When Johann and Daniel Bernoulli founded fluid dynamics they encountered several problems. To go beyond the vision of Newtonian particles, a new set of images was needed in order to deal with the spatial extensibility and lack of form of fluids. I point to evidence that analogy was an essential abductive strategy in the creation of this imagery. But its heuristic behavior is complex: analogy can provide an initial model or proto-model that establishes the starting point of a (...) theoretical process, but it can play other roles as well. The historical genesis analyzed here shows that the participation of analogy in physicists’ creativity is not so restricted and that its richness opens up the field for very different roles and strategies in model-based discovery processes. Analogies can crop up intermittently in the evolution of a theory; and they can cooperate with images, extreme case reasoning and thought experiments, and even activate these processes at origin. Although it may seem that the contributions of analogy are generative in the sense of helping to discover new aspects of reality, we must stress the evaluative function that sometimes is performed by analogical reasoning in order to gain confidence. The study of the Bernoulli’s genesis of the foundations of fluid dynamics generates interesting hypotheses about the multiple roles that analogy can play in scientific model-based reasoning. (shrink)

The necessity of a calculation aiming to evaluate a risk can be revoked in doubt when the question is to make a decision in a situation of uncertainty, all the more when the question is about life or death. In the controversy opened on the opportunity to inoculate the smallpox, D'Alembert’s position constitutes an exemplary case of scepticism concerning the application of the mathematics, and in this particular case the probability theory, to decisions relative to the human life. D’Alembert, indeed, (...) disputes in the social mathematics the power to describe human phenomena by looking for regularities and for formalizations without separating the mathematical and probability dimensions of the philosophic and ethical ones. By following the debate which, in the middle of the 18th century, takes place between the French mathematician and his Swiss counterpart Daniel Bernoulli, we attend one of the episodes of the slow gestation of the notions of risk-taking, decision and rationality. (shrink)

La nécessité d’un calcul ayant pour fin d’estimer un risque peut être révoquée en doute lorsqu’il s’agit de prendre une décision en situation d’incertitude, a fortiori lorsqu’il s’agit d’une question de vie ou de mort. Dans la controverse engagée sur l’opportunité d’inoculer la variole, la position de D’Alembert constitue un cas exemplaire de scepticisme portant sur l’application des mathématiques, et en l’occurrence du calcul des probabilités, à des décisions relatives à la vie humaine. D’Alembert, en effet, conteste aux mathématiques sociales (...) le pouvoir de rendre compte de phénomènes humains en y cherchant des régularités et des formalisations sans dissocier les dimensions mathématiques et probabilistes des dimensions philosophiques et éthiques. En suivant le débat qui, au milieu du xviiie siècle, se déroule entre le mathématicien français et son homologue suisse Daniel Bernoulli, on assiste à l’un des épisodes de la lente gestation des notions de prise de risque, de décision et de rationalité. (shrink)

Modern scholarship on decision behavior dates from the late 1940s. But that scholarship has been preoccupied with two ideas that are much older. One is the notion of expected utility, first articulated in the scholarly literature by Daniel Bernoulli in 1738. In its simplest form, the expected utility concept applies to monetary gambles. Imagine you are asked to choose between two gifts, either gamble G, which you would then play and get either $9 or nothing, or else a (...) simple, direct payment of $3. As shown in the decision tree in figure 10.1, you receive gamble G's $9 payoff if the toss of a fair die yields one or two pips, but you receive nothing otherwise. (In decision trees, choice points are represented by square nodes, chance points by circular nodes.) The expected value or expectation of a gamble is the sum of its payoffs, each weighted (i.e., multiplied) by its probability. Thus, the expected value of G is EV(G) = (1/3)($9) + (2/3)($0) = $3, the same as the direct payment. So, if you generally make decisions like this one so as to maximize expected value, you would be indifferent between the present options. However, if you are like most people, you are not indifferent. Instead, you are risk‐averse, preferring the guaranteed $3. Why? (shrink)

In this paper I offer an account of the normative dimension implicit in D. Bernoulli’s expected utility functions by means of an analysis of the juridical metaphors upon which the concept of mathematical expectation was moulded. Following a suggestion by the late E. Coumet, I show how this concept incorporated a certain standard of justice which was put in question by the St. Petersburg paradox. I contend that Bernoulli would have solved it by introducing an alternative normative criterion (...) rather than a positive model of decision making processes. (shrink)

This chapter defines a quantitative notion of a person’s lifetime wellbeing. It does so on the basis of betterness among uncertain prospects, using expected utility theory and a theorem of John Harsanyi. It adopts the assumption of Daniel Bernoulli that wellbeing is risk-neutral. It gives an account of interpersonal comparisons of wellbeing.

The classical theory of errors can be divided into stochastic and determinate parts, or branches. The birth of the first of therse became inevitable after Bradley's idea of cultivating astronomy and natural science in general by “regular series of observations and experiments” became universally accepted. Such scholars as Lambert, Simpson, Lagrange, Daniel Bernoulli and Euler were responsible for the development of the stochastic theory of errors while Laplace and Gauss completed its construction. About fifty or sixty years ago (...) it was included into mathematical statistics. (shrink)

Many philosophers and some economists value economic equality on the ground that transfers from the relatively rich to the relatively poor increase the utility of the poor more than they reduce the utility of the rich. These philosophers and economists are assuming the ethical principle that a pattern of economic distribution is justified by maximizing aggregate utility. They are also assuming the truth of an empirical generalization proposed in the eighteenth century by Daniel Bernoulli–that successive equal increments of (...) income produce ever-diminishing increments in an individual's level of utility. In the first part of this essay I will argue against Bernoulli's hypothesis, and suggest an alternative view of the relation between income and utility. (shrink)

The evolution of the equation of mass conservation in fluid mechanics is studied. Following early hydraulic approximations, and progress by Daniel and Johann Bernoulli, its first expression as a partial differential equation was achieved by d’Alembert, and soon given definitive form by Euler. Later reworkings by Lagrange, Laplace, Poisson and others advanced the subject, but all based their derivations on the conserved mass of a moving fluid particle. Later, Duhamel and Thomson gave a simpler derivation, by considering mass (...) flow into and out of a fixed portion of space. The later propagation of these derivations in nineteenth-century British textbooks and treatises is also examined, including Maxwell’s on the kinetic theory of gases. (shrink)

Mary is confined to a black-and-white room, is educated through black-and-white books and through lectures relayed on black-and white television. In this way she learns everything there is to know about the physical nature of the world. She knows all the physical facts about us and our environment, in a wide sense of 'physical' which includes everything in completed physics, chemistry, and neurophysiology, and all there is to know about the causal and relational facts consequent upon all this, including of (...) course functional roles. If physicalism is true, she knows all there is to know. For to suppose otherwise is to suppose that there is more to know than every physical fact, and that is just what physicalism denies. … It seems, however, that Mary does not know all there is to know. For when she is let out of the black-and- white room or given a color television, she will learn what it is like to see something red, say. This is rightly described as learning—she will not say “ho, hum.” Hence, physicalism is false. (Jackson 1986, p. 291, Chapter 2, this volume). (shrink)

Metaphysics has undergone two major innovations in recent decades. First, naturalistic metaphysicians have argued that our best science provides an important source of evidence for metaphysical theories. Second, social metaphysicians have begun to explore the nature of social entities such as groups, institutions, and social categories. Surprisingly, these projects have largely kept their distance from one another. Katherine Hawley has recently argued that, unlike the natural sciences, the social sciences are not sufficiently successful to provide evidence about the metaphysical nature (...) of social entities. By contrast, I defend an optimistic view of naturalistic social metaphysics. Drawing on a case study of research into contextual effects in social epidemiology, I show that social science can provide a valuable evidence for social metaphysicians. (shrink)

The process of constructing a social reality where “difference” becomes a social asset rather than a monster that threatens peace and progress must commence with a phenomenological understanding of social interactions within and among human societies. In my opinion, Hegel, more than any other thinker, has constructed a phenomenological framework that adequately captures and represents the nature of group interactions within human societies. This paper explores the Hegelian phenomenon of social identity, and, especially, characterizes the interactions between and among various (...) social identities. It is a modest effort to contribute theoretically to the available discourse on the management of “difference” in multi-ethnic societies. (shrink)

In this dissertation I advance a Jaspersian account of the formation and possession of irrational attitudes. This account stands in opposition to two competing views – externalism and internalism with respect to rational and irrational attitudes. According to externalism, a subject’s attitudes are irrational when they fail to satisfy standards or criteria independent of the subject, such as laws of logic, methods for evidence acquisition, and rules of decision theory. According to internalism, a subject’s attitudes are irrational when they are (...) not supported by reasons selected by the subject. In this dissertation, I take Donald Davidson’s theory of rational and irrational attitudes to be a case of externalism and John Searle’s theory of rational and irrational attitudes to be a case of internalism. While articulating and identifying the merits of externalism and internalism with respect to rational or irrational attitudes, I argue that each account ends up in difficulties: Davidson’s externalism cannot account for the experience of freedom, an individual’s subjectivity, and is unable to avoid an infinite regress of rules; Searle’s internalism struggles to avoid solipsism and an infinite regress of reasons. Karl Jaspers’ account of rational and irrational attitude formation, I argue, avoids the pitfalls of Davidson’s and Searle’s views while preserving the merits of each. On Jaspers’ account, a subject possesses rational attitudes insofar as that subject holds those attitudes to be always open to revision while, at the same time, using those attitudes to bring unity to all manner of phenomena and other attitudes. Irrationality, by contrast, occurs, on the Jaspersian view, when a subject holds onto attitudes with complete and absolute resolution and interprets all else according to these attitudes. Having defined a Jaspersian account of rational and irrational attitudes, I show how it accounts for the irrationality of delusional beliefs and the irrationality of certain worldviews. On Jaspers’ view, I argue, delusions and worldviews are irrational insofar as they are held with absolute conviction, are unamenable to modification, and are used to understand all available evidence, views, and opinions. (shrink)

L’apôtre Paul a la réputation d’être un théologien performant dans l’argumentation, plus enclin à la rationalité qu’aux envols extatiques. Or, un examen attentif de sa correspondance fait apparaître la présence d’expériences religieuses, que l’apôtre raconte, et que l’on ne peut hésiter à appeler mystiques. Les signes sont discrets, mais indéniables: parler en langues, guérisons charismatiques, extases, visions. L’enquête de Daniel Marguerat fait l’inventaire de ces expériences, mettant en évidence l’interprétation qu’en donne l’apôtre. On ira jusqu’à parler d’une subversion de (...) l’expérience mystique chez Paul. (shrink)

In _The Smile of Tragedy_, Daniel Ahern examines Nietzsche’s attitude toward what he called “the tragic age of the Greeks,” showing it to be the foundation not only for his attack upon the birth of philosophy during the Socratic era but also for his overall critique of Western culture. Through an interpretation of “Dionysian pessimism,” Ahern clarifies the ways in which Nietzsche sees ethics and aesthetics as inseparable and how their theoretical separation is at the root of Western nihilism. (...) Ahern explains why Nietzsche, in creating this precursor to a new aesthetics, rejects Aristotle’s medicinal interpretation of tragic art and concentrates on Apollinian cruelty as a form of intoxication without which there can be no art. Ahern shows that Nietzsche saw the human body as the vessel through which virtue and art are possible, as the path to an interpretation of “selflessness,” as the means to determining an order of rank among human beings, and as the site where ethics and aesthetics coincide. (shrink)

My dissertation is a systematic defense of the moral relevance of alternative possibilities. As such, it constitutes an attack on semi-compatibilism. ;To begin, then, I defend alternative possibilities against three related but independent lines of criticism. The most prominent of these is Harry Frankfurt's now famous counterexample strategy in which cases are constructed that purport to show that a person can, in fact, be responsible even when he cannot do otherwise. Another line of criticism is John Fischer's "flicker of freedom" (...) argument, which builds on Frankfurt-type argumentation by challenging the "robustness" of alternative possibilities. Finally, some recent critics of alternative possibilities have developed "reasons-responsiveness" accounts of moral responsibility that seem further to invalidate the importance of the power to do otherwise. By extending traditional concerns and developing new objections, I argue that room remains for the possible relevance of an alternative possibilities condition on moral responsibility. ;I try to make a positive case for the plausibility of relevance by offering reasons to think that the ability to do otherwise plays an important role in our moral life. Alternatives are important, I argue, because giving up a "freedom to do otherwise" condition would put us in an epistemic bind with respect to our responsibility. That is, the kind of confidence we ordinarily have in our own moral responsibility would be unjustified if it turned out that we do not have alternatives. A second consideration in favor of the relevance of alternatives is distinctively moral. I explore and exploit the relationship between the ability to do otherwise and the putatively Kantian idea that "ought" implies "can," concluding that the semi-compatibilist must either reject both alternative possibilities and the Kantian thesis, or accept that people would not be blameworthy for their moral failures under determinism. Neither option is attractive. ;I conclude, then, that there is good reason to believe that alternative possibilities are necessary for moral responsibility and that semi-compatibilism should be rejected. Our intuitions about the importance of being able to do otherwise can still factor into the traditional arguments to the conclusion that moral responsibility is incompatible with causal determinism. (shrink)

Much of contemporary philosophy of mind is dominated by the intersection of three topics: physicalism, the conceivability argument, and the necessary a posteriori. I will be concerned here to describe the consensus view of these topics; to explain why I think this account is mistaken; and to briefly sketch an alternative.

The general knowledge of Brentano's ethical doctrines comes from the little book of his, Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, first published in 1889. Only the recent publications and the insight into his not yet published correspondence throw more light on the history of his axiology.

Analytic epistemology is traditionally interested in rational reconstructions of cognitive pro- cesses. The purpose of these rational reconstructions is to make plain how a certain cognitive process might eventually result in knowledge or justi?ed beliefs, etc., if we pre-theoretically think that we have such knowledge or such justi?ed beliefs. Typically a rational reconstruction assumes some unproblematic basis of knowledge and some justi?cation-preserving inference pattern and then goes on to show how these two su ce to generate the explicandum.

I first examine Origen’s notion of nature as personal, and secondly a modern presentation of the same theme by Erazim Kohak. I then consider possible scientific support given to both these authors’ accounts by Lovejoy. I conclude that there are many strengths in viewing nature as a whole as both divine and personal.

I try to clarify the ways in which one would seek to hold that language and/or thought are public. For each of these theses, I distinguish four forms in which they can be framed, and two ways of establishing them. The first will try to make the publicity of thought follow from that of language; the second will try to make the publicity of language follow from that of thought. I show that none of these strategies can do without the (...) thesis that language and thought are interdependent, and that even while admitting this thesis, the second strategy presents more difficulties than the first. (shrink)