ABSTRACT ‘Facts remain robust only when … supported by a common culture,’ observes Bruno Latour. Current debates over the veracity of climate change are, in actuality, crises of facts. Questions of facticity have, moreover, precipitated a deeper issue – the prospects of unshared, ‘alternative’ worlds. Climate science believers have one world, climate change deniers another, creating what Latour calls ‘epistemological delirium.’ Following Latour, the paper turns to Pierre Hadot’s description of Stoic physics and understanding of philosophy as spiritual exercise. Finally, (...) taking up both Latour’s claims of ‘alternative worlds’ and Hadot’s notion of spiritual exercise, this paper explores the possibilities of shared practices in light of unshared realities. (shrink)

We thank Nielsen Busch and Mjaaland for their article on the dead donor rule (Nielsen Busch and Mjaaland 2023). We would like to take this opportunity to go beyond the dead donor rule in order to r...

The surviving sources on the Stoic theory of division reveal that the Stoics, particularly Chrysippus, believed that bodies, places and times were such that all of their parts themselves had proper parts. That is, bodies, places and times were composed of gunk. This realisation helps solve some long-standing puzzles about the Stoic theory of mixture and the Stoic attitude to the present.

We often think about the alternatives to a decision that has been made. Thinking in this way is known as counterfactual thinking, that is, thinking about what could have been had an alternative dec...

Increasingly, physicians are being asked to provide technical services that many believe are morally wrong or inconsistent with their beliefs about the meaning and purposes of medicine. This controversy has sparked persistent debate over whether practitioners should be permitted to decline participation in a variety of legal practices, most notably physician-assisted suicide and abortion. These debates have become heavily politicized, and some of the key words and phrases are being used without a clear understanding of their meaning. In this essay, (...) I endeavor, firstly, to clarify the meaning of some of these terms: conscience, conscientious action, professional judgment, conscientious objection, conscience clauses, civil disobedience, and tolerance. I argue that use of the term conscientious objection to describe these refusals by health care professionals is mistaken and confusing. Secondly, relying on a proper understanding of the moral and technical character of medical judgment, the optimal deference that the state and markets ought to have toward professions, and general principles of Lockean tolerance for a diversity of practices and persons in a flourishing, pluralistic, democratic society, I offer a defense of tolerance with respect to the deeply held convictions of physicians and other health care professionals who hold minority views on contested but legal medical practices. (shrink)

Horan offers a substantial challenge to the narrative of radical orthodoxy's idiosyncratic take on Scotus and his role in ushering in the philosophical age of the modern. This volume not only corrects the received account of Scotus but opens a constructive way forward toward a positive assessment and appropriation of Scotus's work for contemporary theology. --Book cover.

My article, “Whole-brain death and integration: Realigning the ontological concept with clinical diagnostic tests”.

One of the most important questions in the debate over the morality of euthanasia and assisted suicide is whether an important distinction between killing patients and allowing them to die exists. The U.S. Supreme Court, in rejecting challenges to the constitutionality of laws prohibiting physician-assisted suicide, explicitly invoked this distinction, but did not explicate or defend it. The Second Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals had previously asserted, also without argument, that no meaningful distinction exists between killing and allowing (...) to die. That court had reasoned that if this were so, it would be discriminatory to allow persons on life support to end their lives by removing such treatment, while those who are not connected to life support would be denied similar access to death. (shrink)

Prestigious University is a large, private educational institution with a medical school, a university hospital, a law school, and graduate and undergraduate colleges all on a single campus. In the face of the Covid‐19 pandemic, students were told during spring break to return to campus only briefly to retrieve their belongings. Classes then went online. On March 23, 2020, the faculty, students, and staff were emailed the following by the university's director of infection control and public health: We have become (...) aware that a Prestigious University staff member has tested positive for the virus that causes Covid‐19. The individual, who was last on campus on March 16, is now in isolation at their permanent residence and is doing well clinically. The university has already identified those members of our community who may have been in close contact with this individual, and we are working to notify them. Further, this individual's local health department has a protocol for identifying people who have been in direct contact with anyone testing positive for Covid‐19 (such as this Prestigious University staff member) so that they can self‐quarantine and watch for COVID‐19 symptoms for a period of 14 days from their last contact with the infected individual.A professor in the Philosophy Department has asked the ethicists at the medical school whether such contact tracing suffices. “Don't the members of the community deserve to know who this is? Isn't there a mandate to identify this person in order to maximize public health benefits and slow the spread of this deadly virus?”. (shrink)

Abstract:Arguments against physicians’ claims of a right to refuse to provide tests or treatments to patients based on conscientious objection often depend on two premises that are rarely made explicit. The first is that the protection of religious liberty (broadly construed) should be limited to freedom of worship, assembly, and belief. The second is that because professions are licensed by the state, any citizen who practices a licensed profession is required to provide all the goods and services determined by the (...) profession to fall within the scope of practice of that professional specialty and permitted by the state, regardless of any personal religious, philosophical, or moral objection. In this article, I argue that these premises ought to be rejected, and therefore the arguments that depend on them ought also to be rejected. The first premise is incompatible with Locke’s conception of tolerance, which recognizes that fundamental, self-identifying beliefs affect public as well as private acts and deserve a broad measure of tolerance. The second premise unduly (and unrealistically) narrows the discretionary space of professional practice to an extent that undermines the contributions professions ought to be permitted to make to the common good. Tolerance for conscientious objection in the public sphere of professional practice should not be unlimited, however, and the article proposes several commonsense, Lockean limits to tolerance for physician claims of conscientious objection. (shrink)

Pellegrino was there at the beginning of the field. In the 1950s and 60s, before there was a Kennedy Institute of Ethics or a Hastings Center; before the word ‘bioethics’ itself was coined, Pellegrino was writing articles such as "Ethical Considerations in the Practice of Medicine and Nursing," published in 1964. He was among those who started the Society for Health and Human Values—a precursor organization to the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities. He was the founding editor of the (...) Journal of Medicine and Philosophy at a time when the notion that there was a relationship between philosophy and medicine was foreign to both physicians and philosophers. The authors of the articles published in the very .. (shrink)

One major argument against prohibiting euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (PAS) is that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between killing and allowing to die: if we permit patients to die by forgoing life-sustaining treatments, then we also ought to permit euthanasia and PAS. In this paper, the author argues, contra this claim, that it is in fact coherent to differentiate between killing and allowing to die. To develop this argument, the author provides an analysis of Saint Augustine’s distinction between (...) martyrdom and suicide, highlighting the relevance of intention in the assessment of an agent’s actions. As a general matter of ethics, the intentions of agents, not just the outcomes of their actions, matter enormously for drawing distinctions between what is permissible and what is impermissible. Constructing an Augustinian account of this distinction between killing and allowing to die, the author argues that it is coherent to hold that assisted suicide is wrong, while also accepting that it is permissible to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatments. (shrink)

The Beatitudes have long functioned as a cornerstone for spiritualities of nonviolence. In that tradition, this essay explores how active nonviolence, rooted in the hope of the third Matthean beatitude—“Blessed are the meek for they will inherit the earth”—can be understood as a response to the interrelated cries of the earth and the oppressed within history. To concretize the demands of a political ecology of nonviolence, the essay then examines how the legacies of Western extractive colonialism have shaped the contours (...) of the contemporary planetary emergency, an emergency that is social, cultural, economic, and ecological in nature. The essay concludes by considering how the practice of meekness, in response to the interrelated cries of the earth and the oppressed, might be lived out within the contemporary historical moment. (shrink)

Epistemology is a branch of philosophy that studies the origin, nature and limits of human knowledge. Contemporary epistemology is a theory of knowledge in terms of reasons, evidence, justification and explanation. This book shows how Anglo-American philosophers captivated by the power of modern science and concomitant advances in logic and mathematics mistook knowledge itself to be reducible to the propositions of science and logic. Ethics, along with metaphysics and religion, were cast off as mere expressions of sentiment at best, or (...) as utter nonsense at worst. Is science the only source of knowledge? Can ethics count as knowledge? Are there kinds of knowledge beyond epistemology? This book develops innovative answers to these and other related questions. (shrink)

Some secrets are fine to keep to ourselves, and others are not. At first glance, Clark’s secret seems to be fine, but it may not be if we look further into it. We all know Clark’s big secret: he is Superman. Secrets always belong to someone. This is one of the things that distinguish secrets from information we simply don’t have. Secrecy is morally neutral and can be used for good or bad ends. One other closely linked concept we must (...) distinguish from secrecy is privacy. Clark Kent is a citizen (sort of), but Superman is purely a public persona. In Superman, vol. 2, #2 (February 1987), Lex Luthor figured out Superman’s secret. Superman has confided his true identity to the Kents and Lana. In Clark’s case, there are several reasons for his secret, but the most compelling one is to protect his loved ones. (shrink)

This article re-visits the critiques of anthropocentricism levied against John Dewey by his contemporaries and offers a reading of this critique through the lens of nonhuman agency using the theoretical work of Bruno Latour and Jane Bennett, particularly the latter’s coverage of Dewey’s theory of democracy. This work culminates into an argument for envisioning Dewey’s publics as constituted by human and nonhuman bodies, anticipating in some ways the work of contemporary posthumanists and new materialists. This leads us to not only (...) re-think Dewey’s typecasting as unabashedly anthropocentric but also reinvigorates the use value of Dewey’s thinking in the context of contemporary ecological issues. (shrink)

How are we to make theological sense of the Covid-19 pandemic? In response to the viewpoint of Wilhelm Jordaan as expressed in a popular newspaper that it is foolish to understand Covid-19 as God’s punishment or nature’s way for restoration, it is critically argued that Jordaan mostly helps us with what not to think, but not so much with what to think of the current situation from a Christian theological perspective. The theological perspective that is presented in response to Jordaan (...) takes as the vantage point a different interpretative line of an image of God over against more popular and established lines of God images such as God the Almighty. It is argued that the different God image of a ‘silent God’ and the need for wisdom that is prompted by the image challenges us here and now with an invitation to take responsibility for the Covid-19-pandemic before a silent God.Contribution: This article represents original systematic-theological reflection on the doctrine of God and anthropology within contemporary theology-science discourses. It focuses on a Christian biblical neglected God image of a ‘regretting/sorrow God’ in relation to embodied personhood within the current Covid-19 pandemic. It proposes a newly formulated understanding of a ‘silent God’ on the one hand and human self-responsibility and the seeking of wisdom on the other hand. (shrink)

Media coverage and statements by various Catholic spokespersons regarding the case of Terri Schiavo has generated enormous and deeply unfortunate confusion regarding Church teaching about the use of life-sustaining treatments. Two weeks ago, for example, I received a letter from the superior of a community of Missionary Sisters of Charity, who operate a hospice here in the United States The Missionary Sisters of Charity are the community founded by Mother Theresa, the 20th Century saint whose primary ministry was to rescue (...) dying Untouch-ables from the streets of Calcutta and bring them into her convent where they were washed, sheltered, fed if they were able to eat, prayed for, and cherished. In other words, the sisters gave these poor souls the gift of a death with dignity. The order Mother Theresa founded has continued this ministry, running hospices in the United States and elsewhere for the homeless, the destitute, those dying of AIDS and poverty and drug addiction, and all those dying alone and otherwise unwanted. (shrink)

The original position contractarian model of ethical reasoning put forth by John Rawls has been examined as a basis for an environmental ethic on three previous occasions in this journal and in Peter Wenz’s Environmental Justice. In this article, I critically examine each of these treatments, analyzing the proposals offered and identifying their shortcomings. I find a total of seven different proposals in this literature for modifying Rawls’ theory to augment its adequacy or as a ground environmental ethics. The diverse (...) difficulties that arise in attempting to apply Rawls suggest the conclusion that Rawlsian ethics may not be a suitable foundation for an adequate long-term environmental ethics. (shrink)

A culture war has been brewing in Singapore since 2009 when a conservative Christian group conducted a reverse takeover of a feminist civil society organization and was subsequently expelled from the organization in a publicized meeting between the two groups. Since then, the state has mediated the contestation of values between religious conservatives and liberal groups allied around issues of gender and sexuality. The culture war between the two sides has revolved around creative protests that have evaded state prohibitions against (...) public contestations over what is legally considered private beliefs and affairs. They involve innovative hybridizations of American discourses on values and rights mixed with Asian emphases on family traditions and sentiments. The COVID-19 pandemic has, however, laid bare the adaptation of the American culture war into the Singaporean public sphere. This article looks at and analyzes COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy among conservative Christians in Singapore and their incorporation of anti-vaccination views from American Christian nationalism into secular framings, invoking legal rights and responsibilities aligned with the state’s nationalist discourse. I argue that this represents a new phase of contestation by conservatives, refashioning their religious views into secular frames of public good and morality serving the secular nation. By doing so, they implicitly challenge the state’s regulation of religion as private interests and beliefs. This altered religious activism has shifted the terms of secularism and loosened the hegemony of the state in defining these terms. (shrink)

Pellegrino has argued that end-of-life decisions should be based upon the physician's assessment of the effectiveness of the treatment and the patient's assessment of its benefits and burdens. This would seem to imply that conditions for medical futility could be met either if there were a judgment of ineffectiveness, or if the patient were in a state in which he or she were incapable of a subjective judgment of the benefits and burdens of the treatment. I argue that a theory (...) of futility according to Pellegrino would deny that latter but would permit some cases of the former. I call this the circumspect view. I show that Pellegrino would adopt the circumspect view because he would see the medical futility debate in the context of a system of medical ethics based firmly upon a philosophy of medicine. The circumspect view is challenged by those who would deny that one can distinguish objective from subjective medical judgments. I defend the circumspect view on the basis of a previously neglected aspect of the philosophy of medicine -- an examination of varieties of medical judgment. I then offer some practical applications of this theory in clinical practice. (shrink)

Wrestling and arguing with God: between insider and outsider African perspectives -- Introduction to Richard Kearney's intellectual autobiography: where do you come from, Richard Kearney? -- Where I speak from: a short intellectual autobiography -- Phenomenology in South Africa: an indirect encounter with Richard Kearney -- Transcendence and anatheism -- Response to Richard Kearney's Anatheism: Anatheism and holy folly -- Kearney between poles: is too much lost in the middle? -- Strangers, Gods and Africa: in dialogue with Richard Kearney on (...) Otherness -- Approaching the threshold: hospitality as a pedagogical wager in the work of Richard Kearney -- God-talk, the biblical prophets and Richard Kearney -- 'Strange' theology: engaging with Richard Kearney -- Trinitarian theology and Richard Kearney's anatheism: an engagement -- After God but behind the Cross: the procession as a way to re-encounter God in a culture beyond classical liturgy -- Touch gives rise to thought: Paul Ricoeur and Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela on mutual recognition and carnal hermeneutics -- Towards hospitality between enemies -- Across oceans: a conversation on otherness, hospitality and welcoming a strange God. (shrink)

In recent years, dozens of human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) across the globe have begun to advocate for economic and social rights, which represents a significant expansion of the human rights movement. This article investigates a central strategy that NGOs have pursued to realize these rights: legalization. Legalization involves specifying rights as valid legal rules and enforcing them through judicial or quasi-judicial processes. After documenting some of the progress made toward legalization, the article analyzes five unique challenges involved in legalizing (...) economic and social rights. It is important to identify these challenges because they must be overcome if the human rights movement wishes to refute the notion that economic and social rights are inherently non-justiciable (and therefore, to some, invalid as rights). These challenges also point to the possibility that legalization is not the only, or even the best, strategic pathway to realize economic and social rights effectively. (shrink)

Health care has increasingly come to be understood as a commodity. The ethical implications of such an understanding are significant. The author argues that health care is not a commodity because health care (1) is non-proprietary, (2) serves the needs of persons who, as patients, are uniquely vulnerable, (3) essentially involves a special human relationship which ought not be bought or sold, (4) helps to define what is meant by necessity and cannot be considered a commodity when subjected to rigorous (...) conceptual analysis. The Oslerian conception that medicine is a calling and not a business ought to be reaffirmed by both the profession and the public. Such a conception would have significant ramifications for patient care and health care policy. (shrink)

A number of practices at the end of life can causally contribute to diminished consciousness in dying patients. Despite overlapping meanings and a confusing plethora of names in the published literature, this article distinguishes three types of clinically and ethically distinct practices: double-effect sedation, parsimonious direct sedation, and sedation to unconsciousness and death. After exploring the concept of suffering, the value of consciousness, the philosophy of therapy, the ethical importance of intention, and the rule of double effect, these three practices (...) are defined clearly and evaluated ethically. It is concluded that, if one is opposed to euthanasia and assisted suicide, double-effect sedation can frequently be ethically justified, that parsimonious direct sedation can be ethically justified only in extremely rare circumstances in which symptoms have already completely consumed the patient’s consciousness, and that sedation to unconsciousness and death is never justifiable. The special case of sedation for existential suffering is also considered and rejected. (shrink)