Cosmopolitics, the concept of a world politics based on shared democratic values, is in an increasingly fragile state.

Among the different interpretations of the philosophy of Schelling, there is no doubt that the ones developed by Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers played a prominent role within the most recent Schelling scholarship. Both Heidegger and Jaspers focused on Schelling’s discourse on freedom, pointing out the fundamental incompatibility of its key elements, i.e. ‘ground’ and ‘existence’, as well as the fallacious conception of Seynsfuge that emerges from it. Moreover, Heidegger argues that Schelling’s ontology ultimately falls back into traditional metaphysical subjectivism, (...) ignoring the question of Being as such and in fact paving the way to nihilism. Similarly, Jaspers criticizes Schelling’s arbitrary account of the relation between freedom and existential being and his misleading conception of transcendence. However, I argue against Jaspers that Schelling’s discourse on freedom must be read as a philosophy of immanence, which aims at maintaining the concreteness of the concepts and at avoiding any form of transcendence. Consequently, I also argue against Heidegger that not only does Schelling’s discourse successfully show the compatibility of ground and existence, but that Schelling’s understanding of the ‘subject’ does not comply with Heidegger’s notion of ‘metaphysical subjectivism’ and is immune to Heidegger’s criticism. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper offers an opportunity to ponder the way the Catholic Church and its methods of information control reshaped, and paradoxically even enabled, the dissemination and practice of science in early modern Italy. Focusing on the activities of Newtonian scholars operating in Rome in the First half of the eighteenth century – especially the Celestine monk Celestino Galiani and prelate Francesco Bianchini – I will argue that major contributions to the spread of Newtonianism in Italy came from individuals operating within (...) the Church, acting more-or-less independently from the Church’s oversight. These scholars realized they were witnessing an inexorable transition and that the medieval scholastic cosmology and physics could not survive. In order to rescue the Church – and to avoid further embarrassment, especially after the Galileo Affair – renewal was needed. Counterintuitively, the dissemination of Italian Newtonianism was largely a Catholic effort. (shrink)

In this article I reconstruct the philosophical conditions for the emergence of the notion of counter-conduct within the framework of Michel Foucault’s study of governmentality, and I explore the reasons for its disappearance after 1978. In particular, I argue that the concept of conduct becomes crucial for Foucault in order to redefine governmental power relations as specific ways to conduct the conduct of individuals: it is initially within this context that, in Security, Territory, Population, he rethinks the problem of resistance (...) in terms of counter-conduct. However, a few months later, in What is Critique?, Foucault replaces the notion of counter-conduct with that of critical attitude, defined as the particular form that counter-conduct takes in modern times. This notion allows him to highlight the role played by the will in resistance to governmental strategies. But since the notion of counter-conduct is conceptually wider than that of critical attitude, I suggest in conclusion that it could be worth reactivating it as a “historical category which, in various forms and with diverse objectives, runs through the whole of Western history.”. (shrink)

In this paper, I focus on the concept of intuition in Schelling’s philosophy. More specifically, I show how Schelling attributes to intuition an ontological value by essentially relating it to freedom and primal Being. Indeed, for Schelling intuition is both the main instrument of philosophy and the highest product of freedom, by which we attain the so-called “God’s-eye point of view” and concretely grasp things in their immediate existence. That is, through intuition it is possible to grasp the absolute and (...) original unity of the principles, namely of being and thought, subject and object and freedom and necessity. Accordingly, I argue that Schelling’s conception of intuition, rather being a merely theoretical speculation, is aimed at demonstrating the immanent nature of Being, which is one of the key points in Schelling’s philosophy. (shrink)

This paper addresses Frege's discussion of illogical thought in the introduction to Basic Laws of Arithmetic. After a brief introduction, I discuss Frege's claims that logic is normative vis-à-vis thought, and not descriptive, and his opposition to the idea that logical laws express psychological necessities. I argue that these two strands of Frege's polemic against psychologism constitute two motivating factors behind his allowing for the possibility of illogical thought. I then explore a line of thought—originally advanced by Joan Weiner—according to (...) which Frege should have rejected illogical thought as not constituting a genuine possibility. I argue that, once developed, this line of thought constitutes an important correction (moreover, one that is consistent with his two aforementioned anti-psychologistic strands) to Frege's own response to the possibility of illogical thought. -/- . (shrink)

Dans tous les pays et particulierement en Europe, les citoyens, les magistrats et les juristes en general deplorent la complexite normative. Comment traiter la complexite des normes a prendre en compte dans toutes les decisions fondees sur la regle de droit? Depuis une quinzaine d'annees, l'etude des systemes complexes a fait de grands progres tant du point de vue des methodes que de la modelisation. L'approche politique et l'approche scientifique semblent a priori eloignees, mais elles convergent sur l'interet de prendre (...) en compte un objet nouveau: la complexite des systemes. Ces systemes font emerger de nouvelles proprietes, non observables au niveau des elements constitutifs, par une dynamique difficilement previsible, et rendent vaine toute analyse en sous-systemes plus simples. Pour la premiere fois, des specialistes des systemes complexes, des juristes, des philosophes, des experts de l'action publique et de l'evaluation des lois conjuguent leurs reflexions pour depasser les problematiques de la simplification et proposent des concepts et des outils totalement nouveaux pour comprendre et traiter de facon simple l'inevitable complexite du droit. (shrink)

Previous research has identified several factors (such as remuneration, workload, negative perceptions of criminal defendants) which may lead to a barrister not acting in the defendant's best interests, when advising on plea or engaging in plea bargaining. This article applies aspects of the principal – agent problem to the relationship between defence barristers and defendants in England and Wales in order to analyse the extent to which incentives can align the interests of the agent (the barrister) with those of the (...) principal (the defendant) in order to prevent moral hazard caused by the agent's competing interests. Coercive, material and moral incentives are considered, and the role of the solicitor and the significance of the barrister's reputation are also discussed. It is argued that none of the forms of incentive which would traditionally reduce the risk of moral hazard do so to any great extent in the barrister – defendant relationship, and that this is due in part to the complexity of the overlapping principal – agent dynamics within which the barrister – defendant relationship lies. (shrink)

RESUMO As elites simbólicas perpetuam as formas mais importantes de racismo, o que aponta a importância de nos dedicarmos à análise de como discursos racistas são construídos, com foco específico no discurso da elite branca e, neste trabalho, da branquitude soteropolitana conforme plasmada por estudantes da Universidade Federal da Bahia. Para tanto, reunimos dados, gerados na UFBA, oriundos de questionários abertos e grupo focal com estudantes de graduação. Nesta análise discursiva crítica, utilizamos recorte de uma pesquisa mais ampla, na qual (...) se investigou a percepção da branquitude por discentes autodeclarados/as brancos/as da UFBA. Nossa análise sugere que a percepção do privilégio branco, mesmo quando afirmada, é permeada de ideias que podem fundamentar práticas e/ou discursos racistas, e que a representação de mulheres negras ainda é calcada em estereótipos socialmente construídos numa sociedade fortemente racista como a nossa. ABSTRACT Symbolic elites perpetuate the most critical forms of racism, which points to the importance of the analysis of how racist discourses are constructed, with a specific focus on the white elite. In this paper, the focus is Bahia's capital whiteness as shaped by students at the Federal University of Bahia. For this, we gathered data, generated at UFBA, from open questionnaires and a focus group with undergraduate students. For this critical discursive analysis, we used a section of a broader research, in which the perception of whiteness by self-declared white students from UFBA was investigated. Our analysis suggests that the understanding of white privilege is permeated with ideas that can support racist practices and discourses, and that the representation of black women is still based on socially constructed stereotypes in an actively racist society such as ours. (shrink)

Despite considerable differences, Stanley Cavell and Jean-Luc Nancy share the demand for a renewal of thinking produced through and with the concept of the world. Their articulation of the legacy bequeathed by Heidegger and Wittgenstein begins with an understanding of the world in excess of knowledge and insists on this impossible mastery as the most productive incentive for thinking. Inasmuch as philosophy has understood itself as producer of worldviews, systems and principle, philosophy has constantly suppressed the thinking of the world, (...) for any worldview absorbs and dissolves the world in its vision. For both Cavell and Nancy an insistence on this suppression leads to an emphasis on film. Two gestures can be said to intertwine in their thinking of film: to recapture our relation to the world as one that is not based on knowing as certainty, but on the reception of the singular; to recapture thinking as that which is attracted and called for by the insurgence of the singular, by the seam in experience. Nancy and Cavell reverse the idea of cinema as completing the regime of representation stressing how cinema produces a step away from thinking as representation in view of what the article names thinking as patience. The article concludes by asking: what does it mean for philosophy to understand itself as patience? (shrink)

A groundbreaking examination of Michel Foucault's history of truth. Many blame Michel Foucault for our post-truth and conspiracy-laden society. In this provocative work, Daniele Lorenzini argues that such criticism fundamentally misunderstands the philosopher’s project. Foucault did not question truth itself but what Lorenzini calls “the force of truth,” or how some truth claims are given the power to govern our conduct while others are not. This interest, Lorenzini shows, drove Foucault to articulate a new ethics and politics of truth-telling (...) precisely in order to evade the threat of relativism. The Force of Truth explores this neglected dimension of Foucault’s project by putting his writings on regimes of truth and parrhesia in conversation with early analytic philosophy and by drawing out the “possibilizing” elements of Foucault’s genealogies that remain vital for practicing critique today. (shrink)

This paper studies the interaction between savagean uncertainty and time preferences. We introduce a variation of the discounted subjective expected utility model, where time preferences are state dependent. Before uncertainty is resolved, the individual is unsure about the discount factor that will be used, even when evaluating certain payoffs. The model can account for the present bias and diminishing impatience, even if the future is discounted geometrically. The present bias disappears when the immediate payoff becomes uncertain. Although preferences are not (...) stationary, choices may be time consistent. (shrink)

In view of the concern with the insertion of critical environmental education in school, we seek theoretical-methodological contributions in critical historical pedagogy. In this sense, this article will address theoretical reflections that are born within the “Grupo de Pesquisa em Educação Ambiental” - Unesp-Bauru and that were issued during the 1st Symposium on Dialectical Historical Materialism and Research on Science Education and Environmental Education. Thus, we approach the question of the content of critical environmental education from the curriculum design of (...) critical historical pedagogy. Despite the question of the content and form of Environmental Education being present since its origins, we understand that the indepth debate on what should be its content in the school context is still absent. In this sense, assuming the school insertion of critical Environmental Education as the core of the curriculum is a way to overcome its limitations in theory and practice for the human formation necessary for social transformation. (shrink)

Consider two entities x and y, and a relation R which holds among them. Is R’s existence accountable merely in terms of the non relational properties exhibited by x and y, once they interact? Or, is it more appropriate to say that R is independent of x and y, and these acquire sets of relational properties because of their being related through R? In case the former option obtains, the existence of relations is reducible to the relevant properties of the (...) related terms. As a consequence, some version of antirealism or eliminativism towards relations turns out to be true. Otherwise they are irreducible, and ontological analysis cannot be dispensed with relations treated as basic or primitive entities. The first section of my paper provides a framework for handling ontological facts about relations. I will address the assessment of the notions of internal and external relations by K. Mulligan. In the second section I will put my cards on the table. My purpose is to defend a Moorean approach to relations, i.e. both internal and external relations exist. I will briefly outline my methodology, and I will comment on the kind of evidence usually referred to in the debate. My view is that evolutionary research on groups behavior may play an important role. In the third section of the paper I will show that commonsense intuitions on relationships among human beings endorse an external reading of relations. My claim is supported by notorious examples drawn from literature. In the final section I will consider whether evolutionary research on human prosociality provides an empirical setting for the assessment of the commonsense understanding of (at least some) relations in terms of externality. I expand such setting to include behaviors of social animal in general (i.e., animals whose behaviors depends on groups’ hierarchy), and I advance a few reason why empirical research needs postulating the independent existence of relations. (shrink)

I In this paper, we investigate the nature of empirical hypotheses used in scientific reasoning and the act of formulating hypotheses. This is achieved through a novel logical framework in which we provide specific semantics for two types of hypotheses: a strong and a weak sense of hypothesis, each characterized by different logical structures. This framework enables us to better characterize certain aspects of hypothetical reasoning in scientific practice, especially when we attempt to rationally deny the content of an empirical (...) hypothesis. (shrink)

In the original Ulam-Rényi game with _m_ lies/errors, Player I chooses a secret number \({\bar{x}}\) in a finite search space _S_, and Player II must guess \({\bar{x}}\) by adaptively asking Player I a minimum number of binary questions. Up to _m_ answers may be mendacious/erroneous or may be distorted before reaching Player II. In his monograph “Fault-Tolerant Search Algorithms. Reliable Computation with Unreliable Information”, F. Cicalese provides a comprehensive account of many models of the game and their applications in error-correcting (...) coding with noiseless feedback. Since for \(m>0\) lies the game is not called off by contradictory answers, and repeated answers to the same question are more informative than single answers, the underlying logic of the game with _m_ lies is not boolean. Indeed, the logic of Rényi-Ulam games is Łukasiewicz infinite-valued logic Ł \(_\infty \). In this paper we consider Ulam-Rényi games with variable numbers of lies over infinite search spaces. We characterize the MV-algebras and the unital Specker \(\ell \) -groups given by the logic of these games. (shrink)

L’œuvre de Bruno Goosse Classement diagonal exemplifie la tendance qui consiste, pour certains artistes contemporains, à entreprendre des enquêtes proches des recherches menées en sciences humaines, et particulièrement en histoire. Au travers d’une démarche spécifique, Classement diagonal questionne les processus de valorisation, de conservation et de patrimonialisation diversifiés qui ont affecté le champ de bataille de Waterloo, depuis 1815. L’exploration minutieuse conduite par Bruno Goosse pendant près de trois années a autorisé trois formes de présentation – une installation, un livre, (...) une conférence – qui, chacune à leur manière et non sans humour, font progresser la réflexion sur les mécanismes et les enjeux de la patrimonialisation, comme sur le régime d’historicité qui est celui de notre époque. L’artiste belge, s’il s’attelle à une étude historique, ne le fait pas en savant, affublé d’une autorité institutionnelle ou d’une accréditation universitaire, mais en amateur. Cette situation inconfortable lui permet d’interroger les idées reçues quant aux délimitations des arts et de la science, de la raison et de l’imagination, de la forme et du fond…. (shrink)

In this paper I take the opportunity of the recent publication of Pieranna Garavaso’s and Nicla Vassallo’s Frege on Thinking and Its Epistemic Significance (with whose main tenets this paper is in constant dialogue) to provide an overview of some important components of Frege’s conception of logic. Section 1 discusses Frege’s view that the task of logic is to provide justification for what we think, and in sections 2 and 3 this idea is shown to play a central role in (...) his anti-psychologistic view that logic is normative for thinking. Section 4 offers a survey of Frege’s manifold conception of thinking. Finally, section 5 discusses the rela-tions between thinking and language in Frege’s philosophy. (shrink)

In his recent John Locke Lectures, Robert Brandom defends a view of pragmatism as an extension of the classical project of semantic analysis powerful enough as to incorporate not only relations among meanings, but also, and more fundamentally, relations among meaning and use. The paper explores one of the core aspects of this project – the relation between modal, normative, and empirical vocabularies. Brandom’ focus on a general semantics for non-logical vocabularies intends to meet and answer the empiricist concerns about (...) the intelligibility of modal concepts, which are themselves couched in a modal metavocabulary. Brandom’s purpose is to show that, in using ordinary empirical vocabulary, «in order to be able to talk at all, to make claims and inferences, one must already know how to do everything necessary in principle to deploy modal and normative vocabulary». This is the so-called «Kant-Sellars thesis». In the first part, I present the general framework of analytic pragmatism, the rationale for that project, and its normative foundation. Although the project is in continuity with the goal, pursued in Making It Explicit, of explaining inferential semantics in terms of a normative pragmatics, more structure is added, which clarifies the foundation of the overall enterprise. In the second part, I focus on some objections to the complementary structure of normative and modal vocabularies, and defend a different interpretation of its foundational structure. The goal is to show the modal vocabulary underlies the conceivability and the very inferential practices in which normative vocabulary is involved. (shrink)

We study a strong enumeration reducibility, called bounded enumeration reducibility and denoted by ≤be, which is a natural extension of s-reducibility ≤s. We show that ≤s, ≤be, and enumeration reducibility do not coincide on the \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\Pi^0_1}$$\end{document} –sets, and the structure \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\boldsymbol{\mathcal{D}_{\rm be}}}$$\end{document} of the be-degrees is not elementarily equivalent to the structure of the s-degrees. We show also that the first order theory (...) of \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\boldsymbol{\mathcal{D}_{\rm be}}}$$\end{document} is computably isomorphic to true second order arithmetic: this answers an open question raised by Cooper (Z Math Logik Grundlag Math 33:537–560, 1987). (shrink)

This paper explores the intertwining of uncertainty and values. We consider an important but underexplored field of fundamental uncertainty and values in decision-making. Some proposed methodologies to deal with fundamental uncertainty have included potential surprise theory, scenario planning and hypothetical retrospection. We focus on the principle of uncertainty transduction in hypothetical retrospection as an illustrative case of how values interact with fundamental uncertainty. We show that while uncertainty transduction appears intuitive in decision contexts it nevertheless fails in important ranges of (...) strategic game-theoretic cases. The methodological reasons behind the failure are then examined. (shrink)

The beliefs involved in the placebo effect are often assumed to be self-fulfilling, that is, the truth of these beliefs would merely require the patient to hold them. Such a view is commonly shared in epistemology. Many epistemologists focused, in fact, on the self-fulfilling nature of these beliefs, which have been investigated because they raise some important counterexamples to Nozick’s “tracking theory of knowledge.” We challenge the self-fulfilling nature of placebo-based beliefs in multi-agent contexts, analyzing their deep epistemological nature and (...) the role of higher-order beliefs involved in the placebo effect. (shrink)

For the first time in print, this article reports passages from John Rawls’s graduate papers and annotations on books and manuscripts from his personal library. The analysis of this material shows the historical inaccuracy of the widespread assumption that Rawls’s philosophy owes very little to American pragmatism. Peirce’s notion of truth, as well as the holistic critique of pragmatism thatMortonWhite began in the late 1940s, prove significant at the very beginning of Rawls’s philosophical enterprise. In the light of this material, (...) it might be argued that Rawls’s elaboration of ‘reflective equilibrium’ started at least in part as an attempt to overcome the pending problems of pragmatism. (shrink)

We discuss the hints for the disappearance of continuum space and time at microscopic scale. These include arguments for a discrete nature of them or for a fundamental non-locality, in a quantum theory of gravity. We discuss how these ideas are realized in specific quantum gravity approaches. Turning then the problem around, we consider the emergence of continuum space and time from the collective behaviour of discrete, pre-geometric atoms of quantum space, and for understanding spacetime as a kind of “condensate”, (...) and we present the case for this emergence process being the result of a phase transition, dubbed “geometrogenesis”. We discuss some conceptual issues of this scenario and of the idea of emergent spacetime in general. As a concrete example, we outline the GFT framework for quantum gravity, and illustrate a tentative procedure for the emergence of spacetime in this framework. Last, we re-examine the conceptual issues raised by the emergent spacetime scenario in light of this concrete example. (shrink)

Conant argued that the epistemology of logic developed in the Tractatus is self-undermining, like Frege’s, because it contends that contradictions are nonsense. The difference between them is that Wittgenstein is deliberately self-undermining: the theory of the Tractatus is “a structure of thought which is designed to undermine itself” (1992, 97). I offer a comparison between Wittgenstein’s and Frege’s terminologies to argue that Wittgenstein held, like Frege, that contradictions are impossible to assert but not nonsense. Thus, the theory of the Tractatus (...) is not self-undermining. (shrink)