionaries of modern science began their dismemberment of the Greek cosmos that had endured for (...) 2,000 years. We now have no theory of creation. The Hebrew cosmos and the Greek cosmos made up the traditional theories of creation for the western world. Since many have forgotten this history, I summarize it before venturing into my proposal for a new theory of creation. Our universe and the ancient universe are vastly different. The ancient universe was static. It was thought to have no history. Our universe is dynamic. It has a history. Harold Morowitz has identified 28 emergences of new complexity in our universe [1]. I propose a new theory of creation. I give four arguments for community as the next emergence based on the statements of four great thinkers: Plato, Thomas Jefferson, Martin Luther King, and Michael Sandel. These thinkers do not propose community as the next emergence, they do identify community as a central process in human affairs. A description of my experience with community-building projects is included. While writing this section, the importance of civic fabric in building community confronted me.Community does not flow from civic fabric. Community does not flow without civicfabric. Civic fabric is the foundation for community. 1. Morowitz, Harrold. The Emergence Of Everything: How The World Became Complex. (shrink)

In a morally fragmented society there is no good reason for ethics committees to assume any particular point of view, yet failure to do so compromises their ability to function in either a case‐review or an educational capacity. A casuist methodology might enable committees to fulfill both roles.

"Dr. Rubin has brought cognitive psychology into a wholly unprecedented dialogue with studies in oral tradition. The result is a truly new perspective on memory and the processes of oral tradition." --John Miles Foley, University of Missouri.

In their target article, Millum and Bromwich situate their article against a backdrop of well-documented empirical research demonstrating that many participants have variable and often poor...

This study examines how different forms of media use predict attitudes toward the development of facial recognition technology (FRT) and applications of it by law enforcement to identify criminal suspects, identify potential terrorists, and monitor public protests. The theoretical framework builds on theories of cultivation and genre-specific viewing to develop hypotheses and research questions. The analyses draw on original data from two nationally representative surveys of the U.S. public conducted in 2020, amid a series of controversies and protests about policing (...) and racial justice. The results demonstrate that overall television viewing and crime media viewing predicted support for multiple uses of FRT, while Fox News viewing predicted support for using FRT to monitor protests. The findings advance our understanding of public opinion toward the technology and its implications for policing, protests, and social justice. (shrink)

Settling the debate over conscientious refusal (CR) in liberal democracies requires us to develop a conception of the healthcare provider’s moral role. Because CR claims and resulting policy changes take place in specific sociopolitical contexts with unique histories and diverse polities, the _method_ we use for deriving the healthcare norms should itself be a democratic, context-dependent inquiry. To this end, I begin by describing some prerequisites—which I call _publicity conditions_—for any democratic account of healthcare norms that conflict or jibe with (...) CR. Next, drawing on Ronald Dworkin’s jurisprudence and Tom Beauchamp & James Childress’s approach to bioethical reasoning, I briefly introduce one method for generating healthcare norms that is faithful to the publicity conditions and has potential to constructively, and democratically, derive important boundaries for CR. Finally, I argue that many critics of CR fail to similarly ground their accounts of healthcare norms in healthcare professionals’ sociopolitical contexts, often relying instead on their own interpretation of a generally stateable healthcare norm. This leads to their misconstruing both the value judgments on which their own approaches rest and the public, political values that are often invoked in favor of CR. (shrink)

The two target articles in this issue draw an important connection between disability bioethics and geriatric bioethics. Dominic JC Wilkinson makes a pragmatic case for using frailty as a fa...

Leading a corporation through a crisis requires rational decision making guided by an ethical approach (Snyder et al., Journal of Business Ethics, 63, 2006, 371). Three such approaches are virtue ethics (Seeger and Ulmer, Journal of Business Ethics, 31, 2001, 369), an ethic of justice, and an ethic of care (Simóla, Journal of Business Ethics, 46, 2003, 351). In this article, I consider the effectiveness of these approaches for leading a corporation after a crisis. The standard I use is drawn (...) from recent studies that examine how people tend to react to corporate unintentional harms. I conclude from these studies that an ethic of care approach is most effective for managing corporate crises when it comes to stakeholder concerns. I conclude the article with strategies for managing a crisis using an ethic of care. (shrink)

One way in which philosophers have often sought to distinguish moral judgments from non-moral judgments is by using the “moral-conventional” distinction. I seek to raise serious questions about the significance of the moral-conventional distinction, at least for philosophers interested in moral judgment. I survey recent developments in the fields of philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science that have led many to the conclusion that moral judgment is not a distinctive kind of judgment or the result of a specific, identifiable cognitive process. (...) I argue that if this conclusion is largely correct, the moral-conventional distinction loses significance. If moral judgment does not correspond to a distinctive cognitive process, it is unclear how distinguishing between types of norms tracks anything of significance to human judgment formation. I then discuss the implications of abandoning the distinction for research in the field of moral psychology and tentatively propose a more modest way of conceiving of norm significance. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Dike Phonou: The Right of Prosecution and Attic Homicide ProcedureDavid C. MirhadyAlexander Tulin. Dike Phonou: The Right of Prosecution and Attic Homicide Procedure. Stuttgart and Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1996. x 1 135 pp. Cloth, DM 56. (Beiträge zum Altertumskunde, 76)The normal means of seeking redress in Athenian law was through a dike, which the victim brought to the appropriate magistrate, who then conducted the case through the (...) various stages of the Athenian legal process, an initial inquiry, possibly a public arbitration, and finally a trial before a democratic court. What distinguishes homicide from almost every other offense, however, is precisely that its victim cannot seek legal redress because he is dead. So who does? [End Page 639]This short book is devoted to the single aim of supporting the “traditional view” that it was only the members of the victim’s family who had the right to seek this redress through a suit for murder (dike phonou). In a wider-ranging book (almost as short as this one, Athenian Homicide Law in the Age of the Orators), Douglas MacDowell argued in 1963 against that restrictive interpretation: though Athenian law enjoined the relatives (or in the case of a slave, the owner) of the victim to prosecute, it did not order others not to. Others have since followed MacDowell’s lead. Tulin relies on three disparate pieces of evidence, to each of which he devotes one chapter: Drakon’s Code (IG I3 104), [Dem.] 47.68–73, and Plato’s Euthyphro 3e7–5d7.He gives the entire text of Drakon’s Code in Greek, translates most of it in a footnote, but then discusses specifically only the four lines (20–23) that relate most directly to his argument, although he points out many peripheral issues along the way, such as the authenticity of the code and the possibility of interpolation. Without reviewing the evidence in detail, he takes as established that in archaic conceptions of homicide, murder was viewed initially as a violation of a kinship unit, not “any larger corporate entity” (11). Yet the Code itself is an indication of interest, and indeed control, being taken by the larger corporate entity, and the roles it ascribes to the ephetai in the place of the family of the victim need discussion, since they touch directly on Tulin’s central thesis; they do not get it. Ultimately the issue of restrictiveness will be decided on the basis of whether the jussive infinitives that form the injunctions of the Code are to be understood inclusively or exclusively. To Tulin they seem exclusive and restrictive; to me they could be inclusive, calling upon an ever wider circle to take responsibility for sharing in the prosecution. Viewed in isolation, this piece of evidence is inconclusive.In [Dem.] 47.68–73 the speaker, the Trierarch, is concerned to show his own scruples with regard to legal procedure, which prevented him from laying charges for murder against his opponents even after they had killed his old wetnurse. Tulin analyzes the passage in great detail, giving the Greek text twice and reproducing the Loeb translation. Although the presentation is unnecessarily awkward, Tulin is successful in showing that it is in fact the lack of the requisite family or owner’s relationship to the victim that has compelled the Trierarch not to pursue a prosecution for murder. It would have required him and his family to commit perjury with regard to their relationship to the deceased. One lapse in Tulin’s account sticks out, however: his interpretation of the clause (47.69). He translates it as a protasis to the infinitives set out in the funeral nomima: “if there be anyone related to the woman, let him...” (23). But the position of the clause after the second of the three infinitive clauses strongly suggests that it be made to follow that clause as an indirect question: “and (you, Trierarch, must) make a proclamation at the tomb whether there be some relative of the woman.” It becomes clear several lines later that the Trierarch will make this proclamation, since no relative [End Page 640] is required for it. The proclamation involves not... (shrink)

List of contributors; Acknowledgments; Introduction Robert S. Westman and David C. Lindberg; 1. Conceptions of the scientific revolution from Bacon to Butterfield: a preliminary sketch David C. Lindberg; 2. Conceptions of science in the scientific revolution Ernan McMullin; 3. Metaphysics and the new science Gary Hatfield; 4. Proof, portics, and patronage: Copernicus’s preface to De revolutionibus Robert S. Westman; 5. A reappraisal of the role of the universities in the scientific revolution John Gascoigne; 6. Natural magic, hermetism, and (...) occultism in early modern science Brian P. Copenhaver; 7. Natural history and the emblematic world view William B. Ashworth, Jr.; 8. From the secrets of nature to public knowledge William Eamon; 9. Chemistry in the scientific revolution: problems of language and communication Jan V. Golinski; 10. The new philosophy and medicine in seventeenth-century England Harold J. Cook; 11. Science and heterodoxy: an early modern problem reconsidered Michael Hunter; 12. Infinitesimals and transcendent relations: the mathematics of motion in the late seventeenth century Michael S. Mahoney; 13. The case of mechanics: one revolution or many? Alan Gabbey; Index. (shrink)

Kin selection is a core aspect of social evolution theory, but a small number of critics have recently challenged it. Here I address these criticisms and show that kin selection remains an important explanation for much social evolution. I show how many of the criticisms rest on historical idiosyncrasies of the way the field happened to develop, rather than on the real logic and evidence.

According to Frankena, “the moral point of view is what Alison Wilde and Heather Badcock did not have.” Most of us, however, are not such extreme examples. We are capable of the moral point of view, but we fail to take the necessary time or make the required efforts. We resist pulling ourselves from other distractions to focus on the plight of others and what we might do to ameliorate their suffering. Perhaps compassion is rooted in understanding what it is (...) that connects us with others rather than what separates us, and rests on developing sufficient awareness, to internalize what our actions, or lack of them, mean in the lives of others. (shrink)

We define and examine a notion of logical friendliness, which is a broadening of the familiar notion of classical consequence. The concept is tudied first in its simplest form, and then in a syntax-independent version, which we call sympathy. We also draw attention to the surprising number of familiar notions and operations with which it makes contact, providing a new light in which they may be seen.