Metaphilosophy, Volume 53, Issue 2-3, Page 267-283, April 2022.

In the first chapter of his The World, Descartes compares light to words and discusses signs and ideas. This made scholars read into that passage our views of language as a representational medium and consider it Descartes’ model for representation in perception. I show, by contrast, that Descartes does not ascribe there any representational role to language; that to be a sign is for him to have a kind of causal role; and that he is concerned there only with the (...) cause’s lack of resemblance to its effect, not with the representation’s lack of resemblance to what it represents. I support this interpretation by comparisons with other places in Descartes’ corpus and with earlier authors, Descartes’ likely sources. This interpretation may shed light both on Descartes’ understanding of the functioning of language and on the development of his theory of representation in perception. (shrink)

Biological and cognitive sciences rely heavily on the idea of information transmitted between natural events or processes. This paper critically assesses some current philosophical views of natural information and defends a view of natural information as Nomic and Factive. Dretske offered a Factive view of information, and recent work on the topic has tended to reject this aspect of his view in favor of a non-Factive, probabilistic approach. This paper argues that the reasoning behind this move to non-Factivity is flawed (...) and mixes up different problems with Dretske’s original view. I show that one of these problems—strictness—has to do with Nomicity rather than Factivity. The other problem—reference class ambiguity—is not solvable just in terms of a theory of natural information. On the Dretske-inspired view I defend, natural information is Factive and Nomic but is insufficient to determine the cognitive or biological content of a natural process. In sum I present an examination what natural information is and what role it can play in our understanding of living and thinking things. (shrink)

In my time at The Hastings Center, the projects I've worked on have intersected in fascinating ways, but one through line has impressed me as especially important: centering the experiences and needs of people and communities most affected by the issue at hand.

Pickeringet al’s paper argues that the capacity of the decision-maker is the sole consideration in whether a decision should stand, and that the risk of the decision should not be considered. This argument ignores the existence of the player who is of the view that a decision is not wise. This paper argues that patient autonomy is not the sole determinant of whether a person is able to make an unwise decision, particularly in healthcare where there are always others affected (...) by the patient decision. Rather than asserting that patients have an unfettered autonomous choice on clinical decisions this paper argues that these decisions should be looked at through the lens of quality in health care that has proposed four parameters to be balanced; the patient experience, wise use of resources, the effect on public health and the clinician experience. (shrink)

Christopher Nolan’s seems a spy thriller in which a government operative saves the world. As others have noted, it is in a larger sense about climate change—even though it mentions it but once. Where the film has been dismissed as not saying anything substantial, or even read as promoting an activist message, I argue it is most coherently interpreted as a reactionary defense of the status quo. The film is about a war between the present and future, its heroes those (...) who beat back time travelers trying to prevent us from destroying the planet. If audiences are not passive recipients of propaganda, but critical and cognitive, then blockbusters need to distract them from unavowable larger meanings by redirecting interpretive energies into the details; plot holes are not a bug, but a feature. The meticulous, puzzle-box construction of Nolan’s films, which encourages elaborate fan theorizing, distracts both viewers and Nolan himself from their ideological content. (shrink)

Strategies to increase influenza vaccination rates have typically targeted healthcare professionals and individuals in various high-risk groups such as the elderly. We argue that they should focus on increasing vaccination rates in children. Because children suffer higher influenza incidence rates than any other demographic group, and are major drivers of seasonal influenza epidemics, we argue that influenza vaccination strategies that serve to increase uptake rates in children are likely to be more effective in reducing influenza-related morbidity and mortality than those (...) targeting HCPs or the elderly. This is true even though influenza-related morbidity and mortality amongst children are low, except in the very young. Further, we argue that there are no decisive reasons to suppose that children-focused strategies are less ethically acceptable than elderly or HCP-focused strategies. (shrink)

Abstract:This article sets out two central theses. Both theses primarily involve a fundamental criticism of current contractarian business ethics (CBE), but if these can be sustained, they also constitute two boundary conditions for any future contractarian theory of business ethics. The first, which I label the self-discipline thesis, claims that current CBE would gain considerably in focus if more attention were paid to the logic of the social contract argument. By this I mean the aims set by the theorist and (...) method of reasoning by which normative conclusions are drawn in the contract model. The second, to which I refer as the domain-specificity thesis, argues that current CBE needs to be better adapted to its field of application and the specific goals which it aims to establish. I will substantiate these two theses on the basis of a comparative analysis of CBE with two earlier families of social contract theories. (shrink)

A recent critique of hierarchical Bayesian models of delusion argues that, contrary to a key assumption of these models, belief formation in the healthy (i.e., neurotypical) mind is manifestly non-Bayesian. Here we provide a deeper examination of the empirical evidence underlying this critique. We argue that this evidence does not convincingly refute the assumption that belief formation in the neurotypical mind approximates Bayesian inference. Our argument rests on two key points. First, evidence that purports to reveal the most damning violation (...) of Bayesian updating in human belief formation is counterweighted by substantial evidence that indicates such violations are the rare exception—not a common occurrence. Second, the remaining evidence does not demonstrate convincing violations of Bayesian inference in human belief updating; primarily because this evidence derives from study designs that produce results that are not obviously inconsistent with Bayesian principles. (shrink)

The paper is dealing with the foundation of the Division for German Literature and Language at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem from the point of view of its first head, Prof. Stéphane Mosès.

This paper investigates the logistics of crafting and accounting for animal realities on television. Using the case of The Making of David Attenborough’s Conquest of the Skies, a behind-the-scenes documentary about how the Sky TV series David Attenborough’s Conquest of the Skies was created, it explores how the material reality of animals becomes a televisual reality. In seeking to challenge the lingering concern within many media studies critiques of wildlife TV about the constructed and manipulated nature of televisual animals, we (...) propose an approach focused on how realities are provoked. This approach draws on recent debates within STS and screen theory about the contingent elements and accountability relations that become practically operative in making something real. Equally significant is the animal performer. How do the animals, often domesticated, that are used in television to simulate wildness or scientific facts participate in and resist the television apparatus? And how do these animal performances shape distinct animal–human relations and contact zones? (shrink)

"Here, for the first time, we have the work of a key pioneer presented in all its depth and range. The pragmatic and prophetic voice of Joseph Ben-David speaks with a power and a clarity that will win the attention of a new generation of scholars."--Arnold Thackray, University of Pennsylvania "A superb collection of brilliant papers by a pioneering mind of international fame, who did much to shape the sociology of science. In organizing this major work, its knowing editor, Gad (...) Freudenthal, has identified a remarkable sociological edifice that exhibits the theoretical coherence of Joseph Ben-David's many-sided and evolving contributions to the field."--Robert K. Merton, Columbia University. (shrink)

It has traditionally been assumed that organ donation must be altruistic, though the necessity of altruistic motivations has recently been questioned. Few, however, have questioned whether altruism is always a good motive. This paper considers the possibility that excessive altruism, or self-abnegation, may be intrinsically bad. How this may be so is illustrated with reference to Tom Hurka’s account of the value of attitudes, which suggests that disproportionate love of one’s own good—either excessive or deficient—is intrinsically bad. Whether or not (...) we accept the details of this account, recognising that altruistic motivations may be intrinsically bad has important implications for organ procurement. One possible response is to say that we should take further measures to ensure that donors have good motives—that they are altruistic is no longer enough. An alternative is to say that, since altruistic donation need not be intrinsically good, we have less reason to object to other motivations. (shrink)

In this paper we prove that from large cardinals it is consistent that there is a singular strong limit cardinal $\nu $ such that the singular cardinal hypothesis fails at $\nu $ and every collection of fewer than $\operatorname {\mathrm {cf}}(\nu )$ stationary subsets of $\nu ^{+}$ reflects simultaneously. For $\operatorname {\mathrm {cf}}(\nu )> \omega $, this situation was not previously known to be consistent. Using different methods, we reduce the upper bound on the consistency strength of this situation for (...) $\operatorname {\mathrm {cf}}(\nu ) = \omega $ to below a single partially supercompact cardinal. The previous upper bound of infinitely many supercompact cardinals was due to Sharon. (shrink)

This article responds to an argument from Katarzyna de Ladari-Radek and Peter Singer in their article, "The Objectivity of Ethics and the Unity of Practical Reason.".

Environmental philosophies concerning our obligations to each other and the natural world too rarely address the aftermath of environmental injustice. Ideally we would never do each other wrong; given that we do, as fallible and imperfect agents, we require non-ideal ethical guidance. Margaret Walker’s work on moral repair and Annette Baier’s work on cross-generational communality together provide useful hermeneutical tools for understanding and enacting meaningful responses to intergenerational injustice, and in particular, for anthropogenic climate change. By blending Baier’s cross-generational approach (...) with Walker’s emphasis on victim subjectivity and moral repair, I propose that a reparative model of intergenerational justice can provide some much needed direction on non-ideal moral issues comparatively neglected in climate-ethics debates today. (shrink)

The sensation-perception distinction did not appear before the seventeenth century, but since then various formulations of it have gained wide acceptance. This is not an historical accident and the article suggests an explanation for its appearance. Section 1 describes a basic assumption underlying the sensation-perception distinction, to wit, the postulation of a pure sensory stage--viz. sensation--devoid of active influence of the agent's cognitive, emotional, and evaluative frameworks. These frameworks are passive in that stage. I call this postulation the passivity assumption. (...) Section 2 suggests three major reasons for the emergence of this assumption in the seventeenth century: the mental-physical gap, the causal theory of perception, and epistemological considerations regarding the status of the sensory given. In the last section a critical discussion is presented. The passivity assumption is found to have serious empirical and theoretical flaws. (shrink)

This essay engages the question whether it makes sense to talk about friendship between human beings and robots. Encountering the question of human and robot friendship, many might initially dismiss the possibility of such relationships out of hand. But such dismissals, it seems, based solely on the basis of species membership, are nothing more than unjustifiable speciesism. Mitias’s analysis of friendship is helpful, but makes the conditions for friendship demanding. Nevertheless, his framework implies that human and robot friendships are possible.

Educators continue to struggle with how masculinities are performed and regulated in spaces of learning. In a time of rapid social change, there is a renewed impetus for gender justice reform in schooling, though these approaches themselves remain a shifting picture. Adding a new layer of complexity, we are now witness to educational policy recommendations around surveillance which are designed to counteract boys’ and young men’s vulnerabilities to be radicalised into the misogynies of the ‘manosphere’. These recommendations exist despite limited (...) research and significant gaps in our understanding regarding both the manosphere as well as the emotional lives of young men. The article intentionally shifts the conversation from reactive surveillance in schools to educative gender justice approaches. We focus, in particular, on the significance of ‘pedagogic discomfort’ in terms of fostering gender transformative dialogue which is critical of ideas associated with the manosphere. We consider how a constructive dialogue might be fostered with a particular focus on pedagogies that recognise the emotional intensities of gender justice work. (shrink)

The value of ecological restoration has seen considerable criticism and defense in environmental ethics over the past thirty years. Proponents stress the human and ecological benefits of restoration projects at their best; critics characterize restoration as impossible, arbitrary, domination or delusional. As ethical debates on ecological restoration developed and sometimes threatened to devolve into scholastic quibbling, pragmatists contributed a welcome perspective, as Light and others urged that those investigating restoration attend to its publicly relevant aspects. Most recently...

Two theses are proposed; regarding the future evolution of the value systems of advanced AGI systems. The Value Learning Thesis is a semi-formalized version of the idea that; if an AGI system is taught human values in an interactive and experiential way as its intelligence increases toward human level; it will likely adopt these human values in a genuine way. The Value Evolution Thesis is a semi-formalized version of the idea that if an AGI system begins with human-like values; and (...) then iteratively modifies itself; it will end up in roughly the same future states as a population of human beings engaged with progressively increasing their own intelligence. Taken together; these theses suggest a worldview in which raising young AGIs to have human-like values is a sensible thing to do; and likely to produce a future that is generally desirable in a human sense. While these two theses are far from definitively proven; I argue that they are more solid and more relevant to the actual future of AGI than Bostrom’s “Instrumental Convergence Thesis” and “Orthogonality Thesis” which are core to the basis of his argument for fearing ongoing AGI development and placing AGI R&D under strict governmental control. In the context of fleshing out this argument; previous publications and discussions by Richard Loosemore and Kaj Sotala are discussed in some detail. (shrink)

Modern Western society has framed fashion in opposition to hegemonic masculinity. However, fashion functions as a principal means by which men’s visible gender identities are established as not only different from women but also from other men. This article draws on the concept of hybrid masculinities and on wardrobe interviews with Canadian men across social identities to explore how men enact masculinities through dress. I illustrate three ways men do hybrid masculinities by selecting, styling, and wearing clothing in their everyday (...) lives. The differences between these three hybrid masculine configurations of practice are based on the extent to which men’s personal and professional social identities were associated with hegemonic masculine ideals as well as the extent to which those ideals shaped the settings in which they were situated. Although participants had different constellations of gender privilege, they all used dress to reinforce hegemonic masculinity, gain social advantages, and subsequently preserve the gender order. Failing to do so could put them personally and professionally at risk. My research nuances the hybrid masculinities framework by demonstrating how its enactment is shaped by the intersection between men’s social identities and social contexts. (shrink)

This article argues that Rawlsian liberal political institutions are incapable of ensuring that the basic welfare needs of the worst off are met. This argument consists of two steps. First, I show that institutions are incapable of ensuring that the basic needs of the worst off are met without pursuing certain non-taxation-based courses of action that are designed to alter the work choices of citizens. Second, I argue that such actions are not permissible for Rawlsian institutions. It follows that a (...) state governed by a Rawls-type political conception of justice is parasitic on the willingness of citizens to be sufficiently motivated by concern for the worst off, but it cannot require or even encourage them to be so motivated. (shrink)

Coupled with the ‘smart city’, the idea of the ‘smart school’ is emerging in imaginings of the future of education. Various commercial, governmental and civil society organizations now envisage education as a highly coded, software-mediated and data-driven social institution. Such spaces are to be governed through computational processes written in computer code and tracked through big data. In an original analysis of developments from commercial, governmental and civil society sectors, the article examines two interrelated dimensions of an emerging smart schools (...) imaginary: the constant flows of digital data that smart schools depend on and the mobilization of analytics that enable student data to be used to anticipate and shape their behaviours; and the ways that young people are educated to become ‘computational operatives’ who must ‘learn to code’ in order to become ‘smart citizens’ in the governance of the smart city. These developments constitute an emerging educational space fabricated from intersecting standards, technologies, discourses and social actors, all infused with the aspirations of technical experts to govern the city at a distance through both monitoring young people as ‘data objects’ and schooling them as active ‘computational citizens’ with the responsibility to compute the future of the city. (shrink)

Opponents of legalised assisted dying often assert that palliative care is worse in countries where assisted dying has been legalised, and imply that legalised assisted dying makes palliative care worse. This study considers five versions of this claim: that it is difficulty to access expert palliative care in countries where assisted dying has been legalised, that those countries rank low in their quality of end‐of‐life care; that legalising assisted dying doesn't expand patient choice in respect of palliative care; that growth (...) in palliative care services has stalled in countries where assisted dying has been legalised; and that legalised assisted dying impedes the growth of palliative care or causes it to decline. In each case, it concludes that neither argumentation nor evidence supports these claims. (shrink)

Call the conventionalist challenge to natural rights theory the claim that natural rights theory fails to capture the fact that moral rights are shaped by social and legal convention. While the conventionalist challenge is a natural concern, it is less than clear what this challenge amounts to. This paper aims to develop a clear formulation strong enough to put pressure on the natural rights theorist and precise enough to clarify what an adequate response would require.

Most scholarly interpretations of Hannah Arendt's political writings account for her idiosyncratic understanding of politics and freedom in one of two ways. They interpret Arendt's more sensational claims about politics either literally or figuratively, but not in both ways. This essay proposes a new interpretation of Arendt's political writings based on a neglected, dichotomous pattern of metaphors in her collected works. That pattern, once mapped, yields insights into the meaning, applications, and limitations of Arendt's controversial political ideals and rhetoric. Neither (...) a wholly literal nor a wholly figurative interpretation will do; I propose a reading that makes use of both strategies and gives Arendt her due while acknowledging her challenges. (shrink)

We prove that the definition of supersimplicity in metric structures from [Ben Yaacov, Uncountable dense categoricity in cats] is equivalent to an textit{a priori} stronger variant. This stronger variant is then used to prove that if $T$ is a supersimple Hausdorff cat then so is its theory of lovely pairs.

We prove that for every simple theory $T$ (or even simple thick compact abstract theory) there is a (unique) compact abstract theory $T^fP$ whose saturated models are the lovely pairs of $T$. Independence-theoretic results that were proved in [Ben Yaacov, Pillay, Vassiliev - Lovely pairs of models] when $T^fP$ is a first order theory are proved for the general case: in particular $T^fP$ is simple and we characterise independence.

This article highlights a somewhat neglected aspect of love : their complexity. We suggest distinguishing between three major related types of emotional complexity: emotional diversity, emotional ambivalence, and emotional behavior. The notion of emotional complexity has far-reaching implications for understanding emotions and our wellbeing. This is illustrated by examining the notion of emotional complexity in two common yet complex phenomena in the romantic realm: romantic compromises and polyamory.

In Bernard Stiegler’s Automatic Society Volume 1: The Future of Work, ‘the impossible’ and ‘the improbable’ appear as explicit parts of his political project. In his philosophy of technology, the impossible highlights the structural incompleteness that technics imparts to human existence. This article will trace how Stiegler draws on the work of Maurice Blanchot to produce this conjunction between technics and indetermination, and explore its political ramifications. This will show that rather than being a recent aspect of Stiegler’s work, the (...) political use of the impossible brings Blanchot’s subterranean influence to the fore. After briefly reconstructing Blanchot’s understanding of language, impersonality, and writing, it will be shown that Stiegler shifts Blanchot’s emphasis from the impossible to technical practices of the improbable. Stiegler follows an anthropological line where the experience of the impossible becomes a more general understanding of the experience of improbability through technical structures. Stiegler’s reading of Blanchot is central in his break with the place of the impossible in the politics of resistance advocated by post-structuralism, allowing him to support a politics of invention which makes space for the improbable within a large-scale politics of technicity, rather than privileging indeterminacy itself. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 25, Issue 2, pp 256 - 278 Rabbi Abraham Isaac Ha-Cohen Kook’s essay “The War” is a text of immense importance with respect to the development of ideological militaristic writing in religious Zionism. The essay was first published in the book _Orot me-Ofel_, edited by R. Kook’s son, Rabbi Zvi Yehudah Kook. In this study, I wish to distinguish the views presented in the notebooks and collected writings of R. Kook from his position as set forth in (...) the edited essay, which bears the stamp of the editor’s interpretation. Nine of the essay’s ten passages were written during World War I, and only the first passage, which bears the theological-militant stamp, does not appear in the collections of manuscripts from which the essay was constructed. My aim is to trace how R. Zvi Yehudah edited the essay and to explore the important influence of this passage. (shrink)

Reading noir and Lacan together can establish a structural corollary between the function of the signifier 'noir' in film criticism and the retroactive function of the point de capiton in Lacan's theory of language. Furthermore, at a narrative level, the function of the point de capiton can also be found in the retroactive constructions of film noir flashbacks. It is therefore possible to say that a retroactive 'noir temporality' is also the temporality of the Symbolic order. This article explores the (...) way in which the signifier 'noir' enables the analysis of a certain type of 1940s Hollywood film, and how a noir film such as Double Indemnity (Billy Wilder, 1944) is concerned with the retroactive production of knowledge through narrative structure. (shrink)

In his very early work, Heidegger was already fascinated by the problem of time, which became more and more radicalized in his thinking. The experience of time, and its connection to the status of philosophical concepts, forms the background of Heidegger’s reading of Paul in his 1920-21 lecture course, 'Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion.' In discussing the peculiarity of philosophical concepts, Heidegger points out that their uncertainty is by no means accidental, but is in fact endemic to them. This (...) amounts to a definitive step away from the Platonic, Cartesian and Hegelian tradition and its ideal of certainty. In this article the author begins by presenting Heidegger’s description of the phenomenon of time. Then he presents his reformulation of the status of philosophical concepts, and he ends by showing how this is present in Heidegger’s analysis of the letters of Saint Paul. Especially in Heidegger’s interpretation of the letters to the Thessalonians, he shows how the actualization of factical life is understood on the basis of the ‘parousia,’ the second coming of Christ. An essential moment of the orientation of factical life appears in the articulation of the actualization of the lived life; this is historicality. The meaning of human existence appears in existence as historicality. The way in which factical life lives time is the actualization of historicality. (shrink)

In this article the author presents a comment on Ludwig Heyde’s last book. This book on autonomy, transcendence and mortality was published a few days before he died. Heyde analyses the concept of autonomy, transcendence and mortality from a philosophical point of view. He especially pays a lot of attention to the notion of mortality. Here, he tends to strengthen the Kantian postulate of immortality by giving it an ontological claim. But what kind of “being” can we ascribe to what (...) on the other side of death counts for the immortals? Isn’t this a question about the relation between philosophy and religion? Many philosophers tend to approach religion in a reductionistic way. By their point of departure they ignore beforehand the specific religious aspects of life. But isn't it the task for philosophy to approach religion in such a way that religion preserves its specificity? To achieve this, maybe it is also necessary to ascribe ontological claims to religious truth. With his concept of transcendence Heyde approaches religion not in a reductionistic way. However the question remains whether philosophy can do justice to religious truth. Since religion is, as Heyde says in the beginning of his study, sui generis, can philosophy ever do justice to it? Or is religion neutralised by philosophy beforehand? This book therefore, leaves us behind with the question: can philosophy do justice to religion? (shrink)